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Biodiversity has been the goal of conservation for thirty years but recent work by 
biodiversity eliminativists has raised serious challenges to its suitability as the primary 
goal of conservation. This project groups those challenges into three major arguments: the 
conceptual case for biodiversity’s elimination, the empirical case for biodiversity’s 
elimination, and the value compass case for biodiversity’s elimination. Aside from 
discussing biodiversity as a property, this thesis will also discuss biodiversity as a concept 
(as in biodiversity), and refer to the word biodiversity (as in ‘biodiversity’). In the 
conceptual case for biodiversity’s elimination, eliminativists argue that biodiversity 
misdirects the efforts of conservation and is not a scientifically coherent concept. In the 
empirical case, eliminativists argue that biodiversity is not operationalisable. In the value 
compass case, eliminativists argue that biodiversity does not reliably track biological 
value. I will argue that all three cases for biodiversity’s elimination are unsuccessful. 
Biodiversity is a complex concept with multiple dimensions of biological diversities but 
understanding it as a homeostatic property cluster avoids the conceptual case for its 
elimination. The empirical case is unsuccessful because the surrogacy strategy for 
measuring biodiversity can be defended against its limitations and the expanding 
multiplicity of biodiversity measures is overblown. The value compass case is correct 
about the inability of biodiversity to track pluralistic biological value, but for the wrong 
reasons. Biodiversity is not a reliable compass for pluralistic biological value because 
there are no reliable compasses for pluralistic biological value. However, biological value 
is distinct from conservation normativity—understood as what conservationists ought to 
do—and biodiversity is an excellent guide to conservation normativity. This makes 
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Introduction  
I Opening Remarks 
Biodiversity is an important goal of conservation.1 It has been an environmental priority 
for over three decades but recently several authors have argued that it should be eliminated 
as the goal of conservation. Carlos Santana, Paul Angermeier, and James Karr build on the 
critical discussion of biodiversity to argue that it is the wrong goal for conservation. 
Conservation goals should be scientifically rigorous. As a concept ‘biodiversity’ should 
have a clear meaning and as a property biodiversity should be adequately measureable and 
able to reliably track the goals of conservation. Biodiversity eliminativists argue that 
biodiversity does not meet these requirements. 
 
Recent work in the philosophy of biology has attempted to clarify and defend the use of the 
biodiversity concept in conservation science. I argue against these views, and give reasons to think 
that the biodiversity concept is a poor fit for the role we want it to play in conservation biology on 
both empirical and conceptual grounds. (Santana 2014, 761) 
 
Our review of current conceptions of integrity and diversity indicates that resource policy would be 
most effective if based on the more comprehensive goal of protecting biological integrity. Specific 
policy shifts related to that goal include a reliance on preventive rather than reactive management 
and a focus on landscapes rather than populations. We draw heavily from our experience with 
aquatic systems, but our conclusions apply equally to terrestrial systems. (Angermeier and Karr 
1994, 690) 
 
Criticism is essential to the empirical reputation of science. The evidence we 
collect gives weight to our theories, but criticism decides if a theory should be entertained 
or rejected. Rejection is rarely immediate because most theories can be adapted in the face 
of small criticisms. One of the reasons for the success of science is that it treats all its 
theories as corrigible in the light of future experience. When there is a counterexample to 
an existing theory critical debate decides if the theory should adapt to the new evidence or 
be eliminated in favour of a new theory. Science has the empirical reputation that it does 
because it respects and invites criticism. Theories which survive that criticism are made 
stronger. 
This project will discuss biodiversity as a concept, a word, and a property. In this 
thesis italics will indicate a concept, single quotes will mention a word and standard type 
face will indicate the property. So, Carlos Santana wants to eliminate biodiversity from its 
role in conservation because he argues that ‘biodiversity’ has no clear meaning and he 
doubts that biodiversity exists. Biodiversity eliminativists have collectively presented 
serious criticisms of biodiversity as a goal for conservation. The critical debate will decide 
                                                 
1 Throughout this thesis I will use ‘goal of conservation’ as shorthand for the complex relation between 
conservation and its possible targets. Biodiversity is the goal of conservation in the sense that 
conservationists wish to preserve as much biodiversity as possible. However, it is also the goal of 
conservation in the senses that: it is the current theoretical focus of conservation efforts, that it is an 
empirical measure of the success of conservation, and that it is a means to the end of maximising biological 
value. It is these roles in conservation, for which I defend biodiversity. 
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if biodiversity should be adapted to its counterexamples or eliminated in favour of a 
different goal for conservation.  
 
II Eliminativism about Biodiversity  
Biodiversity eliminativism is a criticism of the continued adaptations of biodiversity to its 
counterexamples. ‘Biodiversity’ is a short hand for biological diversity and was coined as 
a term for the accelerating rate of species extinction during the modern period (Takacs 
1996, 37). But it is better for a group of species to be thriving than critically endangered so 
biodiversity should also take abundance into account. An additional species of moth adds 
fewer novel features to a group of moths than an ancient species of lizard, so biodiversity 
should also consider the evolutionary relationships species bear to one another. These 
adaptations still overlook the important functional roles of species and interactions 
between them so biodiversity should also include functional diversity. As a concept 
biodiversity has adapted many times to include important biological elements but that 
process of continued adaptation has had implications for its conceptualisation, 
operationalisability, and its relationship with biological value. 
 Where biodiversity’s defenders believe these adaptations to be important 
improvements to the goal of conservation, biodiversity eliminativists believe that the 
concept has stretched to breaking point. As a concept they argue that ‘biodiversity’ 
misleads conservation efforts and has no clear meaning. As an empirical target for 
conservation Santana argues that biodiversity is not operationalisable. As a compass to 
biological value they argue that it prioritises the wrong elements for conservation and 
cannot explain why conservation preserves the elements which it does. Taken collectively, 
their criticisms of biodiversity raise serious concerns about the suitability of biodiversity as 
the goal of conservation. They argue that it ought to be eliminated as the goal of 
conservation. 
 
III Why a Defence of Biodiversity Is Important   
A defence of biodiversity is required for three reasons: to answer the criticisms of 
biodiversity eliminativists, to establish an argument for the success of biodiversity as a 
goal of conservation, and to maintain the effectiveness of environmental policy. Firstly, a 
defence of biodiversity is required in response to the arguments for its elimination. 
Biodiversity eliminativists have raised serious criticisms. They deserve a serious response. 
Secondly, there are currently few standard defences for biodiversity in the literature. With 
the exception of the recent publication by Burch-Brown and Archer (2017), the suitability 
of biodiversity as the goal conservation is often presumed rather than justified. There is 
interesting work on what biodiversity is, on the ability of surrogates to track biodiversity, 
and the relationship between biodiversity and biological value, but there are few standard 
defences of biodiversity.  
Thirdly, eliminating biodiversity will have a serious impact on environmental 
policy world-wide. Aside from the many legal changes which would be required, the target 
of conservation has gone through a number of changes. Once it was the balance of nature, 
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then it was wilderness, then it was species number, and now it is biodiversity (Takacs 
1996, 11). Because conservation asks people to sacrifice resources, it risks becoming 
unpopular with the people whose help it needs. Prematurely eliminating biodiversity will 
exacerbate that risk because biodiversity has only been our goal for three decades. 
Eliminating biodiversity calls into question the sacrifices which people have made to 
conserve biodiversity. It would also happen at a time when conservation needs support the 
most. The solutions to climate change, pollution, and the depletion of our natural resources 
are tenable but they are utterly reliant on the cooperation of human beings. These are three 
good reasons why academic literature will benefit from a defence of and the conservation 
of biodiversity against biodiversity eliminativism. 
 
IV What I Will Argue in This Project 
The aim of this project is to answer the criticisms of biodiversity eliminativists whilst 
providing a standard defence for biodiversity as the goal of conservation which is available 
to both biodiversity realists and instrumentalists. This project will discuss biodiversity as a 
concept, a word, and a property. Italics indicate a concept such as biodiversity. Single 
quotes mention a word such as ‘biodiversity’. Standard typeface indicates a property such 
as biodiversity. This thesis will answer the criticisms of biodiversity eliminativists by 
grouping them into three categories; the conceptual case for elimination, the empirical case 
for elimination, and the ‘value compass’ case for elimination. 
In chapter one I will discuss conceptual issues with biodiversity and outline the 
case for its elimination. I outline the different meanings of ‘biodiversity’ before using the 
diversity of meanings to motivate the conceptual case for eliminativism. I outline 
Angermeier and Karr’s argument that a lack of meaning hampers both conservation efforts 
and Santana’s meaning-dilemma argument. I justify both horns of Santana’s meaning-
dilemma that specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ have counterexamples but general 
meanings are uninformative. In chapter two I will respond to the conceptual case for 
biodiversity’s elimination. I discuss the recent response to Santana by Burch-Brown and 
Archer before developing an overlooked possibility that biodiversity can be understood as 
a homeostatic property cluster. I outline a conception of biodiversity as a homeostatic 
property cluster and argue that its ability to address the species problem sets an important 
precedent for the biodiversity problem. In chapter three I will argue that the conceptual 
case for elimination is unsuccessful if biodiversity is a homeostatic property cluster. An 
HPC conception of biodiversity reduces misdirection in conservation efforts and avoids 
Santana’s meaning-dilemma because it is both a general and informative meaning for 
‘biodiversity’. I also discuss other reasons to retain biodiversity even if it is uninformative. 
 In chapter four I will outline the surrogacy strategy for measuring biodiversity and 
the empirical case for its elimination. I group Santana’s empirical reasons for eliminating 
biodiversity into the empirical poor fit argument and argue that it has been unintentionally 
motivated by biodiversity conservationists who emphasise the growing multiplicity of 
biodiversity measures. I then categorise Santana’s objections as limitations generated by 
either incommensurability or the use of multiple surrogates. I reply to both limitations 
before I argue that the empirical case is misrepresenting the state of biodiversity measures. 
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I argue that the apparent limitations of the surrogacy strategy are advantages and that 
familiarity with the methodological detail of its surrogates makes it clearer that 
biodiversity is operationalisable.  
In chapter five I will continue my empirical defence of biodiversity by outlining the 
methodological detail of three measurement surrogates: species richness, species diversity, 
and phylogenetic diversity. I use the methodological detail to argue that all three 
surrogates are operationalisable and that the apparent expanding multiplicity of 
biodiversity measures is overblown. In chapter six I will conclude my empirical defence of 
biodiversity by outlining the methodological detail of two measurement surrogates: 
theoretical morphology and functional diversity. I argue that the methodological detail 
indicates that neither surrogate is operationalisable. I use the arguments from chapter four 
and the methodological detail from chapters five and six to argue that the empirical case 
for biodiversity’s elimination is unsuccessful because biodiversity is operationalisable.  
In chapter seven I will outline the value compass case for biodiversity’s 
elimination. The value compass case treats the goal of conservation as a compass which 
ought to point towards biological value. Santana, Angermeier, and Karr argue that as a 
compass for conservation, biodiversity is not a reliable guide to biological value. The 
focus of chapter seven is identifying the type of value which eliminativists appeal to in 
their examples. I consider whether the value compass case for elimination is appealing to 
instrumental value, intrinsic value, or a different kind of non-anthropocentric value. I 
argue that the value compass case actually appeals to pluralistic biological value and that 
eliminativists’ examples equivocate on the meaning of ‘value’. In chapter eight I will adapt 
the value compass case to use pluralistic biological value as the goal which biodiversity is 
intended to track. I then argue that it is unsuccessful for three reasons. There are problems 
with using pluralistic biological value as the minimum standard for a conservation goal.  
Furthermore, there are still good reasons to retain biodiversity even if is not a reliable 
value compass and the value compass case conflates biological value with normativity. 
Having successfully defended biodiversity against the conceptual, empirical, and value 





1 Conceptual Issues with Biodiversity and the Case for 
Its Elimination 
1.1 Introduction 
The nature of biodiversity is controversial because we need the concept to be 
operationalisable for conservation but also to encompass all the important elements of the 
environment that conservationists want to protect. ‘Biodiversity’ itself is a young term 
with an age of more than 30 years and whilst it was initially coined in response to the rapid 
extinction rate of species, its meaning grew to encompass multiple other valuable 
dimensions of the environment. In section 1.4 I will discuss the many specific dimensions 
of biodiversity such as phylogeny, genetics, functionality, and a holistic view of 
ecosystems. The combination of specific biological dimensions and generalisations has 
created a lack of consensus in biology about what biodiversity actually is. That is 
problematic because the goal of conservation is to preserve biodiversity and it is difficult 
to preserve something when you cannot identify what it is. The problem is severe enough 
that some authors have argued we should replace or eliminate biodiversity. Angermeier 
and Karr both argue that the conceptual issues mislead conservation efforts so biological 
integrity is a more suitable goal (Angermeier 2000, 375; Karr 1993, 298). Santana believes 
that we should eliminate the concept entirely and presents a sophisticated meaning-
dilemma argument (Santana 2017, 86). Specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ have multiple 
counterexamples and general meanings are uninformative so we should eliminate the 
concept from academic discourse. 
In this chapter I will discuss conceptual issues with biodiversity and outline the 
case for its elimination. I start with a discussion of the multiple ways in which 
‘biodiversity’ is used. The term was coined in 1986 so I begin with its analytic use as 
shorthand for ‘biological diversity’, in response to the species crisis. Next I present an 
account of the sociological project of David Takacs who surveyed academics for a one-
sentence definition of ‘biodiversity’ (Takacs 1996, 46–50). I group these multiple 
meanings into general and specific categories before discussing the contesting uses of 
‘biodiversity’ in modern academia. I then outline Sarkar’s deflationary meaning of 
‘biodiversity’ as the relation used to prioritise conservation efforts. Next I use this 
evidence of multiple meanings to motivate the argument for eliminating biodiversity. I 
discuss Angermeier and Karr’s concerns that the conceptual confusion misleads 
conservation goals, and I outline Santana’s meaning-dilemma argument for eliminating 
biodiversity. I motivate his argument by discussing the two horns of his dilemma: specific 
meanings have multiple counterexamples but general meanings of ‘biodiversity’ are 
uninformative. I conclude that the eliminativist case is compelling and that my strategy in 
chapters two and three will be to deny the second horn of the dilemma. In those chapters I 
will argue that conceptions of biodiversity can be both general and informative.  
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1.2 The Multiple Uses of ‘Biodiversity’ 
In this section I will discuss the multiple uses of ‘biodiversity’ in academia to highlight the 
conceptual debate over its nature. I begin with a brief account of the term’s inception 
before its rise to popularity. Then I outline the work of David Takacs, whose book The 
Idea of Biodiversity: Philosophies of Paradise provides a comprehensive sociological 
account of the uses and meanings of ‘Biodiversity’ (Takacs 1996). I use Takacs’ 
sociological account to draw a distinction between specific and general meanings of 
‘biodiversity’. Specific meanings narrowly conceive of biodiversity along a single 
dimension such as species richness or phylogeny whereas general meanings conceive of 
biodiversity along multiple dimensions. Next I apply this distinction to modern uses of 
‘biodiversity’ discussing Sarkar’s deflationary meaning of ‘biodiversity’. Sarkar’s 
meaning is distinct in that it reduces biodiversity to the ranking procedure for places and 
because he uses the conceptual debate to justify his deflationary account. Sarkar is not a 
biodiversity eliminativist but his strategy is the template for biodiversity eliminativism. 
Santana argues that the conceptual controversy leads to deflationary accounts which justify 
eliminating biodiversity all together (Santana 2014, 765). 
 
1.2.1 Meanings in the 80s and 90s 
Although the origins of ‘biodiversity’ are a point of contention among some, Takacs and 
Sarkar credit the term’s creation to Walter G. Rosen, who coined the term as shorthand for 
‘biological diversity’ (Takacs 1996, 37; Sarkar and Margules 2002, 131). Rosen noticed 
that a concern which frequently came up at conferences at the National Academy of 
Science was the frequency of extinctions and what this meant for biological diversity. 
Rosen suggested having a forum on “Biodiv . . . Biological Diversity”, and so the national 
forum on Biodiversity and the term itself were created (Takacs 1996, 36). 
‘Biodiversity’ captured many intuitions about the target of conservation efforts. 
During 1988 ‘biodiversity’ never appeared as a key word in biological abstracts but 
‘biological diversity’ appeared once. By 1993 those numbers had substantially increased 
and ‘biodiversity’ appeared 72 times in biological abstracts compared to 19 times for 
‘biological diversity’ (Takacs 1996, 39). Some of this increase may be due to the inflation 
in the number of publications as total numbers of academics increased but the evidence 
shows that academia quickly adopted the term. A Google Ngram viewer can track use 
frequency for individual terms and produce a graph of term use frequency (indicated along 










Figure 1.1: Comparative Use Frequency of ‘Biological Diversity’ and ‘Biodiversity’ Over 
Time (Google Ngram, 2015) 
 
While ‘biological diversity’ appeared in the sixties it did not take off until after the 
popularity of ‘biodiversity’ surged in the late 1980s following the National Forum of 
Biodiversity, which was held from 21st to the 24th of September in 1986 (Takacs 1996, 38). 
By 2000 ‘biodiversity’ has clearly emerged as the preferred term. The popularity of 
‘biodiversity’ is most likely due to its flexible meaning. The useful thing about 
‘biodiversity’ is that it can refer to both a very specific aspect of biological life such as the 
number of species in a local ecosystem or it can refer to the entire ecosystem itself (Takacs 
1996, 52). This flexibility means that ‘biodiversity’ captures a multiplicity of intuitions 
about conservation but could also lead one to be sceptical about its meaning.  
David Takacs discuss the conceptual development of the meaning of ‘biodiversity’, 
going into the term’s invention, history, and many uses with some detail. In his research 
Takacs asked several notable academics for a brief definition of ‘biodiversity’ (Takacs 
1996, 46). Below are some of the responses which he received. 
 
The standard definition is species diversity, and then diversity of communities or habitats that the 
species combine into, and then, on the other side of the scale, the genetic diversity that the species 
are comprised of. — Peter Brussard  
 
I don’t have a definition of ‘biodiversity’. I’ve tried very hard to stay away from formal definitions. 
When I deal with it in the journal [conservation biology] . . . it obviously means to some people 
species diversity; other people expand that to include populations. To other people it means really 
genetic diversity, heterozygosity, allelic diversity, often within populations. To many people, it 
means variety of ecosystems or ecosystem types, landscape types. Obviously its all of those things. 
— David Ehrenfeld 
 
To me, biodiversity is the living resources of the planet. — Paul Ehrlich  
 
Biodiversity is the total number of genetic lineages on earth. I just made that up; if I think about it, 







. . .It is the sum of earth species including all their interactions and variations within their biotic and 
abiotic environment in both space and time. — Terry Erwin  
 
I think of it as fundamentally a measure of difference. And the most important aspect of the 
definition for me is that it exists at many different levels of biological organization, even though we 
tend as mental habit to focus most on species diversity. . . So I guess I would describe it as the 
dimension of difference at multiple levels of organization. — Donald Falk  
 
Biodiversity is the complete array of organisms, biologically mediated processes, and organically 
derived structure out there on the globe. — Jerry Franklin 
 
I guess . . . ‘biodiversity’ to me means importance: which areas do we have to concentrate on, or 
which groups are more important in terms of preserving than others. — Vickie Funk  
 
Well it’s just the diversity of living things on the face of the earth. — Hugh Iltis 
 
The whole package of genes, populations, species, and the cluster of interactions that they manifest. 
— Daniel Janzen  
 
The variations or the variability or the variety of living organisms . . . which includes intraspecific 
variation. . .You’re looking at the community level, you’re looking at ecosystem level, at landscape 
level, and so on. — K.C. Kim  
 
The term is really supposed to mean diversity at all levels of organization. But the way its most 
often used is basically relating to species diversity. — Thomas Lovejoy  
 
Biodiversity encompasses the number, the variability, and the variety of life on Earth . .  at three 
levels of biological organization: genetic, species, and ecosystem. — Jane Lubchenco  
 
The total biotic diversity as indicated by the number of species and genetic diversity they 
encompass. — S. J. Mcnaughton  
 
Well, ‘biodiversity’, to me is shorthand for all the richness of life. — Reed Noss  
 
‘Biodiversity’ is a very comprehensive term which reflects the diversity of living organisms at all 
levels, from . . . populational—genetic and geographical—diversity to species, to lineages, and 
highger taxonomic categories, to ecological systems. — Gordon Orians  
 
The term ‘biodiversity’ really focuses on the mix of species or diversity. — David Pimentel  
 
The sum total of plants, animals, fungi, and microorganisms in the world including their genetic 
diversity and the way in which they fit together into communities and ecosystems. — Peter Raven  
 
What we’re looking at in biodiversity is the history of biology, the history of life in all its forms 
over the entire time it’s existed on our planet. . .And one of the things I think it should not be seen 
as . . . is just an accounting of the number of species — G. Carelton Ray  
 
I’d rather not [try to define biodiversity] . . . biodiversity is something that occurs at a community 
level, at a species level, you know that it’s genetic as well as—whatever. — Walter Rosen  
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The short way [to define biodiversity] is the best. And it’s life in all of its dimensions and richness 
and manifestations, not only at the level of individuals and species, but at the level of aggregation, 
communities, or what have you. — Michael Soule  
 
Biodiversity is the variety of life across all levels of organization from genic diversity within 
populations, to species, which have to be regarded as the pivotal unit of classification, to 
ecosystems. — E. O. Wilson  
 
I take a very holistic view of biodiversity. It’s made up of individuals that make up populations that 
make up species. —  David Woodruff  (Takacs 1996, 46–50) 
 
These definitions indicate two things. Firstly, while academics differ in their 
concepts of biodiversity, the responses can be grouped into two distinct categories. 
Franklin, Soule, Noss, Wilson and Woodruff etc are using ‘biodiversity’ in a very general 
sense. They take ‘biodiversity’ to mean the variety of life, the richness of life, or the 
complete array of organisms which make it up. This broadly captures what biodiversity is 
but seems too general to be operationisable. Contrast this with some of the more specific 
accounts provided by Brussard, Eisner, Janzen, and Raven. Biodiversity is species 
diversity, the number of genetic lineages, the package of genes, populations, and species, 
or the sum total of plants, animals, fungi and microorganisms. These distinct categories 
indicate that while there is disagreement about the meaning of ‘biodiversity’ there is 
enough overlap to ensure that the problem of what ‘biodiversity’ means is not intractable. 
These two categories form the basis of my distinction between general and specific 
meanings. Specific meanings of biodiversity identify it with a single dimension whereas 
general meanings identify it with multiple dimensions. However, during this chapter it will 
benefit the project to bear in mind the response of David Ehrenfeld who doesn’t have a 
definition of ‘biodiversity’ because “Obviously it’s all of those things.” (Ehrenfeld in 
Takacs 1996, 46). 
Secondly, these responses suggest that some kind of species count is central to the 
meaning of ‘biodiversity’. A count of species is frequently mentioned as part of 
biodiversity in this survey of well-known conservationists and biologists.2  These one-
sentence definitions indicate two important areas of agreement: biodiversity has something 
to do with species counting but it is also a mistake to reduce biodiversity down to nothing 






                                                 
2 More precisely: Peter Brussard, David Ehrenfeld, Terry Erwin, Donald Falk, Daniel Janzen, 
Thomas Lovejoy, Jane Lubchenco, S. J. Mcnaughton, Gordon Orians, David Pimentel, Peter 
Raven, Walter Rosen, Michael Soule, E. O. Wilson, and David Woodruff.  G. Carelton Ray is 
omitted from this list because he insisted that biodiversity should absolutely not be a mere 
accounting of species.   
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Some Meanings of ‘Biodiversity’ 
In the General Sense In the Specific Sense 
variation of biological life 
value of the natural world 
the local ecosystem 
evolutionary history of biological life 
. . . et al 
number of species 
population levels 
number of unique genes 
total interactions between organisms 
. . . et al 
 
Table 1.1: Some of the Different Meanings of ‘Biodiversity’ 
 
Table 1.1 separates the general meanings of ‘biodiversity’ such as the total 
variation of biological life from its specific meanings such as the number of unique species 
or genes in a local ecosystem. There are some meanings which are resistant to 
categorisation in this framework. Dimensions of biodiversity such as the interactions 
between organisms and the evolutionary history of biological life seems prima facie like a 
general concept, but work on phylogenetics and the tree of life suggest that this could also 
be taken as a specific meaning of ‘biodiversity’ (Faith 1994). This table does not contain 
all meanings of ‘biodiversity’. There are other accounts of what biodiversity is, such as 
morphology and phylogenetic diversity (PD) which I will discuss in later chapters. The 
meanings listed above are simply examples intended to show that the meanings of 
‘biodiversity’ broadly sit into two categories. 
I say ‘broadly’ because the distinction between general and specific meanings is 
vague rather than a sharp one. Specific meanings have a tendency to focus on one or two 
dimensions of biodiversity whereas general meanings incorporate as many dimensions of 
biological interest as possible. This leaves room for meanings of ‘biodiversity’ which 
occupy a middle ground in that they capture multiple dimensions of biodiversity but 
exclude others. The categories of ‘general’ and ‘specific’ meanings of biodiversity are 
intended to provide a framework for sorting and analysing the many different ways that 
‘biodiversity’ may be understood. In the next section I will discuss meanings of 
‘biodiversity’ which appear to occupy a middle ground between general and specific. I will 
argue that whilst there are meanings of ‘biodiversity’ which occupy vague ground on this 
distinction, there are good reasons to think that they tend to lean towards general or 
specific meanings. I return to this issue in section 1.3.2 in which I motivate Santana’s 
meaning-dilemma argument that relies on this distinction. 
A final point of interest with this framework is that while the general senses seem 
to do a better job of capturing all the aspects of biodiversity, the specific meanings are 
much easier to quantify and measure. This is the first major indication of separation 
between what biodiversity is and what is measured. This problem will be discussed in the 
chapters on measurement. In the next section I will apply this distinction to modern uses of 
‘biodiversity’. Takacs’ work was completed over 20 years ago which amounts to nearly 
half the age of ‘biodiversity’ itself, given that it was coined in 1986 (Takacs 1996, 36). In 
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the next subsection I will extend Takacs’ method to examples from academic papers and 
discuss whether my distinction can accommodate the more recent uses of ‘biodiversity’. 
 
1.2.2 General and Specific Meanings in Academia 
In this section I will apply my distinction between general and specific meanings of 
‘biodiversity’ to modern uses in academia. I will present textual evidence from a paper and 
then discuss its implications for my distinction. I begin with two biodiversity eliminativists 
Angermeier and Karr who have jointly agreed on the following conception of biodiversity. 
 
One of the first formal definitions of biological diversity termed it "the variety and variability 
among living organisms and the ecological complexes in which they occur" (OTA 1987, p. 3). In 
addition, because "items are organized at many [biological] levels," biodiversity "encompasses 
different ecosystems, species, genes, and their relative abundance". (Angermeier and Karr 1994, 
690–91) 
 
This quote from Angermeier and Karr is a good example of how authors attempt to 
incorporate both general and specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ into their discussions. The 
total variability and interactions of living organisms is a general conception but the authors 
also mention more specific variation at lower structural levels in an ecosystem. The 
authors state that biodiversity encompasses species and genes etc because items are 
organized at many biological levels. Following this line of thought, a general meaning of 
‘biodiversity’ encompasses the more specific ones. The planet’s natural resources include 
species diversity. 
‘Biodiversity’ is often defined as “the variety of all forms of life, from genes to 
species, through to the broad scale of ecosystems” (Faith 2008). In this quote Faith 
outlines biodiversity as the “variety of all forms of life”. This particular quote is from the 
introductory section of the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy’s article on biodiversity. 
Hence, it is a thoroughly general conception of biodiversity which means the variety of all 
forms of life. Faith’s personal view of biodiversity is more specific. 
 
One link is apparent from recent work on phylogenetic diversity that incorporates probabilistic 
estimates of vulnerability into PD [Phylogenetic Diversity] calculations (Witting & Loeschke 
1995). Phylogenetic and vulnerability criteria then do not conflict but together determine overall 
"expected" feature diversity (Weitzman 1992; Faith & Walker 1995a). (Faith 1996, 1286) 
 
In this paper, Faith approximates biodiversity by performing a phylogenetically informed 
species count. It is a specific conception of biodiversity because it narrowly conceives of it 
along a single dimension: phylogenetic diversity. Contrast this with the general conception 
put forward by Maclaurin and Sterelny. 
 
We have argued for a multidimensional view of biodiversity, though without (of course!) 
identifying all the dimensions, or specifying their relations one to another. We have done so mostly 




Maclaurin and Sterelny hesitate to give a precise account of biodiversity. Instead they 
identify a strong core of species richness in biodiversity but acknowledge that such a core 
is not enough in and of itself because biodiversity also requires dimensions of disparity, a 
phylogenetic bias, and consideration of functions and ecosystems (Maclaurin and Sterelny 
2008, 174).  
This example is important because the authors are appealing to both general and 
specific conceptions of biodiversity. Whilst the authors argue for a multidimensional view 
of biodiversity they also argue that it has a core concept of species richness. Authors find a 
middle ground between general and specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ by either 
identifying the general meaning with a specific dimension or by arguing that a specific 
dimension approximates more general features of biodiversity. The strategy of identifying 
a main dimension of biodiversity and employing a specific dimension to represent values 
from other dimensions is a reoccurring theme in the literature. Maclaurin and Sterelny 
understand biodiversity as species richness supplemented with phylogenetic diversity 
whilst others such as Grenyer use a single dimension as a proxy for biodiversity. 
 
Phylogenetic diversity (PD) is a biodiversity index that measures the length of evolutionary 
pathways that connect a given set of taxa. PD therefore identifies sets of taxa that maximize the 
accumulation of ‘feature diversity’. (Grenyer et al. 2007, 757) 
 
In this multi-authored paper the writers explain their phylogenetically informed species 
richness account of biodiversity. Broadly construed, phylogenetics is the practice of 
analysing biological organisms in terms of their evolutionary history (Maclaurin and 
Sterelny 2008, 139). By aiming to maximise phylogenetic diversity we aim to preserve as 
much of the tree of life as possible. In this example the authors use phylogenetic diversity 
as the main dimension of biodiversity to also represent other dimensions such as feature 
diversity. 
 
In the present paper we describe how to estimate the expected loss of biodiversity. This is done by 
combining a phylogenetic evaluation with the degree of vulnerability to a species (its probability to 
become extinct). (Witting and Loeschcke 1995, 205) 
 
In this quote it first appears that Loeschcke and Witting are another example of authors 
who mean some notion of phylogenetic diversity when they use ‘biodiversity’, but a closer 
reading of their work indicates a more specific understanding.  
 
Hence, the probability of losing the unique information that is common to two species is the product 
of the extinction probabilities of the two species (assuming independent extinction events). Figure 
l(b) shows how to calculate the number of unique genes that is expected to be lost from the species 
shown in Fig. 1 (a). (Witting and Loeschcke 1995, 205 emphasis added)  
 
The authors are arguing that biodiversity conservation can be optimised by minimising the 
unique genetic information which is lost, so they understand biodiversity specifically as 
genetic diversity. It is also another example of authors using a single dimension of 
biodiversity to represent other dimensions of biodiversity such as evolutionary history. 
13 
These authors are also approximating a general conception of biodiversity with a specific 
one. 
Applying the distinction between general and specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ to 
modern uses shows that there is still considerable debate over the meaning of the term. In 
the Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy (hereafter, S.E.P.) Faith (2008) covers a number 
of different conceptions. Maclaurin and Sterelny endorse a general conception of 
biodiversity, whereas authors such as Loeschcke and Witting present biodiversity in a 
specific sense. They use a formula which calculates biodiversity loss in terms of the 
probability of losing unique genetic material to extinction. This is a serious conceptual 
issue because it suggests that while there are many different ways to understand 
‘biodiversity’ there is still little consensus about what it is. Biodiversity requires a handful 
of operationalisable dimensions for the purposes of conservation but we also expect the 
term to accommodate our many intuitions about biological value. My distinction between 
general and specific meanings highlights this tension. Those with a general account such 
as Maclaurin and Sterelny attach it to a smaller number of manageable dimensions 
(Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 174). Those with a specific account such as advocates for 
phylogenetic diversity argue that it can represent the many general features of biological 
value (Faith 2002, 249). It is this lack of conceptual consensus which motivates Sarkar to 
reject biodiversity as a number of biological dimensions and deflate the concept to a 
ranking procedure for prioritising conservation efforts (Sarkar and Margules 2002, 132). 
 
1.2.3 Sarkar’s Deflationary Meaning as a Proto-form of Eliminativism 
In Biodiversity and Environmental Philosophy Sarkar puts forward a deflationary meaning 
of ‘biodiversity’ which understands the term as a conservation tool relative to whatever the 
target of conservation happens to be.   
 
Instead of adopting any of the possibilities emerging from the hierarchies mentioned earlier, the 
position taken here will be that ‘biodiversity’ should be (implicitly) operationally defined as what is 
being optimized by the place prioritization procedures that prioritize all places on the basis of their 
biodiversity content using true surrogates. Thus biodiversity is the relation used to prioritize 
places.” (Sarkar 2005, 182) 
 
In his use of ‘relation used to prioritise places’ Sarkar is employing the 
conservation strategy itself as the target of conservation. This position is reinforced by his 
statements in other publications. “Put bluntly, the position that this paper will argue for is 
that biodiversity is to be (implicitly) defined as what is being conserved by the practice of 
conservation biology.” (Sarkar and Margules 2002, 132). His justification for this 
deflationary position is later adopted by Santana to motivate eliminativism. Sarkar 
considers the typical specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ and rejects them for failing to 
capture important examples of biodiversity. 
 
The standard move at this stage is to suggest that three entities capture what is important about 
biodiversity: genes (alleles), species, and ecosystems. . . Nevertheless, even this catholic proposal 
falls afoul of the diversity of biological phenomena and does so in a rather spectacular manner. 
(Sarkar 2005, 180) 
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Sarkar then offers several compelling examples of biological phenomena which are not 
preserved by protecting, genes, species, or ecosystems. The monarch butterfly, Danaus 
plexippus, has a multi-generational migration pattern. These butterflies populate high 
altitude fir forests in the millions. Beginning in late August they migrate to Mexico and 
begin a very long migration towards Canada. Since the distance is great and the life span 
of a monarch is only 8 months, it takes several generations (and suitable ecosystems along 
the way) to reach their goal. Then they begin to migrate back towards Mexico (Sarkar 
2005, 180–81). He also points out that a particular species of bamboo, Thrysostachys 
oliveri, manages to flower simultaneously despite the seeds being sent to locations roughly 
1,500 km apart. Sarkar goes on to point out that “This is the phenomenon that would 
disappear if these habitats were to disappear, even if the species persisted somewhere else 
(for instance, as isolated stands in botanical gardens). Protecting the holy trinity of genes, 
species, and ecosystems will typically not save such phenomena.” (Sarkar 2005, 182).  
He also rejects general meanings of ‘biodiversity’ on the grounds that they are no 
more informative than the expression ‘all of biology’. 
 
Conserving biodiversity, and construing  the term intuitively to refer to all biological diversity that 
there is, at every level of both hierarchies, amounts to saying that ‘biodiversity’ refers to all 
biological entities. ‘Biodiversity’ in fact becomes all of biology (Sarkar 2005, 180) . . . the position 
taken here will be that biodiversity should be (implicitly) operationally defined as what is being 
optimized by the place prioritization procedures that prioritize all places on the basis of their 
biodiversity content using true surrogates. Thus biodiversity is the relation used to prioritize places 
(Sarkar 2005, 182) 
 
Once Sarkar has rejected both specific and general conceptions of biodiversity he then 
advances his deflationary understanding of the term. ‘Biodiversity’ is just a name for the 
target of conservation: it may be employed to outrank a less important target of 
conservation but there is no deeper meaning to it. Conservationists who are attempting to 
preserve biodiversity are just attempting to preserve the target of conservation.  
One problem with Sarkar’s deflationary position is that it requires denying that 
biodiversity is an agent independent property of the natural world. Biodiversity is a 
complex property but it is also widely viewed as a resource which is rapidly diminishing 
(Faith 2008, section 1). If Sarkar’s meaning of ‘biodiversity’ is correct then all these views 
of biodiversity are simply false. Since there is no biodiversity resource it cannot be 
diminishing and large chunks of conservation, biology, and ecology are mistakenly 
arguing for funds to protect something that doesn’t exist. Under Sarkar’s deflationary 
interpretation, to say that ‘biodiversity is a diminishing resource which requires protection’ 
is simply to express that ‘the targets of conservation are a diminishing resource which 
require protection’. This is a factual claim but it is also a poor justification for why this 
diminishing resource should evoke any sort of concern beyond human preference for the 
preservation of that resource.  
A second caveat is that Sarkar’s examples needn’t be taken as proof of the inability 
of biodiversity to approximate biological value. They could also just identify a specific 
dimension of biodiversity, such as functionality, that is poorly approximated by the 
15 
dimensions of genes, species, and ecosystems. Indeed the most recent version of the S.E.P. 
article on biodiversity stresses the role of function and interactions as an important part of 
biodiversity (Faith 2008, section 3.1). The important lesson is that counterexamples can 
demonstrate the complexity of a property as much as they can deflate it. Sarkar offers 
strong counterexamples to specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ but he focuses on three 
instances: genes, species, and ecosystems (Sarkar 2005, 180). So his counterexamples do 
point out an important but neglected dimension of biodiversity. However, counterexamples 
have multiple implications. I argue that they show that organism functionality is an 
important dimension of biodiversity. Sarkar argues that they justify us understanding 
‘biodiversity’ in a deflationary sense and, Santana argues that they justify eliminating the 
concept altogether. 
 
In brief, Sarkar is close to acknowledging that ‘‘biodiversity’’ means nothing at all, but if 
biodiversity is to be a useful concept, his definition needs more substance. On the other hand, if 
biodiversity, as I suggest, is not a useful concept, we should eliminate rather than deflate it. 
(Santana 2014, 765)  
 
1.3 The Conceptual Case for Eliminating Biodiversity 
In this section I will discuss the conceptual case for eliminating biodiversity. The case for 
elimination is motivated by the conceptual issues of biodiversity. The term has multiple 
uses and there is little consensus about the meaning of ‘biodiversity’. Several authors aim 
for a middle ground between general and specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ by either 
identifying the general meaning with a specific dimension or by arguing that a specific 
dimension approximates more general features of biodiversity. Sarkar believes that these 
problems are sufficient to deflate biodiversity to a place-prioritisation procedure. But 
Santana argues that we should go further and eliminate the concept entirely. Biodiversity 
eliminativists such as Santana use a variety of arguments. Angermeier and Karr agree that 
the lack of consensus about the meaning of ‘biodiversity’ can mislead the goals of 
conservation by causing undue focus on a specific dimensions such as species richness 
(Angermeier and Karr 1994, 692). Santana presents a different argument. He builds on the 
work of Sarkar to argue that specific conceptions of biodiversity miss valuable biological 
elements and general conceptions are uninformative (Santana 2017, 87). I have 
constructed his conceptual argument for the elimination of biodiversity into a meaning-
dilemma which argues that both specific and general meanings of ‘biodiversity’ are a poor 
conceptual fit for the role they must play in conservation biology. 
 
1.3.1 The Lack of Consensus about Meaning Hampers Conservation Efforts  
Angermeier and Karr’s main argument for the elimination of biodiversity focuses on how 
the concept misses valuable elements of the environment. So their work is more applicable 
to the chapters seven and eight on value than those on measurement and concepts. 
However, they do raise concerns that the conceptual issues affecting biodiversity mislead 
conservation efforts by equivocating the target of conservation and overlooking the 
importance of overall ecosystem integrity.  
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Current conceptions of biodiversity fall short of management needs, in part, because they fail to 
distinguish between native (naturally evolved) and artificial (human generated) biotic diversity. 
(Angermeier 1994, 600)  
 
Conservation accommodates many world views (Callicott et al. 1999), but consensus on the 
supremacy of natural elements is critical to precluding certain activities (e.g., introducing species to 
enhance diversity) from being perceived as conservation. (Angermeier 2000, 377) 
 
Further, because attributes of biological systems (e.g., species richness, relative abundances of 
species, production, and trophic dynamics) vary geographically, measures of health or integrity of 
streams must evaluate biological conditions against regional standards rather than against some 
universal standard. (Karr 1993, 302) 
 
Widespread use of single-species bioassays, complicated models, and impact-statement studies have 
been singularly unsuccessful at predicting the effects of anthropogenic stress on biological systems. 
(Karr 1991, 69) 
 
The second distinction between integrity and diversity is that only integrity is directly associated 
with evolutionary context. By definition, naturally evolved assemblages possess integrity but 
random assemblages do not. Adding exotic species or genes from distant populations may increase 
local diversity but it reduces integrity. (Angermeier and Karr 1994, 692) 
 
In these passages, Angermeier focuses on the natural elements of diversity which he 
argues add to integrity. Karr argues that the best standards for ecosystem health are a 
matter of comparison with local similar ecosystems. Jointly they argue that integrity is a 
better goal for conservation than diversity because integrity excludes non-native organisms 
whilst diversity includes it. 
The conceptual problem as construed by Angermeier and Karr is that there is some 
equivocation over the meaning of ‘biodiversity’. We use the term to refer to the overall 
value of the environment but treat it as species richness. So the efforts of conservation 
focus on maximising species richness when they should focus on maintaining healthy 
ecosystems and protecting native species. This concern is most clear when Angermeier 
argues that importing new species into an ecosystem would lower biodiversity instead of 
increasing it (Angermeier 1994, 600). They go on to argue that this conceptual confusion 
has the potential to overlook important instances of biological value such as the mass 
destruction of rainforests or the state of nutrient cycling (Angermeier and Karr 1994, 692). 
For these reasons they argue that an integrity concept should replace biodiversity as the 
goal of conservation. The focus for conservationists should be maintaining the health of an 
ecosystem rather than on a general concept which has a strong focus on species but also 
includes multiple other dimensions of biological elements. 
 
1.3.2 Santana’s Meaning-dilemma Argument 
In Save the Planet: Eliminate ‘Biodiversity’ and in Biodversity Eliminativism Carlos 
Santana argues that we should discard the biodiversity concept entirely (Santana 2014, 
763; Santana 2017, 86). He presents two arguments against retaining the concept of 
biodiversity. He claims firstly that defining ‘biodiversity’ is an impossible dilemma and 
secondly that attempting to measure biodiversity only distorts our attempts to approximate 
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biological value (Santana 2014, 762 and 765). I will address Santana’s concerns about 
measurement and value in the relevant chapters four, five, and six. In this chapter I will 
restrict myself to his claim that “biodiversity is a poor conceptual fit for the role we want it 
to play in conservation biology” (Santana 2014, 761). In this sub section I will discuss his 
meaning-dilemma before justifying his crucial premises in the next two sections. 
Santana begins his argument by drawing a distinction between general and specific 
meanings of ‘biodiversity’ but goes on to argue that this creates a dilemma.  
 
This slipperiness is attributable in part to the fact the users of the biodiversity concept face a 
dilemma. Biodiversity is meant to serve as a reliable indicator of biological value, but given the vast 
variety of ways in which we value the biosphere, this requires us to employ a broad and open-ended 
definition of biodiversity. On the other hand, to serve reliably as a comparative measure, 
biodiversity needs to be observable and straightforwardly operationalisable. (Santana 2014, 762–63) 
 
More formally his argument for the elimination of biodiversity may be understood in the 
following way. 
 
Santana’s Meaning-dilemma Argument 
1) ‘Biodiversity’ has either a general meaning or specific meaning but it cannot have 
both. 
2) General meanings of ‘biodiversity’ are uninformative because they are synonymous 
with ‘all of biology’. 
3) Specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ have numerous counterexamples. 
4) Conservation targets ought to be informative and lack numerous counterexamples. 
5) Therefore: ‘Biodiversity’ is either uninformative or has numerous counterexamples. 
6) Therefore: We ought not to use biodiversity as a conservation target. 
 
This is my reconstruction of Santana’s argument, so I will justify my presentation of the 
meaning-dilemma argument with textual evidence. I begin with the justifications for 
premises one and four.  
 
These two desiderata [general and specific meanings] pull in opposite directions: as our definition 
of biodiversity becomes more broad and open ended, it becomes more difficult to objectively 
quantify the amount of biodiversity in a particular unit of interest. (Santana 2014, 763)  
 
This is Santana’s justification for the truth of premise one. In this quote he argues that 
while on a continuum, definitions of biodiversity lean towards either a general or specific 
meaning, both of which are problematic. The advantages of a general meaning necessitate 
the disadvantages of a specific meaning and vice versa.  
As I discussed in section 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 the distinction between general and 
specific meanings is a vague one. Definitions of ‘biodiversity’ broadly fit under either one 
or the other. Because the category is vague, there are definitions which resist the 
distinction between general and specific meanings; but these still tend to lean to either side 
of the continuum. Maclaurin and Sterelny’s view appears to be specific because of its 
focus on species richness and phylogenetic diversity, but it leans towards general because 
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they argue that biodiversity also requires dimensions of disparity, a phylogenetic bias, and 
consideration of functions and ecosystems (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 174). Santana 
argues that our current definitions of ‘biodiversity’ will be inevitably pulled towards either 
specific or general and that either outcome is unacceptable for defenders of biodiversity. I 
will spend much of chapters two and three challenging this assertion. For now, it is 
important to motivate the eliminativist’s position so that I can present a strong response to 
it. 
Premise four that “Conservation targets ought to be informative and lack numerous 
counterexamples” is an analytic bridging premise for the purposes of constructing a valid 
argument. I take it as tacit that if Santana believes that biodiversity is a conceptually poor 
fit for its role in conservation due to a dilemma between uninformativeness and 
counterexamples, that he implicitly believes that uninformativeness and counterexamples 
make a concept a poor fit as a conservation target. Santana also has other concerns about 
the performance of biodiversity. He worries that biodiversity is not easily measureable and 
fails to approximate biological value (Santana 2014, 763).  
 
If we were to replace the vague concept of biodiversity with the specific biological values we want 
to conserve, conservation would probably become more socially and politically appealing. But if we 
want to save pristine nature, untouched by human hands nature, it’s too late. We have the 
responsibility to decide what to prioritize and value, and taking shelter behind the vagueness of 
‘biodiversity’ will not protect us from the consequences of shirking that responsibility. (Santana 
2014, 778) 
 
These are also reasons to reject biodiversity as a conservation target but, in as far as 
Santana believes that biodiversity is a conceptual poor fit for its role in conservation 
biology, the reasons he offers are concerns about counterexamples and uninformativeness. 
The justifications for premises three and four will be addressed in the next two 
subsections. They require dedicated space because Santana presents an extensive and 
compelling justification for the claims that specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ have 
multiple counterexamples and general meanings are uninformative.  
 
1.4 Specific Meanings of ‘Biodiversity’ Have Multiple 
Counterexamples 
In this section I will motivate premise three of Santana’s meaning-dilemma argument that 
3) “specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ have numerous counterexamples”. There are 
multiple dimensions of biodiversity (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 981). There are too 
many possible specific meanings for Santana to present counterexamples to, so he uses a 
strategy of pessimistic induction. He presents counterexamples to several important 
specific conceptions of biodiversity and infers from those observations—and the work of 
biodiversity conservationists—that all specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ have important 
counterexamples. His strategy here is philosophically interesting because, although he is a 
biodiversity eliminativist, he does not disagree with the analysis of Maclaurin, Sterelny, 
and Sarkar. Instead his pessimistic induction that specific meanings of biodiversity have 
numerous counterexamples relies on their critiques of specific conceptions of biodiversity. 
19 
 
In outlining the weaknesses of biodiversity, I drew on the same biologists and philosophers who 
attempt to rescue the biodiversity concept. The weaknesses of biodiversity, that is to say, are 
generally acknowledged. So why is biodiversity still central to conservation theory and practice? 
(Santana 2014, 773) 
 
To motivate Santana’s pessimistic induction I will consider eight possible specific 
meanings of ‘biodiversity’: species richness, abundance, phenotypic diversity, 
phylogenetic diversity, functional diversity, genetic diversity, ecological diversity, and 
process diversity. Counterexamples to eight specific meanings of diversity drawn from 
both biodiversity eliminativists and conservationists justify the claim that “specific 
meanings of ‘biodiversity’ have numerous counterexamples”. 
 
1.4.1 Biodiversity as Species Richness 
Species richness is a count of the number of species in an ecosystem and is one of the most 
striking candidates for biodiversity. Of the 22 quotes discussed in section 1.2.1, 15 referred 
to some notion of species in their definition. In their book, Maclaurin and Sterelny tracked 
the fate of species richness as a core concept of biodiversity (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 
178). Species richness is an indispensable core of biodiversity because the term was coined 
in response to the modern extinction crisis. Species richness is also a strong candidate for 
the main meaning of ‘biodiversity’ because species are widely taken to be a natural kind 
rather than a purely human concept. If the proverbial visitor from Mars were to colonise 
earth millennia after the extinction of human beings and took an interest in biology, we 
would expect the visitor to roughly group the same organisms into species as we have. 
This is an important point, because while species are taken to be an objective unit in 
nature, other taxonomic categories such as genera and phyla are not (Boyd 1999b, 97). 
While the proverbial visitor from Mars would recognise the categorisation of species, it 
might not recognise the categorisation of genera or sub-species. 
But it is these other taxonomic categories which present a real issue for any 
account of biodiversity which reduces it to species richness. The taxonomic ranking 
system is structured as follows: biota, domain, kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, 
genus, species, and sub-species. So the species Colibri Thalassinus (green violetear 
hummingbird) is a member of the genus Colibri, which is a member of the family 
Trochilidae (hummingbirds), which is a member of the order Apodiformes, which is a 
member of the class Aves (birds), which is a member of the sub phylum Vertebrata 
(animals whose spinal nerve is protected by bone or cartilage vertebrae), which is a 
member of the phylum Chordata (animals with notochords), which is a member of the 
kingdom Animalia, which is a member of the domain Eukaryota (organisms with a 
membrane-bound nucleus in their cell(s)), which is a member of the biota (superdomain 
containing all life on earth.) But species richness gives equal weight to all species. The 
deep sea angler fish Bufoceratias Wedli counts for the same as the earwig Forficula 
Auricularia. 
Therein the problem lies because higher order taxonomic ranks do identify 
important differences in biological organisms, and treating all species as the same even if 
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some are aquatic and others are terrestrial misses an important element of diversity. How 
we cache out diversity of membership in higher order taxonomic ranks is the problem of 
disparity (Griffiths and Sterelny 1999, 287). It was the discovery of the burgess shale 
fauna which provided ecological evidence for this distinction. During the pre-Cambrian 
era we had fewer species than we do today but far more phyla and greater feature diversity 
(Gould 2000, 46). Species richness does not track feature diversity as well as disparity 
does. This is an important problem because there are twice as many marine phyla as 
terrestrial phyla but only half as many marine species (Angermeier and Karr 1994, 691). 
So marine biodiversity is more disparate than terrestrial biodiversity but it is only half as 
rich. Species richness cannot account for this important difference because it only counts 
the number of species and gives no further weighting to other dimensions of biodiversity. 
Treating biodiversity purely as species richness forces conservationists to overlook 
other important dimensions of the biological world. As I will argue in the following 
subsections there are good reasons to think that: abundance, phenotypic diversity, 
phylogenetic diversity, functional diversity, genetic diversity, ecological diversity, and 
process diversity are all important elements of biodiversity but species richness by itself 
cannot account for these. Santana argues that we have overestimated how well species 
richness correlates with these other important elements. A focus on species richness 
encourages us to introduce as many new species to local ecosystems as possible, which 
can be bad for the species currently residing there (Lapointe et al. 2016, 221). Santana also 
argues that it is better for some species to be extinct. The eradication of smallpox was a 
benefit despite the reduction in species richness (Santana 2014, 769). The predator-free 
islands in the Bay of Plenty are another example of conservationists deliberately reducing 
species richness to protect a handful of other species. For these reasons biodiversity cannot 
be solely understood in terms of species richness. There are too many other important 
biological elements which it does not account for.  
 
1.4.2 Biodiversity as Abundance 
One response to the problems of species richness simpliciter is to supplement the concept 
with abundance. Species richness is a measure of the abundance of species types but it 
overlooks the abundance of the population within the species because species only need to 
be represented by a single individual. This is problematic because it means that a 
flourishing species is equally represented as a critically endangered one, which creates 
misleading values for conservation goals. One reason to think that abundance matters for 
diversity is the effect which poorly distributed abundance has on random sampling. 
Assume that in one ecosystem the population levels are balanced whereas the other has a 
very dominant species. Random sampling in the latter scenario is likely to only represent 
the dominant species, so while they are equally species rich, the ecosystem which is also 
equally abundant is more diverse (Vellend et al. 2011, 194). The two ecosystems described 
are vastly different in terms of their diversity but both score the same on species richness. 
To explain the problem another way the current Marvel cinematic universe is 
immortalising its most popular superheroes in live action movies. Of the 20 films currently 
released (Ironman, Thor, Captain America, Antman, Spiderman, etc) the only story 
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focused on an African-American lead is Black Panther.3 So while the MCU does represent 
different ethnicities and genders in the sense of ‘richness’, it is not very diverse. Diversity 
is about more than having a group represented by at least one member. 
 The inclusion of population size into the concept of biodiversity aids the goals of 
conservation. Species diversity is species richness plus abundance. Species diversity is 
better at explaining why we should monitor population levels than a richness-only 
analysis. Despite difficulties with calculations of minimum viable population, abundance 
is an important factor in biodiversity. But it is not enough to explain what biodiversity is. 
Like species richness, species diversity struggles to accommodate disparity. Two species 
in the same phylum count for as much as two species in separate phyla. Stable ecosystems 
are also not structured with evenly distributed populations between species. Because of 
differing caloric requirements and the struggle for survival larger species are less abundant 
than smaller ones. Increasing the population of a particular species has the potential to 
severely disrupt the local ecosystem. A farmer who keeps 50 cattle to 50 blades of grass is 
headed for disaster. As a further example, much of the value which humans assign to 
biological entities is due to their rarity. One study found a direct correlation between the 
rarity of bird species and their desirability to birdwatchers (Santana 2014, 770). 
Biodiversity does include considerations of abundance but it is not the kind of evenly 
distributed species richness which is represented by maximum species diversity. In section 
3.4 I will argue that we have good reasons to think that abundance should not be 
considered as  a part of biodiversity. 
 
1.4.3 Biodiversity as Phenotypic Diversity 
Another candidate for the meaning of ‘biodiversity’ is phenotypic diversity (Burch-Brown 
and Archer 2017, 979). The phenotype of an organism is that organism’s observable 
characteristics, so phenotypic diversity should be understood as the total diversity of 
physical characteristics (Santana 2014, 770). When we attempt to preserve biodiversity we 
are conserving a maximal variety of physical characteristics. The difficulties with 
understanding biodiversity as phenotypic diversity have more to do with 
operationalisability than conceptual issues. Morphological measures of feature diversity 
identify mathematical relationships in nature and plot evolutionary adaptations on adaptive 
landscapes or morphospaces (McGhee 2007, 1). Morphospaces are logical or empirical 
explorations of the possible ways that a physical feature could be (McGhee 1999, 2). But 
there are infinitely many physical traits and no obvious way to aggregate them into a 
single morphological value for the purpose of conservation recommendations. The shared 
properties of leaf shape in flora do not commensurate well with the various wing shapes of 
fauna. 
                                                 
3 In order of release, the full list to the end of April 2018 is: Iron Man  (Favreau 2008), The Incredible Hulk 
(Leterrier 2008), Iron Man 2 (Faverau 2010), Thor (Branagh 2011), Captain America: The First Avenger 
(Johnston 2011), The Avengers (Whedon 2012), Iron Man 3 (Black 2013), Thor: The Dark World (Taylor 
2013), Captain America: The Winter Soldier (Russo and Russo 2014), Guardians of The Galaxy (Gunn 
2014), Avengers: Age of Ultron (Whedon 2015), Ant-Man (Reed 2015), Captain America: Civil War (Russo 
and Russo 2016), Doctor Strange (Derrickson 2016), Guardians of The Galaxy Vol. 2 (Gunn 2017), Spider-
Man Homecoming (Watts 2017), Thor: Ragnarok (Waititi 2017), Black Panther (Coogler 2018), Avengers 
Infinity War (Russo and Russo 2018), and Antman and the Wasp (Reed 2018).  
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So the problem with phenotypic diversity as a meaning of ‘biodiversity’ is 
developing a practical conservation strategy which can process the possible variations of 
multiple phenotypic characters into an operationisable conservation target. For this reason 
diversity of traits or forms such as morphological diversity cannot provide a complete 
account of biodiversity. While morphological diversity can be calculated with a small 
number of properties, attempting to perform such a calculation with all the properties is 
not “empirically or computationally tractable” (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 77). 
Morphological diversity calculations can assist when we are interested in a few specific 
properties but it could never form the kind of global morphospace result that biodiversity 
requires (Santana 2014, 770). 
 
1.4.4 Biodiversity as Phylogenetic Diversity 
Phylogenetic diversity is an analysis of biodiversity through an evolutionary lens. It places 
organisms from an ecosystem on the tree of life and connects them with phylogenetic 
branches which map their evolutionary history (Vellend et al. 2011, 194). This mapping 
allows conservationists to measure the evolutionary distance between species (Faith 2002, 
249). Phylogenetic diversity produces a calculable difference between diversity and 
disparity. An ecosystem with organisms who are members of higher order classes scores 
higher than an ecosystem with the same species richness represented by a narrower 
diversity of genera. PD also has the potential to overlap with other specific conceptions of 
biodiversity since the evolutionary history of an organism is tied to the selective pressures 
of the environment it evolved in. In turn there is a strong link between the evolutionary 
history of an organism and its physical features, functionality, and ecological niche (Faith 
1996, 1287). 
Phylogenetic diversity overlaps with many other specific meanings of 
‘biodiversity’ but it struggles with the steady decline in populations. Since species only 
need one member to be represented on the tree of life, stable populations and critically 
endangered species produce the same value. This is problematic for issues such as the 
large-scale loss of ancient flora, which although not currently endangered still seem like 
they should be protected from human development (Takacs 1996, 1). Deforestation 
highlights the trouble phylogenetic diversity has with explaining why we should not 
bulldoze large sections of ancient rainforest or substantially reduce the population levels of 
species for the sake of human development. If we leave enough organisms alive to prevent 
a substantial increase in extinction rates then we could theoretically harvest the remaining 
natural resources for human benefit without suffering any loss of total phylogenetic 
diversity. If we are only interested in preserving phylogenetic diversity then harvesting 
ancient rainforest for coffee tables does not represent a decrease in biodiversity, provided 
that we leave enough trees alone to prevent any extinction events (Angermeier and Karr 
1994, 692). Because phylogenetic diversity does not take into account population levels, it 
cannot justify our opposition to the deforestation of ancient flora, if such an act would not 
lead to species extinction (Santana 2014, 768). There are good reasons to resist 
deforestation but understanding biodiversity purely as phylogenetic diversity struggles to 
ground those intuitions. 
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1.4.5 Biodiversity as Functional Diversity 
Functional diversity attempts to address the counterexamples to other specific meanings of 
‘biodiversity’ by refocusing diversity on the functionality of organisms within the 
environment (Justus 2013, 345–46). A recurring objection to conceptions of biodiversity 
which focus on elements like species richness and abundance is that it overlooks important 
biological functions or interactions which we should preserve (Takacs 1996, 69). Nature is 
filled with fascinating biological phenomena such as simultaneous bamboo flowering in 
distinct geographical regions (Sarkar 2005, 180). Despite being 1500 km apart, the species 
flowers at identical times. Attention to functional diversity also explains why we might 
prefer organisms in the environment than in Zoos or botanic gardens (Sarkar and Margules 
2002, 302). Keeping species in isolated conditions maintains species richness and 
phylogenetic history but it limits interaction and therefore functionality. 
The conceptual issue with functional diversity is that despite the motivating 
examples of high level biological phenomena, in practice functional diversity is treated as 
feature diversity (phenetic diversity). Functional diversity is treated as a synonym for 
feature diversity, with the restriction that the focus is on functional traits rather than all 
traits (Weiher 2011, 175). However, since a functional trait is defined as one which 
impacts the survivability of other organisms and virtually all traits impact the fitness of 
other organisms, virtually all traits count as functional ones. So the main motivation for 
functional diversity, that we measure and conserve biological functionality, gives way to 
phenetic diversity by another name. Functional diversity as a concept is actually feature 
diversity, so it does not operationalise functionality in the way that it is supposed to. 
 
1.4.6 Biodiversity as Genetic Diversity 
A further candidate for a specific meaning of ‘biodiversity’ is genetic diversity. We can 
observe and monitor the total amount of unique genetic information contained in a local 
ecosystem and attempt to preserve it (Witting and Loeschcke 1995, 205). Focusing on the 
diversity of unique genetic information will also overlap species richness and phenotypic 
diversity. But this candidate is vulnerable to two counterexamples. Firstly, genomic size 
varies greatly from species to species, so a focus on unique genetic information would 
create unusual priorities for conservation (Santana 2014, 771). Secondly, placing diversity 
of genetic information as our conservation target has an unusual implication. A genetic 
soup could contain as much as, if not more, unique genetic material than a sizable chunk of 
the natural world. If biodiversity is understood as genetic diversity then we could boost 
biodiversity by replacing large sections of the natural world with genetic soup, provided 
that said soup contained more unique genetic material than the natural world (Santana 
2014, 771). 
 As a hypothetical counterexample to genetic diversity, the details of genetic soup 
are problematic to cache out. For example, one issue is that it is unclear how anyone could 
extract useful genetic information from a bowl of genes. Mixing biological material 
together does not make it easy to itemise and quantify the genetic information represented 
by that sample.  This thesis aims to defend biodiversity on the eliminativist’s ground as 
much as possible so I will presume the success of the genetic soup counterexample whilst 
discussing conceptual arguments for biodiversity’s elimination. However, during the 
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discussion of the value compass case for biodiversity’s elimination, in section 7.2.2 I will 
evaluate the plausibility of genetic soup in more detail. 
 
1.4.7 Biodiversity as Ecological Diversity or Process Diversity 
The final two candidates for a specific meaning of ‘biodiversity’ that I will consider in this 
section are ecological diversity and process diversity. Ecological diversity is a focus on 
preserving the greatest variety of ecosystems possible (Callicott 2017, 323). This instance 
of diversity has the potential to explain why we should preserve distinct ecosystems. For 
example, deserts tend to be overlooked for conservation because they are biodiversity 
coldspots (Durant et al. 2014, 114). A focus on preserving ecological diversity could 
explain why we should preserve wilderness as well as biodiversity hotspots. However, 
Santana rejects ecological diversity on the grounds that it simply returns us to the original 
meaning-dilemma for biodiversity. “Either we are back to square one, and ecological 
diversity reduces to “all of biology” or we have to choose a manageably small set of 
dimensions. Which dimensions of an ecosystem are relevant, however, depends on our 
goals.” (Santana 2014, 771). 
Process diversity focuses on preserving the greatest variety of biological processes 
(Sarkar et al. 2006, 131). Functioning ecosystems involve multiple biological processes 
such as nutrient cycling in the soil, metabolic rates, carbon cycling, germination, and 
reproduction. But Santana questions the suitability of process diversity as a conception of 
biodiversity. First, he observes that focusing on protecting biodiversity hot spots (in terms 
of species richness), such as the west cape of South Africa, comes at the expense of 
endangered ecological processes in biodiversity cold spots, so process diversity and 
biodiversity come apart (Santana 2014, 772). Secondly Santana notes that conservation is 
not typically concerned with protecting as many different processes as possible. Rather we 
are concerned with a few major processes such as climate change or the persistent 
reduction of lake levels (Santana 2014, 773). Angermeier and Karr also argue that process 
diversity is better understood as a part of biological integrity because it is the rates of 
processes rather than the occurrence which varies (Angermeier and Karr 1994, 692). So 
process diversity will not serve as a specific meaning of ‘biodiversity’ because 
conservationists are less concerned with many distinct processes than they are with a few 
steady ones. 
 
1.4.8 Lessons from the Counterexamples to Specific Meanings of 
‘Biodiversity’ 
This completes my discussion of the counterexamples which face specific meanings of 
‘biodiversity’. Species richness does not account for disparity and conservation based on 
abundance struggles because ecosystem diversity is different to the kind of evenly 
weighted populations which serve as the typical goal of diversity. Phenotypic diversity has 
operationalisable concerns which are also conceptual. We can conceive of a diversity of 
phenotypic characters, but amalgamating all possible phenotypic characters into a global 
morphospace is not computationally or conceptually tractable. Phylogenetic diversity 
overlaps with other dimensions of biodiversity but does account for population levels and 
operational requirements of functional diversity make it a synonym for phenotypic 
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diversity. A focus on genetic diversity implies that gene soup is as valuable as the natural 
world, ecological diversity returns us to the original meaning-dilemma, and process 
diversity incorrectly prioritises as many different processes as possible rather than a few 
stable ones. 
 As each specific meaning identifies an important dimension of biodiversity, many 
of them can be taken as counterexamples to one another. Phylogenetic diversity accounts 
for species richness but species richness does not account for phylogenetic diversity and 
neither fully account for process diversity. These eight specific meanings all have serious 
counterexamples and so this section has motivated Santana’s pessimistic induction. Since 
eight major candidates for a specific meaning of ‘biodiversity’ have serious 
counterexamples there is good reason to believe premise three of the meaning-dilemma 
argument that “specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ have numerous counterexamples”.  
One response to the weaknesses of a pessimistic induction is that Santana does not 
require an inductive justification for premise three. If biodiversity has multiple distinct 
dimensions which are strictly incommensurable then demonstrating that more than one 
dimension is required for biodiversity is sufficient to demonstrate that all specific 
meanings have counterexamples. Whether the strategy is inductive or relying on multiple 
incommensurable dimensions, Santana has justified premise three of the meaning-dilemma 
argument and he has done so by appealing to the conclusions of biodiversity 
conservationists such as Maclaurin, Sterelny, and Sarkar. The last premise for Santana to 
motivate is premise two that general meanings of ‘biodiversity’ are uninformative. 
 
1.5 General Meanings of ‘Biodiversity’ are Uninformative 
In this section I will motivate premise two of the meaning-dilemma argument that “general 
meanings of ‘biodiversity’ are uninformative because they are synonymous with ‘all of 
biology”. This objection is raised in the first place by Sarkar and developed with more 
detail by Santana to justify his eliminativist conclusion. The claim can be understood in 
two ways; a concern that a general meaning of ‘biodiversity’ is not operationalisable or a 
concern that understanding biodiversity as ‘all of biology’ makes it uninformative. As 
concerns about the operationalisability of biodiversity will be addressed in the chapters on 
measurement my discussion about the conceptual case for biodiversity eliminativism will 
focus on the second interpretation of premise two, that general meanings of ‘biodiversity’ 
are uninformative. 
Sarkar and Margules introduce the generality objection in Operationalizing 
Biodiversity for Conservation Planning. They argue that general meanings of 
‘biodiversity’ reduce to ‘all of biology’ which make conservation impractical.  
 
Conserving biodiversity, and construing the term intuitively to refer to all the biological diversity 
that there is at every level of both hierarchies, amounts to saying that "biodiversity" refers to all 
biological entities. "Biodiversity" in effect becomes all of biology. Conservation would be an 
impractical proposal if "biodiversity" is construed in this way. (Sarkar and Margules 2002, 137) 
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Santana develops this argument further in his own work. He agrees with Sarkar that 
general meanings of ‘biodiversity’ reduce to ‘all of biology’ and goes on to argue that for 
this reason we should reject general meanings as a conceptual candidate for ‘biodiversity’. 
One way to interpret this claim is as a concern about the operationalisability of general 
meanings of ‘biodiversity’. 
 
General Meanings of ‘Biodiversity’ are not Operationalisable 
1) Conservationists have limited resources. 
2) Conservationists ought to preserve biodiversity. 
3) If ‘biodiversity’ means ‘all of biology’ then conservationists ought to preserve all of 
biology. 
4) The limited resources of conservationists are not sufficient to preserve all of biology. 
5) Ought implies can. 
6) Therefore: ‘biodiversity’ cannot mean ‘all of biology’. 
 
Premises one and four are widely acknowledged. It is the reason that conservation is so 
frequently compared to a state of triage. Since Santana and his fellow eliminativists 
believe that we ought to eliminate biodiversity from our discourse, premise two should be 
understood as an assumption for the sake of the argument and premise three follows 
analytically because ‘biodiversity’ and ‘all of biology’ are treated as synonyms. In fact the 
only contentious premise in this argument is premise five that ought implies can. ‘Ought 
implies can’ is a  Kantian constraint (Kohl 2015, 690). In this form it seems abstract but its 
converse, that ‘cannot’ implies ‘not the case that you ought’, is more straightforward. If it 
is not within your power to save a starving child then you bear no moral responsibility for 
failing to do so (Kohl 2015, 691). You could not, so it is not the case that you ought to 
have done it.  
It is a contentious principle because it can be interpreted as either a logical law or a 
plausible moral principle. As a logical law it has possible counterexamples. If one doctor 
has three equally urgent patients they all ought to be treated, but resource constraints will 
only allow one to be treated at a time. Logical laws are not meant to have counterexamples 
because deductive logic is built on reasoning with certainty from the premises to the 
conclusion. For a rule to hold as a logical law, it must hold in all situations.  
Rather than a logical law, ‘ought implies can’ is a better candidate for a moral 
principle. But as a moral principle, it also has counterexamples. A strength of the ‘ought 
implies can’ principle is that it argues against moral blame where circumstances were 
beyond an agent’s control (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 1984, 250). A truly compulsive 
kleptomaniac is considered ill rather than evil because they exercise no agency over their 
actions (Graham 2011, 343). The strength of the principle is also a weakness because it 
can be used to devise counterexamples. In ‘Ought’ and Ability Peter Graham describes the 
hypothetical example of a surgeon who can save her ten grandchildren if she kills and 
harvests organs from two healthy people. In the example the surgeon is as compelled to 
complete this action “as is the most severe kleptomaniac to steal”. He argues that despite 
the surgeon’s lack of control over his actions, she still ought not harvest organs from 
healthy people without their permission (Graham 2011, 346). He defends his argument 
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against objections with several variations of this example. In one such state of affairs, the 
surgeon is deluded and believes that she must kill the two healthy patients to prevent an 
apocalypse. Once she kills them, a second transplant surgeon discovers the bodies, notes 
that they had consented to be organ donors whilst alive, and uses their organs to save ten 
people (Graham 2011, 350). Despite saving lives, and the surgeon having no control over 
her actions, harvesting the organs is still wrong and the surgeon is morally blameworthy. 
So ‘ought implies can’ is better as a plausible moral principle which works some but not 
all of the time (Kuhler 2012, 181). We expect there to be some moral goals which we 
cannot accomplish but are still worth pursuing.  
For this concern about operationalisability, conservationists cannot preserve all of 
biology so eliminativists argue that it is not the case that they ought to preserve 
biodiversity (Frank 2017, 106). Hence ‘biodiversity’ cannot mean ‘all of biology’ and we 
should reject general meanings of ‘biodiversity’ because they reduce to ‘all of biology’. 
This is a contentious premise, precisely because ‘ought implies can’ is a plausible moral 
principle rather than a logical law and as a moral principle is has problematic 
counterexamples. 
Concerns about the operationalisability of biodiversity, such as how it can be 
measured and whether it can meet the goals of conservation, will be discussed in more 
detail in the chapters four, five, and six on measurement. However, this interpretation of 
premise two as a concern about operationalisability yields a weaker argument. To be 
successful it requires that ‘biodiversity’ literally refers to every single element which 
biologists study, which implies that there is nothing contained within the field of biology 
which biodiversity is not intended to represent. It is difficult to make sense of the study of 
extinct species as an immediate goal for conservation.  
The role of the ‘ought implies can’ principle here means that it is not the case that 
conservationists ought to protect what they cannot conceivably protect. This is an odd 
view given that so much of the history of conservation has been fighting a losing battle. 
Conservationists still fight to preserve biological elements even when the odds are against 
them or they slowly lose over time to political flux. Using ‘ought implies can’ in this 
situation implies that the obligations of a conservationists are deeply tied to the probability 
of conservation efforts being successful. But I contend that even if they were penniless and 
politically powerless conservationists would still attempt to conserve things because of 
their underlying obligations. By analogy, it would be unusual to argue that conservationists 
have no obligations to conserve species because it is not possible for them to preserve all 
species. For these reasons the use of the ‘ought implies can’ principle here is inappropriate, 
but it is also the analytic bridge which Santana requires to reach a valid conclusion. 
A better interpretation of premise two is as a conceptual concern about 
informativeness. 
 
General Meanings of ‘Biodiversity’ are Uninformative 
1) Conservationists ought to use biodiversity as a goal for the sake of preserving 
biodiversity. 
2) The goal of conservation needs to be more informative than ‘all of biology’ 
3) If ‘biodiversity’ means ‘all of biology’ then the conservation goal is ‘all of biology’ 
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4) Therefore: ‘biodiversity’ cannot mean ‘all of biology’. 
 
Premise one is an assumption for the sake of argument and premise three follows 
analytically from premises one and two. Santana takes the truth of premise two as given 
because it is impractical for conservation to preserve all of biology. Whilst the ultimate 
goal of conservationists may be to save as much of biology as possible understanding 
biodiversity as ‘all of biology’ makes discussions of biodiversity considerably less 
informative. Consider the following abstract from ‘The Optimization of Biodiversity 
Conservation’ (Witting and Loeschcke 1995, 205), in which I have substituted ‘all of 
biology’ in place of ‘biodiversity’. 
 
The conservation of [all of biology] is confronted with two major problems." how to define and 
measure [all of biology], and how to optimize the in situ conservation of [all of biology]. Here we 
outline a conceptual framework for the conservation of [all of biology] that is directed towards these 
problems. The framework combines a phylogenetic evaluation with a multi-species risk analysis 
and defines the objective of conservation biology as the minimization of the future loss of [all of 
biology]. 
 
By replacing ‘biodiversity’ with ‘all of biology’ the abstract becomes less 
informative. The claims make less of an original contribution to the literature. Precise 
claims tend to be more informative. Observing that we struggle to define or measure all of 
biology under a single category suggests the question of why we ought to in the first place, 
and ‘attempting to minimise the future loss of all of biology’ is an ambiguous statement. It 
could be interpreted as preventing the loss of any biology which would be incoherent 
because death and life are part of regular interactions between organisms. Or, it could be 
interpreted as minimising the loss of species, ecosystem reduction, prioritising native 
species, or any other dimension of biology discussed in the previous section on specific 
meanings. This is a deeply uninformative claim to make because it tells us little about 
which dimensions should be cared for. So, on pain of incoherence, ‘biodiversity’ with ‘all 
of biology’ in this abstract makes the claim far less informative. 
This reduction of informativeness also happens when other uses of ‘biodiversity’ 
are exchanged with ‘all of biology’. 
 
For example, economic growth—one of the highest priorities in the domestic policy arena—has 
been identified as posing a fundamental conflict with the conservation of [all of biology]. (Tear et 
al. 2005, 835) 
 
Non-native fishes threaten aquatic [elements of all of biology] in North America by imperilling 
native fishes. (Lapointe et al. 2016, 221)  
 
Here we analyzed local patterns of [all of biology] in a bird community to investigate effects of 
dispersal propensity on local species richness and the presence of rare species. (Møller and 
Mousseau 2011, 2789) 
 
As noted in section two, there is also evidence that [all of biology] is correlated with a wide range 
of ecosystem services. (Maclaurin and Lean 2016, 31) 
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These claims are less informative when ‘biodiversity’ is understood as ‘all of biology’. It 
is almost an analytical truth that conserving all of biology conflicts with economic growth. 
It is now unclear which elements of biodiversity non-native fishes threaten. ‘Local patterns 
of biodiversity’ is informative when it is treated as species richness or some other specific 
dimension of biology but ‘local patterns  of all of biology’ requires more details on the 
kind of patterns which were analysed to be an informative statement. It also analytic that 
ecosystem services are a subset of all of biology, so observing that the two correlate does 
not provide new information to the reader. These examples demonstrate two things. Firstly 
it is unlikely in practice that these authors conceive of biodiversity in a general way, given 
how general it makes their claims. Secondly, treating biodiversity as ‘all of biology’ makes 
claims about biodiversity uninformative by increasing their generality. General claims are 
more vague and less informative than specific claims. So general conceptions of 
biodiversity such as “. . . biodiversity is the living resources of the planet.” (Ehrlich in 
Takacs 1996, 47) are vaguer and make uses of ‘biodiversity’ uninformative. 
In this section I motivated premise two of the meaning-dilemma argument that 
“general meanings of ‘biodiversity’ are uninformative because they are synonymous with 
‘all of biology”. Santana argues that general meanings should be discarded because they 
are uninformative and not operationalisable (Santana 2017, 763). Understanding this 
premise as a concern about uninformativeness yields a stronger version of the argument 
than treating it as a concern about operationalisability. The difficulty of preserving all of 
biology is not a reason that we do not, or ought not, attempt to preserve it. However, 
understanding biodiversity as ‘all of biology’ does make the term uninformative. Treating 
the two as synonyms makes academic claims seem less precise and conservation work 
seems too widely targeted when an analysis is performed on all of biology rather than on a 
specific dimension such as species richness. This completes the motivation for Santana’s 
meaning-dilemma argument. Since specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ have 
counterexamples and general meanings are uninformative, he argues that we should 
discard the concept entirely (Santana 2017, 94).  
   
In this section I have examined several potential reasons for trying to repair the biodiversity concept 
despite its numerous weaknesses. Having found each reason wanting, I tentatively propose the 
retirement of biodiversity from conservation science and philosophy. (Santana 2014, 778) 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I discussed conceptual issues with biodiversity and motivated the 
conceptual case for eliminating its use from conservation biology. I outlined the 
conceptual issues largely by discussing the development of biodiversity as a concept. I 
started with its analytic meaning before discussing the sociological work of David Takacs 
who demonstrated that ‘biodiversity’ carried a diversity of meanings in academic work in 
the 90s. I then continued the methodology of Philosophies of Paradise by analysing uses 
of ‘biodiversity’ in modern academia. After surveying the different uses of ‘biodiversity’, I 
drew a distinction between general meanings of ‘biodiversity’ such as the richness of life 
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and specific senses which focus on a single dimension of biology such as the total amount 
of unique genetic information.  
I used this conceptual ambiguity about the meaning of ‘biodiversity’ to motivate 
the conceptual arguments of biodiversity eliminativists. Angermeier and Karr argue that 
the conceptual ambiguity of biodiversity misleads the work of conservationists. Since 
‘biodiversity’ could mean species richness to one person and native conditions to another, 
conservationists can preserve biodiversity (species richness) when they should be 
protecting native species over non-native species. Santana presents a compelling meaning-
dilemma argument. He appeals to modern work on biodiversity to demonstrate that 
specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ have empirical counterexamples. This point is not a 
contentious claim, as many academics who work on biodiversity discuss the same 
conceptual issues. He then argues that general meanings of ‘biodiversity’ are 
uninformative and not operationalisable (Santana 2017, 87). I will address concerns about 
operationalisability in chapters four to six but Santana’s concern about uninformativeness 
is a compelling one. Substitutions of ‘all of biology’ for ‘biodiversity’ in academic papers 
made the authors’ claims seem less precise and uninformative. In the next chapter I will 
respond to the Santana, Angermeier, and Karr’s conceptual case for eliminating 
biodiversity by developing the underutilised possibility that biodiversity could be a 






2 Biodiversity as a Homeostatic Property Cluster  
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will discuss responses to the conceptual case for biodiversity’s elimination 
and outline a conception of biodiversity as a homeostatic property cluster. In section 2.2 I 
summarise the conceptual case for biodiversity eliminativism. In section 2.3 I discuss 
Burch-Brown and Archer’s (2017) general conception of biodiversity, which was 
developed as a response to Santana’s eliminativism. I will argue that their conception does 
not escape Santana’s meaning-dilemma. In section 2.4 I argue that biodiversity can be 
understood as a homeostatic property cluster—that is—biodiversity can be understood as a 
cluster of co-occurring properties of distinct diversities, the rise and fall of which is united 
by a homeostatic mechanism (Boyd 1991, 141). I introduce the conditions for a 
homeostatic property cluster and argue that biodiversity satisfies them. Then I discuss 
Santana’s objections to HPC conceptions of biodiversity and respond to them. In section 
2.5 I argue that the success of HPCs in dealing with the species problem sets an important 
precedent for its potential with the biodiversity problem. 
2.2 The Conceptual Case for Biodiversity Eliminativism 
In the last chapter I motivated the conceptual case for eliminativism and argued that it had 
laid two challenges against biodiversity. Angermeier and Karr have argued that the 
concept misdirects the efforts of conservation by equivocating its meaning, and Santana 
argues that “biodiversity is a poor fit for the conceptual role we want it to play in 
conservation biology ” (Angermeier and Karr 1994, 692; Santana 2014, 761). Angermeier 
and Karr’s main argument for the elimination of biodiversity focuses on how the concept 
misdirects conservation by equivocating biodiversity with species richness, despite species 
richness being unsuccessful at predicting the impact of human activity on ecosystems 
(Karr 1991, 69). They also argue that biodiversity fails to prioritise native over non-native 
elements, which implies that those who conserve biodiversity are often conserving the 
wrong thing (Angermeier 1994, 600; Angermeier 2000, 377; Angermeier and Karr 1994, 
691). Thus the conceptual challenge raised by Angermeier and Karr is a concern about 
misdirection of conservation effort. Biodiversity leads conservationists to focus on species 
richness when they should focus on ecosystem integrity, and it treats native and non-native 
species as equally valuable when the integrity of an ecosystem is improved by native 
elements. 
 Santana’s conceptual case for eliminating biodiversity is more severe than 
Angermeier and Karr’s. Whilst Angermeier and Karr present an external critique of 
biodiversity by appealing to other important elements of ecosystems, Santana presents an 
internal critique of biodiversity. He argues that the concept cannot fulfil the role we need it 
to in conservation because it is pulled in separate directions. There are many valuable 
elements of the biosphere so our conception of biodiversity must be a very general one. 
However, we need a specific conception of biodiversity for it to be operationalisable 
(Santana 2014, 762–63). He then argues that specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ fail to 
accurately capture the concept but general meanings are uninformative. So the concept 
requires both a specific and general meaning but neither is a good fit for conservation 
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biology. We are either left with a specific conception of biodiversity which falls short or a 
general one which is uninformative. Since both alternatives have serious problems, 
conservation would be better off eliminating biodiversity from discourse entirely. I have 
constructed Santana’s argument as follows. 
 
Santana’s Meaning-dilemma Argument 
 
1) ‘Biodiversity’ has either a general meaning or specific meaning but it cannot have 
both. 
2) General meanings of ‘biodiversity’ are uninformative because they are synonymous 
with ‘all of biology’. 
3) Specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ have numerous counterexamples. 
4) Conservation targets ought to be informative and lack numerous counterexamples. 
5) Therefore: ‘Biodiversity’ is either uninformative or has numerous counterexamples. 
6) Therefore: We ought not to use biodiversity as a conservation target. 
 
So Santana’s conceptual challenge to biodiversity relies on a dilemma over its meaning. 
This is an internal critique because it examines biodiversity against its own conceptual 
standard. Biodiversity is meant to incorporate multiple biological diversities, but however 
we conceptualise it is either incomplete or too vague to be a good fit for the goals of 
conservation. In the next section I will discuss a recent challenge to Santana’s case for 
eliminativism which argues that general conceptions of biodiversity do not warrant 
elimination just because they have multiple dimensions. 
2.3 Burch-Brown and Archer’s General Conception of Biodiversity 
In this section I discuss Burch-Brown and Archer’s response to Santana’s arguments for 
eliminativism. In In Defence of Biodiversity Burch-Brown and Archer argue that the 
classical multidimensional concept of biodiversity plays an important explanatory role in 
ecology in terms of both informativeness and normativity (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 
970–71).  Burch-Brown and Archer’s response to Santana is philosophically interesting 
because they accept much of Santana’s meaning-dilemma argument but deny that a 
general multi-dimensional conception of biodiversity is uninformative. 
 Burch-Brown and Archer begin by identifying the steps in Santana’s argument. In 
a similar construction to my meaning-dilemma argument, they argue that conceptions of 
biodiversity can be either specific dimensions or general multidimensional concepts. But 
neither account will suffice for the role which is demanded of biodiversity in conservation 
biology. Santana is concerned about the ability of biodiversity to reliably predict biological 
value (Santana 2017, 86). However, many valuable biological features do not correlate 
well with aspects of biodiversity, and general conceptions are too multi-dimensional to 
play useful explanatory roles in science (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 974). 
“Biodiversity does not capture all of what Santana calls ‘biological value’, and not all 
forms of diversity are valuable; thus the concept is both too broad and too narrow to be the 
primary target of conservation.” (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 970). Burch-Brown and 
Archer do not challenge the possibility that biodiversity can be understood as a single 
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dimension such as species richness. Instead they identify the contentious premise of 
Santana’s conceptual case for biodiversity eliminativism as a claim of uninformativeness. 
Biodiversity is uninformative because as a concept it is too inclusive and ambiguous to be 
useful.  
 Burch-Brown and Archer respond to Santana’s meaning-dilemma on two fronts. 
They reject his observation that multidimensional conceptions of biodiversity are 
uninformative. They then assume that his argument is successful but argue that 
uninformative concepts can still play important explanatory roles in conservation biology 
(Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 982). The purpose of their argument is to establish that 
conservation has good reasons to retain biodiversity even if ‘biodiversity’ does refer to 
every dimension of biological variation. Their strategy is philosophically interesting 
because they do not attempt to restrict the concept of biodiversity in the face of Santana’s 
arguments. In fact the multidimensional concept which they advocate for is more inclusive 
than that of Maclaurin and Sterelny (2008, 174). Where Maclaurin and Sterelny 
conceptualise biodiversity as a species-richness core with elements of phylogeny and 
morphology, Burch-Brown and Archer endorse biodiversity as an umbrella-concept for 
“all aspects of life’s variety” (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 982). So their conception of 
biodiversity is maximally general. It incorporates all dimensions of biological variance.   
 Burch-Brown and Archer then argue that their maximally general conception of 
biodiversity is still informative. They observe that Santana is concerned that general 
conceptions of biodiversity reduce to ‘all of biology’, then they point out elements of 
biological studies which are not a part of biodiversity.  
 
For example, many parts of biology essentially focus on explaining how things work, such as how 
cells are replicated, how energy is produced, how genes function at a molecular level, and so on. It 
may be part of these studies to look at biological diversity (diversity in forms of cells, or forms of 
energy production, for instance) but the study of variation does not encompass the whole of these 
sciences. Biodiversity does not include ‘all of biology’, although the study of variety is clearly of 
central interest within biological science. (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 983–84) 
 
Burch-Brown and Archer then assume that ‘biodiversity’ is no more informative than ‘all 
of biology’, but argue that biodiversity still has a useful role to play in conservation 
biology. Biodiversity functions as an explanans (a property which explains) because it 
explains important ecosystems behaviour and as an explanandum (a property which needs 
to be explained) because it is treated as an important property of ecosystems which needs 
to be described and explained (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 982 and 985). Burch-
Brown and Archer also argue that biodiversity has normative importance in biology. 
Biodiversity does not track ecological value well but it does not need to. The biological 
variety of life ought to be a priority for conservation because it tracks ecosystem services 
(Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 993). It is therefore one important element of the 
environment which should be valued and is not a surrogate for all the important elements 
of the environment. 
 This response to Santana’s conceptual case for eliminativism is important because 
it relies on excluding possibilities. Burch-Brown and Archer argue that ‘biodiversity’ is 
more informative than ‘all of biology’ because the concept of biodiversity does not include 
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studies of non-relational biological properties. In response to Santana’s arguments that 
biodiversity fails to track ecological value well, Burch-Brown and Archer exclude 
ecological value as a possible dimension of biodiversity. Instead they conclude that 
biodiversity “is one non-instrumentally valuable feature of the natural world” which tracks 
some elements of instrumental value (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 993). Burch-Brown 
and Archer’s response highlights two important strategies in the informativeness debate. A 
case can be made for informativeness if you demonstrate what biodiversity is not and 
separate some important conservational goals from biodiversity. Biodiversity has steadily 
incorporated more dimensions as time has passed so it will benefit from some restrictions. 
 Burch-Brown and Archer’s arguments are important for the strategy in this chapter 
but their conception of biodiversity is still vulnerable to Santana’s concern about 
uninformativeness. The problem is that their multidimensional concept is so broad that 
despite not reducing to ‘all of biology’ it is still not informative enough to advise 
conservation. They have excluded studies of non-relational properties but they also 
acknowledge that biologists are interested in the diversity of those properties (Burch-
Brown and Archer 2017, 984). The problem is that Burch-Brown and Archer want 
biodiversity to include “any and all variation amongst biota” (Burch-Brown and Archer 
2017, 981). Any concept which includes: species richness, abundance, phenotypic 
diversity, phylogenetic diversity, functional diversity, genetic diversity, ecological 
diversity, and process diversity, leaves little for biologists to study without studying 
biodiversity in some way. ‘Biodiversity’ is more informative than ‘all of biology’ but only 
marginally so.  
Their response misses the heart of Santana’s concern. Good scientific concepts are 
precise, testable, and informative. Burch-Brown and Archer’s conception of biodiversity 
looks general, difficult to test, and uninformative. Since conservation decisions should be 
guided by good science, Santana is contending that we should eliminate the umbrella 
concept in favour of its more specific dimensions (Santana 2018, 13). In the case of Burch-
Brown and Archer’s conception of biodiversity I find Santana’s concern about 
uninformativeness to be convincing. Biodiversity contains a constant tension between 
operationalisability for the goals of conservation and generality for the sake of capturing 
important biological elements. Burch-Brown and Archer’s account sacrifices too much 
operationalisability for the sake of generality. In the next section I will develop a different 
response to the conceptual case for biodiversity eliminativism. I develop a possibility 
discussed by Burch-Brown and Archer that biodiversity could be a homeostatic property 
cluster. 
2.4 Biodiversity as Homeostatic Property Cluster 
One possibility which Burch-Brown and Archer consider but do not develop is that 
biodiversity could be a homeostatic property cluster. Maclaurin also argues that 
biodiversity could be understood as an HPC but does not develop the possibility in detail 
(Maclaurin 2017, 63–66). Homeostatic property clusters identify kinds based on a cluster 
of co-occurring properties whose rise and fall is controlled by a homeostatic mechanism 
(Boyd 1991, 141). In the case of species the ‘species’ kind incorporates co-occurring 
properties over multiple conceptions of species but the mechanisms of external pressures 
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and genetic exchange between organisms keep the properties in sufficient homeostasis for 
the kind to be inductively successful  (Boyd 1999b, 81). HPCs are an important conceptual 
possibility because biodiversity has similar conceptual problems to species and HPCs 
provide an excellent account of species-hood. Both are general concepts with multiple 
dimensions but any specific conception has serious counterexamples (Hull 1997). Despite 
this we have not —and I hope will not— eliminate ‘species’ from biology. Instead 
biologists have diverse views. Some are realist pluralists about species (Mishler and 
Donoghue 1982, 500) and some understand it as a homeostatic property cluster (Boyd 
1989, 142)  
 Burch-Brown and Archer point out that a HPC conception of biodiversity escapes 
Santana’s meaning-dilemma. 
 
One response would be to claim that this argument assumes too strong a standard for biological 
kinds. For instance, on the Homeostatic Cluster Properties conception of natural kinds, there may be 
no properties that all instances of a kind share, but if the important properties tend on the whole to 
cluster together, and if a mechanistic explanation can be given for this clustering (such as species 
boundaries), then there might be a biological kind. One strategy for replying to Santana, therefore, 
would be to seek to show that the dimensions of diversity do tend to be reasonably strongly 
clustered, and that there are underlying mechanisms for this clustering. (Burch-Brown and Archer 
2017, 975–76) 
 
However, as Santana observes in his reply, Burch-Brown and Archer do not develop this 
possibility further. “They don’t develop this suggestion at all, however, presumably 
because it is implausible that there is any mechanism maintaining homeostasis across the 
different dimensions of biodiversity.” (Santana 2018, 4) In this section I will argue that 
biodiversity can be understood as a homeostatic property cluster which escapes the 
conceptual case for its elimination. First I will explain the concept of homeostatic property 
clusters, and then I will argue that biodiversity is a homeostatic property cluster. Then I 
will argue that Santana’s objections to biodiversity as a HPC do not fully consider how 
well the HPC concept can address biodiversity’s problems. I further motivate this 
argument in section 2.5 with the example of species as an HPC.  
 
2.4.1 Homeostatic Property Clusters 
In this sub-section I will explain what a homeostatic property cluster is. I will argue that 
HPCs play an important role in biology at explaining biological kinds. Biological kinds are 
difficult to categorise because they sit on various continuums. The continual nature of 
species-hood—for example—leads to counterexamples. So while there are multiple 
concepts for species-hood, no individual concept correctly groups organisms by their 
species (Boyd 1999b, 72). Homeostatic property clusters provide an alternative account of 
species-hood which satisfies the demands of both scientists and philosophers. Likewise 
homeostatic property clusters can provide an alternative account of biodiversity which 
satisfies the conceptual demands of conservation biology. It is just a matter of outlining the 
property cluster conditions and arguing that biodiversity should be understood as a 
homeostatic property cluster.  
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 Homeostatic property clusters are groups of properties whose connection is 
controlled by a homeostatic mechanism. A homeostatic mechanism is a mechanism which 
tends to make properties occur together (Boyd 1991, 141). It is the tendency rather than 
out right regularity which is of use to the conceptual challenges facing biodiversity. A key 
motivating observation in the conceptual case for biodiversity eliminativism is the 
observation that the individual dimensions of biodiversity do not co-vary in important 
ways (Santana 2014, 768). Under a HPC conception of biodiversity the various dimensions 
do not need to co-vary (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 976). For example, health is a 
homeostatic property cluster of normative biological function. Its various dimensions such 
as blood pressure, temperature, liver function, and heart rate, do tend to co-vary but they 
can also come apart in important ways. A broken arm may co-vary with an increased heart 
rate whilst liver function and mental health remain steady.  
The ability to gather together properties which tend to co-vary—but can also 
behave independently—is why HPCs are a useful analytic tool for studies of biological 
kinds (Santana 2018, 4). Biology is a science of continuums which makes identifying 
necessary and sufficient conditions for group membership a difficult task. Special sciences 
such as psychology deal with multiply-realised categories. Pain may be understood as c-
fibre firing in human beings but could also be realised by multiple distinct neural systems. 
HPCs can help with the conceptual difficulties in both these areas as well as with kind 
identification in the historical sciences (Boyd 1999b, 84). So a homeostatic property 
cluster analysis is well suited to the conceptual challenges facing biodiversity. It has been 
used before to solve a conceptual challenge in biology; the challenge of categorising 
species-hood. 
Species are the paradigm case of the success of an HPC analysis. Whilst most 
academic work recognises that ‘species’ describes a natural kind, the attempt to carve 
nature at its joints was plagued with counterexamples (Boyd 1999b, 72). There are 
multiple ways to conceptualise species but each individual concept has counterexamples. 
In this thesis’s chapter on species, I will discuss the difficulties of conceptualising species-
hood in more detail but the important point for this chapter is that a HPC conception of 
species can explain why multiple concepts are needed but can still defend the concept as a 
natural kind. 
 
The paradigm cases of natural kinds - biological species - are homeostatic cluster kinds. The 
appropriateness of any particular biological species for induction and explanation in biology 
depends upon the imperfectly shared and homeostatically related morphological, physiological and 
behavioural features which characterize its members. The definitional role of mechanisms of 
homeostasis is reflected in the role of interbreeding in the modern species concept; for sexually 
reproducing species, the exchange of genetic material between populations is thought by some 
evolutionary biologists to be essential to the homeostatic unity of the other properties characteristic 
of the species and it is thus reflected in the species definition which they propose. (Boyd 1989, 17) 
 
Boyd goes on to explicitly reject the possibility that there could be a single species 
concept because of the continual nature of species-hood and the different ways in which 
genetic information is passed on. 
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Any “refinement” of classification which artificially eliminated the resulting indeterminacy in 
classification would obscure the central fact about heritable variations in phenotype upon which 
biological evolution depends. More determinate species categories would be scientifically 
inappropriate and misleading. (Boyd 1989, 18) 
 
So HPCs are a flexible concept with a successful history in biology. They are also highly 
relevant to the conceptual case for biodiversity eliminativism that the solution to the 
‘species’ problem involved embracing its problem areas. A HPC account of species-hood 
requires that there are counterexamples and that some dimensions of species-hood such as 
reproductive isolation do not always co-vary with other dimensions such as cladistics 
(Boyd 1991, 142). The conceptual challenge to biodiversity has similar features. There are 
multiple ways to conceptualise biodiversity, no individual dimension gets everything 
correct, the dimensions co-vary but also vary independently of one another, and each 
dimensions seems indispensable to biodiversity. 
 Boyd provides the following conditions for homeostatic property clusters. t is a 
homeostatic property cluster if and only if: 
 
1) There is a family F of properties which are contingently clustered in nature in the 
sense that they co-occur in an important number of cases.  
 
2) Their co-occurrence is, at least typically, the result of what may be metaphorically 
(sometimes literally) described as a sort of homeostasis.   
 
3) The homeostatic clustering of the properties in F is causally important.   
 
4) There is a kind term t which is applied to things in which the homeostatic 
clustering of most of the properties in F occurs.  
 
5) t has no analytic definition; rather all or part of the homeostatic cluster F together 
with some or all of the mechanisms which underlie it provide the natural definition 
of t.   
 
6) Imperfect homeostasis is nomologically possible or actual: something may display 
some but not all of the properties in F; some but not all of the relevant underlying 
homeostatic mechanisms may be present.  
 
7) In such cases, the relative importance of the various properties in F and of the 
various mechanisms in determining whether the thing falls under t - if it can be 
determined at all - is a theoretical rather than a conceptual issue.  
 
8) Moreover, there will be many cases of extensional “vagueness” which are such that 
they are not resolvable even given all the relevant facts and all the true theories.   
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9) The causal importance of the homeostatic property cluster F together with the 
relevant underlying homeostatic mechanisms is such that the kind or property 
denoted by t is a natural kind.  
 
10) No refinement of usage which replaces t by a significantly less extensionally vague 
term will preserve the naturalness of the kind referred to.   
 
11) The homeostatic property cluster which serves to define t is not individuated 
extensionally. Instead, the property cluster is individuated like a (type or token) 
historical object or process. (Boyd 1989, 16–17) 
 
Condition one in this definition requires that there exists a cluster of properties. Species, 
such as the kiwi have a cluster of recognisable properties. They have long narrow beaks, 
two legs, vestigial wings, nocturnal habits, etc which tend to instantiate together. The 
species concept distinguishes between a kiwi and an earth worm because the properties 
tend to cluster in different ways. Condition two requires that the clustering of those 
properties is determined by a homeostatic mechanism. There needs to be an underlying 
mechanism which tends to maintain clustering between the properties in F. Without a 
mechanism to explain why kiwi properties and earth worm properties cluster differently, 
the clustering is coincidental. Condition three requires that the clustering is causally 
important. The clustering of the properties in F needs to produce an important effect. 
Speciation is a causally important effect because it impacts competition between 
organisms (among several other effects.)  
Condition four requires that there is an identifiable kind. There must be a 
recognisable category which the properties cluster around. ‘Species’ is a recognisable 
category which picks out clusters of morphological, physiological, and behavioural 
properties. Other categories such as ‘all the objects within one meter of my knee’ are less 
recognisable. Condition five disqualifies analytic concepts as HPCs. Whilst ‘vixen’ picks 
out an important cluster of properties (female fox), the category is given by definition.  
Condition six allows for the mechanisms of the homeostasis not to always co-vary. 
The morphological, physiological, and behavioural properties of species may vary 
independently of one another. Mistaking a honey bee for a wasp can be a painful mistake. 
Condition seven dictates that in cases of imperfect homeostasis, such as those described in 
condition six, membership in the HPC becomes a theoretical issue. Boyd emphasised the 
importance of definitions of scientific kinds to be determined by empirical observations 
and subject to theory-determined revisions (Boyd 1989, 10). In the case of species, the 
reproductive isolation of organisms alters the defining property clusters which pick out 
species (Boyd 1989, 18). Which organisms belong to which species is an ongoing 
discussion that is subject to revision based on the path that evolution takes. Condition eight 
requires that t have vagueness based counterexamples to its specific dimensions and allows 
for those dimensions to vary independently “There will be things which display some but 
not all of the properties in F” (Boyd 1989, 17). In section 2.5.1 I will discuss the multiple 
conceptions of species which includes discussion of how species may be categorised 
differently depending on the applied concept. 
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Condition nine requires that the HPC in question refers to a natural kind. The 
natural kind is the concept which is supported by the cluster of properties. There are many 
different ways to think of natural kinds. They are categories which pick out something real 
about the world or carve nature at the joints. ‘Gold’ picks out a natural kind but ‘the 
distance between my ear lobe and my big toe’ does not. Condition Ten states that 
attempting to understand t under a single dimension would be misleading because “Any 
such refinement would either require that we treat as important distinctions which are 
irrelevant to causal explanation or to induction, or that we ignore similarities which are 
important in just these ways” (Boyd 1989, 17). In section 2.5.2 I will argue that the 
biodiversity problem is similar to the species problem because understanding it along a 
single dimension means that we would fail to consider important biological phenomena. 
The final condition, eleven, is a complex one which allows for the HPC to weather 
changes in specific properties over time. In a sense HPCs are bigger than any specific 
dimension. Evolution may discard one or more of the biological processes that are part of a 
homeostatic property cluster without loss of the cluster (Boyd 1989, 16–17). The 
biological species concept is a dominant model for many species but species did not 
always reproduce sexually. So that dimension has been added into species as sexual 
reproduction developed in organisms through evolution. The details of homeostatic 
property clusters are technical but it is the technical nature which leaves it uniquely suited 
to explain conceptually complex kinds like biodiversity. In the next sub section I will 
argue that the conceptually challenged property of biodiversity is actually a homeostatic 
property cluster. 
 
2.4.2 Why Biodiversity is a Homeostatic Property Cluster  
In the last subsection I explained what a homeostatic property cluster is. In this subsection 
I will argue that biodiversity is a homeostatic property cluster. I will argue that biodiversity 
satisfies the eleven conditions for a homeostatic property cluster set out by Boyd. 
Biodiversity satisfies all of Boyd’s (Boyd 1989, 16–17) conditions for a homeostatic 
property cluster. Where t stands for ‘biodiversity’, biodiversity is a homeostatic property 
cluster if and only if: 
 
1) There is a family F of properties which are contingently clustered in nature in the 
sense that they co-occur in an important number of cases. 
 
The family of properties which are contingently clustered in nature are the specific 
meanings of ‘biodiversity’ discussed in chapter one: species richness, phenetic diversity, 
phylogenetic diversity, etc. Santana has named this group of properties ‘SEGO’ for species 
richness, ecosystem services, genetic diversity, and others (Santana 2018, 6). Exactly 
which proposed specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ are candidates for dimensions of 
biodiversity will be discussed in more detail in section 3.4. In that section I discuss what an 
HPC conception of biodiversity is not and argue that several proposed dimensions of 
biological variation such as evenly distributed abundance and ecosystem diversity are not 
dimensions of biodiversity. The other dimensions of biodiversity such as species richness, 
phenotypic diversity, and phylogenetic diversity constitute a family of properties because 
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they do co-occur in a number of cases. Species richness is a product of evolution, 
phylogenetic diversity is a product of the evolutionary relationships between those species, 
and phenotypic diversity is one of the important factors which allow us to determine one 
species from another. 
 
2) Their co-occurrence is, at least typically, the result of what may be metaphorically 
(sometimes literally) described as a sort of homeostasis.  
 
Homeostasis is the tendency of a common rise and fall among properties. In the 
case of biodiversity it is the tendency of dimensions such as species richness to co-vary 
with phylogenetic diversity and phenetic diversity. The role of ‘tendency’ is important 
here. Properties may vary independently while the other dimensions are maintained by the 
homeostasis. What is important for a HPC is that there is an overall homeostasis. This 
overall co-variance of properties is present for biodiversity because species richness 
increases with speciation. For two organisms to be considered distinct species they must 
possess different phenetic and phylogenetic characteristics.  
There is sufficient homeostasis between the dimensions of biodiversity that our 
measurement strategy relies on using one dimension of biodiversity to approximate the 
other dimensions. This is called the surrogacy strategy and I discuss it in detail in chapter 
four. In that chapter, and chapters five and six, I argue that there is significant between-
surrogate correlation of the dimensions of biodiversity. At times, accurately quantifying 
that correlation is difficult because of the different nature of the dimensions of the 
biodiversity. Despite the imperfect stasis between the dimensions, there is still sufficient 
homeostasis for us to use individual dimensions as key indicators of biodiversity. An 
excellent example of this is phylogenetic diversity. In section 5.5 I provide a detailed 
analysis of phylogenetic diversity and argue that it correlates highly with other dimensions 
of biodiversity such as: species richness, genus richness, habitat diversity, and functional 
diversity (Grenyer et al. 2007, 757 and Faith 1996, 1287). So there is a homeostatic 
relationship between the specific dimensions of biodiversity.  
 
3) The homeostatic clustering of the properties in F is causally important.  
 
The causal importance of property clustering is the relationship which Burch-
Brown and Archer argue for. There is a relationship between high biodiversity and other 
important features such as ecosystem services and stability (Burch-Brown and Archer 
2017, 985). A biodiverse ecosystem yields a variety of ecosystem services for human 
beings to thrive on. It provides greater options for adaptions, innovation, and alternative 
resources if preferred resources are depleted. Stability is another important cause of the 
clustering of the dimensions of biodiversity. The relationship between stability and 
biodiversity is complicated because it is not always the case that high diversity correlates 
with high stability (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 121). In general though, we expect 
diverse ecosystems to weather change more successfully because ecosystems with all the 
same strengths have all the same weaknesses.  
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If Santana’s arguments against these relationships between biodiversity and its 
causally important effects were successful, there would still be other causally important 
biodiversity effects such as option value theory. Option value theory is the theory that 
future generations benefit from having as many environmental options as possible (Forsyth 
2000, 414). We do not know exactly which biological resources will be important in the 
future so it behoves us to preserve the greatest biological diversity possible (Maclaurin and 
Lean 2016, 32). Preserving a diverse array of biological organisms essentially hedges our 
bets against multiple possible futures. There are common resources which we expect 
future generations of humans to need, such as clean air and water, but is not clear which 
organisms will be the most important to future generations. Unknown Flora or fauna may 
be important in the future for medical discoveries and we do not know which extinctions 
future generations may lament the most. Biodiversity is causally important because it 
preserves this option value (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 154).  
 
4) There is a kind term t which is applied to things in which the homeostatic 
clustering of most of the properties in F occurs. 
 
The kind term t is ‘biodiversity’. Biodiversity is a cluster of its various specific dimensions 
such as species richness, phylogenetic diversity, genetic diversity, phenotypic diversity etc. 
The imperfect clustering of these dimensions together is the property of biodiversity. I say 
‘imperfect’ because the clustering applies to most of the properties in F rather than all of 
them. Under condition 6, homeostatic property clusters allow for imperfect homeostasis. 
 
5) t has no analytic definition; rather all or part of the homeostatic cluster F together 
with some or all of the mechanisms which underlie it provide the natural definition 
of t.   
 
‘Biodiversity’ has no analytic definition. I considered its analytic beginning in chapter one 
but argued that it quickly grew as a concept beyond species richness to accommodate other 
important dimensions. Concepts which are revised in the face of empirical evidence are 
not analytic. Instead they are a posteriori concepts which are revisable in the light of 
future experience. It is these kinds of theory-laden concepts, rather than analytic concepts, 
which Boyd has in mind when he developed the conditions for homeostatic property 
clusters (Boyd 1989, 10). 
 
6) Imperfect homeostasis is nomologically possible or actual: something may display 
some but not all of the properties in F; some but not all of the relevant underlying 
homeostatic mechanisms may be present. 
 
Biodiversity demonstrates imperfect homeostasis. The motivating evidence for Santana’s 
conceptual challenges were the observations that its various dimensions come apart in 
important ways (Santana 2014, 768–73). Santana argues that there is not sufficient 
correlation between the dimensions of biodiversity for us to warrant considering it a 
property bundle (Santana 2014, 761). Two examples he uses are that species richness 
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increases as latitude decreases—but this effect is not consistent with other dimensions such 
as genetic diversity (Santana 2018, 4)—and that phylogenetic diversity and species 
diversity come apart on the South Africa Cape region. The eastern region of the cape has 
higher phylogenetic diversity while the western region has higher species richness 
(Santana 2014, 771). There is no contention between my arguments and those of 
eliminativists as to whether the dimensions of biodiversity demonstrate imperfect 
homeostasis. We only disagree on whether they demonstrate useful homeostasis as well as 
imperfect homeostasis. 
 
7) In such cases, the relative importance of the various properties in F and of the 
various mechanisms in determining whether the thing falls under t - if it can be 
determined at all - is a theoretical rather than a conceptual issue. 
 
Boyd’s seventh condition of HPCs states that it is a matter of current empirical 
theory rather than analytic analysis how important any particular dimension or mechanism 
is to the kind. This condition allows for specific dimensions or mechanisms to come or go 
from the kind. Reproductive isolation is an important dimension of the species concept, 
but given the possible ways in which species could have evolved there is some possible 
world in which the species concept does not have a dimension of reproductive 
isolation(Hull 1997). In the case of biodiversity it matters that the debate over which 
dimensions are included in biodiversity is a theoretical debate rather than a conceptual 
issue. Much of Burch-Brown and Archer’s paper—for instance—is dedicated to such a 
theoretical debate (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017).  
That theoretical debate is important because biodiversity needs to adapt to new 
biological discoveries. If at some stage, human beings discover life on other planets, it 
may well be microbial. That planet would have biodiversity but the biodiversity concept 
for that planet would look quite different to that of Earth. The phylogenetic map between 
species would be much smaller if the life was (relatively) newly evolved. The species core 
would lack a biological species concept because the survival of genes is not reliant on 
sexual reproduction. Morphology would be a dominant dimension because it is a useful 
tool for studying microbial life forms. There would be lower functional diversity because 
of simpler interactions between organisms. The biodiversity concept adapts to evolution 
and biological discoveries, so theoretical debate is essential for its justification. 
 
8) Moreover, there will be many cases of extensional “vagueness” which are such that 
they are not resolvable even given all the relevant facts and all the true theories.  
 
Cases of extensional vagueness over membership in biodiversity are common in 
the literature. Angermeier argues that introducing non-native species into an ecosystem 
lowers biodiversity (Angermeier 1994, 600) whilst some authors argue that it increases 
biodiversity. The same problems occur for desert conservation. Some authors argue that 
biodiversity hotspots focus conservation away from biodiversity coldspots (Santana 2014, 
772–73). Deserts are an important element of biodiversity, even if they are comparatively 
lower in bio mass (Durant et al. 2014, 116). These are cases of extensional vagueness 
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because it is not clear if the dimensions they represent are a part of biodiversity or not. In 
chapters seven and eight of this thesis I dedicate much space to disentangling the concept 
of biodiversity from the concept of biological value. I argue that one of the reasons for the 
conceptual bloat that biodiversity has suffered is that dimensions of biological value have 
been added into it.  
I will offer two further examples of extensional vagueness to justify the claim that 
biodiversity satisfies condition 8 of homeostatic property clusters: abundance and viruses. 
In section 3.4 I will argue that the abundance of species—in the sense that all species in an 
ecosystem have the same population— is not a dimension of biodiversity. Despite its 
importance for distinguishing species richness from species diversity, questions of 
abundance are a better dimension of ecosystem health than of biodiversity. That there is a 
strong argument both for including and excluding abundance as a dimension of 
biodiversity is a common feature of extensional vagueness.  
Another extensionally vague element of biodiversity is the role that viruses occupy. 
Viruses are a quasi-species concept because, whilst they bear most of the properties of 
living organisms, they occupy an extensionally vague ground between living organism and 
chemical reaction (Van Regenmortel 1997, 18). Because of that vague middle ground, they 
also occupy an extensionally vague ground within biodiversity because ‘biodiversity’ 
fundamentally refers to the variation of biological organisms. In particular, the 
membership of viruses in biodiversity may not be resolvable given all the relevant facts 
and true theories. So, biodiversity satisfies condition 8 of homeostatic property clusters.  
 
9) The causal importance of the homeostatic property cluster F together with the 
relevant underlying homeostatic mechanisms is such that the kind or property 
denoted by t is a natural kind. 
 
Boyd has a realist preference for HPCs. In his ninth condition, he argues that they 
should be understood as natural kinds (Boyd 1991). In the case of biodiversity, there are a 
number of arguments that biodiversity is a natural kind, such as those by Maclaurin 
(Maclaurin 2017) who discusses biodiversity as a natural kind, natural quality, and HPC. 
These arguments are convincing. Biodiversity is a rapidly diminishing resource and 
conservationists are attempting to preserve it (Faith 2008, section 1). Biodiversity carves 
nature at the joints but is the task of conceptual analysis to explain how it does that. It is 
not surprising that such conceptual analysis would require much debate because by the 
very nature of homeostatic property clusters, biodiversity is an empirical concept which is 
subject to revision in the light of future experience. Biodiversity is a natural kind so it 
satisfies condition 9.  
 
10) No refinement of usage which replaces t by a significantly less extensionally vague 
term will preserve the naturalness of the kind referred to.  
 
Biodiversity satisfies condition ten because understanding biodiversity as one of its 
specific dimensions misses important elements of biological variation. Refining the usage 
of Biodiversity with a significantly less extensionally vague term is what happens if we 
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employ a specific meaning of ‘biodiversity’ which only refers to one or two dimensions of 
biological variation. We could replace biodiversity with a single dimension such as species 
richness but then we would have a conservation priority which overlooked other important 
biological properties such as phenetics, genetics, species diversity, and phylogenetic 
diversity. In sections 1.4.2 to section 1.4.7 I outlined several reasons to believe that there is 
more to biodiversity than species richness. Because of phylogenetic, phenotypic, and other 
differences two groups of 100 species can represent different amounts of biodiversity. 
Refining Biodiversity to just species richness will not preserve the naturalness of the kind; 
so too for the other dimensions of biodiversity. In section 1.4.8 I argued that the specific 
dimensions of biodiversity are counterexamples to any particular dimension of biodiversity 
which purports to represent all of biodiversity. That is because each dimension identifies 
an important element of biological variation. Thus it would not be an improvement to 
understand biodiversity along one or two dimensions 
 
11) The homeostatic property cluster which serves to define t is not individuated 
extensionally. Instead, the property cluster is individuated like a (type or token) 
historical object or process. (Boyd 1989, 16–17) 
 
The homeostatic property cluster which distinguishes biodiversity from other parts 
of biology is not defined by a list of members. This is one way that a HPC concept is 
different from the classical multi-dimensional concept of Burch-Brown and Archer. Under 
the classical multi-dimensional concept biodiversity can be defined by a list of all its 
dimensions. Under a HPC concept biodiversity persists as individual dimensions are added 
or eliminated through historical processes. In a fictitious example, imagine that we 
discover a planet whose biological life was perfectly preserved in an instantaneous flash 
freeze. Such a planet still has biodiversity in the sense of species richness and evolutionary 
history but because none of the organisms are interacting with one another it has no 
functional diversity. If the planet thaws and the organisms survive then they will begin to 
interact and raise the functional diversity. The property cluster of dimensions which makes 
up biodiversity changes like a historical process.  
Biodiversity satisfies all eleven conditions for a homeostatic property cluster. The 
conceptual challenges which biodiversity faces are not evidence that the concept should be 
eliminated. They are evidence that biodiversity is a homeostatic property cluster. Such 
challenges are normal for a HPC, and as such biodiversity is just another complex 
umbrella concept.  
The conceptual challenges to biodiversity are less convincing when we consider 
them in relation to the conceptual challenges facing other complex properties like 
‘gender’. Sex was once conceived of as a matter of biology for human beings (Ayala and 
Vasilyeva 2015, 730).  A human being with an XX chromosome pair was female; a human 
being with an XY chromosome pair was male. Gender was then distinguished from sex to 
accommodate gender identity and counterexamples to the biological conception of sex 
(Mikkola 2009, 560; Stone 2004, 139). Now, some accounts of ‘gender’ make it a matter 
of placement along multiple continuums (Ayala and Vasilyeva 2015, 727; Mikkola 2009, 
560). Biological sex is still a matter of chromosomes but the distinction struggles because 
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people’s chromosomes do not neatly group into binary categories (Ayala and Vasilyeva 
2015, 727). They can have different combinations such as XXY. So, the gender concept 
also includes gender assigned at birth, the gender a person identifies with, the gender a 
person is attracted to, and the gender a person prefers to express themselves as.  
Like biodiversity, gender also has multiple dimensions which tend to co-vary but 
also come apart in important ways. As an example, a person could be born with androgen 
insensitivity syndrome. In a normal pregnancy the Y chromosome detects androgens in the 
womb and triggers the development of male phenotypic characteristics. With androgen 
insensitivity syndrome the Y chromosome does not respond to androgens, so the foetus 
will develop female phenotypic characteristics whilst being a genetic male. They could 
identify as pan-gender whilst being attracted to males but express themselves as female. 
As with biodiversity, there has been a shift towards eliminating the concept of gender but 
that generated a push for retaining the concept (Stone 2004, 137). This was because, in 
part, social science benefits from having a concept which correctly identifies members of a 
vulnerable and oppressed group (Mikkola 2009, 561). 
Biodiversity is just another sufficiently complex property in which multiple 
dimensions co-vary but can also act independently of one another. The conceptual case for 
biodiversity eliminativism cannot establish that biodiversity should be eliminated because 
of conflict between its dimensions. A homeostatic property cluster requires the clustering 
dimensions to conflict with one another. In this subsection I argued that biodiversity is a 
homeostatic property cluster. I argued that biodiversity satisfies the eleven conditions set 
out by Boyd. In the next subsection I will respond to Santana’s objections to the possibility 
that biodiversity could be a homeostatic property cluster. 
 
2.4.3 Santana’s Case against Biodiversity as a Homeostatic Property 
Cluster 
In this section I consider Santana’s objections to HPC conceptions of biodiversity. His 
arguments are a response to Burch-Brown and Archer’s suggestion that biodiversity could 
be understood as a HPC. He argues that biodiversity cannot be a HPC because there is no 
plausible underlying mechanism which could unite all the relevant properties. In response, 
I argue that speciation is a plausible homeostatic mechanism for the multiple dimensions 
of biodiversity. I also argue that Santana swiftly discounts the possibility that biodiversity 
is a homeostatic property cluster. He does not consider important similarities between the 
application of HPC to the species problem and the application of HPC to the biodiversity 
problem. I also argue that the counterexamples to specific meanings of ‘biodiversity’ 
which motivate Santana’s conceptual challenge are a normal feature of a homeostatic 
property cluster. Understood as a homeostatic property cluster, biodiversity is expected to 
have multiple dimensions which tend to co-vary but also come apart in important ways.  
Santana considers Burch-Brown and Archer’s suggestion that biodiversity could be 
a homeostatic property cluster but argues that it is an implausible possibility. Burch-Brown 
and Archer point out that a HPC concept of biodiversity would avoid many of Santana’s 
objections because under a HPC concept multiple dimensions can vary independently of 
one another (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 976). In response Santana argues that there is 
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no plausible mechanism which could unite the different properties of biodiversity. 
 
They don’t develop this suggestion at all, however, presumably because it is implausible that there 
is any mechanism maintaining homeostasis across the different dimensions of biodiversity. 
Primarily this is because different dimensions of biodiversity are not even properties of the same 
types of entities. (Santana 2018, 4) 
 
The problem, as Santana portrays it, is that biodiversity is typically construed along three 
different hierarchies: genes, species or populations, and ecosystems. So, a plausible 
homeostatic mechanism needs to unite properties across different levels (Santana 2018, 4). 
As an example, Santana considers natural selection as a candidate for the homeostatic 
mechanism and rejects it. 
 
. . . under most selective regimes it inhibits genetic diversity; mutation is the primary driver of 
genetic diversity, and the vast majority of genetic diversity created by mutation is quickly pruned 
away by selection. And selection’s effect on trait diversity is mixed, since it acts as a promotor by 
sustaining novel adaptations but also as an inhibitor through convergent evolution. (Santana 2018, 
4) 
 
Santana’s objections overlook important features of homeostatic property clusters.  
He argues that no single mechanism could unite the disparate dimensions of biodiversity. 
But Boyd’s seventh condition of HPCs allows for multiple mechanisms “. . .  the relative 
importance of the various properties in F and of the various mechanisms in determining 
whether the thing falls under t.” (Boyd 1989, 16 emphasis added).  
Santana also observes that the dimensions of biodiversity vary independently.  
 
Species richness increases as latitude decreases, for instance (Hillebrand 2004), but whatever 
correlate of latitude causes this doesn’t seem to affect every dimension of diversity. Genetic 
diversity within species, for instance, is probably not affected, and even species richness within 
certain taxa, such as certain avian and planktonic groups, turns out to have the opposite relationship 
with latitude (ibid). (Santana 2018, 4) 
 
But the conditions of a HPC allow for independent variation. Condition six states that 
“Imperfect homeostasis is nomologically possible or actual: something may display some 
but not all of the properties in F; some but not all of the relevant underlying homeostatic 
mechanisms may be present.” (Boyd 1989, 16). These oversights indicate that Santana is 
working with an idea of HPCs which is not fully fleshed out. An HPC concept which 
required a single homeostatic mechanism and perfect homeostasis would be inappropriate 
for biodiversity but the conceptual challenges facing biodiversity are not problematic for a 
pluralistic account of homeostatic property clusters. 
 The tension between a fully fleshed out account of homeostatic property clusters 
and the restricted notion that Santana is working with is evident when we consider the 
application of HPCs to the species problem. Santana uses the species problem to highlight 
why a HPC analysis could solve the biodiversity problem. 
 
The virtue of the HPC account of kinds is that it doesn’t pick out any single property or set of 
properties as essential for kind membership, and thus tends to accommodate biological kinds better 
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than alternatives. Instead, it requires the presence of a mechanism which maintains similarity among 
kind members. Reproductive barriers, for instance, ensure that members of sexually-reproducing 
biological species tend to be more similar to each other than to other organisms. (Santana 2018, 3–
4) 
 
But Santana is misrepresenting how a HPC analysis addresses the species problem. 
Reproductive barriers only function as a homeostatic mechanism for species which 
reproduce sexually. That excludes micro-organisms, hybridisation, and ring species.  In 
fact the homeostatic mechanism for species is much more complex because of the 
“imperfectly shared and homeostatically related morphological, physiological and 
behavioural features which characterize its members.” (Boyd 1989, 17). Boyd later 
clarifies his position that he was not relying solely on Mayr’s biological species concept, 
as many commenters interpreted his position exactly as Santana did. 
 
I didn't intend to subscribe to Mayr's biological species definition, but simply to refer to it, and to 
indicate that, for those cases in which it provides some insight into what defines a species, it 
validates the HPC conception. Every commentator I have read (or spoken with) about what I wrote 
has taken me to endorse roughly Mayr's conception, so obviously the problem lies in the unclarity 
of my exposition. (Boyd 1999b, 79) 
 
The ‘species’ solution should be understood as an HPC with multiple homeostatic 
mechanisms which unite the morphological, physiological and behavioural features of 
distinct species. Santana uses species as an example of a successful HPC. Since SEGO 
(species richness, ecosystem services, genetic diversity, and others) can be united by a 
homeostatic mechanism in the case of species, it is difficult to see why—in biodiversity’s 
case—SEGO could not also be united by a homeostatic mechanism. A more detailed 
account of homeostatic property clusters indicates that a homeostatic mechanism which 
could unite the various dimensions of biodiversity is plausible. Santana is correct in 
arguing that the dimensions of biodiversity do vary independently of each other, but this 
kind of imperfect homeostasis is a feature of species as well as biodiversity. In fact Boyd 
explicitly rejects any changes to ‘species’ for the sake of eliminating the conceptual 
challenges. 
 
Any “refinement” of classification which artificially eliminated the resulting indeterminacy in 
classification would obscure the central fact about heritable variations in phenotype upon which 
biological evolution depends. More determinate species categories would be scientifically 
inappropriate and misleading. (Boyd 1989, 18) 
 
Homeostatic property clusters embrace conceptual complexity. So a more detailed analysis 
of HPCs indicates that they are well suited to the biodiversity problem. Important 
similarities between the species problem and the biodiversity problem indicate that a 
homeostatic mechanism can maintain similarity among the dimensions of biodiversity. It is 
just a matter of identifying it. 
 The homeostatic mechanism which maintains co-variance among the dimensions 
of biodiversity is speciation. I will not cover the relationship between speciation and every 
dimension of biodiversity but I will argue that speciation should satisfy Santana’s 
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concerns. Since species itself is a HPC, speciation already has a close relationship with 
morphological, physiological, and behavioural features. In the case of biodiversity, 
speciation affects species richness and diversity. It also affects phenotypic diversity 
because organisms must have distinct physical characteristics to be different species. 
Speciation therefore also affects genetic diversity because it is genetics which bring about 
phenotypic changes through mutation and selection. Speciation affects phylogenetics 
because the emergence of a new species is an adaptation to a new ecological niche or 
changing environmental pressures. Lastly, speciation also affects functional diversity 
because functions and other behavioural features are adaptations to ecological niches, and 
it is these adaptations which help to distinguish one species from another. 
 These examples satisfy Santana’s concern about the implausibility of a homeostatic 
mechanism for the first two levels of biodiversity. The diversity of genetic material, 
phenotypic features, evolutionary history, and functional adaptations are maintained in an 
imperfect homeostasis by the act of speciation. The third level, which contains ecosystem 
diversity, is more difficult to argue for because it is a property of ecosystems or sometimes 
groups of ecosystems (Santana 2018, 4). A possible response is to argue that ecosystem 
diversity is not a focus on a diversity of landscapes so much as on the unique functional 
adaptations which those landscapes produce. Whilst conservation might be concerned with 
rocky landscapes as well as deserts, biodiversity is a focus on the diversity of biological 
organisms. In that sense, biodiversity is concerned with the functional adaptations to rocky 
landscapes and the interactions between organisms which live in extreme desert 
temperatures. It is the functional diversity of organisms rather than a diversity of 
landscapes which are important targets for conservation. It just happens that preserving the 
landscapes is important for preserving the organisms. 
 One objection to this line of reasoning is to disagree with my argument and 
maintain the idea that maintaining a diversity of ecosystems is an important goal for 
conservation. In that situation the biodiversity theorist has the option of excluding 
ecosystem diversity from the biodiversity umbrella. One important difference between a 
HPC concept of biodiversity and the classical multi-dimensional concept advocated by 
Burch-Brown and Archer is that biodiversity does not include every dimension of 
biological variation. It only includes biological variations which are part of the 
homeostasis united by acts of speciation. If ecosystem diversity is not affected by 
speciation then the theorist is in a good position to argue that despite being an important 
goal for conservation it is not a part of biodiversity. One could object further and argue 
that ecosystem diversity should be included in biodiversity, but including too many 
dimensions takes the concept further down the slippery slope to Santana’s meaning-
dilemma. 
 Excluding one or more dimensions from biodiversity is an important response to 
the conceptual case for its elimination. Santana’s concern about informativeness is 
motivated by the fact that we have folded so many dimensions into biodiversity that it has 
become too general. He echoes this concern in his objection to natural selection as a 
plausible candidate for a homeostatic mechanism. He argues that natural selection cannot 
be a plausible homeostatic mechanism for biodiversity because although it can increase 
functional diversity, it impedes genetic diversity instead of maximising it (Santana 2018, 
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4). He is correct that conservationists want species to flourish without maximising genetic 
diversity. There are many biological elements which are better for organisms and 
ecosystems when their diversity is not maximized. Scientists study the effects of nuclear 
fallout on mutation rates in birds. The meltdown at Chernobyl has increased rates of 
mutations, but the authors are concerned about this rather than excited about an increase in 
mutation diversity (Bonisoli-Alquati et al. 2015, 2). Therefore one response to Santana’s 
conceptual challenges is to exclude one or more dimensions of biodiversity. The advantage 
of a homeostatic property cluster concept of biodiversity is that it explains why certain 
dimensions should be excluded. I return to this topic in section 2.6.3 in which I argue that 
there are several important biological elements which are not a part of biodiversity. 
 In this section I considered Santana’s objections to HPC conceptions of 
biodiversity. Santana argued that biodiversity cannot be a HPC because there is no 
plausible underlying mechanism which could unite all the relevant properties of multiple 
levels. In response, I argued that speciation is a plausible homeostatic mechanism for the 
multiple dimensions of biodiversity. I also argued that Santana is too swift to discount the 
possibility that biodiversity is a homeostatic property cluster. He does not consider 
important similarities between the application of HPC to the species problem and the 
application of HPC to the biodiversity problem. The counterexamples to specific meanings 
of ‘biodiversity’ which motivate the Santana’s conceptual challenge are a normal feature 
of homeostatic property clusters. Understood as a homeostatic property cluster, 
biodiversity is expected to have multiple dimensions which tend to co-vary but also come 
apart in important ways. In the next two sections I will argue that a homeostatic property 
cluster conception of biodiversity avoids the conceptual case for biodiversity 
eliminativism.  
2.5 The Success of an HPC solution for the species problem 
In this section I will motivate the idea that the biodiversity problem is solvable by briefly 
discussing the species problem. Species are the canonical core of biodiversity and like the 
case of biodiversity their conceptualization and measurement are contentious (Santana 
2014, 770). There are several important similarities between the biodiversity problem and 
the species problem. To highlight these similarities I will give a brief history of the 
multiple incommensurable conceptions of species. Then I will argue that that the 
biodiversity problem and the species problem share several important features. They both 
had multiple attempts at conceptualisation which identified important features of the 
concept. Since those features were important the different attempts could not be subsumed 
under one model so both concepts end up as multi-dimensional with strictly 
incommensurable dimensions. Then I introduce the species-the-category vs species-the-
individuals objection to a homeostatic property cluster solution for the species problem. I 
argue that ultimately it is unsuccessful because, as Boyd argues, an HPC endorsement of 
species-the-individual tacitly requires an endorsement of species-the-category as a 
homeostatic property cluster (Boyd 1999a, 167). The solution to the species problem was 
to embrace its multidimensional nature. Given how many features the two problems share, 
it is therefore plausible to approach the biodiversity problem with a similar strategy  
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2.5.1 The Multiple Distinct Conceptions of Species 
In this subsection I will give a brief account of the multiple distinct conceptions of species. 
Then I will discuss the biological species concept in detail as an example of the 
counterexamples facing the distinct conceptions of species. I discuss the biological 
phenomena of clonal species and asexual reproduction, before discussing the problems of 
hybridisation and ring species. I argue that this complexity is not a reason to eliminate the 
species concept. Instead the species problem and its solution set an important precedent for 
how to approach the biodiversity problem. 
 The problem with the species concept is that it is not clear how to justify the 
species classification. The classification of an atom is by the structure of its sub-atomic 
particles. This classification is justified because it divides up all the elements without any 
counterexamples. By contrast there are several different ways to classify species, and 
whilst they all have good justifications, they all also come with problem areas (Hull 1997). 
In What is Biodiversity? Maclaurin and Sterelny (2008, 32–33) discuss seven ways of 
conceptualizing species: biological, cladistic, cohesion, ecological, phylogenetic, 
phenetics, and typological. However, there are more than 22 species concepts currently in 
play in the literature and there seems to be little consensus about which is the best concept 
to use (Kocovsky, Ruffling, and Stauffer 2002, 143). 
 An ideal species concept would group organisms by similarity without 
counterexample, apply to all organisms, and be pragmatically maximal in terms of its 
operationalisability. But there is little agreement on the priorities for a species concept. 
Phenetic species concepts group organisms by clusters of properties, regardless of change 
over time. This is advantageous because it applies to extinct, extant, and yet to come 
species but there is no clear point when we can determine that a mutation has yielded a 
new species. The mate-recognition species concept claims that species are grouped by 
their disposition to recognize mates (Hull 1997). Organisms which mate together tend to 
be species. This idea works for species which mate but it is not universal. It struggles with 
clonal groups such as aspen trees, the brackern fern and asexually reproducing organisms 
such as bacteria (Mishler 1999, 309). Bacteriological species concepts have their own 
complex requirements (Chun, Goodfellow and Manfio 1997, 50) because they reproduce 
by binary fission, a process in which a mother cell splits into two daughter cells. As a 
group they maintain genetic variation by passing mutated genes between one another 
(Goodfellow, Manfio, and Chun 1997, 30).  
 Focusing on one species concept indicates how difficult it is to produce an ideal 
and comprehensive species concept. Consider the widely accepted biological species 
concept (Goodfellow, Manfio, and Chun 1997, 26). The biological species concepts claims 
that species are “groups of interbreeding natural populations that are reproductively 
isolated from other such species” (Hull 1997). Species of birds which cannot reproduce 
with one another are separate species. This is a highly intuitive idea for most organisms 
which mate with one another but it is not practically maximal for all of those organisms. 
Biologists as a whole seem to have adopted an instrumentalist response to this issue “The 
criteria that designates a ‘good’ species to cyprinid taxonomists may not be the same as 
those of salmonid researchers” (Kocovsky, Ruffling, and Stauffer 2002, 143). 
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The biological species concept does not group all organisms correctly. It cannot 
categorise clonal species or asexually reproducing species similar to the examples I have 
discussed in previous paragraphs. It also strongly requires supplementation with a further 
concept. Given that much of the early life on earth reproduced asexually, it would be odd 
to argue that there were no species on earth during this period (Hull 1997). It also cannot 
categorise viral species. After a great deal of debate viruses were recognised as species 
(Van Regenmortel 1997, 18). But the boundaries between unique strains are so fuzzy that 
categorizing them requires polyphetic classes which group organisms if they share most of 
the essential properties. 
 There are two further counterexamples to the biological species concept: 
hybridization and the ring species problem. Hybrids occur when two reproductively 
isolated species successfully mate with one another. The Grolar bear is a hybrid of the 
Grizzly and Polar bear which has occurred in both captivity and the wild. The problem is 
gene flow. Reproductive isolation is a useful way of categorizing species because gene 
flow typically occurs within a species rather than between them. The grolar bear and other 
hybrids are an important counterexample because they represent a mechanism for gene 
flow between species. So the notion of reproductive isolation which determines species in 
this case needs to be flexible, referring to organisms which are likely to breed together, 
rather than organisms which strictly have the capability of producing offspring (Maclaurin 
and Sterelny 2008, 32). But there is another mechanism for genes to transmit between 
species: the ring species. 
A ring species problem occurs when there are two distinct species separated by 
terrain which is not traversable and whilst those species are reproductively isolated from 
one another, their sub-species can reproduce with one another (Cacho and Baum 2012, 1). 
The Eurasian greenish warbler has a range of sub-species living around the arid Tibetan 
Plateau as in figure 2.1 below. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Sub-species around Uninhabitable Terrain in a Ring Species. 
(Cacho and Baum 2012, 2) 
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It cannot inhabit the plateau itself but it can inhabit the area around it. Two species of the 
warbler (Phylloscopus viridanus and Phylloscopus plumbeitarsus) live next to each other 
on the circumference of the plateau and are sufficient different that they cannot interbreed 
with each other (Irwin et al. 2005, 414). But a western sub-species of P. viridanus can 
reproduce with another sub-species which is further around the plateau, and that sub-
species can reproduce with another sub-species which is slightly further to the east. 
Around the circumference of the plateau, various sub-species can reproduce with one 
another until P. viridanus has become P. plumbeitarsus. The two resulting species are still 
quite distinct from one another but they are not reproductively isolated because there is a 
continuum of sub-species between them.  
 This more detailed examination of the biological species concept has highlighted 
some of the difficulties faced by the species debate. The debate leaves us with a dilemma 
between species monism or pluralism. Monism (there is one correct species concept) will 
leave one field of study worse off whereas pluralism will falsely give the impression of a 
universal concept and leave us with less information to mitigate disputes between the 
concepts (Hull 1997). Hull’s famous paper ‘The ideal species concept and why we can’t 
get it’ identified the goals of an ideal species concept as universality, monism, and 
applicability (Hull 1997). He then scored seven species concepts on how they performed at 
these goals and concluded with some melancholy that they all perform similarly well. This 
concern can be alleviated if we remember that conceptual complexity does not imply no 
matter of fact about the property  in question (Justus 2013, 367). Prejudice is an important 
concept in social science which can be measured in ways varied from rating images on a 
Likert scale (Aosved, Long, and Voller 2009, 2323) to how the introduction of double 
blind reviewing affects the rejection rate of submissions from female authors (Budden et 
al. 2008, 5). It is also conceptually complex, describing beliefs, actions, and subtle 
dispositions toward members of other groups, but like species-hood, prejudice is a real 
concept worth measuring.  
 In this subsection I gave a brief account of the multiple distinct conceptions of 
biodiversity. Then I focused on counterexamples to the biological species concept. I 
discussed clonal species and asexual reproduction hybridisation before moving on to the 
problems of hybridisation and ring species. I then argued that this is not a reason to 
eliminate the species concept. The best conception of species just is inherently 
multidimensional and complex. In the next subsection I will outline several important 
similarities between the species problem and the biodiversity problem to argue that there is 
an important precedent for treating biodiversity as a complex multidimensional concept. 
 
2.5.2 Important Similarities between the Species Problem and the Biodiversity 
Problem 
In this subsection I will argue that there are four important similarities between the 
‘species’ problem and the biodiversity problem. In both cases there were a number of 
distinct attempts to explain the concept with a single set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. No individual concept grouped all features correctly but most concepts 
identified an eliminable important feature of the concept. For both species and biodiversity 
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the concept bloated as more dimensions were added until the solution was pluralism. The 
species problem was solved by treating species as a multidimensional concept, so a 
multidimensional approach to the biodiversity problem is a plausible strategy. 
 The first major similarity between the species problem and the biodiversity 
problem is that both concepts have a number of alternative definitions. In the case of 
species the cladistic concept has to compete with the biological species concept which also 
competes with: genetic, ecological, phylogenetic, cohesion, typological, morphological, 
and polyphasic concepts (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008; Hull 1997). In the case of 
biodiversity, species richness has to compete with species diversity, which also competes 
with: genetic diversity, phylogenetic diversity, phenetic diversity, ecosystem diversity and 
functional diversity. So both problems began with an important concept which needed to 
be adequately defined (Santana 2014; Burch-Brown and Archer 2017). In both cases 
pursuing that definition generated multiple definitions which performed very well for most 
examples. 
 Despite performing well for most examples, in both cases each definition has 
serious counterexamples. A cladistic concept implies the extinction  of the old species 
when a new species arrives,  biological concept fails with hybridisation, binary fission, and 
ring species, phylogenetic concept is better at describing than predicting, the cohesion 
concept is likewise a little too general for decisive prediction, and the ecological concept 
rests on the controversial concept of an ecological niche. In the case of biodiversity, 
species richness overlooks abundance, phenetic diversity glosses over genetic diversity, 
and phylogenetic diversity misses the importance of functional interaction between 
organisms. However, in both cases it is also clear that each competing concept has 
identified an important element of the concept which the others miss. So while the 
competing definitions disagree they are not also expendable. This implies that for both the 
species problem and the biodiversity problem both concepts have multiple dimensions 
which have counterexamples but are also not expendable. 
 In another important similarity the dimensions of both species and biodiversity are 
incommensurable and vary independently of one another. If we apply different concepts of 
species to the same group of organisms we will have conflicting results about the number 
of species represented by that group. If we apply different dimensions of biodiversity to a 
decision about introducing a new species we will have conflicting results about whether 
that act will change the biodiversity of the original group. So in both cases the individual 
dimensions vary independently of one another. In both cases those dimensions are strictly 
incommensurable with one another. We cannot make a conservation decision by 
comparing the genetic diversity of one ecosystem with the functional diversity of another. 
Analogously, if we are determining which ecosystem has the most species, we should use 
similar standards to do it.  
 The species problem has a number of similarities with the biodiversity problem. 
The solution to the species problem was to embrace the complexity of a multi-dimensional 
concept. So it is a plausible solution to approach the biodiversity problem in the same way. 
The most accepted view of species at the moment is that of realist pluralism such as Hull’s 
realist pluralism or Boyd’s homeostatic property cluster. That view persists despite 
problems such as incommensurability and independent variation among the dimensions. 
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Whilst Santana is legitimately concerned about incommensurability and independent 
variation, the species problem sets a strong precedent for successful multi-dimensional 
concepts. The key to success is to avoid looking for discrete boxes for the complex subject 
matter of the biological sciences and instead embrace its complexity.  
 
2.5.3 The Species-the-Category vs Species-the-Individuals Objection and its 
Implication for a Conceptual Defence of Biodiversity  
 
In this subsection I will introduce the species-the-category vs species-the-individuals 
objection to a homeostatic property cluster solution to the species problem and argue that 
is unsuccessful. I introduce a distinction between thinking of species-the-individual as a 
natural kind and species-the-category as a natural kind. I argue that a homeostatic property 
cluster framework can be used to justify either conclusion but the failure to distinguish 
between them is problematic for Boyd’s solution to the species problem. It is also 
problematic for my solution to the biodiversity problem because speciation plays an 
important role in my HPC account of biodiversity. Next I outline Boyd’s response that 
once we have accepted a homeostatic property cluster account of species, the best 
arguments for species-the-individual tacitly presume a species-the-category view. I 
consider an objection to this response but argue that Boyd is correct. Endorsing a 
homeostatic property cluster account of species-the-individual requires a homeostatic 
property cluster view of species-the category.  
 The species-the-category vs species-the-individuals objection to Boyd’s solution to 
the species problem is that the homeostatic property cluster framework which Boyd 
supplies is ambiguous. It can be interpreted as a defence of species-the-category as a 
natural kind or it could be interpreted as a defence of species-the-individuals as natural 
kinds. The two views are distinct from one another (Boyd 1999a, 162). Under a species-
the-category defence, there exists a natural kind named ‘species’ which picks out a 
taxonomic group of individuals which is a homeostatic property cluster of species concepts 
such as morphology and the biological species concept (Boyd 1999a, 165). Taken 
together, the HPC species is a natural kind as a category. By analogy, this is akin to 
justifying that Phylum is a natural kind rather than justifying that any particular Phyla such 
as Cnidaria picks out a natural kind.  
 Under a defence of species-the-individuals as a natural kind, each species is an 
individual natural kind (Boyd 1999a, 163). There is a homeostatic property cluster which 
justifies burrowing owls (Athene cunicularia) as a natural kind and there is a homeostatic 
property cluster which justifies staghorn coral (Acropora cervicornis) as a natural kind. 
But, there is no homeostatic property cluster which explains why burrowing owls, staghorn 
coral, and other organisms are species. The species problem is about finding a reasonable 
set of principles to justify a system of classification that accurately reflects existing 
species. A species-the-individuals response denies that there is such a set of principles and 
instead argues that individual taxa such as burrowing owls and staghorn coral are 
individual natural kinds. There is no species-the-category but there are species-the-
individuals. 
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 This objection matters for Boyd’s work because he seeks to solve the species 
problem by applying a homeostatic property cluster to it. He argues that the apparent 
conceptual incoherence of species is actually a cluster of various dimensions of species-
hood correlating in an imperfect homeostasis (Boyd 1989, 17). Under a species-the-
individuals interpretation of homeostatic property clusters, the species concept is 
conceptually incoherent and doesn’t pick out anything real about the world. Under a 
species-the-individuals interpretation, Boyd hasn’t solved the species problem because the 
solution to the species problem is that a species concept is inappropriate. So this objection 
requires Boyd to justify that his homeostatic property cluster justifies a species-the-
category property cluster of speciation concepts rather than individual clusters of 
properties for species as individual natural kinds. 
 This objection matters for this project for several reasons. I have argued in section 
2.4.3 that speciation is the homeostatic mechanism within biodiversity which is driving the 
imperfect homeostasis of its dimensions. I have also argued in this section that the success 
of homeostatic property clusters in addressing the species problem sets a strong precedent 
for the biodiversity problem. But if a species-the-individuals interpretation is correct, then 
homeostatic property clusters have not addressed the species problem and there is less 
precedent for applying the conceptual framework to the biodiversity problem. Lastly, 
adequately responding to the conceptual case for biodiversity eliminativism requires an 
application of the HPC framework which is much more like the species-the-category 
interpretation than the species-the-individuals interpretation. Similar to the species 
problem, Santana is accusing biodiversity of conceptual incoherence. The response 
requires establishing that biodiversity is a property cluster of various dimensions of 
biological variation. That requires demonstrating that the HPC solution the species 
problem is a property cluster of dimensions of species-hood and as such justifies a 
framework for species-the-category. 
 Boyd’s response to species-the-category vs species-the-individuals objection is to 
argue that if you believe in species-the-individuals as natural kinds, then you ought to 
believe in species-the-category as a natural kind. He does not need to argue for rationality 
of belief in the other direction because species-the-category dictates much of the structure 
of species-the-individuals. However, by arguing that a species-the-individuals 
interpretation also justifies a species-the-category interpretation, he argues that the two 
stand and fall together. It follows then that one cannot endorse one view and deny the 
other. In the case of biodiversity, this response addresses concerns about the species 
problem as a precedent for the biodiversity problem. This further insulates my account of 
biodiversity as a homeostatic property cluster against potential objections of biodiversity-
the-category vs biodiversity-the-dimensions. It builds on the arguments in section 2.4.2 in 
which I have argued that it is the dimensions of biodiversity which cluster together to 
explain the conceptual coherence of biodiversity.  
 Boyd argues that once we accept a homeostatic property cluster account of species 
as natural kinds then it will apply to both species-the-category and species-the-individual. 
“I propose that biological species simply are HPC natural kinds. What is interesting is that 
the best arguments in favor of the alternative view that they are individuals rather than 
kinds actually support the thesis I am proposing” (Boyd 1999a, 167). This is because 
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species-the-category dictates species-the-individual and because endorsing a species-the-
individual view requires accepting natural kind status about the ancestry and descent of 
that species 
 
When the residual positivist conception of kinds is stripped away, what the best arguments that 
species are individuals rather than kinds come down to, at least to a good first approximation, is that 
organisms which are in the same biological species must (a) be members of some initial population 
of that species or descendants of its members (so that a species cannot become temporarily extinct 
and then re-evolve) and (b) must, if contemporaneous, be members either of the same population or 
of populations which are relevantly reproductively integrated (so that the constituents of species 
have important internal relations with each other as constituents of paradigm individuals do). 
proposing (Boyd 1999a, 167) 
 
So the view that the southern hairy-nosed wombat (Lasiorhinus latifrons) picks out an 
individual natural kind requires accepting two further propositions. Proposition a) that 
southern hairy nosed wombats are descended from the same initial population; and 
proposition b) that southern hairy nosed wombats are relevantly reproductively integrated 
with one another. In the case of the southern hairy nosed wombat this is isolated sexual 
reproduction. Boyd is being careful to phrase proposition b) so that it respects the variety 
of ways in which species pass on their genes. 
 Boyd then argues that propositions a) and b) tends organisms within species 
towards evolutionary unity. 
 
The biologically serious arguments for (a) and (b) rest on the scientific claim that, without the 
operation of the factors they require, a family of populations will not possess the evolutionary unity 
characteristic of species level taxa. [Considerations of this sort are explicit in, for example, Hull 
1978 and in Ghiselin, 1974.] (Boyd 1999a, 167) 
 
The reason that the southern hairy nosed wombats are so similar to one another is because 
they come from a common ancestor and are reproductively isolated from other species. 
The twist, however, is that common ancestry and relevant reproductive integration also 
drive all speciation. 
 
Let's suppose, for the sake of argument, that the considerations in favor of (a) and (b) are correct. 
Then common descent and reproductive integration of the sort they require are essential to establish 
the homeostatic evolutionary unity of biological species: the unity anticipated by inferences and 
explanations in evolutionary biology, and thus required for accommodation. But, as we have seen, 
the unity anticipated by such inferences and explanations is that appropriate to HPC kinds. Both 
species-as-individuals theorists and their opponents are tacitly treating biological species as HPC 
natural kinds. That's what they are. (Boyd 1999a, 167–68) 
 
Common ancestry and relevant reproductive integration are required to justify a natural 
kind view of species-the-individual. But they are also sufficient to justify a natural kind 
view of species-the-category. The homeostatic property cluster account of species-the-
category is just a framework intended to capture how common ancestry and reproductive 
integration drives imperfect homeostasis of phenotypic characteristics and adaptations etc.  
 Boyd then briefly considers an objection to his response. He considers whether it 
would be reasonable to argue that the natural kind status of species-the-individual are 
driven by one dimension of the species category rather than the whole thing. He gives the 
following example. 
 
My favorite candidate for a programmatic definition of the species level in taxonomy is P. For any 
given species, S, the proper definition of S is provided by the formula 'the P which is instantiated in 
T', rather than by the associated homeostatic property cluster. [Where 'P' is some functional 
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characterization of the species level in taxonomy, like Mayr's biological species concept, and 'T' 
denotes the type specimen(s) of S or some other suitable representative(s).] (Boyd 1999a, 168) 
 
He responds by arguing that this response fails because it retreats from an explanatory 
definition to a programmatic definition and programmatic definitions are far less useful for 
inference and explanation. 
 
What the proposal fails to take account of however, is the distinction between programmatic and 
explanatory definitions. If we have an adequate programmatic definition of the species level (Good 
luck!) then we can indeed offer programmatic definitions of individual species in the way indicated. 
But such programmatic definitions would not be competitors with the explanatory definitions 
provided by the relevant homeostatic property clusters. (Boyd 1999a, 168) 
 
The difference between these definitions is that a programmatic definition simply 
aims to meet the demands of its relevant discipline whereas an explanatory definition also 
explains why this particular definition meets this need (Boyd 1999a, 149). Defining a 
chemical element in terms of its position on the periodic table is a programmatic 
definition. Defining that same element in terms of its atomic number is an explanatory 
definition. Explanatory definitions are better than programmatic definitions because they 
are better suited to inference and explanation. Knowing the atomic number of a chemical 
element explains why it occupies the point on a periodic table that it does (Boyd 1999a, 
150). “This conclusion is easy to see by reflecting on the fact that the programmatic 
definition "stuff which ...." (where .... specifies the role of gold in the periodic table of the 
elements) is not a competitor for the definition of gold as the element with atomic number 
79” (Boyd 1999a, 168).  
This is also true for definitions of species. A species-the-individual definition of a 
southern hairy-nosed wombat which relies only on the biological species concept and 
nothing else is only programmatic. It justifies the hairy-nosed wombat as a species because 
it is reproductively isolated from other species. It cannot seriously compete with a 
homeostatic property cluster account of species-the-category because that framework 
explains why the southern hairy-nosed wombat is a species. Species-the-category explains 
species-hood “in terms of common factors, relations of descent, gene exchange, etc.” 
(Boyd 1999a, 150). The response fails because defining species-hood in terms of one 
species concept is a much poorer explanation of species-hood than explaining it in terms of 
multiple dimensions such as ancestry, genetic exchange, and adaptations. 
In this subsection I argued that the species-the-category vs species-the-individuals 
objection to HPCs as a solution to the species problem is unsuccessful. I outlined different 
interpretations of Boyd’s framework as arguing that either the category or the individuals 
are natural kinds. This was problematic for Boyd’s solution and this project because my 
solution to the biodiversity problem relies heavily on the species problem. Boyd’s 
response was that an HPC endorsement of species-the-individual tacitly requires an 
endorsement of species-the-category as homeostatic property clusters. This is because 
treating individual species as natural kinds requires natural kinds of common ancestry and 
relevant reproductive integration but the species category is a natural kind of how common 
ancestry and relevant reproductive integration drive speciation. I considered an objection 
that one could deny a species category but say that speciation is driven by one process 
such as the biological species concept. I agreed with Boyd that this response fails because 
it represents a programmatic definition and as such cannot compete with the explanatory 
definition which species-the-category as an HPC provides. This conclusion resolves the 
concern which the species species-the-category vs species-the-individuals objection raised 




In this chapter I discussed responses to the conceptual case for biodiversity’s elimination 
and outlined an account of biodiversity as a homeostatic property cluster. I summarised the 
conceptual case for eliminativism and discussed the work of Burch-Brown and Archer 
(2017) as an attempt to avoid Santana’s meaning-dilemma. I was sympathetic to Santana’s 
response to Burch-Brown and Archer, specifically his concern about the lack of 
informativeness of a classical multidimensional approach. I argued that the classic 
multidimensional concept of biodiversity does not escape Santana’s meaning-dilemma. 
Then I developed a conception of biodiversity as a homeostatic property cluster and 
addressed Santana’s objections to biodiversity as a HPC. Lastly, I argued that the success 
of an HPC analysis in dealing with the species problem makes it an excellent candidate to 
approach the biodiversity problem. There are a number of important similarities between 
the species problem and the biodiversity problem which set a precedent for the ability of 
an HPC to explain multi-dimensional concepts. In the next chapter I will argue that an 
HPC conception of biodiversity avoids the conceptual case for biodiversity’s elimination. 
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3 A Homeostatic Property Cluster Conception of 
Biodiversity Avoids the Conceptual Case for Elimination 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I argue that a homeostatic property cluster conception of biodiversity avoids 
the conceptual case for elimination. The goal is not to present a compelling case for the 
correct way to understand biodiversity but rather to highlight that at least one conception 
of biodiversity avoids eliminativist challenges. In section 3.2 I argue that it avoids 
Angermeier and Karr’s concern about biodiversity misdirecting the goals of conservation 
because it embraces its multidimensional nature. Where biodiversity is more than species 
richness, maximising species richness is not the only priority for conservation. In section 
3.3 I argue that an HPC conception of biodiversity also avoids Santana’s meaning-
dilemma because general conceptions can still be informative. I justify this conclusion 
with the classical semantic measure of information (SMI) which measures the 
informativeness of propositions in terms of the possibilities which they exclude. In section 
3.4 I protect an HPC account of biodiversity against Santana’s meaning-dilemma by 
identifying what biodiversity is not. According to the SMI biodiversity will be more 
informative as it excludes more possibilities. In section 3.5 I presume that my HPC 
analysis of biodiversity is unsuccessful and argue that there are still other reasons to retain 
biodiversity. Thus a HPC conception of biodiversity is general, informative, and avoids the 
conceptual case for eliminating biodiversity. 
 
3.2 Understanding Biodiversity as a Homeostatic Property Cluster 
Reduces Misdirection 
Understanding biodiversity as a homeostatic property cluster reduces misdirection in 
conservation because an HPC concept is multidimensional without incorporating all 
dimensions of biological interest. It focuses the efforts of conservation by excluding some 
biological elements from the set of goals but it also makes us engage with the 
multidimensional nature of the environment.  
Understanding biodiversity as an HPC reduces misdirection because it sets a limit 
on the kind of dimensions which are a part of biodiversity. Homeostatic property clusters 
are united by a homeostatic mechanism (Boyd 1991, 141). Where the rise and fall of a 
dimension falls outside of that homeostatic mechanism it should not be considered part of 
that HPC. I have in mind here some of the dimensions which Angermeier and Karr are 
concerned about. Angermeier and Karr are both concerned about the presence of non-
native species in ecosystems and a lack of focus on system integrity (Angermeier 2000, 
377; Karr 1993, 302; Angermeier and Karr 1994, 692). They argue that biodiversity does 
not correlate well with these important features, so setting biodiversity as the goal of 
conservation misleads its efforts. Biological integrity is therefore a better goal for 
conservation than biodiversity (Angermeier and Karr 1994, 690). Their observation that 
biodiversity does not correlate well with either native conditions or ecological integrity is 
warranted. But treating biodiversity as a HPC explains this observation. Native conditions 
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and health do not correlate with biodiversity because they are not bound by a joint 
homeostatic mechanism. Native organisms and biological integrity are not dimensions of 
the umbrella concept. Biodiversity is operationalisable as a measure of biological 
diversities and not operationisable as a measure of health. So biodiversity is an important 
target for conservation but it is not the only important target (Burch-Brown and Archer 
2017, 988). 
Understanding biodiversity as an HPC also reduces misdirection because HPC’s 
are multidimensional, so focusing on a single dimension is erroneous. An analogy with 
‘health’ is a useful example. Like biodiversity, health is an umbrella concept referring to 
many functions (in the case of ‘health’ they are normative but that need not be the case for 
‘biodiversity’). It has general meanings such as ‘healthy’ and specific dimensions such as 
temperature, respiratory function, liver function etc. Like biodiversity, we measure health 
by sampling a number of specific dimensions and using them to approximate the umbrella 
concept of general health. During a visit with a general practitioner the doctor is likely to 
record your temperature, blood pressure, heart rate and a number of other specific 
dimensions. The best way to determine health is to measuring the normative function of 
multiple dimensions of health. Taken together, the results for multiple dimensions indicate 
the overall health of a patient. 
Treating health as a complex umbrella concept reduces misdirection because it 
forces the patient to pay attention to the normative function of multiple individual 
dimensions of health. A diagnosis of ‘ill health’ forces us to engage with the specific 
dimension of health which is affected precisely because ‘health’ refers to a general 
umbrella concept which refers to multiple dimensions of normative biological functions. 
Likewise with biodiversity, a prognosis of biodiversity loss forces us to engage with the 
specific dimensions of biodiversity. Thus, it reduces misdirection because an undue focus 
on a single dimension is erroneous. Like biodiversity, health is a complex concept. Even if 
all biological functions are performing as they should, ill health can still occur if processes 
function as they should in an unfavourable environment (Matthewson and Griffiths 2017, 
454). One of the causes of weight gain is spending adulthood in a high calorie 
environment, following a low calorie intake during foetal development (Matthewson and 
Griffiths 2017, 457). However, retaining health in its conceptually complex state provides 
a rich account of human health and more practical treatment advice. Knowing that obesity 
can be a product of a set metabolism in an unfavourable environment informs attempts to 
treat obesity. It reduces the likelihood of treatment being misdirected in a situation that we 
might have presumed a simpler model of health, one in which obesity is a result of a lack 
of will power. 
 Respecting the multidimensional nature of an HPC concept of biodiversity reduces 
misdirection in the same way.  Saying ‘We measured the biodiversity of the region’ or 
‘there has been a significant reduction in local biodiversity’ does not offer much 
information because biodiversity is an umbrella HPC concept which refers to multiple 
dimensions of biological diversities. Falling biodiversity should suggest further questions 
about which specific dimensions are affected. Treating species richness as interchangeable 
with richness of native organisms is fallacious reasoning because it exchanges one 
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dimension for another. It is as effective as concluding that an agent is ill because they have 
a headache and then treating them for a broken leg.  
In this section I argued that understanding biodiversity as a homeostatic property 
cluster reduces misdirection of the efforts of conservation by setting limits on the 
dimensions which are included in biodiversity and embracing the multidimensional nature 
of conservation. In the next section I will argue that an HPC conception of biodiversity 
escapes Santana’s meaning-dilemma. 
 
3.3 How Biodiversity as a Homeostatic Property Cluster Escapes 
Santana’s Dilemma 
A homeostatic property cluster conception of biodiversity escapes Santana’s meaning-
dilemma because biodiversity in the general sense is informative despite being 
multidimensional. The classical semantic measure of information measures the 
informativeness of propositions in terms of the possibilities they exclude (Bar-Hillel and 
Carnap 1953, 149). Santana is concerned that a general sense of biodiversity is 
uninformative because it reduces to ‘all of biology’. Under a S.M.I. analysis this is a 
concern that ‘biodiversity’ excludes no more possibilities than ‘all of biology’. In this 
section I will argue that this claim is false. A HPC cluster conception of biodiversity is 
informative because it excludes many possibilities which ‘all of biology’ does not. A 
strong response to Santana’s meaning-dilemma argument is to cease focusing on what 
biodiversity is and point out what it is not. By excluding possibilities I will argue that a 
HPC conception of biodiversity and other multi-dimensional versions are informative. 
 
3.3.1 The Classical Semantic Measure of Information 
A recurring objection in the literature on biodiversity is that general meanings or umbrella 
concepts of biodiversity are uninformative because they reduce to ‘all of biology’.  
 
Burch-Brown and Archer (2017) . . . focus on eliminativism as outlined in recent work by Santana 
(2014, 2016), who takes the position that biodiversity is neither a unitary natural entity nor justified 
by appeal to the normative goals of conservation biology. Similar arguments have also been made 
by Maier (2012), who doesn’t deny its natural existence but calls into question its normative and 
scientific utility, and Morar et al. (2015), who worry about both its ontology and its usefulness. 
(Santana 2018, 1–2) 
 
Thus far the objection has relied on intuition rather than an analytic framework to motivate 
it. Work in the philosophy of information can elucidate this objection.  
The classical measure of semantic information (hereafter S.M.I.) measures the 
informativeness of a proposition in terms of the possibilities it excludes (D’Agostino and 
Floridi 2009, 272). The sentence ‘I am walking to a movie or it is not the case that I am 
walking to a movie’ is less informative than ‘I am either walking to a movie or going 
home’ and both are less informative than ‘I am walking to a movie’. The propositions 
increase in informativeness as they exclude more possibilities. Given that I am walking, 
the proposition that ‘I am walking to a movie or it is not the case that I am walking to a 
movie’ truthfully describes all possible destinations. The proposition that ‘I am either 
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walking to a movie or going home’ is more informative because it excludes all possible 
further outcomes except for two destinations and the proposition that ‘I am walking to a 
movie’ is the most informative of the three because it excludes every possible destination 
except for one. In general, the more possibilities that a proposition excludes, the more 
informative it is.  
An S.M.I. analysis has two implications for general conceptions of biodiversity. 
For biodiversity to be a more informative concept than the proposition ‘all of biology’ it 
must exclude more biological elements than ‘all of biology’. Also, the more biological 
elements which biodiversity excludes the more informative it will be. A general meaning 
of ‘biodiversity’ may exclude enough biological entities to be informative but it is only 
likely to be marginally more informative than ‘all of biology’. If biodiversity is an 
umbrella concept which includes at a minimum: species richness, abundance, phenotypic 
diversity, phylogenetic diversity, functional diversity, genetic diversity, ecological 
diversity, and process diversity, then there are few biological elements left to exclude and 
‘biodiversity’ is at best marginally more informative than ‘all of biology’. In the next 
subsection I will apply the S.M.I. to the informativeness debate and argue that despite the 
generality of an HPC conception of biodiversity, it is still informative. 
 
3.3.2 Biodiversity as a Homeostatic Property Cluster is General But 
Informative 
A S.M.I. analysis of Santana’s objections shows that a homeostatic property cluster 
conception of biodiversity can be both general and informative. Santana is concerned 
about general notions of biodiversity being uninformative because they reduce to ‘all of 
biology’ (Santana 2014, 765). If ‘biodiversity’ excludes no more biological elements than 
‘all of biology’ does, then it is no more informative than ‘all of biology’. Under a S.M.I. 
analysis Burch-Brown and Archer’s multidimensional concept is only marginally more 
informative than ‘all of biology’. Whilst the classical concept does exclude elements such 
as biodiversity effects, the inclusion of “any and all variation amongst biota” (Burch-
Brown and Archer 2017, 981) excludes only a few biological elements which ‘all of 
biology’ does not. There is an inverse correlation between the informativeness of 
‘biodiversity’ and the biological elements which it does not refer to. The more biological 
elements which are not covered by the concept’s umbrella, the more informative the 
concept is. These requirements are best satisfied by an HPC. 
 An HPC cluster is general because it includes multiple dimensions of biological 
diversities. Speciation creates a homeostatic mechanism which clusters together the 
relational properties of: species richness, phenotypic diversity, phylogenetic diversity, 
genetic diversity, and functional diversity. So an HPC concept of biodiversity is a general 
umbrella concept in the classical sense. ‘Biodiversity’ refers to a cluster of biological 
diversities. But it is still an informative concept because it excludes more biological 
elements than ‘all of biology’ does. Of the eight specific dimensions of biodiversity which 
I considered as candidates in chapter one I have excluded abundance, ecological diversity, 
and process diversity from the dimensions of my HPC concept of biodiversity. Under an 
HPC concept, membership in biodiversity is determined by how the particular property is 
affected by the homeostatic mechanism. If a dimension of biological diversity such as 
63 
ecosystem diversity is important to conservation but is not connected to the other 
dimensions of biodiversity via a homeostatic mechanism then it is not a part of 
biodiversity. It may be tempting to argue that it should be, but if we fold every element of 
biology into biodiversity then it becomes steadily more uninformative until it does reduce 
to ‘all of biology’ 
 My HPC conception of biodiversity is distinct from Burch-Brown and Archer’s 
concept because it is not as multi-dimensional. Burch-Brown and Archer argue for a 
classical multidimensional concept which includes “any and all variation amongst biota” 
(Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 981). Where Burch-Brown and Archer argue that 
biodiversity is an umbrella concept for all biological diversities, I have argued that some 
restrictions are important to increase its informativeness. Biodiversity eliminativists should 
prefer a restricted conception of biodiversity over the classical umbrella concept because it 
is more precise. Santana has argued that we should eliminate biodiversity in favour of its 
more specific dimensions (Santana 2018, 13). But this is unnecessary if we can maintain 
informativeness with a general conception of biodiversity. Restricted general conceptions 
of biodiversity such as an HPC conception achieve this. They are general concepts but 
they are still informative. So premise two of Santana’s meaning-dilemma argument is 
false. General conceptions of biodiversity do not reduce to ‘all of biology’. The key to 
avoiding uninformativeness in biodiversity is identifying biological elements which are not 
a part of biodiversity. In the next section I will identify several such elements and argue 
that they are not a part of a homeostatic property cluster conception of biodiversity. 
 
3.4 What a HPC Conception of Biodiversity is Not 
In this subsection I will justify my argument that a homeostatic property cluster conception 
of biodiversity is informative by identifying several biological elements and arguing that 
they are not a part of biodiversity. Since the informativeness of a concept is determined by 
the possibilities it excludes, arguing that a HPC conception of biodiversity excludes 
multiple biological elements demonstrates its informativeness. Under a homeostatic 
property cluster concept of biodiversity, this refinement of the concept makes it less 
extensionally vague. The debate over what biodiversity is has led to multiple dimensions 
of biological variety being subsumed under the biodiversity umbrella. At this point in the 
debate it will be useful to defend ‘biodiversity’s informativeness by arguing what it is not. 
I will argue that the following are not a part of biodiversity: cellular diversity, chemical 
diversity, molecular biology, evenly distributed abundance, ecosystem diversity, 
biodiversity effects, or biological value. I begin with cellular diversity. 
 An HPC conception of biodiversity does not include cellular diversity. In 
Ecological Hierarchy and Biodiversity Chris Lean and Kim Sterelny argue that while 
biodiversity includes multiple dimensions of biological variety, authors do not pay 
attention to cellular diversity (Lean and Sterelny 2017, 110). Cellular diversity refers to the 
variation of cells in biological organisms at multiple levels. At a base level there is a 
difference between eukaryotic and prokaryotic cells. Eukaryotic cells have membrane-
bound compartments, such as the nucleus, and appear in flora, fauna, fungi, and single-
celled organisms. Prokaryotic cells are smaller, lack membrane-bound compartments, have 
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no nuclei and appear in bacteria and single-celled organisms without a nucleus. At a higher 
level cellular diversity refers to the different forms cells take. In human beings cells can 
function as metabolic storage, form part of a kidney, or become epithelial cells in the skin. 
Despite the wide biological variation of cells, cellular diversity has not been a focus for 
work on biodiversity and conservation efforts would not benefit from cellular ecosystem 
analyses. Lean and Sterelny reject cellular diversity as a dimension of biodiversity because 
a small number of building blocks can produce a great deal of diversity (Lean and Sterelny 
2017, 110). So we needn’t focus on diversity of the smallest elements. Therefore cellular 
diversity is an interesting dimension of biological variety but it needn’t be a part of 
biodiversity. 
 Building on Lean’s work, biologists also study biochemical elements and 
molecular elements but these are also not typically treated as a part of biodiversity. 
Biologists also work on biochemical elements. Biochemists study the chemical processes 
within living organisms. Those chemical processes range from the energy transfer during 
metabolism to the roles of proteins and nucleic acids in organism growth. At a smaller 
level molecular biologists study the molecular causes of interactions between proteins and 
genes. Both fields of biology describe interesting dimensions of biological variation but 
neither are considered a part of biodiversity. This is likely due to the bottom level of 
biodiversity being treated as genetic diversity (Vira and Kontoleon 2012, 55). Molecular 
biologists do study genes but they are interested in the molecular causes which allow 
genetic function. Genetic diversity is the bottom level of biodiversity but biologists are 
also interested in lower levels of biology such as chemical processes and molecular causes 
of genetic properties. One could argue that molecular and chemical functions are a part of 
functional diversity but this claim would be at odds with conservational practice. 
Conservationists such as Witting and Loeschcke are concerned about the loss of unique 
genes (Witting and Loeschcke 1995, 206). They are not concerned with a diversity of 
biochemical reactions or a diversity of rates of cell division.  
 Biodiversity is not diversity in the sense of evenness. Organisations are evenly 
diverse when every group is represented by an equal number of members. A board with 12 
members is more gender diverse if it is not dominated by men. The intuition about the 
relationship between abundance and biodiversity is often motivated in the same way.  
 
Consider two hypothetical islands, each with only two species of vertebrate animals in equal 
abundance: two birds in one case and a bird plus a mammal in the other. Both islands have species 
richness = 2 (for vertebrates) and the same maximal value of species evenness. However, our 
intuition tells us that a bird plus a mammal represents more biodiversity than does two birds. 
(Vellend et al. 2011, 194) 
 
But, in practice, evenness is not a feature of ecosystems or biodiversity because a healthy 
ecosystem food web requires large populations of prey to support smaller numbers of 
predators.  If the reproductive cycle of the salmon yields 50 salmon to feed 50 brown bears 
then those brown bears are in trouble. Similar motivating examples suffer from analogous 
problems. Ecosystems with equal representations of tree species are maximally diverse in 
the classical sense but this proportion cannot carry on to every species in the ecosystem 
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(Vellend et al. 2011, 194). Limiting insect populations to one for every species of tree will 
have serious impacts on the survivability of trees and nutrient cycling in the soil. 
Ecosystems require greater abundance of smaller organisms, so whatever the relationship 
between biodiversity and abundance is, it excludes classical diversity in the sense of 
evenly represented groups. 
 One counterintuitive possibility is that biodiversity does not include ecosystem 
diversity. This is a contentious possibility because multidimensional concepts typically 
construe biodiversity as biological variation at three levels: genes, species, and ecosystems 
(Vira and Kontoleon 2012, 55). In the same way that biodiversity distinguishes between 
different species it should also incorporate a variety of ecosystems. Biodiversity is higher 
when our ecosystems include arctic tundra, wetlands, and desert. But Santana argues that 
ecosystem diversity is a problem for HPC conceptions of biodiversity because the multiple 
hierarchies make it more difficult to identify the homeostatic mechanism which controls 
the property cluster (Santana 2018, 4). One response to this objection is to accept that 
biodiversity does not include ecosystem diversity. The interest in ecosystem diversity can 
be also understood as an interest in a form of functional diversity such as adaptive 
diversity. Biodiversity would be lower without arctic tundra because we would lose the 
organisms which are adapted to survive in arctic tundra. However, biodiversity would not 
be obviously lower if we preserve the organisms from the arctic tundra whilst losing the 
tundra itself. Preserving the adaptations of the organisms seems to preserve most of what 
is biodiverse about arctic tundra. Preserving functional and phylogenetic diversity would 
therefore also preserve much of ecosystem diversity.  
So we can eliminate ecosystem diversity as a dimension of biodiversity because its 
other dimensions already explain why we should conserve arctic tundra. Often we are not 
interested in preserving ecosystems until we discover living organisms within them. 
Submarine hydrothermal vents did not require conservation until we discovered that 
extremophile microorganisms could live in them. Pyrolobus fumarii is a microorganism 
which can survive at temperatures of up to 113 degrees Celsius (Hafenbradl et al. 1997, 
19). Now hydrothermal vents warrant protecting if we want extremophiles to survive. So a 
case can be made that ecosystem diversity can be eliminated from biodiversity and 
subsumed under the other dimensions of biodiversity. It is not a conclusive case but it is an 
important possible element which can be excluded from biodiversity. 
 Biodiversity is also not the biological elements identified by Burch-Brown and 
Archer such as biodiversity effects. Where biodiversity is understood as a 
multidimensional concept, biologists are also interested in studying biodiversity’s effects, 
such as the relationship between a heterogeneous community and the patterns in their 
community processes (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 986). If the effects of biodiversity 
were a dimension of biodiversity then biodiversity would include its own effects, which 
would be conceptually odd. My HPC concept of biodiversity is different to Burch-Brown 
and Archer’s classic multidimensional concept because I exclude more possibilities from 
biodiversity than they do. However, I agree that biodiversity does not include biodiversity 
effects. These are of interest to biologists but they are not a part of biodiversity. 
Lastly, biodiversity excludes multiple dimensions of biological value. The 
conceptual case for biodiversity eliminativism criticises biodiversity for failing to guide 
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conservation towards the environment’s valuable elements. Sarkar observes that protecting 
the holy trinity of genes, species, and ecosystems will not protect important biological 
phenomena such as the continental migration pattern of the monarch butterfly Danaus 
plexippus. D. plexippus has a migration pattern from Mexico to Canada but it takes 
multiple generations and wintering sites to cover the distance. This is an astounding 
example of biological phenomena because “the migratory instinct is hereditary and, yet, 
the precise geographical migration pattern is so specific” (Sarkar and Margules 2002, 301). 
Santana argues that focusing on biodiversity will miss the extensive loss of old growth 
forest so long as species richness is maintained (Santana 2014, 768). Angermeier argues 
that ‘biodiversity’ equivocates over “native (naturally evolved) and artificial (human 
generated)” conditions (Angermeier 1994, 600). Karr argues that biodiversity fails to 
adequately capture the health of an ecosystem (Karr 1993, 302; Karr 1991, 69). 
These observations and arguments presume that the role of biodiversity is to 
preserve the valuable elements of the environment. In fact biodiversity has a very thorny 
relationship with biological value and in chapters seven and eight I will argue that 
biodiversity is a better guide to conservation normativity than biological value. Humans 
value the environment in multiple ways and there are multiple theories of biological value. 
A key response to Angermeier and Karr’s conceptual case for biodiversity eliminativism 
was arguing that biodiversity is one important part of the environment worth conserving 
but not the only part worth conserving. Biological value has a similar relationship to 
biodiversity because it also an important part of the environment but not a part of 
biodiversity. Santana’s smallpox example makes this mistake. He uses the extinction of 
smallpox as a counterexample to species richness because we are better off without 
smallpox (Santana 2014, 769). Smallpox falls under several dimensions of biodiversity but 
not under the instrumental value dimension of biological value, so it is perfectly sensible 
for us to prefer less species richness in this case. In chapters seven and eight of this thesis I 
will argue that biodiversity ought to be carefully distinguished from biological value. 
Biodiversity tracks some biological value but it does not track all of it. 
 In this section I argued that biodiversity is an informative concept by identifying 
the biological elements which the concept excludes. Santana has argued that general 
conceptions of biodiversity are uninformative because they reduce to ‘all of biology’. I 
provided an analytic framework for Santana’s argument by applying the classical semantic 
measure of information. The SMI measures the informativeness of a proposition in terms 
of the possibilities that it excludes. So I demonstrated that biodiversity is an informative 
concept by identifying the biological elements which the concept excludes. I argued that a 
homeostatic property cluster conception of biodiversity excludes: cellular diversity, 
chemical diversity, molecular biology, evenly distributed abundance, ecosystem diversity, 
non-relational properties, biodiversity effects, extinct species, and biological value. 
I also used these biological elements to argue that biodiversity does not reduce to 
‘all of biology’ because the concept excludes many more biological elements than the 
proposition does. Biology is a diverse field of study and biodiversity is only one object of 
study within it. This implies that premise two of Santana’s meaning-dilemma argument is 
false. General conceptions of biodiversity are informative. So we are not caught in a 
dilemma between specific and general meanings of ‘biodiversity’ because we can 
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demonstrate that general meanings are informative. Santana is correct to worry about lack 
of informativeness. As the concept of biodiversity has evolved to accommodate important 
biological elements we have rolled more and more dimensions into the concept. Under a 
SMI analysis concepts become less informative as they exclude fewer possibilities. Since 
an HPC concept of biodiversity excludes more possibilities than Burch-Brown and 
Archer’s classical multidimensional concept does, it is more informative. But an HPC 
concept is still multidimensional so it escapes Santana’s meaning-dilemma argument. It is 
both general and informative. In the next section I will argue that there would still be good 
reasons to retain biodiversity in conservation biology even if an HPC analysis were 
unsuccessful.  
 
3.5 Other Reasons to Conserve Biodiversity in the Face of Eliminativism 
In this section I will presume that the conceptual case for biodiversity eliminativism is 
successful, to argue that there are good reasons to retain biodiversity in conservation 
biology. This an important consideration given that, while an HPC account of biodiversity 
excludes a number of biological elements, it still incorporates a number of dimensions. 
Even if biodiversity is an uninformative concept which on occasion misleads conservation 
efforts we still lack a compelling case to eliminate the concept entirely. I will discuss 
Burch-Brown and Archer’s work in this area. They argue that in conservation biology 
biodiversity plays an important role as both an explanans and an explanandum. I consider 
Santana’s response to this observation and argue that he has not yet demonstrated that 
biodiversity is eliminable as an explanans or explanandum. Uninformative concepts which 
can be misleading can survive as analytic shortcuts for more complex ideas. Discussions 
which use ‘biodiversity’ are more efficient than those which list all the dimensions of 
biodiversity. In fact biodiversity is only one of a group of important cluster properties. 
Poverty, health, species, and stability are essential concepts, despite requiring multiple 
dimensions to adequately conceptualise. The conceptual case for eliminativism is 
unsuccessful because eliminativism is a nuclear option. Scouring concepts from discourse 
requires a thorough justification. 
 As an explanans, Burch-Brown and Archer argue that biodiversity explains several 
other important environmental properties such as nutrient cycling and stability. 
 
Seventeen ecologists write in Nature that ‘There is now unequivocal evidence that biodiversity loss 
reduces the efficiency by which ecological communities capture biologically essential resources, 
produce biomass, decompose and recycle biologically essential nutrients’ (Cardinale et al. 2012, p. 
60). They also report agreement that current evidence supports the hypothesis that genetic, species 
and functional diversity tend to be associated with ‘insurance effects’, and that on average there is 
‘greater temporal stability of a community property like total biomass at higher levels of diversity’ 
(2012, p. 60). (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 985) 
 
The relationship between diversity and stability has a controversial history (Santana 2014, 
776). The diversity-stability hypothesis was dominant until the mathematical models of 
Robert May predicted that too much diversity would lower an ecosystem’s stability 
(Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 121). Given the controversy, Burch-Brown and Archer 
have been careful to focus on consensus statements. These consensus statements give the 
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most up to date views of the relationship between biodiversity and ecosystem behaviour. 
Burch-Brown and Archer conclude that biodiversity plays an important role as an 
explanans in conservation biology because it explains ecosystem behaviour.  
 Burch-Brown and Archer also argue that in conservation biology biodiversity plays 
a role as an explanandum. Biodiversity plays an explanandum role in biology because 
scientists are interested in explaining the sheer variety of life. “biodiversity has an 
important role to play in science as an explanandum—which is to say that scientists often 
treat biodiversity as an aspect of living systems to be descriptively characterized and 
explained.” (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 982). Burch-Brown and Archer emphasise 
that this fascination with the sheer variety of life cannot be understood as a fascination 
with one of life’s dimensions. 
 
For Wallace, the central object of scientific interest was the variety of life as such. His focus cannot 
be captured in any particular component such as species richness, nor certainly would he recognise 
the idea of biodiversity as reducible to a simple magnitude. Instead, he sought to characterise and 
explain the existence of innumerable forms, differing in innumerable ways, as well as the 
underlying processes by which these ‘variations on themes’ come to exist. (Burch-Brown and 
Archer 2017, 983) 
 
Since all levels of biological variation are an object of study and Burch-Brown and Archer 
have argued that it would equivocate to treat all levels of biological variation as a single 
dimension such as species richness, it follows that multidimensional concepts of 
biodiversity are explananda. Scientists are interested in studying and explaining the sheer 
variety of life. They also focus on specific dimensions of biodiversity, but their 
characterisations of variation between organisms, communities, landscapes, and 
ecosystems are explanans which explain the explananda. The specific dimensions of 
biodiversity explain the multidimensional nature of biodiversity. “Amongst the central 
aims of biology, then (and particularly of branches like ecology, biogeography and 
conservation sciences) is the characterisation and explanation of biological diversity—
what it is like and how it comes to exist.” (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 983). 
 In response, Santana considers Burch-Brown and Archer’s points but argues that 
biodiversity is still eliminable from conservation biology. He presents a formal schema for 
theory elimination but concedes that it does not account for the possibility of explanatory 
utility which Burch-Brown and Archer raise. He then adapts the schema in the following 
form (Santana 2018, 6). 
 
Santana’s Adapted Eliminativist Schema 
1) Biodiversity is a higher-level concept decomposable into distinct lower-level concepts 
species richness, ecosystem diversity, genetic diversity, and others [henceforth 
“SEGO”] 
2) The objects picked out by SEGO don’t tend to share either 
a) A relevant cluster of properties, or 
b) A high degree of observable correlations 
3) To support robust inductive generalizations across the group, a grouping must either 
share 
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a) A relevant cluster of properties, or 
b) A high degree of observable correlations 
4) [From (2) and (3)] The grouping picked out by SEGO doesn’t support robust inductive 
generalizations across the group 
5) To be a natural kind or natural quality a grouping needs to support robust inductive 
generalizations across the group 
6) Therefore, [from (1), (4), and (5)], biodiversity cannot be a natural kind or natural 
quality 
7) To be a valid scientific kind a concept needs to either 
a) Be a natural kind or natural quality 
b) Or function ineliminably as an explanandum or explanans 
8) Biodiversity doesn’t function ineliminably as an explanandum or explanans  
9) Therefore, [from (6), (7), and (8)], biodiversity isn’t a valid scientific kind. (Santana 
2018, 6) 
 
Santana then argues for premise eight of his adapted schema. He contests that biodiversity 
is still eliminable from conservation biology as both an explanandum and explanans. In 
practice, biodiversity as an explanandum is often a stand in for a specific dimension of 
biological variation. Wallace was not curious about every level of biodiversity; he focused 
on the variety of form and adaptations. Likewise, Macarthur and Wilson seek to explain 
species richness, and Hubbel’s Unified Neutral Theory is about abundance and richness 
but not genetic, phenotypic, or functional diversity (Santana 2018, 7). Santana then argues 
that we are better off eliminating biodiversity as the explanandum in favour of its more 
specific dimensions because “Evolution and ecology explain the different aspects of 
biodiversity in different ways” (Santana 2018, 8). He concludes that ‘biodiversity’ is only 
eliminable in a very loose sense of linguistic shorthand. Strictly speaking and in practice 
biodiversity is eliminable as an explanandum. 
 Turning to the possibility of biodiversity as an explanans, Santana argues that we 
still have no reason to think that biodiversity is an explanans because the evidence 
provided by Burch-Brown and Archer is misrepresented. Burch-Brown and Archer have 
argued that biodiversity explains ecosystem behaviour such as nutrient cycling and 
stability but the empirical work identifies links between those effects and specific 
dimensions such as species richness (Santana 2018, 8).  
 
For example: why are diverse communities more productive, where productivity is the rate of 
biomass production? According to Cardinale et al. they are more productive because “they contain 
key species that have a large influence on productivity, and differences in functional traits among 
organ- isms increase total resource capture” (2012). They aren’t appealing to biodiversity in all its 
multiple dimensions as an explanans, but only appealing to two dimensions— species and 
functional diversity. (Santana 2018, 8–9) 
 
Santana’s other examples have a similar structure. Where Burch-Brown and Archer cite 
research on the link between biodiversity and productivity Santana argues that the 
explanans for productivity are actually complementarity and the selection effect. Both are 
properties of species richness and abundance, but crucially the explanation would not be 
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improved by appealing to phylogenetic distance or genetic diversity (Burch-Brown and 
Archer 2017, 9). Santana points out that this claim is not about mistaking a sampling 
method. He is not arguing that biologists are sampling species richness to indicate 
biodiversity and identify the relationship between biodiversity and productivity. He is 
arguing that including additional dimensions of biodiversity into our analysis adds no 
explanatory value. The explanans in these cases are specific dimensions of biodiversity 
rather than its multidimensional form so biodiversity is eliminable as an explanans. 
 The problem with Santana’s response is that he is using an inappropriate inference 
to the best explanation. His evidence is the set of academic studies of the effects of 
specific dimensions of biodiversity and his conclusion is the claim that scientists are 
interested in the dimensions of biodiversity rather than a high-level conception of 
biodiversity. However, there is an alternative explanation for the evidence and counter 
evidence to his conclusion. The large number of studies of specific dimensions of 
biodiversity is to be expected from modern academia which is becoming more and more 
specialised. Journals also set tight word limits which encourages narrow scopes in papers. 
It is a normal feature of scientific disciplines to find experts in one or two dimensions and 
few experts in everything. An expert who studies productivity is unlikely to be able to 
demonstrate a link between productivity and all of biology in 8,000 words or less. 
Biodiversity constitutes a big research project and tackling that project in small pieces 
does not indicate a lack of interest in biodiversity. By analogy, the fact that thousands of 
scientists work on aspects of climate change is not evidence that they doubt that climate 
change itself unites and explains other simultaneous effects. 
 There is also counter evidence to Santana’s conclusion. Santana concludes that the 
author is not discussing biodiversity because the details of the author’s work focus on one 
or two specific dimensions of biodiversity, (Santana 2018, 8). Whether Santana’s 
interpretation is correct is a decision for the author, but Burch-Brown and Archer pull 
examples from consensus statements of 17 collaborating authors. That kind of joint work 
looks like an attempt to give an up to date picture of biodiversity based on the scientific 
work on its specific dimensions. Conservation is particularly interested in a picture of 
biodiversity which is generated by multiple studies of the individual dimensions of 
biodiversity. Species richness can’t guide conservation triage alone because of the kind of 
problems which Santana points out (Santana 2014, 768–70). We need phylogenetic 
distance and genetic diversity to inform that decision so that we make the best 
conservation decision based on the current science. 
 A further issue with Santana’s response to Burch-Brown and Archer is his standard 
for eliminability. He outlines this in premises seven and eight of his revised eliminativist 
schema.  
 
7) To be a valid scientific kind a concept needs to either 
a) Be a natural kind or natural quality 
b) Or function ineliminably as an explanandum or explanans 




For the sake of argument I will assume here that Santana has already demonstrated that 
biodiversity is neither a natural kind nor natural quality and is arguing that biodiversity is 
eliminable from conservation biology. However, Santana is unclear about why the 
eliminability of a concept is a reason to eliminate it. Just because we can do without a 
concept does not mean that we are better off without it.  Maclaurin has argued that under 
Magnus’s account biodiversity can qualify as a natural kind by promoting inductive 
success (Maclaurin 2017, 64–65).  
 Concepts can have useful roles in science beyond the standard for eliminability 
which Santana uses. Analytic concepts are uninformative but play an important role in 
science. Biology is full of concepts such as ‘vixen’ which add no explanatory value but 
serve as linguistic shorthand. ‘Vixen’ is no more informative than ‘female fox’ and 
taxonomic ranks are flush with analytic concepts. The phylum ‘Chordata’ is an analytic 
concept which is no more informative than ‘organisms with notochords’. But we have not 
yet eliminated that concept in favour of its analytic meaning, despite it functioning 
eliminably. Santana himself finds a use for the ‘biosphere’ concept despite it being a 
polyphetic class of all other taxonomic ranks. 
 
Biodiversity is meant to serve as a reliable indicator of biological value, but given the vast variety 
of ways in which we value the biosphere, this requires us to employ a broad and open-ended 
definition of biodiversity. (Santana 2014, 762–63 emphasis added).  
 
Santana is concerned about ‘biodiversity’ reducing to ‘all of biology’ but uses ‘biosphere’ 
which is the name for the set of all biological organisms. An important function of kinds is 
to group other kinds. Such kinds are often eliminable in practice but the concepts survive 
in discourse as both language shortcuts and organisational tools.  
Eliminability is not always a reason to eliminate. Concepts survive for all sorts of 
reasons. Santana is aware of these possibilities, which is why he is “happy to grant that, 
speaking loosely, biodiversity is a key explanandum in biological science” (Santana 2018, 
7). My point is that ‘loosely eliminable explananda’ are actually quite important. Boyd 
identifies loosely eliminable scientific concepts such as the classification of “elements into 
metals, semi-metals and non-metals” (Boyd 1999b, 83) which have endured as useful 
homeostatic property clusters. Even if there were nothing more to ‘biodiversity’ than a 
useful linguistic shorthand we should not eliminate it, because biology involves diagnosis 
and categorisation. Useful linguistic shorthand is essential for both of them. 
 Santana might object that he has other reasons for eliminating biodiversity than the 
observation that it is eliminable, but Santana’s conceptual standard for eliminability more 
generally would still eliminate several other important multi-dimensional concepts. 
Santana has already discussed problems with the stability concept (Santana 2018, 10). He 
observes that it has seven different conceptions which can vary fairly independently of one 
another (Santana 2018, 11). Weeds in a garden have low stability in the sense that they can 
be sprayed or pulled out but high stability in the sense that somehow, they always come 
back (Justus 2013, 360–61). So like biodiversity, stability can be conceptualised along 
multiple dimensions, and needs to be specific to be measured, but a general account might 
be incommensurable and uninformative. Stability has the same problems as biodiversity. 
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Biodiversity has those conceptual issues not because it is a concept stretched to breaking 
point but because biodiversity is an umbrella concept and many umbrella concepts have 
conceptual tensions. They group together multiple dimensions but are typically 
operationalisable one dimension at a time.  
One example of this is health. It is a concept for normative biological function so it 
has multiple dimensions such as temperature, liver function, blood pressure, psychological 
distress, etc which can all vary fairly independently of one another. Blood pressure and 
temperature can be fine if a bone is broken. Digestion can be completely healthy whilst 
you have a headache. Poverty is another important complex concept. Your annual earnings 
can be high compared to some countries’ GDP whilst making it difficult to afford the 
basics in your country. You might have just enough money to survive week to week but 
not enough to create savings. You can have access to the material necessities but little 
disposable income. There are many complex cluster properties which appear eliminable in 
favour of their specific dimensions. But we group their dimensions together because the 
umbrella concepts highlight something important which we need to monitor. Conceptual 
complexity is not a good motivation for eliminativism (Justus 2013, 353). We need 
accounts of stability, poverty, health, and biodiversity. Even if they are complex, multi-
dimensional and no more informative than the sum of their dimensions, concepts like 
biodiversity track an important collection of properties. 
 The conceptual case for biodiversity eliminativism struggles because eliminativism 
is a nuclear response. Concepts like ‘phlogiston’ are only eliminated from discourse once 
they have ceased to be useful. However, the conceptual case for eliminativism infers from 
conceptual difficulties to the claim that we should scour the concept from academic 
discourse. That kind of conclusion requires an enormous body of evidence. Biodiversity 
eliminativists correctly identify a number of problem areas for the concept, but motivating 
the elimination of biodiversity requires a very strong case. At this point a successful case 
has not been made. Biodiversity is only as problematic a concept as other umbrella multi-
dimensional concepts, and if it is uninformative and misleading, it can still function as an: 
explanans, explanandum, linguistic shorthand, useful pragmatic concept, or the collective 
representation of multiple specific dimensions. Biodiversity eliminativists correctly 
identify a number of problem areas for biodiversity but more can be done to correct those 
problems before abandoning the concept. The conceptual case for biodiversity 
eliminativism requires more evidence than we currently have.  
 In this section I presumed that an HPC analysis of biodiversity was unsuccessful 
and argued that there were still good reasons to retain biodiversity in conservation biology. 
I discussed Burch-Brown and Archer’s arguments that biodiversity functions as both an 
explanans and explanandum. Biodiversity explains other ecosystem effects and biologists 
are interested in explaining the sheer variety of life. I considered Santana’s objection to 
these arguments and concluded that he has not been clear about the step from ‘we can 
eliminate a concept’ to ‘we ought to eliminate a concept’. He is correct that in practice 
scientists work with one or two specific dimensions of biodiversity but incorrect that this 
implies we ought to discard biodiversity. Santana’s standard for elimination would also 
cost us a great number of important multidimensional concepts such as: stability, health, 
and poverty. The problem with the conceptual case for elimination is that it is a nuclear 
73 
response to the problematic nature of multi-dimensional concepts. The tension between 
multiple dimensions, informativeness and operationalisability is not unique to biodiversity, 
so it is not a sufficient reason to eliminate it. ‘Biodiversity’ does have some conceptual 
issues but we need more evidence than we currently have to eliminate it from conservation 
biology.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter I argued that an HPC conception of biodiversity avoids the challenges 
raised by the conceptual case for eliminativism. It avoids the concerns of Angermeier and 
Karr because understanding biodiversity as a homeostatic property cluster reduces 
conceptual misdirection because it makes biodiversity more complex than species richness 
and allows for other important elements of the environment such as health. An HPC 
conception of biodiversity also avoids Santana’s meaning-dilemma because general 
conceptions can still be informative. The classical semantic measure of information (SMI) 
measures the informativeness of propositions in terms of the possibilities which they 
exclude so the key to a general conception of biodiversity which is also informative is to 
pay attention to what biodiversity is not.  
To that end I identified biological elements which biodiversity should not 
incorporate, and argued that there were important differences between biodiversity and 
biological value. The exclusion of these possibilities from my HPC conception of 
biodiversity ensures that it is both informative and general. Therefore a homeostatic 
property cluster conception of biodiversity avoids the conceptual case for eliminating 
biodiversity. Furthermore even if his meaning-dilemma argument were successful there are 
other reasons to retain biodiversity. For these reasons, and my conclusion that a HPC 
conception of biodiversity reduces misdirection in conservation and escapes the meaning-
dilemma argument, I conclude that biodiversity survives the conceptual case for its 
elimination. In the next chapter I shift my attention to the empirical case for eliminating 
biodiversity. I discuss Santana’s argument that biodiversity is an empirical poor fit for the 




4 The Surrogacy Strategy for Measuring Biodiversity 
and the Empirical Case for Its Elimination 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will introduce the empirical case for eliminating biodiversity and begin an 
argument that it is unsuccessful. I say ‘begin’ because it will require three chapters to 
establish that the empirical case for eliminativism is unsuccessful. In section 4.2 I outline 
the empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism. The empirical case is an attack by Carlos 
Santana on the methodology for measuring biodiversity. Santana builds this empirical case 
on the work of biodiversity’s defenders, who also express concerns about the methodology 
of biodiversity measurement. Biodiversity is measured using the surrogacy strategy which 
uses individual dimensions as measurement surrogates. In section 4.3 I will explain how 
the surrogacy strategy works and demonstrate it with the example of using resilience as a 
measurement surrogate for Angermeier and Karr’s conception of biological integrity. 
 In section 4.4 I discuss and defend the surrogacy strategy against its limitations. I 
introduce the problem of strict incommensurability between dimensions of biodiversity. 
The various dimensions of biodiversity such as species richness and morphology cannot be 
measured as a single biodiversity value. I argue that the dimensions of biodiversity are not 
strictly incommensurable. Morphology is incommensurable with species richness, but we 
can still meaningfully compare the morphology diversity and species richness of two 
different ecosystems. Then I discuss concerns about multiple surrogates. Santana discusses 
Sarkar's (2005) distinction between true and estimator surrogates. He argues that the 
relationship of estimator surrogate to true surrogate to biodiversity to biological value 
exacerbates imprecision in the surrogacy strategy. In response I argue that including 
biodiversity in this surrogate chain does not weaken the correlation between estimator 
surrogate and biological value. 
In section 4.5 I argue that the empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism is 
misrepresenting the state of biodiversity measurement. I draw a distinction between 
within-surrogate operationalisability—how operationalisable the specific dimensions of 
biodiversity are—and between-surrogate operationalisability—how operationalisable 
biodiversity is as a single property. I argue that Santana’s arguments overlook this 
distinction. He shifts between criticizing the operationalisability of specific dimensions of 
biodiversity and criticizing the correlation between dimensions. I also argue that imperfect 
correlation between biodiversity surrogates is an important feature for measuring an 
umbrella concept. I conclude that the plausibility of the empirical case is incompatible 
with the details of biodiversity’s measurement methodology. Chapters five and six outline 
the details of how specific dimensions of biodiversity are measured and will establish two 
propositions. The expanding multiplicity of biodiversity measures is overblown and the 
empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism is unsuccessful.  
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4.2 The Empirical Case for Biodiversity Eliminativism 
The empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism has two components, Santana’s poor fit 
argument and current methodological debate over biodiversity measures. I construct 
Santana’s poor fit argument by appealing to the textual evidence of his many claims about 
the empirical shortcomings of biodiversity. His remarks are general but serious. He argues 
that biodiversity is not straightforwardly operationalisable, lacks surrogate correlation, 
exacerbates imprecision in the conservation process, and that the true surrogates of 
biodiversity do not track their goals well (Santana 2017, 86; Santana 2018, 6; Santana 
2014, 765–68). The current debate over how to measure biodiversity is not an argument 
for eliminating biodiversity, but it does motivate the argument. Fierce debate over the 
correct way to measure biodiversity, coupled with concerns about incommensurability and 
the number of available measures, give the impression that there is little consensus on how 
to measure biodiversity. The poor fit argument relies on this impression to be plausible. It 
will be the task of this chapter to demonstrate that this impression is misleading. Despite 
healthy debate as to whether this is so, measures of biodiversity are empirically rigorous.  
 
4.2.1 Empirical Case I: Santana’s Poor Fit Argument 
In this section I will formalize Santana’s poor fit argument. I begin by presenting a 
summary of Santana’s main claims that biodiversity is a poor empirical fit for conservation 
biology through textual evidence. Santana does not summarise his objections into a single 
formalised argument against biodiversity. He does present a formal argument that 
biodiversity is eliminable as a scientific kind but the conclusion of that argument is 
focused on biodiversity’s conceptual role (Santana 2018, 6). Compared to the conceptual 
case, Santana’s empirical case against biodiversity is just as important. I will assemble his 
empirical objections into a single argument and formalise it into premise-conclusion 
format. Next I will outline my strategy for disagreeing with his conclusion in this chapter 
and chapters five and six. I outline five key propositions which I will present evidence for. 
The truth of these propositions implies the falsity of the main premises in Santana’s poor 
fit argument and give us good reason to believe that biodiversity is an empirically good fit 
for use in conservation biology. 
Santana has argued that on empirical grounds biodiversity is a poor fit for the role 
we want it to play in conservation biology. He argues that biodiversity is not 
straightforwardly measureable. 
  
The principle role played by the concept ‘biodiversity’ in conservation biology is as a comparative 
measure of value. Biodiversity does not fulfil that role well, in part because it is not a 
straightforwardly measureable quantity.  (Santana 2017, 86) 
 
He argues that the dimensions of biodiversity which we measure do not correlate enough 
for us to consider biodiversity as a property bundle. 
 
Against pluralists, who hold that biodiversity consists of distinct but correlated properties of natural 
systems, I argue that the supposed correlations between these properties are not tight enough to 
warrant treating and measuring them as a bundle. (Santana 2014, 761) 
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He argues that those dimensions of biodiversity do not support robust inductive 
generalisations. “The grouping picked out by SEGO [species richness, ecosystem 
diversity, genetic diversity, and other] doesn’t support robust inductive generalizations 
across the group” (Santana 2018, 6). He argues that the inclusion of biodiversity in our 
methodology from estimator surrogate to biological value makes the approximation less 
precise than if we had just approximated biological value from the estimator surrogate 
without biodiversity. 
 
“I agree with Sarkar that biodiversity is a placeholder, but while Sarkar sees it as a useful 
placeholder, in fact the placeholder itself unnecessarily complicates the picture . . . As normative 
descriptions of the practice of conservation biology, series B is more economical than series A [the 
methodology which employs biodiversity as a proxy], and less prone to errors due to 
misrepresentation of one member by another.” (Santana 2014, 765 my emphasis) 
 
He also argues that the true surrogates around which biodiversity is thought to orbit either 
fail to approximate biodiversity, fail to approximate biological value, or fail the pragmatic 
requirements of conservation biology. 
 
“It has been frequently pointed out that [Species] richness does not even capture intuitive ideas 
about what diversity is, such as abundance and disparity.” (Santana 2014, 768) 
 
“But the relative abundance of species also fails to represent biological value well . . . for one thing . 
. . it could be that a larger population of that species would impact other populations adversely . . . 
and in terms of value to humans, rarity itself might sometimes be preferable.” (Santana 2014, 770) 
 
“So although mathematically described local morphospaces could provide insight into the evolution 
of a lineage, local morphospaces do not meaningfully do not capture a broad notion of 
biodiversity.”  (Santana 2014, 770) 
 
 
“Genetic diversity, however, is nearly a non-starter. A “gene soup” containing a random sample of 
genetic material from a given place would furnish little useful in the way of important information 
for several reasons.” (Santana 2014, 771) 
 
“So ecological diversity, like the measures we have examined fails to correlate reliably with other 
types of biological diversity.” (Santana 2014, 772) 
 
“And although a variety of functional roles must be occupied to keep biological processes in place, 
we can explain those roles and those process without needing to call on a biodiversity concept.” 
(Santana 2014, 773) 
 
Santana argues that taken together these observations justify the claim that biodiversity is a 
poor empirical fit for conservation biology. Consider the following formalization of 
Santana’s poor empirical fit argument. 
 
The poor empirical fit argument 
 
1) General conceptions of biodiversity are not straightforwardly measureable. 
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2) There is not sufficient correlation between properties for biodiversity to be considered 
a property bundle. 
3) The dimensions of biodiversity do not support robust inductive generalisations across 
the group. 
4) The inclusion of biodiversity in the conservation process exacerbates imprecision 
between the measured target and the conservation goal. 
5) Individual dimensions of biodiversity are either: 
a. Not operationalisable 
b. Do not accurately track biodiversity 
c. Or do not accurately track biological value 
6) If premises one to 5) accurately describe biodiversity then biodiversity is a poor 
empirical fit for its role in conservation biology. 
7) Therefore: Biodiversity is a poor empirical fit for its role in conservation biology. 
 
This argument collects Santana’s empirical objections to the use of biodiversity as a 
conservation goal. It is philosophically valid, but the truth of premise six in particular is 
contentious because the goals of conservation biology can be justified for other reasons. A 
goal is a good empirical fit if it is more empirically suitable than the available alternatives. 
However, Santana argues that premises one to five are a sufficient reason to eliminate 
biodiversity. 
 
“While taken individually these arguments must be tentative, relying as they do on uncertain 
empirical claims as well as tendentious assertions of what is worth conserving, taken as a whole 
they are strong enough to cast serious doubt on the usefulness of biodiversity as the primary target 
of conservation.” (Santana 2014, 768) 
 
It will be the task of this chapter and the next two to demonstrate that biodiversity is not a 
poor empirical fit for its role in conservation biology. 
 I will address the individual premises of Santana’s argument at different stages. In 
section 4.3 I will explain how biodiversity is measured with the surrogacy strategy. 
Understanding the surrogacy strategy is important to understanding why an empirically 
suitable conservation goal should not satisfy premises one to five. After outlining the 
surrogacy strategy I respond to Santana’s argument by defending the strategy against its 
limitations. I discuss the problem of strict incommensurability between dimensions of 
biodiversity in section 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. In those sections I discuss premises one and three 
since it is incommensurability which drives difficulties with operationalisability and robust 
inductive generalisations. In sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 I discuss problems with multiple 
surrogates. In these sections I discuss premises two, four, and five since lack of 
correlation, increased imprecision, and concerns about the individual dimensions of 
biodiversity are problems of multiple surrogates. In section 4.6 I discuss premise six that 
“If conditions one to five accurately describe biodiversity then biodiversity is a poor 
empirical fit for its role in conservation biology”. In the next section I explain how the 
debate over the best way to measure biodiversity has unintentionally motivated Santana’s 
poor fit argument. This is the second part of the empirical case against biodiversity. 
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4.2.2 Empirical Case II: How Biodiversity Conservationists Unintentionally 
Motivate the Empirical Case for Biodiversity Eliminativism 
Biodiversity conservationists are academics who wish biodiversity to retain its place as a 
goal of conservation. Understandably, there is considerable debate between academics 
about the best way to measure biodiversity. This debate often takes the form of arguing 
against other measures of biodiversity whilst promoting the author’s newer, preferred 
measure (Maclaurin 2017, 56). The net effect of this debate over time has been a large 
increase in the number of ways to measure biodiversity. Biodiversity is a complex property 
and the ways to measure it seem to be exponentially increasing (Maclaurin 2017, 56). 
Given that each measure produces different results and that selecting a measure is at a 
conservationist’s discretion, the expanding multiplicity of available measures give the 
impression that biodiversity calculation is imprecise. It appears as if there are large 
numbers of measures with varying results so it is possible to select the measure which best 
advances an author’s conclusion. Consider the following comments on the state of 
biodiversity measurement methodology. 
 
Several developments are needed to provide a truly firm foundation to the measurement of 
diversity. First, more attention to and development of methods to account for the fact that collected 
data are sampled data are needed . . . Second, rather than developing new measures of diversity by 
ad hoc processes we hope to see a further focus on fundamental ideas like variance and information 
(Maurer and McGill 2011, 64) 
 
Our current understanding of biodiversity is a mess. It is a fortunate, productive, and useful mess 
but a mess none the less. This can be traced to the lack of a guiding set of standards from which to 
assess the value of proposed biodiversity measures. Although measures are tested, the testing has 
often been piecemeal across conservation biology and related disciplines leading to conflicts over 
whether a metric has been proved. (Maclaurin and Lean 2016, 20) 
 
The problem is that the rigorous discussion of the best way to measure biodiversity 
gives the impression that there is little consensus and that biodiversity values are still up 
for grabs. Biodiversity conservationists exacerbate this impression by discussing the strict 
incommensurability of biodiversity’s dimensions, without explaining how biodiversity 
might still be operationalisable. 
 
Perhaps this wish bundles together dimensions of biodiversity that are strictly incommensurable. 
Certainly we do not as yet have a translation of this imperative into any simply applicable measure 
of biological difference, and perhaps we will never have one.  (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 177) 
 
There are innumerable dimensions along which living things can be compared, so it is impossible to 
describe biodiversity as a simple magnitude (Gaston 2011) . . . To fully describe a region’s 
biodiversity would be impossible. (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 971) 
 
It is not surprising that there is a bewildering array of tools available to those who would measure 
biodiversity. There are of course countless respects in which organisms and ecosystems vary. 
(Maclaurin and Lean 2016, 19) 
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A related problem with broad definitions, discussed by Sarkar (2002, 2005), Norton (2006), 
and recently Maier (2012), is that multiple “dimensions” or biological diversities at different scales 
are incommensurable. This makes it seem impossible to develop an additive “index” of biodiversity 
to rank areas in terms of their overall diversity. (Frank 2017, 98) 
 
The empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism seems more plausible when we 
consider it in the context of these comments. Scientific measures need to be as precise as 
possible, but biodiversity has an expanding multiplicity of measures to choose from. 
Biodiversity conservationists speak of the strict incommensurability of biodiversity’s 
dimensions, but comparing the biodiversity of multiple ecosystems requires some 
commensurability. The debate over biodiversity’s measurement methodology gives the 
impression that the measurement problem is at an impasse. Santana’s empirical poor fit 
argument uses this impression to motivate the empirical case for biodiversity 
eliminativism. Santana points out that his conclusions rely heavily on the work of 
biodiversity conservationists. 
In this chapter and the following two I will argue against the impression that the 
measurement problem is at an impasse. In section 4.4.2 I will argue that despite 
incommensurability between specific dimensions we can still use them to make 
meaningful comparisons between the biodiversity of distinct ecosystems. In chapters five 
and six I outline the detail of measurement methodology for several biodiversity 
surrogates. I will argue that this detail shows that measures of biodiversity are in a better 
state than the poor fit argument presumes. The expanding multiplicity of biodiversity 
measures is overblown and biodiversity is empirically suitable for its role in conservation 
biology. It simply has a very rich tool kit. I begin in the next section by explaining how the 
surrogacy strategy is used to measure biodiversity. 
 
4.3 The Surrogacy Strategy for Measuring Biodiversity 
In this section I will explain the surrogacy strategy for measuring the biodiversity of an 
ecosystem. The detail of how biodiversity is measured is essential to understanding the 
empirical poor fit argument. Because general conceptions of biodiversity are not 
operationalisable, conservationists measure biodiversity using biodiversity surrogates. 
These surrogates are key elements of biodiversity such as species richness, phylogenetic 
diversity and its other dimensions. Scientists measure one or more key elements of 
biodiversity in an ecosystem and use this figure to approximate the total biodiversity of an 
ecosystem and how it has been affected (Sarkar 2005, 153–54). Thus a key element of 
biodiversity such as species richness serves as a useful surrogate for the biodiversity of an 
ecosystem. The selection of a specific surrogate for an area is based on what is the most 
appropriate for the area. Species richness weighted for abundance is usually the dominant 
surrogate but genetic diversity, or diversity of physical characteristics could be better for 
ecosystems containing large numbers of closely-related species (Sarkar 2005, 169). In this 




4.3.1 The Role of Specific Dimensions of Biodiversity in the Surrogacy 
Strategy 
Specific dimensions of biodiversity have an important role in measuring biodiversity 
because they act as different surrogates in a chain of approximation. In its simplest form a 
conservationist may approximate the biodiversity of an area by measuring a single 
dimension such as species richness. In this case the surrogacy strategy can be represented 
in the following way.  
 
Species Richness  Biodiversity 
 
This is the practice in studies which identify biodiversity hot spots. Biodiversity hot spots 
are ecosystems which contain species richness that is disproportionately higher than 
typical species richness. 34 biodiversity hotspots represent 2.3% of the world’s land mass 
but contain 50% of vascular plant species and 42% of terrestrial vertebrates (Burch-Brown 
and Archer 2017, 992). 
 Sarkar gives a more complicated picture of how biodiversity is measured. Sarkar 
discusses the issue of how we assess biodiversity by separating the problem into two 
distinct concerns: a question about which property is to be measured, and a concern about 
the pragmatic possibility of gathering data on that property. 
 
Two problems must be solved: (i) a relatively theoretical one – what is to be measured?, and (ii) a 
practical one – can the required data realistically be collected? The former is the problem of 
quantification; the latter is the problem of estimation. Jointly, these two problems comprise the 
problem of assessing biodiversity. (Sarkar 2005, 168) 
 
Before discussing the concern about which surrogate should be measured he draws 
attention to the distinction between true surrogates and estimator surrogates (Sarkar and 
Margules 2002, 140). The difference between true and estimator surrogates is determined 
by their place on the surrogacy chain. True surrogates are representative of general 
biodiversity whereas estimator surrogates are taken to be representative of true surrogates 
(Sarkar 2005, 169). In this case the surrogacy strategy can be represented in the following 
way.  
 
Estimator Surrogate  True Surrogate  Biodiversity  
 
 Estimator surrogates are important because of the difficulty of measuring the true 
surrogate. True surrogates are operationalisable but it takes time to measure them. We 
have limited time to make conservation decisions because conservation work often 
resembles triage (Takacs 1996, 8). For instance one of the most popular true surrogates for 
biodiversity is species diversity, which is species richness weighted for abundance 
(Santana 2014, 763–64). But species diversity is difficult to accurately determine. This is 
shown by how often our estimates of species numbers and daily extinction rates change 
(Takacs 1996, 83–84). As Sarkar notes: 
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It should be clear that complete distributions of all species for any region will never be available: 
even leaving aside microbial species, complete distributions of many other taxa, including insects 
(which are believe to show more diversity than any other taxon), are never available in practice. 
(Sarkar 2005, 169) 
 
Ecosystems simply have too many inhabitants for measures of species richness to be 
efficient. Identifying some larger organisms is easier but species of flora and insects 
represent a disproportionately large amount of the species richness of a local ecosystem. 
Terry Erwin’s work demonstrated that the unique species of beetle can vary significantly 
as you travel just from one tree to the next (Takacs 1996, 83–84). Species richness is 
operationalisable, but conservationists do not have time to check the species in every 
single tree.  
 Estimator surrogates are both operationalisable and efficient measures. They are 
used as surrogates for the true surrogate through the assessment of representative samples. 
This is how much of current biodiversity assessment is carried out (Sarkar 2005, 171). 
True surrogates tend to be the specific dimensions of biodiversity such as species richness, 
morphology, and genetic diversity. Sarkar provides a list of candidates for estimator 
surrogates, stating that “There are at least six plausible candidates for estimator-surrogates: 
(i) environmental parameter composition, (ii) soil type composition, (iii) dominant 
vegetation composition, (iv) life-zone composition, (v) subsets of species composition, and 
(vi) subsets of genus or other higher taxon composition.” (Sarkar 2005, 171). The 
advantage of an estimator surrogate is that we can obtain date on it within a short time 
frame. In general we have large amounts of weather data for environmental parameter 
composition, soil composition can be easily measured and the dominant vegetation can be 
identified via satellite images (Sarkar 2005, 168–71).  
 Surrogate selection is dependent on the ecosystem we are studying. Sarkar believes 
that selection is based on which true surrogate is the best explanatory and predictive tool 
for the ecosystem’s biodiversity (Sarkar 2005, 160). We should begin by compiling 
existing geographical data on the ecosystem in question whilst remaining aware of any 
problems with the existing data. Then we should select the true surrogate based on which 
one is most appropriate for the ecosystem (Sarkar 2005, 153). If we are studying a 
biodiversity hotspot then species diversity may be the best true surrogate to use. Next we 
select an estimator surrogate on the basis of its accuracy and efficiency. Once we have 
finishing selecting the estimator surrogates we then take representative samples from the 
ecosystem and use it to approximate the system’s biodiversity (Sarkar 2005, 153). So the 
surrogacy strategy uses specific dimensions of biodiversity as the measurement surrogates 
for biodiversity. The purpose of the surrogacy strategy is to operationalise biodiversity in a 
way which meets the demands of conservation biology.  
 One objection to Sarkar’s account of the surrogacy strategy is that it is not clear 
that we need a distinction between estimator and true surrogates. The problem is that 
Sarkar has not yet explained the difference between estimating the prevalence of a true 
surrogate and sampling it. If the surrogacy chain only identifies stages at which we infer 
the value of the next step then we could extend the chain like this: 
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Observed Soil Composition  Soil Composition  Species Richness  Biodiversity 
 
But a good reason to reject this chain is that the first step looks like sampling. Surrogates 
require measuring a different property to the target and using it as a proxy. The first step is 
not a surrogate because the target properties are the same. In practice this occurs with 
studies of species richness. Moller (et al. 2007) study species richness but focus on the 
avian class so their surrogacy chain is like this:  
 
Avian Richness  Species Richness  Biodiversity 
 
Santana characterises avian richness as an estimator surrogate in this kind of chain 
(Santana 2017, 87). But, in this case avian richness is just a sampling method rather than 
an estimator surrogate. Long surrogacy chains are difficult to justify because they require a 
justification for why the middle stages are important. Sarkar has yet to tell us why we 
ought not to simply use soil composition as the true surrogate for biodiversity. There is 
some vague ground in Sarkar’s surrogacy strategy over the distinction between estimator 
surrogates and true surrogates but it is this account of measuring biodiversity which 
Santana directly engages. Since the measurement chapters focus on Santana’s arguments, I 
will use Sarkar’s account of the surrogacy strategy in this thesis. In the next section I 
discuss and defend the surrogacy strategy against its limitations. 
 
4.4 Limitations of the Surrogacy Strategy and Their Defence 
In this section I will discuss methodological limitations of the surrogacy strategy and 
defend the strategy against them. I focus on two limitations of the surrogacy strategy: 
surrogate incommensurability, and the problem of multiple surrogates. The individual 
dimensions of biodiversity which are used as surrogates are strictly incommensurable with 
one another (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 177).  This prevents measures of biodiversity 
from producing a final biodiversity value for an ecosystem (Frank 2017, 98). Without a 
final biodiversity value conservation triage is difficult because there are no easy 
comparisons between the biodiversity of different ecosystems. In response to this problem 
I argue that only certain dimensions of biodiversity are strictly incommensurable. Other 
dimensions such as species richness and phylogenetic diversity still allow for meaningful 
comparisons between distinct ecosystems. 
 The problem of multiple surrogates has to do with the issues that arise from the 
high number of specific dimensions of biodiversity. Because biodiversity has so many 
specific dimensions there is a large number of surrogates and combinations of surrogates 
in the surrogacy strategy. Since they measure distinct dimensions, this implies that 
measures of biodiversity summarise biological properties which do not highly co-vary. 
Santana argues that the use of multiple surrogates in the surrogacy strategy makes the 
process more prone to error (Santana 2014, 765). Three steps of surrogacy is less precise 
than one or two. The number of surrogates also implies that there is latent flexibility in the 
results of the surrogacy strategy. With multiple surrogates to choose between, we could 
choose the surrogates which provide the most favourable data. Against these problems I 
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argue that correlation between dimensions of biodiversity is higher than Santana argues, 
that multiple surrogates do not make the strategy more prone to error, and that biased 
selection of measures would not pass peer review. 
 
4.4.1 The Problem of Incommensurability  
In this subsection I will outline the problem of incommensurability between the specific 
dimensions of biodiversity. It is incommensurability which drives premises one and three 
of Santana’s poor fit argument. To support his conclusion that biodiversity is a poor 
empirical fit for conservation biology Santana claims that general conceptions of 
biodiversity are not straightforwardly measureable and that the dimensions of biodiversity 
do not support robust inductive generalisations. Assuming he is correct, the cause of these 
issues is the incommensurability of the specific dimensions of biodiversity. Specific 
dimensions of biodiversity, such as species richness, genetic diversity, and phenetic 
diversity can be calculated individually, but the results cannot be combined into a single 
value for general biodiversity. 
 It is an important limitation of the surrogacy strategy that we cannot produce a 
single quantity for calculating biodiversity. Since we have no single value, biodiversity is 
not straightforwardly measureable and premise one of the poor empirical fit argument is 
true. Premise three that “the dimensions of biodiversity do not support robust inductive 
generalisations across the group” is ambiguous. It can be understood as a concern about 
correlation between the specific dimensions of biodiversity or as a concern about how well 
the dimensions track biodiversity. The former concern is more explicitly expressed in 
premise two that “there is not sufficient property correlation for biodiversity to be 
considered a property bundle”, so I will interpret premise three in the latter sense. We 
cannot inductively generalise from dimensions of biodiversity to biodiversity values.  
 I accept the truth of premise one that “biodiversity is not straightforwardly 
measureable”. There is no single biodiversity value and we require a surrogacy strategy to 
measure it. That is, we must employ other surrogate measures to approximate biodiversity. 
So it follows that biodiversity is not straightforwardly measureable. The truth of premise 
three is more complex. Whilst it is true that specific dimensions of biodiversity cannot be 
inductively generalised to biodiversity values; that is because there currently is no 
biodiversity value to generalise towards. Conservationists do not currently produce a 
single quantity to represent biodiversity. Instead they provide a quantity of one of its 
dimensions to indicate how much biodiversity there is. We don’t have empirical data of an 
ecosystem with low species richness but high biodiversity because we don’t yet have 
values to assign biodiversity. We should not expect a single value for biodiversity because 
it needs to be multi-dimensional and complex to track the disjunctive nature of biological 
phenomena. 
Premise three is motivated by conceptual concerns. Santana is using his conceptual 
arguments from his 2014 paper to motivate an empirical premise in his 2018 paper 
(Santana 2018, 6). If there is more to biodiversity than species richness, species richness 
will not track biodiversity well. But this inference is problematic for two reasons. 
Conceptual counterexamples rely on intuition. If I’m not convinced that abundance is an 
important element of diversity then I won’t think that evenly-weighted populations are 
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more biodiverse than ecosystems with a few dominant species. Secondly, counterexamples 
only tell us that specific dimensions such as species richness have an imperfect correlation 
with biodiversity. They do not tell us how well the specific dimension and biodiversity 
correlate. Establishing poor correlation requires a large body of statistical evidence which 
is difficult to come across with a single quantity for biodiversity. So premise three of the 
poor fit argument is true. Specific dimensions of biodiversity do not support robust 
inductive generalisations from the dimensions to biodiversity value because there currently 
is no quantity for the biodiversity of an ecosystem. There is no single quantity, because the 
dimensions of biodiversity are incommensurable. In the next subsection I will defend the 
surrogacy strategy against the incommensurability problem. 
 
4.4.2 A Reply to the Incommensurability Problem 
In this section I will offer two replies to the incommensurability problem. I will argue that 
the incommensurable dimensions of biodiversity can still be used for meaningful 
conservation comparisons. I will also argue that measures of biodiversity would not be 
better represented by a single straightforwardly measureable quantity. Beginning with 
incommensurability, it is true that the dimensions of biodiversity are strictly 
incommensurable with each other (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 974) but they are only 
incommensurable in the sense that there is no cross comparison. Most measures of true 
surrogates can be converted into measures of other true surrogates with a small 
transformation. Transformation is possible because most measures of biodiversity use 
species identification as a common data point. 
Consider the following example. Imagine that we have two different ecosystems A 
and B and we have to select one for conservation based on the best use of our resources. 
We have a measure S of the species richness of ecosystem A and P of the phylogenetic 
diversity of ecosystem B.  
 
Ecosystem A  Ecosystem B 
Species Richness Phylogenetic Diversity 
 
 
The problem then is that we need to decide between ecosystem A and B but we cannot 
compare S with P. The true surrogates, species richness and phylogenetic diversity, are 
incommensurable. As David Frank puts the problem, “There is no natural metric of 
“overall biodiversity” to determine whether, say, an additional species in one area (more 
species diversity) and a certain loss in heterozygosity in that area (less genetic diversity) 
would make that area more, less, or equally biodiverse.” (Frank 2017, 98). In chapters five 
and six I will discuss measurement methodology of biodiversity’s true surrogates in more 
detail but there is a solution to Frank’s problem because so many metrics of biodiversity 
use species as a common data point. 
Species are a common point of data collection for many different metrics. 
Measures of species richness require a list of species. Species diversity applies counts of 
abundance to a list of species (Maclaurin and Lean 2016, 25). Phylogenetic diversity maps 
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the evolutionary relationship between lists of species (Faith 1996, 1286). Morphology and 
functional diversity map the variation of physical traits of species. So the quantity of most 
true surrogates can be calculated with a list of species and abundance data. Difficulties 
apply for a focus on traits or genetic diversity, but for the most part the gaps can be filled 
in for both ecosystems and we can cross compare the same dimensions to get an idea of 
which ecosystem has the most biodiversity.  
In the case of ecosystems A and B we can generate a measure of phylogenetic 
diversity from the data set because we have its species richness. In the case of ecosystem B 
we can reverse engineer the species richness from the species list generating phylogenetic 
diversity.  
 
Ecosystem A  Ecosystem B 
Species Richness1 Species Richness2 
Phylogenetic Diversity1 Phylogenetic Diversity2 
 
 
So we can’t compare species richness with phylogenetic diversity but we can easily 
compare S1 with S2 and PD1 with PD2. Conservationists can do a lot with a list of species 
and abundance data because many true surrogates of biodiversity can be understood as 
transformations of the same data set. Incommensurable dimensions can still be used to 
compare ecosystems and inform conservation decisions. The mean, median, and mode of a 
data set conjointly give an important impression of data despite being incommensurable 
values. The incommensurability of the specific dimensions of biodiversity is a barrier to 
straightforward measurability but that barrier can be overcome. We can still perform 
comparative analyses of biodiversity straightforwardly without a single biodiversity 
quantity. 
 A single quantity for biodiversity seems attractive, but it would severely 
misconstrue the status of an ecosystem. It is an important limitation of the surrogacy 
strategy that we cannot reduce our multidimensional results to a single biodiversity 
quantity. Santana presumes that this is a weakness of the surrogacy strategy. He argues 
that a lack of a straightforwardly measureable quantity and the inability for specific 
dimensions of biodiversity to track a biodiversity quantity are empirical reasons to 
eliminate biodiversity (Santana 2017, 86). But a multidimensional incommensurable 
measure is more appropriate for a multidimensional concept like biodiversity. This is 
because properties such as species richness, disparity, resilience and functionality are all 
important elements of biodiversity but no single dimension captures all the important 
elements of biodiversity. A focus on species richness can overlook the importance of 
resilience, or the ecosystems which the species inhabit. Focusing on disparity can overlook 
the importance of unique genetic information or functional interactions (Angermeier and 
Karr 1994, 692). Processing the data of multiple dimensions into a single quantity will 
require transforming results in a way which could cause us to overlook an important result 
along a single dimension.sear Using the analogy with another complex multidimensional 
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concept, a single value for health would be misleading. If there were a single quantity for 
good health then that result could easily overlook critical failure along one specific 
dimension. It is possible for a patient to have a fractured bone whilst many of their other 
bodily functions are still healthy. An average score for health will not lower much when 
there is a serious problem with a single dimension because there are many dimensions of 
health and they can rise and fall independently of one another. Likewise for biodiversity, a 
single measure would gloss over distinct dimensions whose performance should be 
considered individually. A key piece of motivating evidence in Santana’s arguments is the 
independent variation of properties. When properties vary independently of one another 
we should measure them individually instead of processing them into a single value. The 
specific dimensions of biodiversity are incommensurable but that is not a good reason to 
eliminate biodiversity. Complex multidimensional concepts are served best by complex 
multidimensional measures. The surrogacy strategy accomplishes this well. 
 In this subsection I defended the surrogacy strategy against the problem of 
incommensurability. I argued that the incommensurability of specific dimensions of 
biodiversity does not prevent meaningful comparisons of ecosystems. I also argued that 
measures of biodiversity are more informative as complex and multidimensional than as a 
single quantity. Premises one and three of the poor fit argument are therefore true. 
Biodiversity is not straightforwardly measureable and the specific dimensions of 
biodiversity do not support robust inductive generalisations across the group. Values for 
true surrogates cannot accurately predict quantities of biodiversity because there is no 
single quantity for biodiversity.  
The search for a single unified measure of the biodiversity value of an ecosystem 
seems appealing but on closer inspection it is inherently flawed. Generalising biodiversity 
into a single value would be a mistake because it would inevitably gloss over the subtle but 
important biodiversity features of an ecosystem. Measuring specific dimensions of 
biodiversity individually enables us to give them due consideration when making 
important conservation decisions. The incommensurability of the specific dimensions of 
biodiversity is therefore not a flaw of the surrogacy strategy. We are better off treating 
biodiversity as a cluster of distinct but important properties, rather than trying to process 
them all into a single value. As Maclaurin and Sterelny note  
 
Identifying a single quantity is clearly an attractive goal. It would prevent us talking past one 
another. It would maximise the collection of useful data. It would present a clear and unified picture 
of the natural world, useful to those promoting action in the face of ecological threats. But can such 
a one-size-fits-all measure adequately depict biodiversity? We doubt it. (Maclaurin and Sterelny 
2008, 173) 
 
In the next subsection I will discuss problems with multiple surrogates in the surrogacy 




4.4.3 Problems with Multiple Surrogates 
In this subsection I will discuss how the surrogacy strategy generates problems with 
multiple surrogates. Santana appeals to three such problems to motivate his empirical poor 
fit argument. In premise two he claims that there is not sufficient property correlation for 
biodiversity to be considered a property bundle. This premise is important because it also 
informs premise three that the specific dimensions of biodiversity do not support robust 
inductive generalisations across the group. In premise four he claims that including 
biodiversity in the surrogacy strategy exacerbates imprecision between the measured target 
and the conservation goal. In premise five he claims that the multiple surrogates of 
biodiversity either are not operationalisable, do not accurately track biodiversity, or do not 
accurately track biological value. I begin with premise two. 
 Santana argues that there is not sufficient property correlation for biodiversity to be 
considered a property bundle. In part this is a conceptual argument but he also supports his 
conclusion with empirical work. 
 
Species richness increases as latitude decreases, for instance (Hillebrand 2004), but whatever 
correlate of latitude causes this doesn’t seem to affect every dimension of diversity. Genetic 
diversity within species, for instance, is probably not affected, and even species richness within 
certain taxa, such as certain avian and planktonic groups, turns out to have the opposite relationship 
with latitude (ibid). (Santana 2018, 4) 
 
Unfortunately, evolutionary diversity and species diversity are often distinct, as demonstrated, for 
example, by Mooers (2007), who describes a case study on the flora of South Africa’s cape region 
showing that the eastern region of the cape has higher diversity on a clade-based measurement, 
while the western region has higher species richness. (Santana 2014, 771) 
 
So the argument has a strong empirical component. In his 2018 paper Santana takes these 
empirical conclusions to support his claim that the specific dimensions of biodiversity do 
not support robust inductive generalisations across the group (Santana 2018, 6). In the 
previous subsections I discussed the interpretation of premise three, that Santana was 
concerned about the ability of specific dimensions of biodiversity to predict quantities of 
biodiversity. However, Santana is also concerned about the ability of specific dimensions 
of biodiversity to predict other true surrogates. 
 In premise four of the poor empirical fit argument Santana expresses concern about 
the accuracy of the surrogacy strategy. He argues that including biodiversity in the 
surrogacy strategy exacerbates the imprecision between the estimator surrogate and 
biological value. Measurement surrogates are most effective when there is a very high 
correlation between the surrogate measure and the actual measure. A thermometer is an 
accurate gauge of temperature because the expansion of mercury in the glass tube 
correlates very highly with the mean kinetic energy of particles in the measured substance 
(Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 134). However, because the surrogacy strategy involves 
multiple surrogates, Santana argues that the chain is more prone to error.  
 
I agree with Sarkar that biodiversity is a placeholder, but while Sarkar sees it as a useful 
placeholder, in fact the placeholder itself unnecessarily complicates the picture: 
A estimator surrogate  true surrogate  biodiversity  biological value 
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B estimator surrogate  true surrogate  biological value 
As normative descriptions of the practice of conservation biology, series B is more economical than 
A, and less prone to errors due to misrepresentation of one member by another.  (Santana 2014, 
765) 
 
Santana considers the biodiversity concept to be an ineffectual theoretical link which 
makes the final value vaguer (Santana 2014, 762). 
 Imprecision along a surrogacy chain is generated when the quantity for each 
additional step is determined by the quantity of the previous step. For this example 
imagine that each step in the surrogacy strategy predicts the next step with 95% accuracy. 
In a two-step surrogate chain the true surrogate approximates biodiversity. If the true 
surrogate has a value of 100 then the biodiversity value has a range of 95-105. The range 
increases with every additional surrogate step. Santana’s account of the surrogacy chain 
has four steps. 
 
 Estimator surrogate  true surrogate  biodiversity  biological value 
 
Every stage increases the range. In this example the range is not exceptionally large but 
that is because I have presumed a 95% correlation between surrogates. However, the 
conceptual analysis of biodiversity discussed in chapters one to three indicate that the 
specific dimensions of biodiversity diverge more than this. Features of biodiversity vary 
independently of one another and less correlation between surrogates significantly 
increases the imprecision of the surrogacy strategy over multiple stages. So, according to 
Santana, the surrogacy strategy is more precise without biodiversity in the surrogacy chain. 
Santana’s other concern about the use of multiple surrogates in the surrogacy 
strategy is that despite the surrogacy strategy using multiple surrogates, these surrogates 
all have major shortcomings. Individual dimensions of biodiversity are not 
operationalisable, do not accurately track biodiversity, or do not accurately track biological 
value (Santana 2017, 86; Santana 2018, 6; Santana 2014, 765–68). These claims are an 
attack on the ability of specific dimensions of biodiversity to serve as true surrogates. If 
those dimensions are not operationalisable, or do not track biodiversity, or do not track 
biological value then the surrogacy strategy is a poor fit for its role in conservation 
biology. Santana’s solution to this problem is to eliminate biodiversity in favour of its 
specific dimensions (Santana 2018, 8). If there is no such thing as biodiversity than we 
needn’t worry about how well species diversity or genetic diversity track it. 
 Debating premise five of the empirical poor fit argument will require more 
evidence than I have discussed thus far. The conceptual arguments which I set out in 
chapters one to three are sufficient to demonstrate that specific dimensions of biodiversity 
do track biodiversity. They just also vary independently of one another (Burch-Brown and 
Archer 2017, 974). Empirical evidence of high correlation between true surrogates and 
biodiversity is unavailable because we do not measure biodiversity as a single quantity. 
However, demonstrating that specific dimensions are operationalisable requires an analysis 
of their measurement methodology. In chapters five and six I present the methodology of 
species richness, species diversity, phylogenetic diversity, morphology, and functional 
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diversity. I will argue that the former three are straightforwardly operationalisable but the 
latter two are not. The relationship between specific dimensions of biodiversity and 
biological value is contentious partially because Santana is not clear on what type of 
biological value he appeals to. I will discuss that relationship in chapters seven and eight 
which focus on the role of biological value in biodiversity eliminativism. In the next 
subsection my responses to the problems of multiple surrogates will focus on between-
surrogate correlation and the risk of imprecision in the surrogacy strategy. 
 
4.4.4 A Reply to the Problem of Multiple Surrogates 
In this subsection I will defend the surrogacy strategy against the problems of multiple 
surrogates. I will argue that premise two of the poor empirical fit argument is false because 
the within-surrogate correlation of biodiversity’s dimensions is higher than Santana gives 
it credit for. I will argue that premise four of the empirical poor fit argument is false 
because the number of surrogates in the surrogacy chain is not as important as the 
correlation between the measured property and the target property. I also argue that 
biodiversity eliminativism is not the only response to his argument. We could also shorten 
the surrogacy chain by removing biological value or denying the distinction between true 
and estimator surrogates. I begin with Santana’s concern about how well the specific 
dimensions of biodiversity correlate between each other. 
 The correlation between specific dimensions of biodiversity is better than Santana 
indicates. Santana’s conceptual analysis indicated that the specific dimensions of 
biodiversity come apart in important ways (Santana 2014, 768). His empirical evidence 
collects numerous examples from biology studies in which the specific dimensions of 
biodiversity fail to co-vary (Santana 2014, 774; Santana 2018, 4). The problem with this 
strategy is that correlational claims require large bodies of evidence but Santana has 
focused on specific empirical examples. Those empirical examples aren’t problematic for 
proponents of biodiversity because the multi-dimensional concept of biodiversity allows 
for its dimensions to vary independently of one another. Independent variation is a positive 
feature. Phylogenetic diversity is as important as species richness because it picks out a 
feature of biological diversity which species richness glosses over. Santana’s examples 
demonstrate independent variation rather than systematic poor correlation. 
 Santana’s examples give the impression that the specific dimensions of biodiversity 
are poor predictors for one another, but the correlation between them is higher than he 
suggests. Santana does not provide a standard for poor correlation but instead presents a 
large volume of evidence that the specific dimensions of biodiversity come apart in 
important ways. However, there is further evidence that the specific dimensions of 
biodiversity do not come apart as far as Santana argues. Grenyer (et al. 2007) performed a 
case study on the biodiversity of the south cape of Africa. They find that phylogenetic 
diversity has a 77% correlation with species richness and a 96% correlation with genus 
richness (Grenyer et al. 2007, 757). There are other similar claims of correlation in the 
literature because proponents of specific dimensions of biodiversity argue that their 
specific dimension is the best surrogate for other dimensions and biodiversity. In 
Conservation Priorities and Phylogenetic Pattern, Daniel Faith argues that phylogenetic 
diversity correlates with both feature diversity and habitat diversity (Faith 1996, 1287).  In 
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his own discussion of objections to his arguments Santana (Santana 2014, 769) notes that 
species richness correlates well with ecological diversity, diversity of higher taxa, and 
phenetic diversity (provided that the species richness of the ecosystem is high enough). 
There are counterexamples to correlations between surrogates because the specific 
dimensions of biodiversity vary independently of one another. However, there is still 
sufficient correlation between the specific dimensions of biodiversity to deny premise two 
of the empirical poor fit argument. Therefore, there is sufficient property correlation for 
biodiversity to be considered a property bundle. 
 In premise four of the empirical poor fit argument Santana claims that including 
biodiversity in the surrogacy chain increases imprecision in the surrogacy chain. This 
claim is false because Santana is discussing the wrong kind of surrogacy chain. Santana’s 
account of the surrogacy chain has four steps, each of which is used to calculate the 
quantity in the next step.  
 
 Estimator surrogate  true surrogate  biodiversity  biological value 
 
But that isn’t how the surrogacy strategy works. We can’t use a true surrogate to calculate 
a quantity of biodiversity because we don’t have single quantities for biodiversity. We also 
don’t have single quantities for biological value, so the only step of quantity calculation is 
between estimator and true surrogate, or in other cases between empirical sample and true 
surrogate.  
Sarkar resists the idea that the surrogacy strategy should be understood as one stage 
approximating another. His resistance is difficult to justify, as the results which the 
surrogacy strategy yields differ when tested in different regions. At the very least we do 
not yet possess sufficient evidence to think that patterns of estimator surrogates can 
accurately predict patterns of true surrogates (Sarkar 2005, 171).  Sarkar argues that the 
more accepted view of the empirical relationship between estimator and true surrogate is 
that they share an important biological element (Sarkar 2005, 171). The places which the 
estimator surrogate selects for conservation are selected not just because they are high in 
the true surrogate but because they are high in whatever important element of biodiversity 
the true surrogate contains. 
Under this interpretation of the surrogacy chain we should be less concerned with 
the number of surrogates than with the final correlation between the measured property 
and the target property. So, in the case of the surrogacy strategy we should not be as 
concerned with the number of surrogates as we should be with how well the measured 
property correlates with the target property. As an example, consider a simple surrogacy 
measure such as a mercury thermometer measuring the temperature of a liquid. The 
surrogacy chain could be presented as mercury expansion approximating liquid 
temperature. However, the dissipation of heat throughout a substance during the process of 
conduction is rarely uniform so the mercury at the top of the tube is slightly colder than the 
mercury which is being directly heated by the measured substance. That same chain can be 
understood as individual layers of mercury approximating the temperature of the next 
layer. The reason that nobody worries about multiple mercury surrogates widening the 
range of results is that the effect is so minimal. The number of surrogates in the measuring 
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process is irrelevant because of the high correlation between the initial measured property 
and the target property which it approximates. Therefore the number of surrogates is not as 
important as the correlation between measured property and target property. 
In the case of biodiversity the number of surrogates in Santana’s surrogacy chain is 
not as important as the correlation between estimator surrogate and biological value. For 
example Grenyer (et al. 2007, 757) argue that phylogenetic diversity generally has a 77% 
correlation with species richness and a 96% correlation with genus richness. So their 
surrogacy chain looks like this: 
 Species Richness   
 
Estimator surrogate  Phylogenetic Diversity  Biodiversity  Biological Value 
    
Genus Richness 
 
Santana’s case for imprecision relies on the assumption that the quantity of a surrogate is 
always used to calculate the quantity of the next surrogate in the chain. However, this is 
not always the case. Temperature, blood pressure, and heart rate are surrogates for health, 
but they are not used to calculate a health quantity because health is a complex 
multidimensional property, like biodiversity. Santana cannot motivate his concern about 
imprecision via empirical data of poor correlation because there isn’t any. Premise one of 
his empirical poor fit argument tells us that biodiversity is not straightforwardly 
measureable. Since there is no single quantity for biodiversity we cannot measure it to 
empirically check how well it correlates with its surrogates. 
 Santana might object that without an option to measure correlation defenders of 
biodiversity are no more entitled to argue that these surrogates do track biodiversity. 
Sarkar expresses a similar concern about the difficulty of justifying correlational claims 
empirically (Sarkar 2013, 142). But there is a solution to this problem. We can 
demonstrate that multiple measures are picking out an important property if their results 
correlate highly with one another. Consider an example which I call the scale calibration 
thought experiment. 
 
The Scale Calibration Thought Experiment 
Imagine that Maya has invented the first scales and wishes to know how accurate they are. 
She cannot test them with standard weights to see how well measured weight correlates to 
actual weight since weight has not been assigned a value yet. She knows that there is a 
value to be identified (objects on earth have weight); she simply lacks a method to check 
how accurate our measurement of that weight is. One solution is to create multiple scales 
and check to see if they all yield the same value for a single object. The probability that all 
the scales yield the same incorrect answer decreases as the number of scales increases.  
 
92 
The problem of calibrating the first scales is analogous to the problem of checking 
how accurate our scores are for biodiversity. In the case of biodiversity it is unlikely that 
phylogenetic diversity has a 77% correlation with species richness and a 96% correlation 
with genus richness but that those three dimensions are not surrogates for a common 
property. We have empirical justifications that biodiversity surrogates track biodiversity 
because we can test true surrogates against one another and demonstrate that they are all 
picking up on some important biological element. And, as I have argued in this subsection, 
the correlation between biodiversity surrogates is higher than Santana gives it credit for. 
  A final response to Santana’s concern about imprecision in the surrogacy strategy 
is to accept his critique of long chains for the sake of argument and argue that there are 
better things to eliminate than biodiversity. Santana’s surrogacy chain has four 
components: estimator surrogate, true surrogate, biodiversity, and biological value. 
Santana wants to eliminate biodiversity to increase precision but we could also increase 
precision by denying the distinction between estimator surrogate and true surrogate or 
eliminating biological value as the target property. In section 4.3 I discussed the 
problematic nature of Sarkar’s distinction between estimator and true surrogate. Sarkar 
goes on to argue that estimator surrogates are successful because they pick out the same 
element of biodiversity which the true surrogate does (Sarkar 2005, 170). So we could 
increase precision by treating the estimator surrogate as a direct surrogate for biodiversity. 
We could also increase precision by eliminating biological value as the target property. In 
chapter three I argued that biodiversity should be understood as one valuable element of 
the environment rather than a surrogate for biological value. The relationship between 
biological value and biodiversity is a complicated one which will be addressed in chapters 
seven and eight. However, in terms of measurement strategy, determining vegetation 
composition via satellite imagery seems like a complex surrogacy chain for determining 
how valuable an ecosystem is. 
 In this subsection I defended the surrogacy strategy against the problems of 
multiple surrogates. In the poor fit argument Santana claimed that the multiple surrogates 
of biodiversity do not correlate sufficiently well for biodiversity to be treated as a bundle 
property (Santana 2014, 761). He also argues that the number of surrogates in the 
surrogacy chain made it more imprecise and prone to error (Santana 2014, 765). I argued 
that premise two of the poor empirical fit argument is false because the correlation 
between biodiversity surrogates is higher than Santana suggests. I argued that premise four 
of the poor empirical fit argument is false because Santana is analysing the wrong kind of 
surrogacy chain. The surrogacy strategy only predicts a quantity once. It does not 
determine quantities for biodiversity or biological value because there are no single 
quantities for those properties. When measuring biodiversity the number of surrogates is 
not as important as the correlation between measured property and target property. 
Furthermore we could accept Santana’s claim but eliminate other elements from the 
surrogacy chain. The distinction between estimator and true surrogate could be rejected 
and we could eliminate biological value as the target property. In the next subsection I will 
argue that the empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism has misrepresented the state of 
biodiversity measurement.  This argument will challenge premise six of the empirical poor 
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fit argument that “If conditions 1) to 5) accurately describe biodiversity then biodiversity 
is a poor empirical fit for its role in conservation biology”. 
 
4.5 The Empirical Case for Biodiversity Eliminativism is wrong 
about the State of Biodiversity Measurement 
In this section I will argue that the empirical case is wrong about the state of biodiversity 
measurement. This argument will falsify premise six of the poor empirical fit argument 
which claims that satisfying conditions one to five of the argument justifies elimination. 
The empirical case gives the impression that measures of biodiversity are less empirically 
suitable than they actually are.  
 
While taken individually these arguments must be tentative, relying as they do on uncertain 
empirical claims as well as tendentious assertions of what is worth conserving, taken as a whole 
they are strong enough to cast serious doubt on the usefulness of biodiversity as the primary target 
of conservation. (Santana 2014, 768) 
 
Measures are empirically suitable for conservation when there is a common 
methodology and agreement on which measures should be applied in which situation. In 
the case of biodiversity the surrogacy strategy allows for a great multiplicity of different 
methodologies and there is much debate over which measures should be applied to which 
situations. I argue that the empirical case is misleading because it focuses on the problem 
areas of biodiversity measurement. Whilst focusing on problems is important for refining 
measurement methodology, only discussing the problems is a misleading way to determine 
empirical suitability. Considering the successes of measures of biodiversity along with its 
failures gives a different impression of the state of its methodology. I will argue in this 
section that in particular, the empirical case overlooks two important points. It focuses on 
between-surrogate operationalisability but overlooks within-surrogate operationalisability. 
Secondly, Santana does not realise that the imperfect correlation between biodiversity 
surrogates is essential for the surrogacy strategy. I go on to argue that the plausibility of 
the empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism is incompatible with the details of 
biodiversity’s measurement methodology. When the details of biodiversity measurement 
are laid out, it will be clear that the empirical case is wrong about the state of biodiversity 
measurement. 
 
4.5.1 Between-Surrogate Operationalisability is distinct from Within-
Surrogate Operationalisability 
One mistake of the empirical poor fit argument is that it does not distinguish within-
surrogate operationalisability from between-surrogate operationalisability. In his 
arguments Santana questions how straightforwardly biodiversity can be measured, or how 
well one surrogate can predict another (Santana 2017, 86; Santana 2018, 6). These are 
criticisms of between-surrogate operationalisability. They argue that there is no 
straightforward way for one surrogate to approximate another or measure biodiversity. 
Santana rarely discusses within-surrogate operationalisability, which is how well we can 
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measure individual biodiversity surrogates. This is a problematic oversight for two 
reasons. 
 The first reason is that the empirical suitability of a multidimensional complex is a 
function of both its between-surrogate operationalisability and its within-surrogate 
operationalisability. The within-surrogate operationalisability of biodiversity measures is 
empirically rigorous. Demonstrating this requires outlining details of the measurement 
methodology of specific dimensions of biodiversity. In chapters five and six I will outline 
the measurement methodology for species richness, species diversity, phylogenetic 
diversity, morphology, and functional diversity. Premise six of the poor empirical fit 
argument claims that conditions one to five are a sufficient reason to eliminate 
biodiversity. However, biodiversity’s measurement methodology seems far more 
empirically rigorous when we also consider within-surrogate operationalisability. 
 Secondly, there are biodiversity surrogates whose within-surrogate 
operationalisability gives rise to the same problems which Santana uses to justify 
eliminating biodiversity. The measurement methodology which I discuss in chapters five 
and six will make this clearer. Some surrogates such as morphology are not 
straightforwardly measureable, lack high within-surrogate correlation of results, and 
struggle to support robust inductive generalisations across their measures. But Santana 
cannot afford to eliminate many of these dimensions because he needs them to replace 
biodiversity as the goal of conservation. Distinguishing between within and between-
surrogate-operationalisability will show that in many ways biodiversity is no more 
complex than the specific dimensions which Santana would use as biodiversity’s 
replacement. The poor empirical fit argument is misrepresenting the state of biodiversity 
measures because it does not make that distinction. But the within-surrogate 
operationalisability of biodiversity is empirically rigorous and in some cases indicates that 
between-surrogate operationalisability is better than the poor fit argument suggests. 
 
4.5.2 Imperfect Correlation between Biodiversity Surrogates is Important 
The empirical poor fit argument also misrepresents the state of biodiversity measures 
because the complex correlation of biodiversity’s surrogates is important for accuracy. 
Premise six of the empirical poor fit argument claims that satisfying conditions one to five 
are a good reason to eliminate biodiversity. This is false in part because measures of 
biodiversity are better with imperfect correlation between its specific dimensions. Santana 
is correct that biodiversity surrogates do not always correlate highly with one another. 
“Unfortunately, evolutionary [Phylogenetic] diversity and species diversity are often 
distinct.” (Santana 2014, 771). It is possible to have high species richness but low species 
diversity if the abundance of species in an ecosystem is uneven, and, it is possible to have 
high phylogenetic diversity with low species richness if there is an ecosystem containing 
few species which are evolutionarily distinct. But the between-surrogate correlation of 
specific dimensions of biodiversity is no lower than we should expect it to be. 
 This kind of imperfect between-surrogate correlation is normal for a complex 
multidimensional property. Dimensions which perform distinctly from one another can 
often be very helpful in identifying causal relationships. A patient who is healthy in every 
respect except for their blood pressure has a much smaller set of possible causes to 
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investigate than one who has high blood pressure, cholesterol, heart rate, and blood sugar. 
The property of health would not be a better fit for science if all these properties rose and 
fell together and neither would biodiversity. If species richness, diversity and phylogenetic 
diversity all rose and fell at the same rate, we would have little need for them all. 
Biodiversity would just be species richness, and considering the evolutionary relationship 
between species or their abundance would provide us with little more information than 
performing a species count.  
Imperfect correlation does not mean that measures of biodiversity are an 
empirically poor fit for the goals of conservation biology. The independent variation of 
biodiversity’s dimensions informs our conservation decisions. Conservation is about 
prioritising which places need to be protected (Sarkar 2005, 160). An ecosystem with high 
species richness, diversity, and phylogenetic diversity has higher biodiversity and may 
therefore be given a higher priority than one with just high species richness. Such an 
argument is an important scientific justification for a difficult conservation decision, so the 
multidimensional nature of biodiversity measures is an advantage for conservation rather 
than a hindrance. Multidimensional measures of biodiversity are appropriate because 
biodiversity is a multidimensional concept. This entails low correlation between 
biodiversity’s surrogates at times but it is not a good reason to eliminate biodiversity. 
Premise six of the empirical poor fit argument is therefore misleading because low 
between-surrogate correlation is not a good reason to eliminate biodiversity. In the next 
subsection I discuss how the measurement methodology of biodiversity makes the 
empirical poor fit argument seem implausible. 
 
4.5.3 The Plausibility of the Empirical Case for Biodiversity Eliminativism is 
Incompatible with the details of Biodiversity’s Measurement Methodology 
Thus far I have argued against several key premises of the Santana’s empirical poor fit 
argument. I have argued that there are solutions to incommensurability, that multiple 
surrogates do not increase imprecision in the strategy, and that Santana’s standards for the 
goals of conservation are inappropriate. However, more work remains to be done on 
premise five that “individual dimensions of biodiversity are either not operationalisable, do 
not accurately track biodiversity, or do not accurately track biological value”. Santana 
blends together empirical arguments against the operationalisability of biodiversity with 
empirical arguments against the operationalisability of individual dimensions. In this 
chapter I have pointed out several problems with his poor fit argument, but the best 
defence of the empirical suitability of biodiversity is in the detail of the measurement 
methodology.  
 The plausibility of the empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism is incompatible 
with the details of biodiversity’s measurement methodology. It seems plausible because 
the dimensions of biodiversity seem incommensurable and because there is concern in the 
literature about the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity measures. The detail of 
measurement methodology suggests the opposite. The expanding multiplicity of 
biodiversity measures is overblown and the empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism is 
unsuccessful. Chapters five and six will focus on outlining the detail of biodiversity 
surrogates. I will use the measurement methodology of species richness, species diversity, 
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and phylogenetic diversity to argue that the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity 
measures is overblown. I will use the measurement methodology of morphology and 
functional diversity to argue that conservation biology would not be empirically better off 
eliminating biodiversity in favour of its specific dimensions. The detail of the methodology 
will be technical but that detail will show that biodiversity is empirically suitable for its 
role in conservation biology. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I introduced the empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism and 
began an argument that it is unsuccessful. In the previous two chapters I discussed the 
work of Santana, Angermeier, and Karr. In this chapter and the next two I focus on the 
work of Santana. Angermeier and Karr’s arguments for eliminativism are focused on 
conceptual and value based challenges but Santana argues for biodiversity’s elimination by 
appealing to conceptual, value-based, and empirical reasons. Appealing to methodological 
reasons and recent work on biodiversity Santana argues that it is a poor empirical fit for 
the role we need it to play in conservation biology (Santana 2014, 761). His argument is 
persuasive because it builds on the measurement debate by biodiversity conservationists. 
Although biodiversity conservationists are not intentionally motivating biodiversity 
eliminativism, their vigorous debate over the best way to measure biodiversity gives the 
impression that there is little consensus on measurement methodology.  
 To provide context for the empirical case for eliminativism, I explained how 
biodiversity is measured using the surrogacy strategy. According to Sarkar we select 
specific dimensions of biodiversity such as species richness to use as both estimator and 
true surrogates for biodiversity. Then I introduced the limitations of the surrogacy strategy 
and defended the strategy against them. Whilst the apparent incommensurability of 
biodiversity surrogates makes conservation triage difficult, in practice it is only certain 
dimensions of biodiversity which are incommensurable with other dimensions. Other 
dimensions such as species richness and phylogenetic diversity are loosely 
commensurable, at least in the sense that we can use them to make meaningful 
comparisons between the biodiversity of different ecosystems.  
Santana has also expressed concern about the use of multiple surrogates in the 
surrogacy strategy. In response I argued that the correlation between surrogates is higher 
than Santana concludes and that multiple surrogates do not make the strategy more 
imprecise because Santana has misread where in the surrogacy strategy the values are. I go 
on to argue that the surrogacy strategy does not allow for the kind of flexibility in results 
that would preclude it as empirically suitable. I concluded that the empirical case for 
biodiversity eliminativism is misrepresenting the state of biodiversity measurement. This is 
in part because it does not distinguish between within-surrogate operationalisability and 
between-surrogate operationalisability. I also argued that it has misunderstood the 
requirements of conservation biology. Imperfect correlation between dimensions is 
essential if additional dimensions add more value to our analyses. Lastly, I argued that the 
plausibility of the empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism is incompatible with the 
details of biodiversity’s measurement methodology. In the next two chapters I will outline 
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this methodology and use it as evidence to argue that the empirical case for biodiversity 




5 Implications of Measurement Methodology I: The 




This chapter is the second part of a defence of the biodiversity concept against Santana’s 
poor empirical fit argument. In this chapter I will outline the measurement methodology of 
three true surrogates for biodiversity: species richness, species diversity, and phylogenetic 
diversity. The purpose for outlining the technical detail of these measures is twofold. 
Firstly I will challenge a concern which motivates the poor empirical fit argument from 
chapter four. I will argue that the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity measures is 
overblown. Secondly I will continue my argument against the poor empirical fit argument. 
Premise five of the empirical poor fit argument claims that individual dimensions of 
biodiversity are either not operationalisable, do not accurately track biodiversity, or do not 
accurately track biological value. Premise six claims that the truth of premises one to five 
is a sufficient reason for eliminating biodiversity. The measurement methodology outlined 
in this chapter will challenge premises five and six. I will use the detail of the 
measurement methodology to argue that biodiversity surrogates are operationalisable and 
that by implication biodiversity is a good empirical fit for its role in conservation biology. 
Premise six overlooks the possibility that the empirical suitability of a multidimensional 
measure is a function of both its between-surrogate operationalisability and its within-
surrogate operationalisability. In this chapter I will distinguish between-surrogate 
operationalisability from within-surrogate operationalisability. If the within-surrogate 
measurement methodology is empirically rigorous then we have good reason not to 
eliminate the measure. 
 In section 5.2 I summarise the problem of the expanding multiplicity of 
biodiversity measures and how it motivates the poor empirical fit argument. Then I will 
outline the methodology of calculating the species richness of an ecosystem in section 5.3. 
I explain the role of discovery curves and the different metrics of species richness before 
arguing that species richness is an operationalisable measurement surrogate. In section 5.4 
I outline the methodology of measuring the species diversity of an ecosystem. I discuss the 
role of abundance in diversity before outlining different metrics of diversity and arguing 
that species diversity is an operationalisable measurement surrogate. In section 5.5 I will 
outline the methodology for measuring phylogenetic diversity. I explain the use of 
phylogenetic trees and discuss different metrics of phylogenetic diversity before arguing 
that phylogenetic diversity is an operationalisable biodiversity surrogate. I draw on 
analyses of all three biodiversity surrogates in section 5.6 to argue that the expanding 
multiplicity of biodiversity measures is overblown. That is, I will argue that the number of 
biodiversity measures is not an indication of the empirical suitability of biodiversity for 
conservation biology. The technical detail of these measures is significant evidence that 
biodiversity is a good empirical fit for its role in conservation biology.  
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5.2 The Importance of the Expanding Multiplicity of Biodiversity 
Measurement for Motivating the Empirical Case for Biodiversity 
Eliminativism 
In section 4.2.2 of chapter four I argued that biodiversity conservationists unintentionally 
motivate the case for biodiversity eliminativism. Biodiversity eliminativism is more 
plausible when the state of biodiversity measurement seems controversial and undecided. 
The apparent lack of consensus is a by-product of the expanding multiplicity of 
biodiversity measures. Given an ecosystem and the surrogacy strategy for measuring it we 
have a great multitude of options. There are many true surrogates and estimator surrogates 
for biodiversity including: species richness, feature diversity, phylogenetic diversity, 
genetic diversity, historical weather patterns, and satellite imagery. These are some of the 
surrogates that Sarkar, Santana, and I have discussed but in practice there are a great deal 
more. Biodiversity after all, is a multidimensional concept for many different dimensions 
of biological variety.  
 Each surrogate for biodiversity has multiple methods of calculation and each 
calculation produces a different result. In the instance of functional diversity, Weiher 
discusses 17 such calculations (Weiher 2011, 178–85). Multiple surrogates with multiple 
options for calculation produce a great range of biodiversity values for conservation triage. 
So the biodiversity value which a conservationist arrives at depends as much on the 
calculation selection as it does on the ecosystem’s biodiversity. Measurement is the most 
reliable when the value is determined by the property rather than determined by a 
preference for a particular calculation. So the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity 
measures is a problem for its empirical suitability as a goal of conservation. 
 Whilst this problem is well known, much of the discussion takes the expanding 
multiplicity problem for granted rather than contesting it. ‘Biodiversity’ conservationists in 
particular use the issue of expanding multiplicity to motivate new measures of biodiversity 
or concerns about the ontological status of biodiversity. In section 4.22 I outlined 
examples of this in the literature from Archer, Burch-Brown, Frank, Lean, Maclaurin, 
Maurer, Mcgill, and Sterelny.4 I will use the analysis of biodiversity surrogates in this 
chapter to argue that the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity measures is overblown. 
That is, I will argue that the number of biodiversity measures is not an indication of the 
empirical suitability of biodiversity for conservation biology. For species richness, species 
diversity, and phylogenetic diversity, I will explain how the surrogate works, discuss 
different metrics, and argue that they are operationalisable. The detail of their individual 
methodologies also forms a body of evidence for an inference to the best explanation. 
After analysing the evidence I will argue in section 5.6 that the multiplicity of biodiversity 
measures does not make biodiversity a poor empirical fit for its role in conservation 
biology. There are fewer measurement options than it appears and the options which 
conservationists possess indicate a rich and nuanced tool kit. 
 
                                                 
4 The full list of citations was: (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 971; Frank 2017, 98; Maclaurin and Lean 
2016, 19–20; Maclaurin 2017, 56; Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 177; Maurer and McGill 2011, 64) 
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5.3 The Methodology of Measuring Species Richness 
The first true surrogate for biodiversity which I will discuss is species richness. Species 
richness is a measure of the total number of species in an ecosystem. In this section I will 
introduce discovery curves as a tool for measuring species richness. Then I will discuss 
different metrics of species richness before explaining two calculations in detail: 
Abundance Coverage Estimate and Chao2. A focused response to the empirical case for 
eliminativism requires that not all metrics will be covered but the methodological detail I 
outline is sufficient to answer challenges of the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity 
measures and concerns about operationalisability. That detail is technical but familiarity 
with the methodology supports two important claims; species richness is an 
operationalisable measurement surrogate and the expanding multiplicity of measures of 
species richness is overblown. 
  
5.3.1 Discovery Curves 
In this subsection I will explain the methodology of discovery curves for calculating the 
species richness of an ecosystem. I discuss the difficulty of counting the total number of 
species in an ecosystem before discussing how discovery curves address that problem. I 
outline different sampling methods and draw a distinction between species richness and 
species density. Lastly, I discuss the predictive challenges facing the use of discovery 
curves.  
 It is difficult to determine the number of species in an ecosystem because of the 
sheer number of species. Despite a great deal of effort we have catalogued very few of the 
extant species. Mora (et al. 2011, 2) predict that 86% of terrestrial species and 91% of 
ocean species still await description. The issue in part is that it is difficult to detect species 
as they get smaller. So our sampling is not genuinely random as we are limited to what we 
can see, trap, or gas (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 43). To help with this calculation we use 
discovery curves. A discovery curve begins with a rapid growth in the number of new 
species (indicated by point A on the figure below) obtained with each sample and naturally 
curves off into a plateau (indicated by point B on the figure below) as fewer and fewer 
new species are discovered with repeated sampling (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 42).  
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Figure 5.1: Discovery Curve for New Species over Repeated Sampling (Neeson, Van Rijn, 
and Mandelik 2013)  
 
Imagine that you have a large container of Lego bricks in front of you. You reach 
in and retrieve a handful of bricks and inspect them. On this occasion you have identified 
56 Lego bricks which have appeared for the first time in your sample. When you reach in 
for another handful you identify 45 new bricks, as a few of the bricks in this handful were 
also present in the previous handful. As you retrieve more and more handfuls you identify 
fewer and fewer new bricks until eventually the discovery curve reaches its plateau. This is 
known as the asymptote (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 43). Discovery curves are a useful tool 
because the curves which they produce are mathematically predictable, so we can calculate 
where the curve will plateau based on our current position on that curve (Colwell and 
Gotelli 2011, 49). With an empirical sample much smaller than the total number of species 
in an ecosystem we can calculate the ecological sample (the actual number of species in an 
ecosystem) (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 62).  
 Discovery curves have limitations. Firstly we must choose between our sampling 
methods. We can catch and remove species from an ecosystem by releasing gas under 
trees or setting traps or we can catch and release those species (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 
41). This is the difference between sampling a handful of Lego bricks but removing them 
from the container, and sampling a handful but replacing them. The discovery curves will 
function in the same way (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 46). The discovery curve will still 
plateau, using sample and replace, but the difference in methodology matters because 
removing species from an ecosystem frequently to calculate the species richness is 
destructive but replacing them makes it more likely that we will encounter them again in 
future sampling.  
A second problem with discovery curves is that the methodology makes a false 
assumption. The methodology presumes that the ecosystem which we are sampling is a 
closed one. The Lego bricks are all inside a single container. In reality there is no static 
number which represents the species richness of an ecosystem because it fluctuates. Birds 
fly through ecosystems, organisms migrate through them, and predators have large ranges 
which they hunt over because they have a more general ecological niche (Maclaurin and 
Sterelny 2008, 35). Ecosystems are not closed, they are open because the number of 
organisms which reside within them fluctuate regularly (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 141). 
And once we have marked off an area as the ecosystem to test, its species richness will 
fluctuate over time. A key assumption in discovery curves, then, is that while the species 
richness of an ecosystem fluctuates, it does not fluctuate enough to seriously hamper our 
calculations of discovery curves.  
 There is also a predictive problem with the ability of discovery curves to predict 
species richness. The problem is the sheer height of the discovery curve. Estimates of total 
species richness world wide range from 5 to 100 million although more recent work has 
narrowed the estimate to 8.7 million give or take 1.3 million (Mora et al. 2011, 2). For a 
large ecosystem the total species richness is high enough to make accurately 
approximating it somewhere between difficult and impossible. The problem is the margin 
of error in curve calculations. Because the curve alters very little in the beginning we need 
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to be a certain height on the curve to calculate where it will plateau with accuracy. As 
shown on this figure: 
 
Figure 5.2: Margins of error for asymptote calculations from varying points along the 
 rarefaction cure. (Adapted from Neeson (et al 2013)) 
 
The lower the point on the curve which the data will reach, the greater the margin of error 
for the predicting when the curve will plateau. Predicting the asymptote from point A 
would yield a margin of error similar to R* whereas predicting asymptote from point B 
would have a margin of error similar to R. The margin of error increases significantly 
when the prediction is made from an earlier point on the curve. Given the high number of 
species in an ecosystem, for many ecosystems we could sample for years before we can 
accurately predict the species richness of the ecological sample. One such team in the 
rainforest has been cataloguing ant assemblages for 30 years without approaching the 
asymptote. They began this task when the term ‘biodiversity’ was coined and they are still 
sampling (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 43). The accuracy of inferring from the empirical 
sample to the ecological sample is an ongoing problem for biodiversity calculations and 
most of science. Progress on this problem is promising as testing with known samples 
shows that calculations such as Chao2 can find the curve plateau much faster than other 
calculations of species richness (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 51).  
 In this subsection I discussed the methodology of using discovery curves to 
determine the species richness of an ecosystem. I explained how discovery curves work 
and the different sampling methods which are used. Then I discussed the predictive 
challenges facing discovery curves. I mentioned that certain measures are addressing this 
problem. In the next subsection I will explain the methodology of different metrics of 
species richness.  
 
5.3.2 Metrics of Species Richness 
In this subsection I will discuss the different metrics of species richness. I give an 




(ACE) and Chao 2 in detail. I briefly argue that Chao 2 is an excellent estimator of species 
richness. Given the difficulty of accurately calculating the plateau of a discovery curve it 
should not be surprising that there are many different ways to calculate the species 
richness of an ecosystem. In Biological Diversity: Frontiers in Measurement and 
Assessment Colwell and Gotelli (2011, 40–41) discuss 8 different measures of species 
richness viewable in the table below.  
 
Formula for Abundance Data Formula for Incidence Data 
Total number of individuals in Sample: 









Chao 1 (with doubleton species): 





Chao 2 (with duplicate species): 





Chao 1 (any species combination): 




Chao 2 (any species combination): 







First-order jackknife richness estimator: 
𝑆𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑒1 = 𝑆𝑜𝑏𝑠 + 𝑓1 
First-order jackknife richness estimator: 




Second-order jackknife richness estimator: 
𝑆𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑒2 = 𝑆𝑜𝑏𝑠 + 2(𝑓1 − 𝑓2) 
Second-order jackknife richness estimator: 
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Symbol Guide: ‘S’ stands for species and ‘𝑆𝑜𝑏𝑠 ’ for the observed species. Then for abundance 
calculations ‘𝑓𝑘’ is the number of species represented by k individuals.  For incidence calculations, ‘𝑞𝑘’ 
is the number of species present in k samples over repeated sampling and ‘m’ is the total number of 
samples. 
 
Table 5.1: Calculations of Species Richness 
 
Formulae for species richness are divided in the first instance by the data collection 
method, either by abundance or replicated incidence. In data collection by abundance I 
sample an area and record how many individuals there are in each species. In which case f0 
is the number of undetected species, f1 is the number of species with only one individual 
present, f2 the number of species with two individuals present, and so forth to fk. With 
replicated incidence data I sample an area and only record the presence or lack thereof of a 
species. In which case q0 is the number of species which are never recorded, q1 is the 
number of species which are only present in a single sample, q2 are the duplicate species 
(those which are present in two samples), and so forth to qk (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 40). 
Chao, jackknife, ACE, and ICE are then used to predict the total species richness of an 
area based on the observed sample. I will outline ACE and Chao2 in detail. 
 Abundance Coverage Estimate or ‘ACE’ is a calculation of species richness from 
abundance data which separates individuals in samples by their rarity and uses this 
distinction to predict the total number of species in an ecosystem. It is given by the 







2 , where: 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑛𝑑 is the total number of species in 
a sample with more than ten individuals, 𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑒 is the total number of species in a sample 
with less than ten individuals, and 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑒 is the total number of individuals considered to be 
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of rare species. Then 𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐸 is the proportion of all individuals in rare species which are 
represented by more than one individual and 𝛾𝐴𝐶𝐸
2  is the coefficient of the variation which 
is used to calculate the margin of error. The ACE formula will not work if every rare 
species in the sample is only represented by a single individual because in that case 
𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐸 = 0 . In such an instance the version of Chao1 which works for any species 
combination will work (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 40). The analogous formula for data 
gathered by replicated incidence is ICE which works in a similar fashion to ACE. 
Chao2 is a greatly simplified asymptote calculation which works on a principle 
discovered by Alan Turing during the cracking of the enigma coding machine (Colwell 
and Gotelli 2011, 51). The presence of rare occurrences can be used to predict the total 
number of events. Imagine I am trying to work out the total number of Lego bricks in a 
container, and I know that I only have a 1:1000 chance of finding a brown two by one flat 
tile. Then while sampling a handful I discover three brown two by one flat tiles. I could 
extrapolate that there should be at least 3000 bricks in the container. The simplified 




 focuses on the number of 
duplicate species in repeated incidence sampling, where 𝑞2  is the number of duplicate 
species present in repeated sampling. If repeated incidence sampling does not reveal 
duplicate species than a more complex form of Chao2 which works for any combination of 







where 𝑚 is the summation of q1 as the number of species which are only present in a single 
sample, q2 as the duplicate species (those which are present in two samples), and so forth 
to qk for the entire set of observed species Sobs. Chao2 can only be calculated for repeated 
incidence data but it has an analogous measure in Chao1 which can calculate the 
asymptote for abundance data in both a simplified and more complex form if no doubleton 
species are present in the sample (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 40). 
Chao 2 is one of the highest performing predictors of species richness in an 
ecosystem. By ‘highest performing’ I mean that it is able to accurately predict the height of 
the asymptote from much lower down the rarefaction curve than other formulae such as 
ICE and ACE (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 51). The performance of these calculations is 
tested against existing ecosystems in which the species richness is already known. Then 
the ecosystems are resampled and the formula is tested to see how quickly they can predict 
the asymptote with accuracy (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 52). Under these conditions 
Chao2 outperforms its counterparts quickly establishing the prediction and narrowing it as 
we move further along the asymptote. Typical instances of sample based rarefaction plot 
as a smooth curve whereas Chao2 plots a steep almost linear initial gradient until it reaches 
the asymptotes level (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 51). So Chao2 is an excellent predictor of 
species richness which addresses concerns about the operationalisability of large discovery 
curves. 
In this subsection I explained the measurement methodology for calculating species 
richness. I outlined several different metrics before discussing ACE and Chao 2 in detail. I 
then argued that Chao2 is an excellent metric for calculating species richness. In the next 
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subsection I will argue that the detail of the measurement methodology for species 
richness indicates that species richness is an operationalisable surrogate. 
 
5.3.3 Species Richness is an Operationalisable Measurement Surrogate 
‘Operationalisability’ is a pragmatic constraint for quantifying and measuring a property. 
When I describe a property as operationalisable I mean that if an agent needed to know, 
they could go out and determine its quantity by measuring it. Weight is an 
operationalisable surrogate. If an agent wishes to know how many grams of bananas they 
have before they purchase them then they can place them on scales. Santana appeals to 
operationalisability frequently in his arguments but he is not clear what the standard for 
operationalisability is. This is problematic because we can always assign a number to a 
changing property and develop measures, which based on the change in the property, 
generate a value. Well-being is operationalisable because we can generate a value for well-
being based on income levels. But that value would be misleading because there is more to 
well-being than financial security. So there is more to operationalisability than the 
pragmatic constraints of quantification and measurement. Accuracy is also important. A 
biodiversity surrogate is operationalisable if it is accurately quantifiable and measureable. 
Another problem though, is that operationalisability is also a vague constraint.  
There is no clear point at which a property ceases to become pragmatically measureable. 
This is because pragmatism is relative to more than the empirical suitability of a 
measurement method. It is also relative to time constraints, resources, and person power. 
With a large enough team, sufficient time, and funding we could accurately measure the 
species richness or phylogenetic diversity of an ecosystem but conservation requires triage. 
A biodiversity surrogate may then be operationalisable in the sense that we can accurately 
quantify and measure an important element of biodiversity but not operationalisable given 
the time constraints of triage. Science works around time constraints with sampling. 
Sampling difficulties are not a good reason to reject a measure because it is difficulty 
shared by all scientific methodology. However, lack of operationalisability is a good 
reason to reject a measure. Good scientific measures are accurately quantifiable and 
measure important properties. So there is a vague boundary between operationalisability 
and challenges such as sampling which face all measurement methodology. 
Species richness is an operationalisable surrogate for biodiversity because it is 
accurately quantifiable and measureable. There is an issue with the height of the discovery 
curve but that is an issue with sampling rather than with operationalisability. Beginning 
with quantification, there is no controversy over how species richness should be 
quantified. Species richness is a numerical count of the number of species in an ecosystem. 
Species richness is also straightforwardly measureable. Conservationists go to an 
ecosystem and repeatedly sample groups of species. Once the data has been collected a 
method of calculation is selected to determine the asymptote of the discovery curve. 
The height of the discovery curve is a barrier to the operationalisability of species 
richness but it is caused by sampling problems. Ecosystems can contain thousands of 
species so repeated sampling can continue for some time before a conservationist is far 
enough along the discovery curve to accurately predict the asymptote (Colwell and Gotelli 
2011, 52). This is a challenge for the empirical suitability of species richness as surrogate 
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but is a sampling challenge. Sampling issues need to be taken seriously but they do not 
disqualify systems of measurement from informing conservation decisions because 
sampling is a common challenge facing all scientific methodology. This particular 
sampling issue is not universal for all classes or families. Finding the asymptote gets 
harder as the species get smaller and more mobile. Determining the height of the discovery 
curve for birds, mammals and flora species is not as difficult.  
 Determining the operationalisability of a surrogate also requires considering how 
that surrogate addresses its problem areas. In the case of species richness, the diversity of 
methods for calculating the asymptote is a response to that problem. The different 
calculations can determine the height of the discovery curve from different data sets with 
different efficiencies. For example, Chao2 has two variants, one which is intended to work 
for any combination of species and one which is intended to work solely from the 
duplicate species present. It can usually find the asymptote from a smaller data set because 
it focuses on the relative incidence of rarer species (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 51). Species 
richness is therefore accurately quantifiable and measureable. There is a sampling issue 
with determining the asymptote but it does not apply to all classes of species and different 
calculations have been developed to address it. So, species richness is an operationalisable 
surrogate for biodiversity. 
 
5.4 The Methodology of Measuring Species Diversity 
The second true surrogate for biodiversity which I will discuss is species diversity. A 
calculation of species diversity takes the data for species richness and weights it for 
abundance (Maurer and McGill 2011, 56). The aim of measures of diversity is to identify 
ecosystems with misleading high species richness. Species richness may be high but 
diversity is low if there are a small number of dominant species. We tend to think that 
diversity is highest when different groups are represented evenly in a sample. In this 
section I will discuss the role of abundance in diversity and then discuss some different 
metrics of species diversity. I will use this analysis to then argue for two claims; that 
species diversity is an operationisable surrogate and in section 5.6 I will argue that the 
expanding multiplicity of species diversity measures is overblown. 
 
5.4.1 The Role of Abundance in Diversity 
Species diversity takes the value of richness and weights it by how even the populations of 
those species are (Maurer and McGill 2011, 56). The motivation for the idea that there is 
more to species diversity than simple richness is generated by thought experiments. 
Considering the Lego bricks again, now instead of one container with a random assortment 
of Lego bricks, there are two. They both have the same number of bricks (10,000) but 
container B is 50% randomly assorted bricks and 50% one by four red bricks whereas 
container A is 100% randomly assorted bricks. The intuition here is that container A with 
its randomised contents is more diverse than container B because if I sampled them both at 
the same rate then the discovery curve for A would plot much faster and the samples of B 
would nearly always contain multiples of the same one by four red brick. Hill (1973, 427) 
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puts it in the following way.  
 
When we say that the humid tropics are more diverse than the tundra, we mean that there are more 
species there. More precisely, we mean that the species in the humid tropics have on average lower 
proportional abundances than those in the tundra a fact which is amply visible to the naked eye and 
which can be demonstrated by the use of any measure of diversity we care to devise. But there is 
little point in merely confirming the obvious. . . 
 
  Applying this thought experiment to ecosystems, consider the illustration below. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Ecosystems with identical populations and species richness but different 
evenness (McGee 2016). 
 
Ecosystem A is more diverse than B because the populations of the species in the 
ecosystem are all relatively even to one another. Repeated sampling of A would produce 
varied results and that is a good reason to think that A has a more diverse ecosystem than 
B. If I have a container of Lego bricks and I can repeatedly sample it with fewer repeated 
bricks each time then the contents of the container are more diverse than if a quarter of 
every sample is the same red, four by one, Lego brick. Abundance matters for diversity 
because in a diverse group, random sampling should produce different results. That kind of 
even representation is important for conservation because it provides insight into an 
ecosystem’s stability. If a single species has become dominant and is threatening the 
populations of numerously many other species, conservationists want to know. Abundance 
helps identify those threats. 
 In chapter three I have also argued that abundance in the sense of equal 
representation for all species is not a part of biodiversity. Population levels are an 
important element of biodiversity but biodiversity is not at its best when every species has 
an equal population. The number of workers in an individual ant colony can range from a 
handful to 5000 (Burchill and Moreau 2016, 291). 5000 elephants in the same ecosystem 
are sufficient for those animals to be considered pests because large mammals such as 
elephants or whales have large dietary requirements. In Iceland, the conservation of minke 
whales became a threat to the sustainability of fishing cod stocks (Einarsson 1993, 76). 
Furthermore, there are a great number of ecosystems like the one shown in B from figure 
A. These ecosystems are reasonably stable despite a single dominant species which has a 
disproportionately large population. We call them urban cities. It wasn’t human flourishing 
that was a problem for biodiversity, it was the effect that flourishing had on the rest of 
biodiversity. 
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 Abundance has a complex relationship with biodiversity because flourishing 
biodiversity requires a variation in population levels. High populations for dominant 
species aren’t as important for biodiversity as the effects of those populations. Many 
species such as ants can have disproportionately high populations without threatening the 
rest of the local biodiversity (Way and Khoo 1992, 482). There is an international mega 
colony of ants with super colonies in Argentina and Europe (Giraud, Pedersen, and Keller 
2002, 6078). They are all uni-colonial because they refuse to fight one another (Giraud, 
Pedersen, and Keller 2002, 6077). That mega colony does not lower biodiversity. 
Biodiversity is threatened by a disproportionately high population accompanied with 
multiple extinctions because of that high population. However, population levels do matter 
for the goals of conservation. Much of our concern about impending extinction is because 
of rapidly declining populations. So abundance has a complex relationship with 
biodiversity. In the next subsection I will discuss metrics for measuring species diversity. 
 
5.4.2 Metrics of Species Diversity 
In this subsection I will discuss the methodology for measuring species diversity. I discuss 
two of the most successful measures in detail: Simpson’s index and the Shannon-Weiner 
diversity index. Then I outline the large total number of diversity indices but do not 
identify them individually. The technical detail of measures of species diversity is similar 
to that of species richness so it will suffice to give the reader an impression of the total 
number of measures and discuss two calculations in detail. I also briefly discuss the 
additional metrics of evenness which allow us to separate species diversity back into 
richness and evenness.   
 Two of the most common measures of species diversity are Simpson’s Index and 
the Shannon Wiener Diversity Index.  Simpson’s index is a diversity index based on the 
inversion of the probability involved in sampling species from an even population (Maurer 
and McGill 2011, 56). It is given by the formula 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑜𝑛 =
1
𝐷
 where ‘D’ refers to the 
probability that any two individuals drawn from a population will belong to the same 
species and is given by the formula 𝐷 = ∑𝑝𝑖
2 (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 136). The 
inversion is required because in an ecosystem with even species populations the 
probability of any two individuals being from the same species is very low. A high 
probability of any two individuals being from the same species would indicate an 
extremely dominant species in that ecosystem.  
 An example makes the nature of the diversity index clearer. Imagine that there 
exists a board of 13 members and we already know that one of them is named John. What 
then, is the probability that a randomly sampled member from the remaining 12 is also 
named John? If the probability is high then board diversity for member’s names is low 
because its membership is dominated by people named John. Now imagine that the target 
of the calculation was randomly selected. One board member is chosen at random and the 
probability that their name is represented by a second person is calculated. If the 
probability is low then that same  dimension of board diversity is high because no 
individual member has a name which is dominantly represented. Thus the final diversity 
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value is obtained by inverting the result of D and dividing 1 by D is the most common way 
to do it even if it is not the only way (Maurer and McGill 2011, 56). 
  The Shannon Wiener Diversity Index is more strictly speaking a mathematical 
measure of information which can be applied very successfully to calculations of species 
diversity. It measures the informational disorder of the sample which is equivalent to there 
being a group with many different individuals with the same population for each type of 
individual (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 136). So If I have a group with 100,000 
organisms containing 1000 species, each of which has an abundance of 100 individuals, 
then the informational disorder of this group will be very high. That same informational 
disorder will decrease as more species leave the group or the abundance of individual 
species becomes uneven proportional to one another. The calculation is given by the 
formula 𝐷𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑛 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝐼𝑛(𝑝𝑖)
𝑠
𝑖=1  where the act of summation ranges over the probability 
that information drawn from multiple sources will be identical or alternatively those two 
individuals will have an identical genetic makeup (Maurer and McGill 2011, 56).  
 Informational disorder is a complex idea. It works on the relationship between 
variation in data and predictability. The more variation in a group, the harder it is to 
accurately predict a randomly selected member of that group. If our hypothetical board of 
directors only contains people named John and Sandra then there is a high probability of 
correctly predicting the name of a randomly selected member. Likewise, there is a high 
probability of correctly predicting the name of a randomly selected member if half the 
members are named John, even if the remaining six members all have different names. 
Accurate prediction is the most difficult when there is a large number of groups and each 
group is represented evenly. So accurately predicting which species will be selected at 
random from a group is hardest when species diversity is highest. Therefore, diversity can 
be calculated in terms of how unpredictable (or disordered) the group is. 
 Maurer and McGill (2011, 56–57) also present a further four richness focused 
diversity calculations, two measures of species diversity which take evenness into account 
and six additional metrics intended to calculate evenness. I will briefly discuss the 
additional metrics of evenness but I will not go into detail. There are numerous 
calculations of species diversity, nearly three times as any as discussed by Maurer and 
McGill (2011, 64). However, the Shannon Weiner diversity index and Simpson’s diversity 
are two of the oldest and most popular measures of diversity (Maurer and McGill 2011, 
64). 
The additional metrics of evenness are of interest because they allow a 
conservationist to separate evenness from species diversity. If species diversity is 
equivalent to richness plus evenness then by untangling species richness from species 
diversity we should be left with species evenness. Consider the calculation for Simpson 
evenness given by the formula 𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑜𝑛 =
𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑜𝑛
𝑆
 where ′𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑜𝑛′ refers to Simpson’s 
Diversity Index and ‘S’ refers to the number of observed species. Shannon’s measure of 




(Maurer and McGill 2011, 57). In both cases the calculations express the evenness of a 
population as the function of the diversity index over the number of observed species. 
Diversity is equivalent to richness weighted by evenness so evenness is equivalent to 
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diversity inversely weighted by species. Both of these formulae allow an agent to easily 
convert a calculation of species diversity into one of evenness by removing the richness 
from the final value.  
In this section I outlined the detail of the measurement methodology for calculating 
species diversity. I outlined Simpson’s diversity index and the Shannon-Weiner diversity 
index in detail before giving the reader an impression of the large number of diversity 
indices available. I finished by discussing metrics of evenness which pull the evenness out 
of diversity scores. In the next subsection I will argue that the detail of the measurement 
methodology for species diversity indicates that species diversity is an operationalisable 
surrogate. 
 
5.4.3 Species Diversity is an Operationalisable Measurement Surrogate  
Species diversity is an operationalisable surrogate if it is accurately quantifiable and 
measureable. Species diversity is accurately measureable but its quantification is 
problematic because of the relationship between abundance and diversity. Beginning with 
measurability, species diversity is straightforwardly measureable. Diversity is a function of 
richness and evenness. Evenness is a measure of how equally individual groups are 
represented by a sample. Populations in ecosystems are maximally even when all species 
are equally abundant. So measuring the species diversity of an ecosystem requires richness 
and data on the abundance of the collected species. The methodology of species diversity 
calculations shows that species diversity is straightforwardly measureable. With data on 
abundance and richness, Simpson’s index is the probability that the second organism you 
sample is from the same species as the first organism you sampled. There is a higher 
probability of randomly selecting two larch trees from a sample when larch trees are the 
dominant flora in the ecosystem. 
 The accuracy of quantifying species diversity is more complex. In one sense 
measures of species diversity are accurate. They quantify what they are supposed to. They 
measure how evenly populations of species are distributed. In another sense the 
quantification is not accurate because species diversity is not at its best when all species 
are equally represented. A thriving ecosystem requires an uneven distribution of predators 
to prey. Increasing the populations of certain species to maximize evenness is a poor use of 
conservation resources if the population in question is already highly stable (Santana 2017, 
92). Maximising evenness can be a very bad thing for an ecosystem (Santana 2014, 770). 
Whilst equal representation of gender and race in a board of directors is maximally 
diverse, a farm with one blade of grass for every cow would be a disaster. 
 More work is required on the role of abundance within biodiversity. Abundance is 
an important part of biodiversity because it is linked to resilience, stability, and patterns of 
extinction. 1000 Maui dolphins would be better than the population of <100 that currently 
exists because the species is an extinction risk (Baker et al. 2013, 229; Hamner et al. 2014, 
87). One of the causes of toxic algae blooms in the ocean is rapid changes in abundance 
over a short period of time. Because of overfishing by humans the organisms which eat 
plankton are suddenly low in abundance (Jackson et al. 2001, 631). Lack of predators and 
the benefits of nutrient flow off into the water mean those phytoplankton are thriving 
(Heisler et al. 2008, 3). Phytoplanktons now have such high abundance that they die of old 
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age. Then they fall to the ocean floor and decompose. During this composition the bacteria 
thrive but use up most of the oxygen. That creates an anaerobic ecosystem which is toxic 
for any organism which can’t migrate away. We have large scale toxic algal blooms 
primarily because of changes in abundance. Overfishing prevents the fished species from 
interacting with the other organisms in its environment (Jackson et al. 2001, 629). If the 
abundance of plankton were low in proportion to the abundance of species which eat 
plankton such as the sea urchin Diadema Antillarum then we wouldn’t have as many toxic 
algal blooms. 
 The controversy is not about whether species diversity is an operationalisable 
surrogate but whether abundance should be a part of biodiversity. Species diversity is 
straightforwardly measureable and accurately quantifies what it aims to quantify. But it is 
not clear if quantifying abundance informs our view of biodiversity. Abundance is an 
important element in an ecosystem but it may be better understood as a dimension of 
ecosystem health or stability. Santana briefly criticises maximal evenness for threatening 
an ecosystem’s stability (Santana 2014, 770). A strong motivation for measures of species 
diversity is that they distinguish between a flourishing species and an imperilled one.  
However these can also be understood as concerns about health. Richness tells us how 
much biological diversity exists, evenness tells us how likely biological diversity is to stay 
at that level. Regardless of whether abundance is better understood as a dimension of 
biodiversity or something like stability, it is an operationalisable surrogate. We can 
straight-forwardly measure it and it accurately quantifies the evenness of an ecosystem so 
it is operationisable. In the next section I will discuss the methodology of measuring 
phylogenetic diversity. 
 
5.5 The Methodology of Measuring Phylogenetic Diversity 
The third true surrogate for biodiversity which I will discuss is phylogenetic diversity. 
Phylogenetic diversity is a measure of the evolutionary variation of the organisms in an 
ecosystem. Two ecosystems can have similar species richness but one can better represent 
biodiversity if it has greater feature diversity or unique evolutionary adaptations. 
Phylogenetic diversity measures this relation by mapping organisms onto a phylogenetic 
tree in terms of their common evolutionary ancestors. In this section I will introduce 
phylogenetic trees and explain how they are used to calculate the phylogenetic diversity of 
a group of organisms. Then I will discuss the different metrics of biodiversity. I will use 
this analysis to argue for two claims; phylogenetic diversity is an operationisable surrogate 
and in section 5.6 I will argue that the expanding multiplicity of phylogenetic diversity 
measures is overblown.  
 
5.5.1 Why Phylogenetic Diversity Matters 
In this subsection I will explain why measures of phylogenetic diversity are important for 
conservation decisions. I will argue that phylogenetic diversity tracks an important element 
of biodiversity which species richness overlooks, feature diversity. I explain why feature 
diversity matters and present three sources of evidence for species richness’ inability to 
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track it: counterexamples from the literature, the burgess-shale fauna, and the different 
proportion of phyla to species for marine and terrestrial organisms. 
Phylogenetic diversity matters because it captures an important element of 
biodiversity which species richness overlooks. Species richness treats all species as equal 
so it overlooks how complementary that species is. Species are complementary to the 
extent that including them in a group brings novel features to that group (Faith 1994, 49). 
If I have a group of two avian species and a choice about adding a floral species or a third 
avian species then the floral species is more complementary because adding it instead of a 
third avian species will introduce more novel features. Feature diversity is an important 
element of biodiversity but species richness overlooks it (Frank 2017, 97). Phylogenetic 
diversity tracks feature diversity because speciation is caused by natural selection isolating 
organisms. Survival of the fittest favours certain adaptations over others. So, over time 
speciation tends to diversify phenotypic characteristics. So there is a phylogenetic pattern 
between all species on the tree of life. The branching patterns on the tree of life are used in 
phylogenetic calculations to track overall feature diversity (Faith 1996, 1286). 
Demonstrating that phylogenetic diversity is important requires demonstrating that 
species richness does not track feature diversity well. In the literature this is typically 
motivated with a hypothetic counterexample of two groups of organisms such as the 
following passage. 
 
Consider two hypothetical islands, each with only two species of vertebrate animals in equal 
abundance: two birds in one case and a bird plus a mammal in the other. Both islands have species 
richness = 2 (for vertebrates) and the same maximal value of species evenness. However, our 
intuition tells us that a bird plus a mammal represents more biodiversity than does two birds. 
(Vellend et al. 2011, 194) 
 
Feature diversity is important. The brown spotted kiwi of New Zealand is a more 
worthwhile conservation target than the snail darter because there are only a few species of 
kiwi and the snail darter is a “thoroughly unremarkable minnow.” By contrast the kiwi has 
a number of unique features. Kiwis, which are native to New Zealand, are a group of 
flightless birds with nostrils at the end of their extended beaks. Their highly developed 
sense of smell allows them to detect food such as worms long before seeing them and their 
long beaks allow them to root prey out of the ground (Martin et al. 2007, 198). They 
burrow in the ground instead of nesting and proportionate to its body size, lay the largest 
egg for any avian species at approximately 20% of the mother’s body mass. Species 
richness treats the snail darter and the kiwi as of equal value to conservation. Phylogenetic 
diversity distinguishes different degrees of complementariness because of the kiwi’s 
unique features.   
 Aside from hypothetical motivations for the value of feature diversity, the failure 
of species richness to track feature diversity is shown by important ecological discoveries. 
The burgess shale fauna were discovered by Charles Walcott in Canada during the second 
decade of the twentieth century. These fossils were unusual. They were members of the 
metazoan kingdom from the pre-Cambrian era but work on these fossils in the 1970s by 
Whittington, Briggs, and Conway revealed that these creatures did not fit into existing 
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phyla (Gould 2000, 46). Stephen Gould hypothesised that these creatures belonged to 
phyla which had since gone extinct. He argued that the physical characteristics of the 
fossils precluded them from membership in modern phyla. The fossils are radically 
different from any surviving lineages of metazoans which are alive today. Some are 
arthropods and some of those arthropods are trilobites but most of them are significantly 
different in physical character to the groupings of trilobites or arthropods (Griffiths and 
Sterelny 1999, 287).  
 Gould argued that the burgess-shale fauna indicate that diversity does not always 
increase with time. Greater species richness does not indicate greater diversity because 
during the Precambrian era, there were more families and orders with fewer species 
(Sepowski 2017, 35). The burgess shale fauna bear the features of the metazoan kingdom 
but they are phenotypically distinct enough that they do not belong in modern phyla 
(Gould 2000, 47). Gould illustrates his hypothesis in the following way: 
  
 
Figure 5.4: Increasing diversity over time and Greater Diversity in the Precambrian Era  
     (Gould 2000, 46). 
 
The tree in the left of figure B indicates fewer phyla with more species. The burgess-shale 
indicate a time period with more disparity but fewer species. So during that time period 
species richness was lower but feature diversity was higher. This indicates that species 
richness does not track feature diversity as well as phylogenetic diversity.  
 In this subsection I argued that phylogenetic diversity matters because it tracks 
feature diversity in a way that species richness does not. Species richness treats all species 
as equal despite organisms being complementary in different degrees. This conclusion is 
supported by hypothetical counterexamples, the burgess-shale fauna, and the difference in 
proportions of phyla to species for marine and terrestrial species. In the next subsection I 
will outline the detail of phylogenetic trees and how they represent the evolutionary 
pattern which tracks feature diversity. 
 
5.5.2 Phylogenetic Trees  
In this subsection I will outline the detail of phylogenetic trees for calculating phylogenetic 
diversity. I will cover the common elements of all trees and the different kinds of trees 
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which are used. The first stage of phylogenetic calculations is mapping organisms onto a 
phylogenetic tree. Since any two existing species share a common ancestor somewhere in 
their lineage, entire ecosystems can be represented on evolutionary maps like this one.  
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Figure 5.5 Simple Phylogenetic Tree 
 
 This tree depicts the phylogenetic pattern of the organisms in the group. It is 
simplified because it is agnostic as to whether the lengths of the branches indicate any 
information. It represents evolutionary history and can be used to track feature diversity 
for conservation. The phylogenetic pattern is represented by the common features of 
phylogenetic trees: tips, branches, nodes, and roots. The tips of each tree represent 
individual species. The branches represent the evolutionary development. A node is a point 
at which one branch splits into two (in the case of more than two they are referred to as 
polytomies) so it represents the act of speciation. The root node is the single common 
ancestor which is shared by all organisms on the tree. These are the common features of 
phylogenetic trees (Vellend et al. 2011, 196).  
 There are different kinds of phylogenetic trees so as well as common features, there 
are unique features. Trees differ in branch length and whether or not the branches indicate 
distance. Distance is typically indicated either by time or standard for similarity in 
features. Consider the following phylogenetic trees. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Ultrametric Phylogenetic Tree (Faith 1992, 6) and Non-Ultrametric 
Phylogenetic Tree (Faith 1996, 1287) 
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The branches of these phylogenetic trees are quantifiable. That is the phylogenetic pattern 
presented represents not only the relations of ancestry and descendants but also 
quantifiable information about phylogenetic distance. In these trees the length of the 
branch indicates either the time between acts of speciation or the number of novel features 
developed. The tree on the left is ultrametric because all of its tips end at the same place. It 
is also additive because its branch length is quantifiable. The scale used is time and all tips 
represent extant species. The tree on the right is non-ultrametric because its tips end at 
different places (Vellend et al. 2011, 196). This is because it is an additive tree with a scale 
of physical difference. Physical difference can also be indicated in an ultrametric tree with 
dash for difference or parallel speciations (Faith 1992, 3; Faith 1994, 48; Faith 1996, 
1287). The details of the distance metrics will be discussed in the next subsection. In this 
subsection I explained the methodology of phylogenetic trees which represent the 
evolutionary relationships between organisms.  
 
5.5.3 Metrics of Phylogenetic Diversity 
In this subsection I will explain the methodology for calculating phylogenetic diversity. I 
explain the detail of three groups of metrics. First I discuss the quantification of branch 
length in distance based trees. Next I outline metrics for node based trees. I discuss 
taxonomic distinctiveness, species originality, and pendent edge in detail. Then I outline 
the metrics for distance based trees and discuss phylogenetic diversity and mean 
phylogenetic distance in detail.  
 Branch lengths along phylogenetic trees can be quantified using different metrics. 
The different metrics are important because phylogenetic diversity tracks feature diversity. 
A problem with quantifying the diversity of features is that it requires a measure of 
similarity between organisms (Maclaurin and Lean 2016, 28). Similarity is notoriously 
difficult to quantify (Goodman 1972, 437). It is easiest to quantify in restricted groups but 
living organisms are extremely phenotypically diverse with more distinct traits than shared 
ones. So much of the operationalisability of phylogenetic diversity relies on how well the 
trees represent similarity and difference between organisms. There are at least four 
common methods for quantification. One common method is to make the tree ultrametric, 
use time for a scale and place the nodes along branch lengths according to the date of 
speciation. A second method is to proportion branch length to the total change from 
ancestor to speciation. A third method is to rely solely on the phylogenetic pattern for 
distance. These calculations only factor into account the branching pattern and do not 
consider branch length. 
 For node based phylogenetic trees, there are five main metrics: taxonomic 
distinctiveness, species originality, pendent edge, species evolutionary history, and 
originality of species within a set (Vellend et al. 2011, 198). I will explain two metrics in 
more detail: taxonomic distinctiveness, and pendent edge. The methodology of the metrics 























Figure 5.7 Taxonomic Distinctive Values for Species on a Simplified Phylogenetic Tree 
 
Taxonomic distinctiveness is calculated as the reciprocal of number of nodes between 
species and the root of the tree. The result for an individual species can be standardised by 





















Figure 5.8 Pendent Edge Values for Species on a Simplified Phylogenetic Tree 
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Pendent edge calculates the length of the branch connecting a species to the rest of the 
regional tree. It focuses on how few members belong to a clade. This is not a distance 
measure. Metrics for node based trees do not rely on quantifiable distance in the branch 
length. Instead, they determine phylogenetic diversity based on the phylogenetic pattern 
made by the organisms in the ecosystem. 
 The metrics for distance based trees rely on a quantifiable distance in branch 
length. The calculation typically relies on an ultrametric tree with time as the scale. Four 
such measures are shown in the following table adapted from (Vellend et al. 2011, 199).  
 
Distance Based Metric  Formula  











Sum of Phylogenetic Distances 𝑆𝑃𝐷 =∑∑𝑑𝑚𝑛
𝑛𝑚
 
Mean Nearest Neighbour Distance 𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐷 =∑∑𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑑𝑚𝑛)
𝑛𝑚
 
Symbol Guide: ‘B’ stands for ‘branch’ where the act of summation ranges over the length 
‘L’ of all branches. ‘S’ stands for the total number of species and 𝑑𝑚𝑛  is the distance 
between two points ‘m’ and ‘n’ . ‘𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑑𝑚𝑛)’ is then the minimum distance between those 
two points. 
 
Table 5.3 Metrics of Phylogenetic Diversity for Distance Based Trees 
 
I will explain phylogenetic distance in more detail. The methodology is shown on the 
following simplified phylogenetic tree. The following tree is assumed to be additive for the 
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Figure 5.10 Phylogenetic Distance Scores for a Simplified Additive Phylogenetic Tree 
 
Phylogenetic diversity is calculated as the sum of all branch lengths in the phylogenetic 
tree. After calculating the length of the individual branches, the results are added together 
to yield a score of 29. 
Metrics for distance based trees like phylogenetic distance rely on a quantifiable 
distance in branch length. So the results which they produce are a function of both the 
phylogenetic pattern and branch length. Because branch length affects the phylogenetic 
value which a species adds to overall phylogenetic diversity, distance based trees can be 
more easily weighted for abundance. Node based trees record presence or absence for a 
species but since each tip of the tree is represented by a pathway length, distance based 
trees assign a quantity to species. Each branch represents a quantity which can be weighted 
for abundant populations of pairs of species (Vellend et al. 2011, 199). In this subsection I 
explained the methodology for calculating phylogenetic diversity by grouping the metrics 
according to distance, node based trees, and distance based trees. In the next subsection I 
argue that phylogenetic diversity is an operationalisable measurement surrogate.  
 
5.5.4 Phylogenetic Diversity is an Operationalisable Measurement Surrogate 
In this subsection I will argue that phylogenetic diversity is an operationalisable surrogate 
for the goals of conservation biology. To argue that phylogenetic diversity is accurately 
quantifiable and measureable, I present evidence from a principle component analysis by 
Vellend (et al. 2011). The results show a high redundancy between metrics for node based 
trees, and between metrics of distance based trees. I argue that phylogenetic diversity has 
made the problem of similarity operationalisable for the goal of tracking feature diversity. 
Other studies also indicate that there is a consensus of results between node and distance 
based trees for triage decisions in conservation biology. I conclude that phylogenetic 
diversity is operationalisable because it is accurately quantifiable, pragmatically 
measureable, and correlates highly with other true surrogates of biodiversity. 
Phylogenetic diversity is an operationalisable surrogate if it is accurately 
quantifiable and measureable. The values which it assigns must be accurate and the true 
surrogate needs to be measureable within the time constraints of conservation biology. 
One way to test for accuracy is with a principle component analysis. A PCA calculates all 
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metrics on the same group of organisms to test how highly the results of different metrics 
correlate. The PCA performed by Vellend (et al. 2011, 201) demonstrates that the different 
metrics of phylogenetic diversity which I discussed in section 5.5.3 correlate highly with 
one another. The mean correlation for any two metrics of node based trees was 0.88 which 
indicates high redundancy among metrics. That is, the different measures of phylogenetic 
topology correlate so well that they are almost equivalent. 
Correlation was also high for metrics of distance based trees. Two versions of the 
four metrics I discussed in section 5.5.3 were tested against one another; one which 
weighted for abundance and one which was not (Vellend et al. 2011, 202). The results of 
the PCA indicated that they had an overall correlation of >0.9 (Vellend et al. 2011, 205). 
This result is high but there is a greater range of scores which are represented by the mean. 
Correlation scores could be increased by restricting certain measures of phylogenetic 
diversity such as imbalanced trees but this is not necessary for the goals of conservation. 
Conservation biology most frequently uses the higher correlating node based trees. 
Distance based trees are favoured by community ecology (Vellend et al. 2011, 192).  
 There is also some evidence that node and distance based trees make the same 
conservation recommendations. In Conservation Evaluation and Phylogenetic Diversity, 
Faith compares conservation recommendations for bumble bees of the sibiricus group to 
demonstrate that phylogenetic diversity is a better measure than taxic diversity (Faith 
1992). Given the decision of selecting one place of three for conservation, he arrives at the 
following data. 
 
 R1 R2 R3 
Species Number 9 8 10 
Phylogenetic Diversity 66 71 50 
Taxic Diversity 21.1 15.1 12.7 
 
 
Table 5.4: Values for species richness, phylogenetic diversity and taxic diversity for each 
of the three reserve areas, RI, R2, and R3 (Faith 1992, 6) 
 
So taxic diversity suggests protecting reserve area 1 but phylogenetic diversity suggests 
protecting reserve area 2. Faith considers if the results could be a product of branch length 
assumptions and so repeats the process with a node based analysis. The node based 
analysis also indicated that reserve area 2 should be selected for conservation. “When all 
the terminal branches were simply set to unit length, it remained the case that R2 had 
greater PD than R1, though the difference between the two was now greater (38 versus 
19).” (Faith 1992, 7).  
This conclusion is supported by the findings of Vellend (et al. 2011, 206) who note 
that weighting branches by abundance had little impact on the results for distance based 
trees. Abundance has little effect on the results because it is obscured by the phylogenetic 
pattern. The redundancy of weighting for abundance supports the operationalisability of 
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phylogenetic diversity because the extra step for weighting has no serious impact on the 
conservation recommendation. Part of the constraint of operationalisability for 
conservation biology is time constraints so not having to weight for abundance or use a 
distance based tree speeds up the process. More work is required to demonstrate node 
based and distance based trees do not have an impact on place selection in conservation 
but some precursory evidence exists. Deciding between node trees, distance trees, and 
weighting for abundance has little impact on the final conservation recommendation 
because the greatest factor is the phylogenetic pattern. 
 This high redundancy between metrics is an impressive result for phylogenetic 
diversity because of the difficulty of quantifying similarity and difference. The redundancy 
is between metrics rather than for the surrogate. Phylogenetic diversity is not a redundant 
surrogate but the different ways in which it is calculated correlate so highly in their results 
that metrics are redundant against one another. This meets the requirements of 
conservation biology because metric selection has little impact on results. This is an 
impressive result because phylogenetic pattern tracks feature diversity and quantifying 
similarity and difference is meant to be an almost insurmountable problem. In Seven 
Strictures Against Similarity, Nelson Goodman argues against relying on similarity to 
solve problems. “Similarity, ever ready to solve philosophical problems and overcome 
obstacles, is a pretender, an impostor, a quack. It has, indeed, its place and its uses, but is 
more often found where it does not be- long, professing powers it does not possess.” 
(Goodman 1972, 437) 
The strictures, which Goodman argues for, make the problem more approachable. 
He notes that similarity can be addressed in restricted domains with a small number of 
important properties (Goodman 1972, 444,446). It is easier to quantify how tomatoes are 
different to one another than how different a tomato is from a human being. But this 
restriction is not available to feature diversity because the features of biological organisms 
are so diverse (Vellend et al. 2011, 194). The high redundancy between metrics of 
phylogenetic diversity is such an impressive result because it demonstrates that feature 
diversity can be accurately quantified. 
 Because metrics of phylogenetic diversity are accurately quantifiable, their 
operationalisability turns on whether they are pragmatically measureable. Phylogenetic 
diversity is pragmatically measureable because conservationists can measure the 
phylogenetic diversity of an ecosystem with limited resources in a small time frame. 
Because species are already placed on the tree of life, and considering abundance is 
optional, conservationists only need to identify the species present in an ecosystem to 
calculate phylogenetic diversity. Some information on extant species in an ecosystem is 
already available. For this reason, phylogenetic diversity can make quick 
recommendations from complex data sets. In Conservation Evaluation and Phylogenetic 
Diversity, Faith shows how a cladogram of the taxa in a group can accurately predict 
which species would preserve the greatest feature diversity without having to directly 
observe any features (Faith 1992, 3). In his example, individual species do not need to be 
checked for novel features before deciding which to preserve. Preservation of the greatest 
feature diversity is accurately tracked by the phylogenetic pattern of the organisms. The 
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option to easily construct a visible pattern to inform conservation is a strong pragmatic 
advantage. 
Lastly there is a high correlation between phylogenetic diversity and other true 
surrogates for biodiversity. In their PCA Vellend (et al. 2011, 201) found a 0.91 
correlation between species richness and node based phylogenetic trees. Grenyer (et al. 
2007, 757) phylogenetic diversity has a 77% correlation with species richness and a 96% 
correlation with genus richness. Faith has also argued that phylogenetic diversity correlates 
with habitat diversity and functional diversity (Faith 1996, 1287). The high correlation 
between phylogenetic diversity and other true surrogates is a pragmatic advantage for 
conservationists because it limits the number of other surrogates which need to be 
measured. The correlation is imperfect because the specific dimensions of biodiversity 
vary independently of one another. However, perfect correlation would not be beneficial to 
conservation. If phylogenetic diversity had a perfect correlation with species richness then 
the two metrics would be redundant for one another. There would be no point in 
calculating phylogenetic diversity because it would not give us any information that 
species richness could not. High but imperfect correlation between surrogates is the 
pragmatic goal for conservationists. Phylogenetic diversity meets that goal. It is accurately 
quantifiable and pragmatically measureable so it is operationalisable for the goals of 
conservation biology. 
 In this subsection I argued that phylogenetic diversity is an operationalisable 
surrogate for the goals of conservation biology. I first argued that metrics of phylogenetic 
diversity are accurately quantifiable by appealing to the results of a PCA of the metrics I 
discussed in section 5.5.3. The high redundancy between metrics indicated accurate 
quantification. This conclusion is supported by the low impact of distance based trees and 
weighting for abundance on conservation recommendations. The most important factor in 
tracking the feature diversity of organisms in an ecosystem is the phylogenetic pattern. 
Then I argued that metrics of phylogenetic diversity are pragmatically measureable. I 
argued that metrics of phylogenetic diversity require little information to be performed, 
that they can easily make sense of complex data sets, and that they correlate highly with 
other true surrogates for biodiversity. I concluded that phylogenetic diversity is 
operationalisable for conservation biology. In the next section I will use the detail of the 
measurement methodology which I have outlined in sections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 to argue that 
the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity measures is overblown. 
 
5.6 The Expanding Multiplicity of Biodiversity Measures is Overblown 
In this section I will use the analysis of measurement methodology which I have outlined 
in this chapter to argue that the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity measures is 
overblown. That is, the number of biodiversity measures is not an indication of the 
empirical suitability of biodiversity for conservation biology.  The expanding multiplicity 
of biodiversity measures is a problem because it gives the impression that biodiversity 
calculation is in a worse state that it actually is. There are enough measures to choose from 
that in ‘Is biodiversity a natural quality?’ Maclaurin (Maclaurin 2017, 56) use the 
expanding multiplicity to motivate the debate over the ontological status of biodiversity. 
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Contra to that impression, I will advance several points to argue that the expanding 
multiplicity of biodiversity measures is overblown. I will argue that there are fewer options 
for measuring species richness because each calculation is catered to a different data set. In 
the case of species diversity, I argue that the total number of diversity measures do not 
impact the success of Shannon’s diversity index and Simpson’s diversity index. The detail 
of phylogenetic diversity shows a high within-surrogate correlation of results. I explain 
that the apparently large number of biodiversity calculations is actually a product of 
multiple decisions with a small number of options. I consider the objection that surrogate 
selection still does negatively impact the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity measures 
but argue that a range of choices does not make all options equal. A misleading focus on 
an inappropriate biodiversity surrogate will not pass academic scrutiny. I conclude that the 
expanding multiplicity of biodiversity measures is overblown and so cannot motivate the 
empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism.  
The apparent expanding multiplicity of species richness’ measures is overblown 
because the disjunction of measures represents a rich and nuanced tool kit. Every 
calculation in that tool kit determines the height of the discovery curve using a prediction. 
The predictive success of those calculations is dependent on collected data. So there is a 
multiplicity of measures because there are different kinds of data collection. 
Conservationists eliminate half the possible measures when they decide to record species 
via incidence or abundance. Following data collection, the different metrics are then 
available because they cater to different data sets but all are focused on identifying the 
height of the discovery curve. The multiplicity of measures seems large because it is the 
product of a small number of choices. The biodiversity tool kit is a rich and nuanced one 
precisely because it can cater to diverse needs.  
Imagine that Sandra collects incidence data in a study on species richness. Sandra 
could employ the ICE calculation to determine the height of the asymptote but all the 
infrequent species in her sample are singletons. If all the infrequent species in a sample 
have an abundance of one then ICE will not work (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 41). Instead 
Sandra is better off calculating the asymptote with Chao2. She then has two further options 
based on her data set. Chao2 has two variants, one which is intended to work for any 
combination of species and one which is intended to work solely from the duplicate 
species present. It can usually find the asymptote from a smaller data set because it focuses 
on the relative incidence of rarer species (Colwell and Gotelli 2011, 51). Sandra has 
multiple calculations to choose from because they are optimised for different kinds of data 
sets. 
We need multiple calculations of species richness because there are multiple 
possible data sets and we need the fastest way of determining the height of the discovery 
curve. By analogy, a cheese knife, bread knife, and a paring knife can all carve a block of 
cheese. One will do the best job and the others will not perform as well because they are 
intended for different materials. We still need all three knives but the available number of 
knives does not make them a poor fit for the role of carving food. Instead it makes them 
collectively better at the task. Likewise with calculations of species richness, the 
expanding multiplicity of measures represented a rich and nuanced tool kit.   
 The expanding multiplicity of species diversity’ measures (the large number of 
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available measures to choose from) is overblown because despite the large number of 
calculations available there are still dominant measures of species diversity. There is a 
large number of different methods for calculating species diversity but Shannon’s diversity 
index and Simpson’s diversity index are still two of the best performing, most 
straightforward, and most used (Maurer and McGill 2011, 64). The expanding multiplicity 
of biodiversity measures is not solely a function of biodiversity’s conceptual complexity. It 
is also a function of the academic focus on publication. Publications require an original 
contribution to literature which can be achieved by developing a new measure of 
biodiversity and demonstrating that it outperforms other measures at some task. No 
individual measure of biodiversity captures every important element of biodiversity. It 
can’t because biodiversity is a complex multidimensional concept. So, it is normal for 
systems of measurement to appear which capture those important elements. The expanding 
multiplicity is overblown because despite multiple measures to capture as many important 
elements as possible two of the oldest measures are still two of the best. 
The expanding multiplicity of phylogenetic measures is overblown because there is 
high within-surrogate correlation of phylogenetic measures. The different distance metrics 
have a 90% correlation with one another (Vellend et al. 2011, 205). That is an impressive 
result because biological organisms are so phenotypically diverse and quantifying 
difference and similarity seems like an intractable problem outside of restricted domains 
(Goodman 1972, 437). There are scenarios in which we can accurately quantify difference. 
A spinal column with six vertebrae is minimally different to the same spinal column with 
seven vertebras. Facial recognition software uses points of comparisons to determine 
identity. It can do this because it focuses on a small number of important properties in a 
general setting (Goodman 1972, 444, 446). The problem is more complex when 
quantifying the difference between a house fly and a thistle. Despite this, the mean 
correlation between two metrics of phylogenetic diversity is 90%. 
 The expanding multiplicity of phylogenetic measures is also overblown because 
like species richness the large numbers of metrics is a product of a small number of 
decisions. Conservationists must choose between node and distance based trees. If there is 
a preference for distance based trees then they have the option of different scales and 
whether to weight branch lengths by abundance. What is interesting in the case of 
phylogenetic diversity is that the correlation between metrics is so high that preference can 
determine the easiest metric to calculate. “Within node-based and distance- based metrics, 
redundancy is quite high (r > 0.9 for most pairs of metrics across all tree types). As such, 
an appropriate criterion for choosing among metrics is their conceptual and mathematical 
simplicity.” (Vellend et al. 2011, 205). The expanding multiplicity of phylogenetic 
measures is a product of a small number of decisions, most of which do not have a serious 
impact on conservation recommendations. 
The analysis of the measurement methodology of biodiversity surrogate outlined in 
this chapter indicates that the large number of measures is a factor of a small number of 
choices. During biodiversity calculation several decisions are made between a small range 
of options. A true surrogate is selected. An estimator surrogate is selected. The importance 
of abundance in the results is considered. Sampling strategy is decided. A calculation is 
selected based on the collected data. In the case of phylogenetic calculations a distance 
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metric is decided. Each decision step has a small number of options but multiple stages 
increases the total outcomes exponentially. Three true surrogates with ten measurements 
and five options for distance metrics is already 150 options. A small number of choices 
exponentially increase the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity measures. For example in 
the next chapter I will discuss measures of trait diversity. Since those measures require 
focusing on a common trait, there are as many possible trait diversity calculations as there 
are common traits.  
 The expanding multiplicity of biodiversity measures gives the impression of 
thousands of possible results. But in practice there are a handful of distinct ways to 
calculate biodiversity with a great number of subtle variants. Because the expanding 
multiplicity increases exponentially for each decision, it also narrows exponentially once a 
decision is made. The decision with the biggest impact on the results isn’t the decision 
between chao2 and first-order jackknife richness estimator, it’s the selection of true 
surrogate. Species richness, species diversity, and phylogenetics are all distinct measures 
so once one true surrogate has been selected, two thirds of the possible results are 
eliminated. By analogy with temperature the expanding multiplicity of measures is less a 
problem of 100 ways to measure temperature and more a product of there being a few 
ways to measure a temperature with many brands of thermometer. Temperature can be 
measured via digital, mercury, internal or surface but there are many competing brands 
which perform slightly differently. Like temperature, once a conservationist selects a true 
surrogate for biodiversity they drastically narrow the possible range of results. 
 An objection might be that a source of the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity 
measures is surrogate selection. Whilst measurement preference cannot heavily skew final 
results, surrogate selection can. A score of species richness is very different from a score 
of species diversity which weights results for abundance. This concern conflates the 
number of choices with no matter of fact about the best choice. But, the multiplicity of 
diversity measures does not imply that all calculations are equally valuable for all 
ecosystems. Using a straight-forward measure of species richness to assess the taxonomy 
of an ecosystem containing ancient species such as the tuatara, is a poor choice of 
surrogate because an ancient unchanged species and a relatively recently evolved species 
count for the same. In this case a phylogenetic score is better because it gives greater value 
to species which have remained unchanged over a long period of time. 
 The expanding multiplicity of biodiversity measures should not motivate the 
empirical case for eliminativism because poor choices do not pass critical evaluation. In 
NZ there is an issue with child poverty and in 2015 a nationwide study on the depth of the 
problem yielded 13 measures indicating that the problem was severe. The government of 
2015 opted to focus on the measure which presented the problem as least severe. The 
opposition of 2015 were quick to argue that this single measure misrepresented the state of 
child poverty in NZ (Parliament 2015, question 11). Likewise, while a poor selection of 
surrogate may be misleading it is unlikely to go unnoticed by critical academic work. A 
large proportion of Santana’s academic work is built on pointing out where biodiversity 
surrogates fall short. Their limitations are clear and so a biased surrogate selection 
intended to mislead the taxonomic state of an ecosystem is unlikely to convince anyone. A 
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2 ) from a set of incidence data is likely to have the same amount of academic 
credit as a doctor who checks a patient for diabetes by taking their temperature. The ACE 
calculation is intended for abundance data rather than incidence data.  
 There is a great multiplicity of biodiversity measures but more often than not those 
measures share a great deal in common both conceptually and empirically. Species 
richness, species diversity, and phylogenetic diversity all measure different dimensions of 
biodiversity but they are also all transformations on the same data set. For any ecosystem, 
if a conservationist has a list of species and their abundance, they can calculate that 
ecosystem’s species richness, species diversity, and phylogenetic diversity. Like mean, 
median, and mode biodiversity surrogates are often transformations on the same data set. 
They process the data in different ways to calculate different features. Those distinct 
features give us important insight into the properties of the data set but they are not meant 
to be the only aspect of the data set worth considering. Deciding which transformation of a 
data set is the most important is made on a case by case basis. Species richness may work 
well for biodiversity hotspots but ecosystems with unique selective pressures such as 
islands may be better served by calculations of phylogenetic diversity. 
 In this section I argued that the analysis of measurement methodology which I have 
outlined in this chapter shows that the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity measures is 
overblown. I argued that the apparent expanding multiplicity of species richness’ was 
actually a case of a rich and nuanced tool kit. I argued that the apparent expanding 
multiplicity of species diversity’ measures was a case of diverse competition with a few 
dominant competitors. In the case of phylogenetic diversity, I argued that despite the 
apparent expanding multiplicity, phylogenetic measures have a high within-surrogate 
correlation of results. I explained that the large range of available biodiversity calculations 
is a function of a small number of options at several decision points. I argued that these 
decision points do not increase imprecision because poor measurement choices do not 
survive academic scrutiny. Because the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity measures is 
overblown it cannot motivate the empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism. Familiarity 
with the detail of the measurement methodology of biodiversity surrogates indicate that 
biodiversity is a good empirical fit for the role it plays in conservation biology. Its 
surrogates are operationalisable and the large number of options for measurement is a 
normal feature of complex multi-dimensional concept. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I presented a detailed analysis of three measurement surrogates for 
biodiversity, focusing on their measurement methodology: species richness, species 
diversity and phylogenetic diversity. I argued that the technical detail of the methodology 
supported two claims about the state of biodiversity measurement. The expanding 
multiplicity of biodiversity measures is overblown and measurement surrogates are 
operationalisable. First I summarised the role of the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity 
measures in motivating the poor empirical fit argument. Then I outlined the measurement 
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methodology for three true surrogates of biodiversity: species richness, species diversity 
and phylogenetic diversity. For each surrogate I discussed its unique approach to 
measuring biodiversity. Species richness uses discovery curves to solve the problem of 
counting the thousands of species in an ecosystem. Species diversity weights richness 
results by abundance to detect how evenly species in an ecosystem are represented. 
Phylogenetic diversity maps species on to phylogenetic trees to measure the evolutionary 
variation of in an ecosystem. 
 Next, for each surrogate I outlined different metrics and explained how they work. 
I used this technical detail to argue that each surrogate was operationalisable for 
conservation biology. This conclusion contradicted premises five, six and the conclusion 
of the empirical poor fit argument. Premise five claimed that “individual dimensions of 
biodiversity are either not operationalisable, do not accurately track biodiversity, or do not 
track biological value. In chapters one to four I argued that the true surrogates of 
biodiversity track biodiversity conceptually and empirically. In this chapter I argued that 
they are also operationisable. Premise six claimed that satisfying conditions one to five 
was a sufficient reason to eliminate biodiversity but in chapter four I argued that it 
overlooked the importance of within-surrogate operationalisability.  
Within-surrogate operationalisability is as important for a multidimensional 
measure as between-surrogate operationalisability. So demonstrating that measurement 
surrogates for biodiversity are operationalisable shows that premise five is false, premise 
six has overlooked an important ‘good fit’ element, and produces important evidence that 
the conclusion of the empirical poor fit argument is false. Lastly I used the detail of the 
surrogate’s measurement methodology to argue that the expanding multiplicity of 
biodiversity measures is overblown. Whilst it may appear that measures of biodiversity are 
numerous with little consensus on how biodiversity ought to be measured, the large 
number of measures is the product of a small number of options. The inference to the best 
explanation is not that the biodiversity measures are in a poor state but rather that 
conservationists have a highly nuanced tool kit. In the next chapter I will continue my 
analysis of measurement methodology and conclude that the empirical case for 






6 Implications of Measurement Methodology II: The 
Empirical Case for Biodiversity Eliminativism is 
Unsuccessful  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the final part of an extensive defence of the biodiversity concept against 
Santana’s poor fit empirical argument. In this chapter I will outline the measurement 
methodology of two true surrogates for biodiversity: morphology, and functional diversity. 
The purpose of outlining the technical detail is to demonstrate that some biodiversity 
surrogates are not operationalisable. This implies that premise five of the empirical poor fit 
argument that “individual dimensions of biodiversity are either not operationalisable, do 
not accurately track biodiversity, or do not accurately track biological value” is true for 
some surrogates. I will use this conclusion to argue that the empirical poor fit argument 
fails because it has an internal contradiction.  
 First, I will summarise the importance of within-surrogate operationalisability for 
the empirical case against biodiversity. Then I will outline the measurement methodology 
of morphological calculations. I explain why phenotypic diversity is an important element 
of biodiversity and outline adaptive landscapes and morphospaces as empirical tools. I call 
attention to the mathematical relationships in nature before arguing that morphology is not 
an operationalisable surrogate for biodiversity. Next I outline the measurement 
methodology of functional diversity. I explain why functional diversity is an important 
element of biodiversity before discussing several different metrics of functional diversity. I 
use this detail to argue that measures of functional diversity are not functional enough and 
that functional diversity is not an operationalisable surrogate for biodiversity. Lastly, I 
argue that the empirical poor fit argument for biodiversity’s elimination fails because it 
contains an internal contradiction. Santana’s intended replacement for biodiversity fails his 
own empirical standard for a conservation goal. 
 
6.2 The Importance of Within-Surrogate Operationalisability for the 
Empirical Case against Biodiversity 
In this subsection I will argue that within-surrogate operationalisability (how 
operationalisable specific dimensions such as species richness are) is important for the 
empirical case against biodiversity. The empirical case would eliminate biodiversity in 
favour of its surrogates so the operationalisability of those surrogates is important. I give 
examples of theory replacement in the history of science before arguing that eliminating 
biodiversity shifts the burden of operationalisability to its surrogates. I consider and defend 
against the possible objection that Santana does not need his attack on the specific 
dimensions of biodiversity to motivate the empirical poor fit argument.  
Within-surrogate operationalisability is important for the empirical case against 
biodiversity because Santana wants conservation to eliminate biodiversity without a new 
replacement. Theory eliminativism in the history of science is either an instance of 
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replacement or hard eliminativism. Replacement eliminativism occurs when a more 
successful theory replaces an older one. This is a case of Kuhnian paradigm shift, or 
Lakatoshian research program replacement. The oxygen theory of combustion replaces 
phlogiston theory and the theory of moving tectonic plates replaces biblical catastrophism. 
In cases of hard eliminativism a theory or concept is eliminated without replacement. 
There are no seriously competitive theories for the transmutation of iron into gold because 
chemistry eliminated the theory of chryosperia in the late seventeenth century (Principe 
2014, 97). Santana’s eliminativism is a case of hard eliminativism because biodiversity is 
being removed from the surrogate chain rather than replaced. Angermeir and Karr, by 
contrast, want to replace biodiversity with biological integrity. Santana simply wants it 
gone.  
 Eliminating biodiversity rather than replacing it with something like biological 
integrity will shorten the surrogacy chain so that conservationists infer biological value 
from the specific dimensions of biodiversity such as species richness. So if dimensions 
such as species richness are not operationalisable then conservationists lack a practical 
goal for conservation. Within-surrogate operationalisability matters for the empirical case 
against biodiversity because Santana expects biodiversity’s surrogates to pick up the work 
which biodiversity was doing. The surrogacy chain goes from ‘Surrogate  Biodiversity 
 Biological Value’ to ‘Surrogate  Biological Value’. So if conservationists are relying 
on surrogates to guide conservation decisions then they need those surrogates to be 
operationalisable. 
 The importance of within-surrogate operationalisability is a problem for the 
empirical case against biodiversity because Santana does not distinguish between within-
surrogate operationalisability and between-surrogate operationalisability in his arguments. 
He presents arguments against both as an attack on biodiversity. Consider the poor 
empirical fit argument.  
 
The poor empirical fit argument 
 
1) General conceptions of biodiversity are not straightforwardly measureable. 
2) There is not sufficient property correlation for biodiversity to be considered a property 
bundle. 
3) The dimensions of biodiversity do not support robust inductive generalisations across 
the group. 
4) The inclusion of biodiversity in the conservation process exacerbates imprecision 
between the measured target and the conservation goal. 
5) Individual dimensions of biodiversity are either: 
a. Not operationalisable 
b. Do not accurately track biodiversity 
c. Or do not accurately track biological value 
6) If conditions 1) to 5) accurately describe biodiversity then biodiversity is a poor 
empirical fit for its role in conservation biology. 
7) Therefore: Biodiversity is a poor empirical fit for its role in conservation biology. 
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In my construction of his argument I have distinguished between-surrogate methodology 
from within-surrogate methodology. Premises one to three target the between-surrogate 
operationalisability of biodiversity. According to Santana, general conceptions of 
biodiversity are not straightforwardly measureable because they gather together strictly 
incommensurable dimensions. We don’t have good reasons to treat those dimensions as a 
property bundle. We cannot inductively generalise from one dimension to another. 
However, premise five that “individual dimensions of biodiversity are either not 
operationalisable, do not accurately track biodiversity, or do not accurately track biological 
value” is a concern about within-surrogate operationalisability. Santana needs premises 
one to five to motivate the conclusion. 
 One objection is that Santana could dispense with premise five and motivate the 
conclusion with premises one to four. This is not an option because Santana has already 
used premise five in his conceptual argument for biodiversity’s elimination. A key premise 
in his conceptual dilemma was that no specific dimension of biodiversity captures all the 
important biological elements which we ought to preserve. There is more to conservation 
than maximising species counts so there is more to biodiversity than species richness. 
Santana uses these conceptual arguments to motivate his empirical case. If biodiversity in 
the general sense is not operationalisable and its specific dimensions are either not 
operationalisable or do not accurately track biodiversity then biodiversity is a poor 
empirical fit for its role in conservation biology. Santana is using within-surrogate 
operationalisability to motivate between-surrogate operationalisability.  
 Because Santana doesn’t distinguish within-surrogate operationalisability from 
between-surrogate operationalisability he doesn’t consider important problems with the 
former. Only a small number of biodiversity surrogates are fully operationalisable. In 
chapter five I argued that species richness, species diversity, and phylogenetic diversity are 
operationalisable. In this chapter I will argue that morphology and functional diversity are 
not operationalisable. Santana needs a large number of operationalisable biodiversity 
surrogates because eliminating biodiversity implies that the surrogates are better indicators 
of biological value. If conservationists only have a small number of surrogates and those 
surrogates fail to track biological value then Santana has no viable alternative to using 
biodiversity as a goal of conservation. In this chapter I will argue that the empirical case 
against biodiversity fails because Santana has no viable alternative to biodiversity. I use the 
detail of the measurement methodology of morphology and functional diversity to argue 
that there are few operationalisable true surrogates for biodiversity. Santana requires 
additional surrogates beside species richness and phylogenetic diversity to accurately track 
biological value but those surrogates are not operationalisable for the demands of 
conservation biology. I begin with morphology. 
6.3 The Methodology of Measuring Morphology 
The fourth true surrogate for biodiversity which I will discuss is morphology. Morphology 
is a method for calculating phenotypic diversity. Phenotypic diversity is the variety of 
observable physical characteristics contained in an ecosystem (Santana 2014, 764). In this 
section I will argue that phenotypic diversity is an important dimension of biodiversity. 
Then I explain how adaptive landscapes and morphospaces work before I draw attention to 
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other mathematical patterns in nature. I will argue that morphology is not an 
operationalisable surrogate for biodiversity because of a problem I will call ‘the trait 
dilemma’. Calculations of morphology must select a range of traits to represent the 
phenotypic diversity of an ecosystem. Unique traits such as wing length are informative 
but are not operationalisable because they are not features of all organisms. Common traits 
such as mass are operationalisable but uninformative because they do not detect unique 
phenotypic features. I conclude that morphological calculations offer interesting biological 
insight but are not suited to the demands of conservation. 
6.3.1 Why Phenotypic Diversity Matters  
Phenotypic diversity refers to the variation of physical characteristics present in an 
ecosystem (Santana 2014, 764). It focuses on the physical attributes of organisms: their 
colour, shape, how many limbs they have, and what their internal structure is like. 
Phenotypic diversity is an important dimension of biodiversity because ecosystems are 
more biodiverse when they have a greater variation of physical characteristics. One of the 
reasons that there is more to biodiversity than species counts is that species can be quite 
similar. Ladybird beetles may seem similar but they are actually part of family named 
“Coccinellidae”. “Coccinellidae” contains 6000 distinct species of ladybird. Groups which 
contain ladybird beetles and house sparrows are more biodiverse than those which just 
contain ladybird beetles. Phenotypic diversity can quantify this example more accurately 
than species richness by assigning greater values to unique phenotypic traits. 
 Calculating the variation of physical characteristics is difficult because of the 
number of distinct physical traits and the problem of quantifying difference between those 
traits. Simple physical traits such as mass range widely from charismatic megafauna to 
microorganisms but are shared. Complex traits are often not shared or multiply realisable. 
Traits such as wingspan are not shared by all organisms in an ecosystem so wing variation 
will not tell us much about the total phenotypic diversity of an ecosystem. Wings are also 
multiply realisable. Something is multiply realisable if it can be instantiated in multiple 
distinct ways. Mouse traps are multiply realisable because they are defined by function; 
they can be made of steel or wood and still be mousetraps. Wings are multiply realisable 
because a fly, a sparrow, and a penguin all have wings but that module is phenotypically 
distinct for each organism. Fly wings have chitin over a vein structure. Sparrows’ wings 
have feathers and hollow bones. Penguin wings are vestigial limbs because they are now 
used for swimming.  
 Multiple realisability, along with lack of shared traits and a large number of total 
traits makes quantifying phenotypic diversity difficult (Vellend et al. 2011, 194). The 
problem is not unsurmountable. Nelson Goodman argues that similarity is a more tractable 
problem when it is confined to a specific domain with a limited number of important 
properties (Goodman 1972, 444,446). We can quantify how similar one human face is to 
another better than how similar it is to a pumpkin. Morphologists tackle the quantification 
of phenotypic diversity by mapping the diversity of physical traits on to morphospaces. 
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6.3.2 Morphospace Methodology  
A morphospace is a map of the variation of physical traits within a group of organisms. 
This enables us to visualise the relationship between multiple ranges of traits. There are 
two kinds of morphospaces, empirical morphospaces and theoretical morphospaces. 
Empirical morphospaces map physical traits against an appropriate scale. In subsection 
6.4.2 I will discuss calculations of functional diversity which use empirical morphospaces. 
Theoretical morphospaces map physical traits against a scale of all logical possibilities so 
they indicate how much space of biological possibility is currently occupied by the 
organisms in an ecosystem. For instance this hypothetical morphospace shows all of the 


















Figure 6.1: Complete morphospace (contains all possibilities) of planispiral bivalved shell 
morphology. (Adapted from (McGhee 1999, 122–24)) 
 
Morphospaces are not the only way to quantify the variation of physical characteristics. 
Morphology aims to reduce multiple physical characteristics down to their mathematical 
relationships (McGhee 1999, 2).  
 One reason for the success of theoretical morphology is the way in which 
morphospaces visualize the relationship between phenotypic traits. On a morphospace, 
ranges of traits can be plotted against one another to visualize an important pattern 
(McGhee 2007, 60). There is a dimensional limitation to visualising morphospaces. We 
cannot map five traits against one another because we cannot create a five dimensional 
morphospace. We can map up to three properties against one another visually. True 
morphological spaces are hyper-dimensional (McGhee 2007, 45). These cannot be 
visualized but they can be analysed with clustering algorithms.  
 Raup’s cube which explores the possible forms of shell coiling in univalve 
mollusks is an example of a three dimensional morphospace. 
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Figure 6.2: Raup’s three dimensional morphospace of shell coiling in mollusks (Raup 
1966, 1184). 
 
The cube plots all theoretical combinations of shell coiling. Visualising the relationship 
between these traits allows for some interesting observations. It shows us certain 
correlations but it also shows us that much of the possible space is unoccupied. These 
empty volumes on a morphospace represent non-existent organisms (McGhee 2007, 59). 
This could be due to local environmental pressures or the impracticality of certain coiling 
shapes but it highlights unrealised evolutionary potential. 
 Mapping properties on morphospaces can also give us insight into important 
changes in phenotypic diversity. During the cretaceous/tertiary extinction the ammonites 
became extinct which emptied an existing ecological niche. During this period the 




Figure 6.3: Change in Nautilid Shell Morphologies Following the Ammonite Extinction. S 
represents its shape, D represents the distance of the generating curve (Ward 1980, 32).  
 
By plotting the nautilids over morphological space, we can see them evolving to fill an 
empty ecological niche. This is important evidence for the ecological rule of competitive 
exclusion. Competitive exclusion is important for biodiversity because it drives the ability 
of phylogenetic pattern to track feature diversity. Species with the same features occupy 
the same niche and species which require the same ecological niche cannot co-habit 
(Justus 2013, 356). Here in this morphological cube, we can see how the ammonites’ 
survival was constraining the nautilids’ evolutionary potential. The role of ecological 
niches in biodiversity is contentious because the concept of an ecological niche is 
controversial (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 35). This morphospace is an interesting 
example of understanding the organisms of biodiversity in terms of their ecological niches.  
 Despite the insight which morphospaces can provide to biology I will argue in 
section 6.3.4 that morphology is not an operationalisable surrogate for biodiversity. The 
problem with the methodology of morphology is that it is better suited to investigating 
specific hypotheses such as the impact of ecological niches on evolution than generating 
phenotypic diversity values for conservation decisions. It is not possible to create a single 
morphospace because of the sheer number of total traits and the lack of shared traits. 
Three-dimensional morphospaces can accommodate three traits, whereas a global 
morphospace is hyper-dimensional (McGhee 2007, 47–49). It must be hyper-dimensional 
because of the staggering number of possible traits (McGhee 2007, 45). 
Clustering algorithms are used for processing large numbers of traits. Whilst we 
cannot visualise multiple ranges of variables on a single morphospace, we can apply 
algorithms to determine the relationship between the ranges of phenotypic traits. Despite 
their use with processing enormous volumes of data, clustering algorithms cannot generate 
a global morphospace because of the lack of common traits between organisms. If we have 
the complete theoretical morphology of a Devil’s Fingers fungus (Clathrus archeri) and 
the complete theoretical morphology of a duck-billed platypus (Ornithorhynchus anatinus) 
then we can still not usefully calculate the relationship between those data points on a 
single morphospace. The Devil’s Fingers fungus does not have enough traits in common 
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with a duck-billed platypus. This suggests that the operationalisability of morphology is 
limited to testing specific hypotheses (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 75).  
6.3.3 Mathematical Patterns in Nature 
This section should not be understood as a case for eliminating morphology. 
Morphological work is impressive and important. At its heart morphology is about 
identifying mathematical relationships in nature and there are many such relationships to 
discover. One example of this is the work on reducing the branching patterns of flora to 
formulae. Whilst the images below all appear to be fairly natural branching patterns they 




Figure 6.4: Computer produced branching patterns (McGhee 1999, 258) 
 
Mathematical relationships are everywhere in a nature. Nature’s apparent 
randomness often yields surprising regularities. The Fibonacci sequence is a sequence of 
numbers in which each successive numeral is the sum of the previous two numerals: 1, 1, 
2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144, etc.  Surprisingly, that sequence appears in nature in 
unusual places such as breeding cycles with pairs of rabbits and the leaf arrangements in 
plants (McGhee 1999, 259). In The Geometry of Evolution McGhee argues that an 
adaptive evolutionary landscape shows a convergent evolution among marine mammals, 
marine reptiles, cartilaginous fishes, and bony fishes. Ichthyosaurs and porpoises resemble 
sharks and swordfishes because each group has individually evolved organisms with a 
streamlined morphology for fast swimming (McGhee 2007, 33). These morphological 
results are interesting and important. The morphological results which we have thus far 
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can inform our conservation decisions. Morphology is operationalisable but as I will argue 
in the next section, it just isn’t operationalisable for the demands of conservation biology. 
Morphological methodology cannot analyse two ecosystems and tell us which one to 
preserve. 
6.3.4 Morphology is Not an Operationalisable Surrogate 
Morphology is not an operationalisable true surrogate for biodiversity because we cannot 
produce an accurate value for the overall phenotypic diversity of an ecosystem. A 
biodiversity surrogate is operationalisable if it is accurately quantifiable and measureable. 
In this subsection I will argue that specific morphological features are accurately 
quantifiable and measureable but overall phenotypic diversity is not. To motivate this 
conclusion I consider the plausibility of a global morphospace and a global morphospace 
library. I argue that the resource demands of conservation and lack of established 
theoretical morphological work make both options implausible. I argue that the main 
obstacle to the operationalisability of morphology is an internal problem with the nature of 
phenotypic traits. Phenotypic traits are widely diverse and there is a lack of shared traits 
between organisms. I argue that morphological calculations face a dilemma. They must 
select a range of traits to indicate the ecosystem’s overall phenotypic diversity but general 
traits gloss over important morphological features and specific traits—those which are 
unique to a few species—do not accurately track phenotypic diversity. I conclude that 
morphology is not an operationalisable true surrogate for biodiversity. 
Specific morphological features are accurately quantifiable and measureable. 
Raup’s cube of shell coiling in mollusks produces accurate morphological maps of the 
specific morphological feature of shell coiling. That cube, and other specific 
morphological features do not offer much insight into the overall phenotypic diversity of 
an ecosystem. So whilst specific morphological features are operationalisable morphology 
in the sense of phenotypic diversity is not. For morphology to be operationalisable for the 
demands of conservation biology it needs to either produce a global morphospace library 
or identify a common range of functional traits to use as an estimator surrogate for 
phenotypic diversity. I will argue that neither is an operationalisable possibility. 
 A global morphospace could produce an overall score for phenotypic diversity. A 
global morphospace is the idea of morphology applied to every phenotypic trait in an 
ecosystem with the aim of producing a final value for the total phenotypic variance of the 
ecosystem in question (McGhee 1999, 13). The prospect of such a morphospace is grim 
because of several methodological difficulties. The first of which is the number of 
phenotypic traits in an ecosystem. Morphospaces can successfully compare many 
phenotypic traits at a time but phenotypic diversity is the variation of every phenotypic 
trait in an ecosystem. There is no single morphospace which could map all the data. 
 A global library of morphospaces for specific morphological features may be a 
suitable replacement for a single global morphospace. It could not process the phenotypic 
diversity of an ecosystem into a single value but it could highlight the unique organisms 
within an ecosystem to inform conservation decisions. Such a library will not meet the 
time constraints of conservation because of the number of phenotypic characteristics and 
the morphological work which remains to be done. Applying the work of Nelson 
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Goodman on similarity, we could constrict the number of phenotypic characteristics to 
those which biologists are interested in (Goodman 1972, 444, 446). However, there is still 
a wide diversity of phenotypic traits which warrant study and few traits which are shared 
by many species (Vellend et al. 2011, 194). It would be a long time before such a library 
would be close to complete. The time constraint does not meet the demands of 
conservation because conservation work requires triage (Durant et al. 2014, 120). With the 
increasing impact of human habitation on biodiversity, the goal is to swiftly preserve as 
much as possible with the resources we have left. 
Triage concerns are a bigger problem for theoretical morphology than for other 
surrogates because in any given conservation scenario, we do not just need to sample the 
species/access the weather patterns but also finish identifying the mathematical 
relationships in the species we are studying. Nearly all species on the planet remain 
unstudied from a theoretical morphological stand point. In Theoretical Morphology: The 
Concept and its Applications McGhee notes that work in theoretical morphology has only 
been undertaken on a fraction of the total species. Of the 56 phyla in the super domain, 41 
currently have no theoretical morphological work completed on them at all. Within the 15 
phyla which have been studied, work has only been completed on a handful of species 
(McGhee 1999, 282). We have morphological data on practically all discovered species 
because all known species have been documented. However, very few species have had 
their morphological features quantified and mapped and the known species are a small 
fraction of the total species (Mora et al. 2011, 5). The triage requirement is more pressing 
for theoretical morphology than for other estimator surrogates because the mathematical 
groundwork still needs to be completed for millions of remaining species. It is possible 
that a global morphospace library could provide a decisive biodiversity value but it is just 
as likely that by the time we are finished with the mathematical groundwork, there won’t 
be much biodiversity left to apply it to.  
The obstacle facing the operationalisability of morphology is more than just a 
sampling issue. The time constraints of conservation affect all true surrogates for 
biodiversity. Reliable conservation recommendations require large volumes of accurate 
data which takes time to collect but conservation decisions need to be made swiftly. In 
practice conservationists solve this dilemma through a combination of sampling methods 
and use of historical data. Whilst studying the impact of radioactive fallout on the 
biodiversity in Chernobyl, Moller (et al. 2007) calculated the biodiversity of the area using 
species richness as their true surrogate. They conducted standard census point counts of 
birds (their estimator surrogate) in 254 locations. For each standard point count the authors 
stood in place for five minutes and recorded every bird species which was seen or heard. 
This methodology produces a reliable estimate of species richness and abundance (Moller 
et al. 2007, 483). The sampling is combined with adjustments to the data for confounding 
variables such as weather. Weather conditions affect bird activity which can impact the 
census data. So weather conditions were recorded and these can be compared to historical 
weather patterns to determine if the census point data was gathered on a typical day. By 
employing a combination of sampling and historical data the authors concluded that the 
radioactive fallout in Chernobyl negatively impacted the species richness of the area and 
health of local organisms in a severe manner (Moller et al. 2007, 485).  
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 The main obstacle to the operationalisability of morphology is not a sampling issue 
such as the number of species which are required to accurately predict species richness. 
Instead, the problem is that there is no trait (or collection of traits) which can accurately 
predict the phenotypic diversity of an ecosystem. This is due to the problems with the great 
range of phenotypic diversity and the lack of common traits. Phenotypic traits cover 
everything from petal number to eye colour. They are so distinct that there is little reason 
to think that mollusk coiling or leaf shape indicates much about the rest of phenotypic 
diversity. There is a causal relationship between the empirical sample of species in an 
ecosystem and the ecological sample. There is not a strong causal relationship between 
wing diversity and branching patterns. The great variance of phenotypic diversity makes 
sampling impractical because there are few common traits between distinct organisms. 
Mammals have no chlorophyll and flora have no blood. Petals, teeth, and claws are not 
present in all biological organisms. 
 The wide diversity of phenotypic characteristics and lack of common traits force 
morphological calculations into a trait dilemma. A calculation of phenotypic diversity 
should accurately indicate the variation of phenotypic characteristics in an ecosystem but 
the calculation can only use a small range of traits. So a range of traits must be selected to 
serve as an estimator surrogate. Those traits can be shared or specific. If the traits are 
shared then they will be a very general phenotypic trait such as colour or mass. They will 
also tell us little about the variation of the other phenotypic traits in the ecosystem because 
they generalise over important differences. For example the diversity of mass per organism 
tells us little about the form or function of those organisms. If the range of traits is a 
specific such as shell coiling then it will accurately map the diversity of that specific 
morphological feature but it will be a misleading indication of the overall phenotypic 
diversity in the ecosystem. As I argued previously, the diversity of specific traits implies 
that they cannot reliably indicate overall phenotypic diversity. Morphology is therefore not 
an operationalisable true surrogate for biodiversity. Specific morphological features are 
accurately quantifiable and measureable but morphological work cannot accurately predict 
the overall phenotypic diversity of an ecosystem. 
In this subsection I argued that based on its measurement methodology, 
morphology is not an operationalisable true surrogate for biodiversity. I drew a distinction 
between the morphology of an ecosystem and specific morphological features before 
considering if morphological calculations could accurately predict the phenotypic diversity 
of an ecosystem. I considered the possibility of a global morphospace but argued that there 
are too many phenotypic traits to process in a single morphospace. I considered the 
possibility of a global morphospace library but argued that the triage requirements of 
conservation and lack of theoretical morphological work make it implausible. I then 
argued that the obstacle to operationalisability was not a sampling issue but a deeper 
problem to do with phenotypic traits. There is a wide variation of phenotypic traits and few 
common traits. This creates a trait dilemma for operationalisability. Common traits are 
uninformative but specific traits predict phenotypic diversity poorly. I concluded that 
morphology is operationalisable for specific morphological features but not as a true 
surrogate for the demands of conservation biology. In the next section I move my analysis 
on the detail of calculations of functional diversity. 
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6.4 The Methodology of Measuring Functional Diversity 
The final true surrogate for biodiversity which I will discuss is functional diversity. 
Functional diversity shifts the focus of conservation away from the number of organisms 
in an ecosystem and towards the functional interactions between those organisms. In this 
section I will explain the importance of functional diversity with case studies on three 
organisms. Then I will outline different metrics of functional diversity. For those metrics I 
draw a distinction between calculations which use morphospaces and calculations which 
use phylogenetic trees. I then argue that functional diversity is not functional enough 
because measures of functional diversity do not prioritise rare biological functions. I 
conclude that functional diversity is not an operationalisable true surrogate for biodiversity 
because of the trait dilemma and because the standard for functional trait is too liberal. 
6.4.1 The Importance of Functional Diversity  
In this section I explain the importance of functional diversity as a true surrogate of 
biodiversity. I motivate this claim with three case studies of complex biological 
phenomena: the tiger moth (Arctia caja), P. Carnivora, and X. Vesparum. I introduce the 
zootopia thought experiment and briefly defend it. In all three cases I argue that functional 
diversity captures an important dimension of biological variation which other surrogates 
miss because it focuses on how organisms interact.  
 Functional diversity is an important dimension of biodiversity because it shifts the 
focus of conservation away from static elements of an ecosystem like species counts and 
towards the interactions and behaviours of those organisms. Complex biological 
phenomena are a high priority for conservationists. Functioning butterflies tell us more 
than those preserved in glass cases because we can also preserve their behaviour and 
interaction with other organisms. Interactions between organisms matter to conservation 
but species counts and phylogenetic analyses aren’t the best guide to those interactions. 
The monarch butterfly has an inter-continental migration pattern but scores of species 
richness or phylogeny only consider an organism as an equal species or in terms of how 
complementary it is to the ecosystem. Species richness treats the monarch butterfly as an 
equal species. If there is a species in the ecosystem with recent common ancestors with the 
monarch butterfly then phylogenetic diversity will not prioritise it for conservation. 
Functional diversity is important because it pays attention to important functional 
biological phenomena. Here I present three case studies which highlight such phenomena: 
the tiger moth and its ability to mislead sonar, the predatory bagmoth larvae, and the 
parasitic fly xenos vesparum.  
The tiger moth (bertholdia trigona) is an insect which has evolved a sophisticated 
adaptation against the predation of the big brown bat (eptisicus fuscus) (Corcoran, Barber, 
and Connor 2009, 325). Like most other bats, the brown bat of Central America hunts 
insects for its primary food source. Known commonly as sonar, bats hunt their prey using 
a system of echolocation. The bat makes a clicking noise which travels into the world and 
bounces off objects. Based on the time it takes for the click to return, the bat is able to 
determine the shape of objects and their proximity to it. The use of sonar makes the big 
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brown bat a formidable hunter because unlike focused vision, sonar is omni-directional. 
The big brown bat does not have to look at an insect to know it is there.  
As a defence mechanism, the tiger moth has evolved the ability to jam the sonar of 
approaching bats. As the bat approaches the moth, it makes a series of high duty cycle 
ultrasonic clicks which prevent the bat from successfully killing its prey. One such study 
aimed to discover if the ultrasonic clicks produced by the tiger moth startle the bat, warn it, 
or functionally jam the predator’s sonar. Researchers trained three naïve and one adult 
eptisici fusci to hunt tethered moths over the course of several days and then tested them 
against tethered tiger moths for several more days (Corcoran, Barber, and Connor 2009, 
326). If the clicks produced by the tiger moth startled the attacking bats then over time the 
bats would habituate to the noise and learn to ignore it. If the clicks served as a warning 
the bats would initially capture the moth then drop the distasteful insect and learn to abort 
future attacks upon hearing the warning click. If the clicks jammed the radar, then the bats 
would be unable to capture the tethered moth and would continue to do so.      
In this study, the bats successfully hunted control moths four times as much as a 
clicking tiger moth. The same bats had a 100% contact rate with tiger moths which had 
been silenced. They also persisted in their attacks against the tethered moth despite failing 
multiple times which suggests that the clicks do not serve to startle or warn the bats. The 
tiger moth is actually jamming the sonar of the big brown bat. Roughly one third of the 
time the bats would suddenly change their attack pattern shifting their focus from the 
moths’ location to a new unoccupied location. This was an immediate response to the high 
cycle clicks of the tiger moth which suggests that the jamming function of the tiger moth 
may be to alter the location in which its predator perceives it to be (Corcoran, Barber, and 
Connor 2009, 327). The evolutionary arms race between bertholdia trigona and eptisicus 
fuscus has led to the tiger moth evolving an organic jamming function. 
 My second example of complex biological phenomena is perisceptis carnivore. P. 
carnivore is a bagworm moth, which means that its larvae are safely contained within a 
case made of golden abdominal hairs called setae (D. R. Davis et al. 2008, 689). Like most 
bagworm moths, P. carnivore lays a single egg inside a protective case. As the larva 
outgrows its case it forms a portable structure in which all larval stages and pupation will 
take place. Unlike most bagworm moths, the larva of P. carnivore is actually predatory. 
The species thrives on so many different plants because it hunts other organisms around 
those plants. This particular species of bagworm moth launches itself out of one end of its 
bag to capture prey and devour them before adding un-digested items to the outside of its 
enclosure (D. R. Davis et al. 2008, 698–99). The larval bag of a P. carnivore prefers ants 
but its bag is also commonly decorated with pieces of beetles, flies, grasshoppers, 
katydids, and wasps.  
 Perisceptis carnivore is an important example of the interaction between 
organisms. As a bagworm moth it is unique because of its diet and predatory nature (D. R. 
Davis et al. 2008, 689). As a functioning part of an ecosystem it interacts heavily with 
many other organisms in the ecosystem. P. carnivore constructs its home and hunting 
disguise from the undigested remains of its prey. P. carnivore is just as important for 
biodiversity conservation as any member of the charismatic megafauna group because the 
structure of its case changes based on which prey are around it. If we were to move P. 
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carnivore to a reserve then the structure of its protective casing would change to reflect the 
other organisms in the reserve. P. carnivore demonstrates a preference for ants but has a 
fairly wide diet ranging from crickets to other predatory larvae. If we keep it in a reserve 
with ants for food then its protective casing would only be decorated with ant parts. If we 
leave it in its native environment then its protective casing will be decorated by a wide 
range of prey. 
 My third case study is xenos vesparum. Xenos vesparum is a parasitic organism 
which has evolved the ability to burrow into a paper wasp and affect its neuro chemical 
instincts (Manfredini, Benati, and Beani 2010, 254). The common European paper wasp 
(polistes dominulus) first contracts xenos vesparum in its larval form from the underneath 
of foliage or a deposit inside its own colony. X. vesparum  burrows into the paper wasp 
through its abdomen and lodges itself there. Whilst there, it exerts a unique effect on the 
behaviour of its host. The host paper wasp begins to reject its colony role idling and 
pursuing its own interests at a time when other members of the colony gather food and 
defend the colony. The host grows but much less than uninfected wasps and when the hive 
is at its busiest the host wasp leaves the colony for good. Presumably under the influence 
of X. vesparum, the host wasp flies to a location at which multiple infected wasps meet so 
that their parasites may mate.   
 At this mating site, the males burrow out of their hosts and abandon them, leaving 
them to die from massive infection. Female X. vesparum, however, remain in their hosts 
and extend their rears from the host for mating. The parasitic effects of X. vesparum are 
powerful. The infected paper wasps are incapable of reproducing. Their shrunken ovaries 
are non-functional because the negative effect of their parasites on growth and 
development. Despite this infected, P. dominulus which are now carrying a pregnant X. 
vesparum will now treat themselves as queens. They fatten themselves on any food they 
can find before flying to resting sites with other uninfected paper wasp queens to wait out 
the winter. When spring comes, the other queens go off to build nests whilst the infected 
queens either find foraging sites to deposit their host’s larvae or transport the larvae 
directly to another queen’s colony. So, the complex life cycle begins again (Manfredini, 
Benati, and Beani 2010, 253). It is a cycle which highlights the importance of interaction 
between species and the functions they perform in our concepts of biodiversity. Functional 
diversity captures such interactions better than static elements of biodiversity such as 
species richness. 
 One motivating thought experiment for the importance of interaction between 
organisms is what I will call the ‘zootopia thought experiment’. This thought experiment is 
based on Sarkar’s observation that botanic gardens often preserve species without 
preserving complex biological phenomena. 
 
 In 1970–71, there was simultaneous flowering of spiny bamboo (Bambusa arundinacea) throughout 
India after a lapse of 45 years. Clearly, a very precise biological clock exists in these species. In 
these cases, extinction of the species would also lead to the extinction of the phenomenon of 
synchronous flowering. More interesting, in this context, is that in extended habitats consisting of 
forests of a single bamboo species, flowering occurs in waves, starting at one end and propagating 
to the other. This unique phenomenon would disappear if these habitats do, even if the species 
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persist elsewhere (for instance, as isolated stands in botanical gardens). (Sarkar and Margules 2002, 
302) 
 
Sarkar argues that botanic gardens miss some important biological elements because they 
isolate a species from a functioning ecosystem. Botanic gardens are still ecosystems but all 
the interactions have changed because the survival of each species is manged by human 
beings. 
 The zootopia thought experiment applies Sarkar’s reasoning on a grander scale. 
Imagine that we could conserve all extant species by shifting them into tightly managed 
futuristic enclosures. We conserve all our species but we have also lost biological elements 
in the process. Species richness, diversity, disparity, morphology, and genetic diversity are 
all protected but we will have lost a number of important biological interactions. Placing 
endangered eagles in an aviary does protect them but that eagle cannot soar and it will 
never spot a rabbit from a distance of three kilometres before snatching it off the ground. 
Zoos, which are small scale Zootopias, have a place in conservation. Often, if a species is 
critically endangered, it needs to have its population managed in some way. Zoos also 
draw attention to the efforts of conservation and why they are important. However, 
Zootopias are an imperfect solution for conservation because they drastically alter the 
interactions and behaviours of the conserved organisms.  
 Functionality and interaction matter. The Darwin bark spider can build webs over 
rivers up to 25 metres in diameter (Kuntner and Agnarsson 2010, 351). But it can only do 
that if there is a river to bridge, and it will only continue to build webs across rivers if that 
method catches prey for it to feed on. So to for tiger moths which jam bat sonar, a bag 
worm moth which hunts prey from a protective casing of undigested prey, and a parasitic 
fly which can use a European paper wasp as a personal mode of transport. Organisms 
which are preserved but lose important functions or interactions with other species 
represent a lower biodiversity value than if both the organism and its function or 
interactions were preserved. In this section I explained the importance of functional 
diversity as a true surrogate of biodiversity. I motivated this claim with three case studies 
of complex biological phenomena: the tiger moth, P. Carnivora, and X. Vesparum, and the 
zootopia thought experiment. 
6.4.2 Metrics of Functional Diversity 
Metrics of functional diversity approximate the functional variance in an ecosystem by 
measuring the degree that the functional traits of co-existing species vary (Weiher 2011, 
175). In this subsection I will explain the notion of a functional trait and argue that it sets a 
general standard. Then I will outline the measurement methodology of calculations of 
functional diversity. The calculations themselves are separated by their methodology. I 
will outline the metrics which use morphological methodology first and then I will outline 
the metrics which use phylogenetic methodology.  
Calculations of functional diversity rely on a general conception of functional trait. 
A functional trait is understood as “observable or operationally defined phenotypic 
characteristics that influence species performance and/or ecosystem processes” (Weiher 
2011, 175). Whilst the case studies that I presented earlier in this section focused on 
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unique biological phenomena such as the ability of the tiger moth to jam bat sonar with 
high frequency ultrasonic clicks, this notion of a functional trait is not limited to such 
complex interactions between species. Any observable trait which influences the 
performance of a species or an ecosystem’s process is a functional trait. Not all traits are 
functional ones. There are other traits such as genetic ones which do not qualify as 
observable or operationally defined phenotypic traits. Recessive genes are only realised 
when there is no dominant gene to compete with so organisms can have genetic traits 
without them becoming functional traits. However, so many traits are functional that in 
practice functional diversity is treated as a synonym for trait diversity (Weiher 2011, 175). 
 Morphological calculations of functional diversity are based on morphospace 
methodology. They apply morphospace calculations to functional trait space to determine 
the functional diversity of a set of organisms. A selection of the trait space based 
calculations of functional diversity are shown in table 6.1 
 
Selection of Trait Space Based Formula for Functional Diversity 
Convex Hull Volume (CHV) 
Calculation of the overlap in trait space 
occupied by more than one species.  













































Functional Attribute Diversity (FAD) 
 

















Functional Dispersion (FDis) 
 




















Table 6.1 Morphological Calculations of Functional Diversity (Weiher 2011, 178–84). 
 
 Functional Divergence (FDiv) will serve as an example of how morphological 
calculations of functional diversity work. It is a complex calculation which corrects for a 
weakness in calculations of functional dispersion (Weiher 2011, 180). Conceptually FDiv 
is a measure of dispersion across trait space. Tight clustering of species over trait space 
indicates low FDis whilst loose spacing indicates high FDis. The problem is the 
background scale which the clustering is measured against. Loose spacing across trait 
space appears as tight clustering if the scale on the figure is extended far enough 
(presuming the respective traits are presented on a non-finite scale.) The results of FDiv 
are independent of both functional evenness and the volume of trait space. The measure 
accomplishes this by calculating the tendency of the most common species to be on the 
periphery of the convex hull which is the overlap between mapped species in trait space, 
but also weights the distance by the abundance of that species. 




¯ . It appears straightforward but involves several steps of substitution. When viewed 
as a single formula the calculation is given by the following expression. 
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In this calculation V is the taxon on the periphery of the convex hull, t,i and k are identical 
to their use in functional dispersion, T stands for the total number of traits, S the total 
number of taxa and p is the relative abundance for the species i. The calculation is 
performed in several steps. First we calculate the trait space centroid which is the mean 
Symbol Guide: In trait space based calculations of functional diversity ‘a’ is 
abundance, ‘i’ is species and ‘t’ is the value of trait ‘k’. ‘z’ is the distance from the 
mean centroid c except for FDiv which represents the mean centroid with ‘𝑔𝑘’. 
Because MFAD clusters together identical species for its calculation, The ‘F’ in the formula 
for MFAD represents species clusters.  
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𝑖=1 . Next, for each individual species, we calculate the mean distance 
from the trait space centroid and then calculate the mean of the distances. Given by the 
following formulas in which 𝑑𝐺𝑖 = √∑ (𝑡𝑖𝑘 − 𝑔𝑘)
2𝑇








𝑖=1  calculates the mean of the distances. With the values for dGi  and the 
mean of dG calculated we are now in a position to calculate the abundance weighted 
difference between each taxon’s distance to the trait space centroid. This is given by the 
expression ∆𝑑 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖 (𝑑𝐺𝑖 − 𝑑𝐺
¯
)𝑠𝑖=1 . We then sum the total of the weighted differences 
(given as absolute values). This is calculated as ∆|𝑑| = ∑ 𝑝𝑖 |𝑑𝐺𝑖 − 𝑑𝐺
¯
|𝑠𝑖=1 . And then we 
can calculate the functional divergence of our data set by substituting the results into our 
original formula. 
Functional divergence is a complex calculation but it is also valuable because it is 
independent of the volume of occupied trait space. The kind of trait space affects results of 
functional diversity because dispersion may be measured over an empirical morphospace 
or a hypothetical morphospace. On a hypothetical morphospace, how tightly clustered the 
data points are indicates high or low functional diversity. On an empirical space apparent 




Figure 6.6: Identical clustering of functional traits over trait space with different scales 
 
The plotted clustering is identical in both cases but it appears tighter when the scale is 
spread out. This is not a problem for hypothetical morphospaces because the scale 
indicates all logical possibilities. But it is an issue for empirical morphospaces so it is 
useful to have a calculation which is independent of the volume of occupied trait space. 
 Phylogenetic based calculations of functional diversity construct dendrograms of 
the evolutionary relationships between ranges of functional traits (Weiher 2011, 179). 
Original calculations of FD sum the branch lengths of a dendrogram similarly to those 
used for phylogenetic diversity. The modified dendrogram is closer to phylogenetic 
methods. It uses a species based dendrogram which presents the species which have the 
relevant traits in terms of the evolutionary position to one another and then sums the 
distance. The main difference between dendrogram based calculations of functional 
146 
diversity and a straight-forward phylogenetic analysis is that it restricts itself to species 
which possess the salient functional traits. A selection of the phylogenetic based 
calculations of functional diversity are shown in table 6.2 
 
Selection of Phylogenetic Based Formulae for Functional Diversity 
Functional Diversity (FD): 
Sum of the accumulative branch lengths 
represented by the phylogenetic tree. 
Minimum Spanning Tree (MST): 
Shortest possible combination of branches 
representing all species. 
 
Alpha MST (𝛼𝑀𝑆𝑇): 
Rank branches by length then (𝛼𝑀𝑆𝑇) is the slope 
of the relationship between the cumulative branch 
length and its rank on a log scale 









































Quadratic Entropy (FDq) 



















𝑖=1  is the logarithmic mean value 
of the trait weight by relative abundance.  
 
Symbol Guide: In phylogenetic based calculations of functional diversity ‘S’ stands for 
species and ‘p’ is the abundance of the species S. ‘𝑑𝑖𝑗’ is the distance of the branch length between 
species i and j except for Feve which uses the notation ‘li,j’. 
 
Table 6.2 Phylogenetic Calculations of Functional Diversity (Weiher 2011, 179–84). 
 
Functional evenness (FEve) will serve as an example of how dendrogram based 
calculations of functional diversity work. It is a measure of the consistency of branch 
lengths in the minimum spanning phylogenetic dendrogram which connect all the species 
with salient property (Weiher 2011, 181). It is an index between 0 and 1 which measures 
the MST by weighting branch length against the abundance of the species represented by 
that branch. The index approaches 1 as species in the ecosystem approach equal abundance 
and branch length. FEve may be calculated with or without taking species abundance into 

















However, without abundance data, the measure only expresses the similarity of the branch 
lengths for individual species. If taking abundance into account then FEve may be 


















where p is the abundance of the species S and li,j is the branch length from species i to j. 




 In this subsection I analysed the measurement methodology of functional diversity. 
I drew attention to the general notion of a functional trait before moving on to the detail of 
the metrics. Calculations of functional diversity either use morphospaces or phylogenetic 
trees. I presented 13 calculations in tables and I explained two in detail. I explained how 
calculations of functional divergence work as an example of morphological calculations of 
functional diversity. Then I explained how functional evenness works as an example of a 
phylogenetic calculation of functional diversity. In the next subsection I use the detail of 
this measurement methodology to argue that functional diversity is not an 
operationalisable true surrogate.  
6.4.3 Functional Diversity is Not an Operationalisable Surrogate 
A biodiversity surrogate is operationalisable if it is accurately quantifiable and 
measureable. Similarly to morphology, functional diversity is accurately quantifiable and 
measureable for specific functional traits but not for overall functional diversity. Despite 
high within-surrogate operationalisability, functional diversity is not functional enough 
because it cannot track overall functional diversity. The problem is twofold. Firstly, the 
conception of a functional trait is too general because functional diversity is virtually a 
synonym for trait diversity (Weiher 2011, 175). The general notion of a trait is a product of 
the trait dilemma. Like morphology, calculations of functional diversity select a range of 
functional traits to use an estimator surrogate. Specific traits highlight important 
functionality but are not operationalisable. Shared traits are general so they tell us little 
about the functional diversity of an ecosystem. Secondly, because of the methodology of 
functional diversity calculations, the results are often incommensurable with one another. I 
conclude that functional diversity is not an operationalisable true surrogate for 
biodiversity. 
Calculations of functional diversity have high within-surrogate operationalisability. 
That is, the thirteen measures which I presented in section 6.4.2 all have similar results 
when applied to the same functional trait of the same ecosystem. Weiher tested multiple 
measures of functional diversity over 16 different conditions in a principle component 
analysis (Weiher 2011, 188). He performed the functional diversity calculations for two 
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traits: height and leaf dry matter content in different conditions. The conditions covered 66 
different plant species with richness ranging from 3 to 15 species on an experimental 
grassland and artificial data on a theoretical grassland with random richness from 3 to 20 
species with random species abundances and two random traits. The calculations required 
the rescaling of results to a value between 0 and 1 where applicable.  
 The results indicated a high correlation of results within calculations of functional 
diversity. The results differ somewhat for artificial data on random assemblages but the 
tight clustering from the observational data indicates high within-surrogate 
operationalisability for specific functional traits. The authors argue that there is no single 
perfect measure of functional diversity and we should employ the one which is most 
appropriate to our goals. In most cases we can accurately approximate the diversity of a 
shared functional trait diversity in an ecosystem with around four measures of functional 
diversity (Weiher 2011, 191). We should select a measure focused on the occupation of 
trait space such as: CHV, FDis, FDpg, FDq, FDvar, MFAD, or MST. Then we should also 
calculate the functional evenness, functional divergence and the density of species 
packing. Taken as a package these four methods will provide a reliable approximation of 
the functional diversity of an ecosystem. However, the authors also stress that “there are 
few, if any, bona fide standard practices at this point in time” (Weiher 2011, 191).  
 This result is positive but it is evidence for the operationalisability of the functional 
diversity of a small number of traits rather than for the operationalisability of an 
ecosystem’s functional diversity. This is because the employed concept of a functional 
trait is too broad. In section 6.4.1 I motivated the importance of functional diversity by 
discussing three case studies of complex interactions between organisms in an ecosystem. 
An excellent metric of functional diversity would assign a high score of functionality 
diversity to biological phenomena such as the parasitic life cycle of xenos vesparum but 
the measures currently available to us do not. At the very least functional diversity should 
distinguish functional traits as a proper subset of phenotypic traits. I argued in chapter two 
that concepts become more informative as they exclude possibilities. In practice, 
functional diversity is treated as a synonym for trait diversity because there are no 
phenotypic traits which do not impact the survival of other species. Evolution has little use 
for phenotypic traits which do not give an organism an advantage over the competition.  
The definition of a functional trait is so inclusive that functional diversity is not 
functional enough. This is problematic because calculations of functional diversity will not 
account for complex biological phenomena. An example such as the jamming of bat sonar 
by tiger moths highlights the way that species or morphological accounts of biodiversity 
do not give enough weight to complex biological interactions. But the current 
understanding of a functional trait is far too general to pick out those interactions. The 
definition requires just that the trait influence the performance of another species. If we 
understand a functional trait as any observable trait which affects the fitness of another 
species then we must accept that functional diversity is a synonym for trait diversity. 
While it can be sensible to be wary of overly restrictive definitions, our current definition 
is so general that it fails the counterexamples which were used against species focused 
concepts of biodiversity in the first place. There was dissatisfaction with existing accounts 
of biodiversity because they overlooked complex interactions between organisms such as 
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the migration pattern of the monarch butterfly (Sarkar and Margules 2002, 301).  These 
calculations of functional diversity are more similar to morphological measures or 
phylogenetic calculations some cases than measurements of high-level functionality.   
 The reason that the definition of a functional trait is so general is that there is a trait 
dilemma. Like morphology, calculations of functional diversity require a range of traits to 
use as an estimator surrogate for the ecosystem’s functional diversity. Those traits can be 
shared or specific. A specific functional trait such as creation of high frequency clicks 
highlights functionality but cannot indicate ecosystem functional diversity because it is 
only shared by a few species. A general trait such as height is shared but doesn’t represent 
the kind of functional interaction which calculations of functional diversity aim for. 
However, calculation constraints limit us to generic shared traits such as height. The trait 
dilemma can be seen in Weiher’s analysis of within-surrogate correlation. For the sake of a 
common trait, the calculations focus on height and dry leaf matter (Weiher 2011, 188). 
They also have to be performed on artificially controlled ecosystems because in a full 
ecosystem, most organisms do not shed leaves. The variation of height and dry leaf matter 
tells us much about the trait diversity of plant assemblages. But, it tells us little about how 
those plants interact or the variation of other biological functions in a full ecosystem. 
Specific functional traits are not shared, shared functional traits are not good predictors of 
functional diversity and often not good examples of organism interaction. 
 A final concern with the operationalisability of functional diversity is that many of 
its results are incommensurable with one another. This is a problem because for a 
biodiversity surrogate to be operationalisable for the demands of conservation biology, it 
needs to be able to compare values for different ecosystems. Values for functional 
diversity cannot be compared between ecosystems unless they refer to the same trait. Like 
calculations of biodiversity, calculations of functional diversity use a surrogate. A range of 
common traits is used as a surrogate for the functional diversity of the ecosystem (Weiher 
2011, 188). Functional diversity scores which use different traits as surrogates are not 
commensurable because they can refer to different ranges of traits. A score of 0.78 is not 
comparable with a score of 0.82 if the former refers to the dry leaf matter and the latter 
refers to mollusk coiling. They are incommensurable because we have no good reason to 
think that these trait ranges are accurate surrogates for the overall functional diversity of an 
ecosystem. The scores also cannot be compared with the method I outlined in section 
4.4.2. Scores for phylogenetic diversity and species richness can be reverse engineered 
from one another. Scores for functional diversity cannot.  
 In this subsection I argued that functional diversity is not an operationalisable true 
surrogate for biodiversity. Similar to morphology, functional diversity is accurately 
quantifiable and measureable for ranges of specific functional traits but not for overall 
functional diversity. The various metrics of functional diversity have high within-surrogate 
operationalisability but they cannot accurately predict an ecosystem’s overall functional 
diversity. This problem is caused by the inclusive standard of a functional trait and the trait 
dilemma. ‘Functional trait’ is defined in such a way that functional diversity is a synonym 
for trait diversity, so it does not track the diversity of interactions between organisms well. 
Even if it did, calculations face a dilemma when selecting a range of functional traits to 
use as estimator surrogate. Specific functional traits track some functional variation but are 
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not common enough for use as a general data point. General functional traits are shared but 
are poor examples of functionality. Given that there are also issues with cross comparing 
functional diversity’s results between ecosystems, functional diversity is not an 
operationalisable true surrogate for biodiversity. In the next section I will draw on the 
detail of measurement methodology which I have discussed in chapters four, five, and six 
to argue that the empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism is unsuccessful.  
 
6.5 Why the Empirical Case for Biodiversity Eliminativism is 
Unsuccessful  
In this section I will argue that the empirical case against biodiversity is unsuccessful for 
two reasons. Firstly the evidence and arguments which I have presented in chapters four, 
five, and six indicate that the premises of the empirical poor fit argument are either false or 
not problematic. That is, if a premise of the empirical poor fit argument is true then it is 
still not a good empirical reason to eliminate biodiversity. Secondly there is an internal 
contradiction in the poor empirical fit argument. If premises one to six are true and 
biodiversity ought to be eliminated for empirical reasons then biodiversity’s true 
surrogates ought to be eliminated for the same empirical reasons. The surrogates which 
will take on biodiversity’s role fail the empirical standard which Santana uses to justify 
eliminating biodiversity. I conclude that the empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism is 
unsuccessful. 
 The first reason that the empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism is 
unsuccessful is that Santana’s empirical poor fit argument is unsound. Consider the truth 
of the following premises. 
 
The poor empirical fit argument 
 
1) General conceptions of biodiversity are not straightforwardly measureable. 
2) There is not sufficient property correlation for biodiversity to be considered a property 
bundle. 
3) The dimensions of biodiversity do not support robust inductive generalisations across 
the group. 
4) The inclusion of biodiversity in the conservation process exacerbates imprecision 
between the measured target and the conservation goal. 
5) Individual dimensions of biodiversity are either: 
a. Not operationalisable 
b. Do not accurately track biodiversity 
c. Or do not accurately track biological value 
6) If conditions 1) to 5) accurately describe biodiversity then biodiversity is a poor 
empirical fit for its role in conservation biology. 
7) Therefore: Biodiversity is a poor empirical fit for its role in conservation biology. 
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In chapter four I argued that premises two and four are false. Premise four is false because 
including biodiversity does not exacerbate the imprecision between the measured target 
and the conservation goal. The number of surrogates in the surrogacy chain does not 
increase the imprecision because in the case of biodiversity values are only calculated for 
the first or second stages. Those values are used to inform a broader picture rather than 
determine a precise value for biodiversity or biological value. There were also other 
options for elimination. If Santana is right about the number of steps increasing 
imprecision then we could deny the distinction between estimator and true surrogate or 
eliminate biological value as the final goal of conservation.  
Premise two is false because there is sufficient correlation between the specific 
dimensions of biodiversity for them to be treated as a property bundle. Empirical results 
show correlations between species richness, phylogenetic diversity, genus richness, and 
feature diversity correlation of  (Grenyer et al. 2007, 757; Vellend et al. 2011, 201; Faith 
1996, 1287). Further arguments have also been made for correlations between 
phylogenetic diversity, functionality, and habitat diversity (Faith 1996, 1287). Furthermore 
instances in which the specific dimensions of biodiversity do not co-vary are important. 
Phylogenetic diversity does not co-vary perfectly with species richness because it tracks a 
distinctly important element of biodiversity. This casts doubt on the truth of premise six 
because the lack of between-surrogate correlation is not a good empirical reason to 
eliminate biodiversity. Imperfect homeostasis is an important feature of homeostatic 
property clusters (Boyd 1991, 142). 
In chapter four I also argued that premise six of the empirical poor fit argument is 
false because whilst premises one and three are true they are not good empirical reasons to 
eliminate biodiversity. Premise two cast doubt on the truth of six because if premise two 
were true then it would not be a good empirical justification for elimination. Premises one 
and three confirm that suspicion. Complex multidimensional properties are not 
straightforwardly measureable but the difficulty of measuring them does not imply that we 
should not do it. Also, the lack of robust inductive generalisations between surrogates is an 
important feature. We can’t inductively generalise across the dimensions of biodiversity 
because they are strictly incommensurable.  They are strictly incommensurable because 
each dimension tracks a distinct important biological feature of the natural world. Like 
other important multidimensional concepts such as health and poverty, conceptual 
complexity is not a good reason for elimination. 
In chapter four I concluded that the state of biodiversity measures is not as bad as 
the empirical poor fit argument suggested and that familiarity with the detail of the 
measures’ methodology would make this clearer. This technical detail also demonstrated 
that premise five of the empirical poor fit argument, that “individual dimensions of 
biodiversity are either not operationalisable, do not accurately track biodiversity, or do not 
accurately track biological value”, was false. In chapters five and six I outlined the 
measurement methodology of five true surrogates for biodiversity: species richness, 
species diversity, phylogenetic diversity, morphology, and functional diversity. I used the 
detail of that methodology to determine if those surrogates were operationalisable for the 
demands of conservation biology and whether the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity 
measures should motivate the empirical poor fit argument. The technical detail of these 
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measures indicated that the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity measures is overblown 
and that some but not all true surrogates for biodiversity are operationalisable.  
 This conclusion implies that premise five of the empirical poor fit argument is true 
for some surrogates of biodiversity but not others. Premise five is disjunctive with three 
disjuncts so satisfying at least one component makes it true. The conceptual arguments 
which I presented in chapters one to five demonstrate the specific dimensions of 
biodiversity do track biodiversity. The relationship between biodiversity and biological 
value will be discussed in chapters seven and eight but we can take it for granted at the 
moment that surrogates for biodiversity do track biological value. At least they track 
sufficient normative importance for us to be convinced that they should be a part of 
biodiversity. If phylogenetic diversity, for example, did not highlight an important 
biological feature which species richness glossed over then it would not be a useful 
dimension of biodiversity.  
 So the truth of premise five for each surrogate turns on whether that surrogate is 
operationalisable. Premise five of the empirical poor fit argument is therefore false for 
species richness, species diversity, and phylogenetic diversity but true for morphology and 
functional diversity. But the truth of premise five is not a good reason to eliminate 
biodiversity because the empirical suitability of its surrogates has been evaluated on a 
sliding disjunctive scale. In his analysis, Santana changes his justification for disqualifying 
biodiversity surrogates. Species richness fails because it does not track value well but 
ecological diversity fails because it is not operationalisable (Santana 2014, 768, 772). The 
problem with a disjunctive standard is that it is reasonable for a biodiversity surrogate to 
succeed at two out of three disjuncts. A surrogate such as species richness which is 
operationalisable and tracks biodiversity is still useful even if it does not also track 
biological value. Species richness should not be expected to succeed at all three disjuncts 
or we would not need the other dimensions of biodiversity such as functional diversity and 
phylogenetic diversity to inform our conservation decisions. 
Not every dimension of biodiversity needs to be operationalisable. Only a small 
number of operationalisable dimensions of biodiversity are required to make the surrogacy 
strategy work. Between-surrogate operationalisability will always be complicated because 
not every dimension has within-surrogate operationalisability. It is normal for complex 
multidimensional concepts to have specific dimensions which are not operationalisable. In 
the instance of health it is very difficult to operationalise pain. In the case of poverty it is 
very difficult to operationalise social mobility. Premise five is true for some surrogates of 
biodiversity but false for others. That mix is sufficient for the surrogacy strategy to meet 
the demands of conservation so it is not a good reason to eliminate biodiversity. The 
empirical poor fit argument fails because most of its premises are false. The premises 
which are true are not a good reason to eliminate biodiversity so premise six which 
justifies the elimination of biodiversity based on conditions one to five is also false. 
The second reason that the empirical poor fit argument is unsuccessful is that the 
empirical standard which eliminates biodiversity as a goal of conservation would also 
eliminate its surrogates. The surrogates cannot be eliminated for the poor fit argument to 
work because Santana needs them to be conservation’s new goal. 
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If we keep our lens zoomed out at the general level of multilevel biodiversity and stability, we 
should expect decades of seesawing on the relationship, because there is no unitary relationship. But 
if we tackle the complexity of ecosystems by zooming into examine specific dimensions of 
diversity, as the best experimental and theoretical work does, we have compelling and 
understandable explanations. (Santana 2018, 13) 
 
Santana argues that we should remove biodiversity from the surrogacy chain and use true 
surrogates as a direct approximation of biological value. 
 Using biodiversity’s specific dimensions as surrogates for biological value is 
problematic because no individual surrogate perfectly tracks biological value. Broad 
surrogates such as environmental diversity track it well but are not operationalisable. 
Narrow surrogates such as species richness are operationalisable but do not track 
biological value well. If that dilemma sounds familiar it’s because it is. It is the same 
dilemma that Santana used to motivate conceptual eliminativism.  
 
This slipperiness is attributable in part to the fact the users of the biodiversity concept face a 
dilemma. Biodiversity is meant to serve as a reliable indicator of biological value, but given the vast 
variety of ways in which we value the biosphere, this requires us to employ a broad and open-ended 
definition of biodiversity. On the other hand, to serve reliably as a comparative measure, 
biodiversity needs to be observable and straightforwardly operationalisable.  (Santana 2014, 762–
63) 
  
Eliminating biodiversity in favour of its specific dimensions leads to an analogous 
empirical dilemma. Conservationists must select a true surrogate for biological value but 
the operationalisable surrogates are misleading and the accurate surrogates are not 
operationalisable. 
The empirical dilemma is tougher than the conceptual dilemma because of the 
empirical standards which Santana has set. He implies that for a surrogate to serve as the 
goal of conservation it should be both operationalisable and track biological value. 
However one implication of Santana’s analysis of the specific dimensions of biodiversity 
is that there are no such surrogates. In chapter one I considered possible specific meanings 
of biodiversity which I later argued in chapter two were part of a single homeostatic 
property cluster. I will now argue that the following true surrogates for biodiversity do not 
pass Santana’s empirical standard: species richness, species diversity, phenotypic 
diversity, phylogenetic diversity, functional diversity, genetic diversity, ecological 
diversity, and process diversity. 
Phenotypic diversity and functional diversity cannot be true surrogates because 
neither is operationalisable. The detail in this chapter demonstrated that there is a trait 
dilemma which prevents these surrogates from being both accurately quantifiable and 
measureable. Likewise ecological diversity and process diversity are disqualified because 
Santana has argued that they are also not operationalisable.  
 
So ecological diversity, like the measures we have examined fails to correlate reliably with other 
types of biological diversity. (Santana 2014, 772) 
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And although a variety of functional roles must be occupied to keep biological processes in place, 
we can explain those roles and those process without needing to call on a biodiversity concept. 
(Santana 2014, 773) 
 
 The remaining four candidates for true surrogates are genetic diversity, species 
richness, species diversity, and phylogenetic diversity. Santana has argued that genetic 
diversity does not track biological value well. 
 
Genetic diversity, however, is nearly a non-starter. A “gene soup” containing a random sample of 
genetic material from a given place would furnish little useful in the way of important information 
for several reasons. (Santana 2014, 771) 
 
In response, I argued that his gene soup example is unconvincing for various reasons. 
However, genetic diversity is unlikely to be operationalisable because genetic barcoding is 
expensive and time consuming. Shortcuts have been developed such as relying on 
mitochondrial sections of DNA but studies have questioned the accuracy of such shortcuts 
(Will, Mishler, and Wheeler 2005, 844; Elias et al. 2007, 2881).  
Another problem is that genetic barcoding requires making physical contact with 
the organisms in an ecosystem. Outside of insect collections and flora cuttings much of the 
documentation involved in conservation is via distance. Avian species richness is 
determined using census point data. Aquatic species are documented visually and various 
recording devices are used to capture the behaviour of nocturnal organisms and other 
species. If a true surrogate only represents organisms which can be physically sampled 
then it will miss many more organisms in the ecosystem. Genetic diversity is 
operationalisable for the demands of biology but not for the demands of conservation 
biology because of the difficulty of making physical contact with organisms in an 
ecosystem.  By Santana’s standard then, genetic diversity cannot be a true surrogate for 
biological value. 
The remaining three candidates of species richness, species diversity, and 
phylogenetic diversity are strong candidates because they are operationalisable. However, 
Santana has already argued that they do not track biological value well. 
 
It has been frequently pointed out that [Species] richness does not even capture intuitive ideas about 
what diversity is, such as abundance and disparity.  (Santana 2014, 768) 
 
But the relative abundance of species also fails to represent biological value well . . . for one thing . 
. . it could be that a larger population of that species would impact other populations adversely . . . 
and in terms of value to humans, rarity itself might sometimes be preferable.  (Santana 2014, 770) 
 
Disparity might include genetic or evolutionary difference, such as Faith’s proposal (1994) that 
phylogenetic distance can represent true biodiversity. It could also be morphological or phenotypic, 
since an organism that has a unique trait like the tuatara’s third eye is intuitively more diverse. 
Unfortunately, the intuitive appeal of these types of disparity is not always matched by their 
tractability as measurement tool.  (Santana 2014, 764) 
 
This implies that, by Santana’s standards there are no suitable true surrogates for 
biological value. Phenotypic diversity, functional diversity, ecological diversity, process 
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diversity, and genetic diversity are not operationalisable. Species richness, species 
diversity, and phylogenetic diversity are operationalisable but do not track biological value 
well. 
The purpose of this argument is not to demonstrate that no true surrogate can track 
biological value but rather to demonstrate that the empirical poor fit argument has a strong 
internal tension. Several dimensions of biodiversity do track biological value but Santana 
has argued that they do not. Santana motivated concerns about between-surrogate 
operationalisability by attacking within-surrogate operationalisability. But, criticising the 
dimensions of biodiversity implies that they cannot serve as replacements for biodiversity 
because they are either not operationalisable or do not track biological value well. Without 
a better alternative, Santana cannot argue that eliminating biodiversity would leave 
conservation biology better off. The empirical poor fit argument is unsuccessful because 
the empirical difficulties which face biodiversity also face its specific dimensions. Santana 
wants to eliminate biodiversity in favour of its specific dimensions but he cannot justify its 
elimination by appealing to its empirical difficulties. 
 In this section I argued that the empirical case against biodiversity is unsuccessful 
for two reasons. The first reason is that several premises of the empirical poor fit argument 
are false. Premises two and four which focus on between-surrogate operationalisability are 
false. Premise five which focuses on within-surrogate operationalisability is false for some 
but not all surrogates. Premises one and three which focus on between-surrogate 
operationalisability are true but they are not good reasons to eliminate biodiversity. They 
are normal features of operationalising a complex multi-dimensional property. A weakness 
of the argument is premise six which justifies eliminating biodiversity if the first five 
premises are satisfied. This is a false premise because features such as imperfect 
homeostasis among dimensions, strict incommensurability between dimensions, and lack 
of within-surrogate operationalisability are valuable features.  The second reason why the 
empirical case against biodiversity is unsuccessful is that biodiversity shares empirical 
difficulties with its specific dimensions. Santana cannot use the empirical difficulties of 
biodiversity to justify its elimination because they would also justify eliminating Santana’s 
intended replacement. Conservation requires triage so without a substitute target, Santana 
cannot argue that conservation biology is better off without biodiversity. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I argued that the empirical poor fit argument for biodiversity’s elimination 
fails. This conclusion relies on evidence and arguments produced in chapters four and five 
as well as this one. In this chapter I summarised the importance of within-surrogate 
operationalisability for the empirical case against biodiversity before presenting a technical 
analysis of the measurement methodology of two surrogates: morphology and functional 
diversity. In the case of morphology, I motivated its importance as a dimension of 
biodiversity before explaining the use of morphospaces and highlighting the mathematical 
relationships in nature. I used the detail of my analysis to argue that morphology is not an 
operationalisable surrogate for biodiversity. In the case of functional diversity, I also 
motivated its importance as a dimension of biodiversity before discussing several different 
metrics of functional diversity. Used the detail of my analysis to argue that measures of 
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functional diversity are not functional enough and that functional diversity is also not an 
operationalisable surrogate for biodiversity. 
 In the final section I drew on material presented in this chapter as well as four and 
five to argue that the empirical poor fit argument for biodiversity’s elimination is 
unsuccessful. In chapter four I accepted that premises one and three of the poor fit 
argument are true but argued that premises two and four are false. I argued that the truth of 
premise five required a large body of evidence and concluded that familiarity with the 
detail of how biodiversity surrogates are measured would demonstrate that the empirical 
poor fit argument fails. In chapter five I outlined the measurement methodology of species 
richness, species diversity, and phylogenetic diversity. I defended them as true surrogates 
for biodiversity and argued that they are operationalisable because they are accurately 
quantifiable and measureable. In this chapter I outlined the measurement methodology of 
morphology and functional diversity. I defended them as dimensions of biodiversity but 
argued that they are not operationalisable. That is, they do not satisfy the empirical 
demands of conservation triage. Taken together, the arguments and evidence of chapters 
four, five, and six imply an internal contradiction in the empirical poor fit argument. The 
empirical standard which Santana uses to justify eliminating biodiversity would also 
eliminate most biodiversity surrogates. However, Santana has already argued that the 
remaining biodiversity surrogates do not track biological value well so by his own 
standards he has no viable conservation goal which could replace biodiversity. Since the 
empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism is unsuccessful, in the next chapter I move 








7 The Value Compass Case for Biodiversity’s Elimination 
and its Equivocations of ‘Value’ 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will introduce the value compass case for biodiversity’s elimination and 
argue that biodiversity eliminativists are equivocating in their appeals to biological value. 
The value compass case treats the goal of conservation as a compass which ought to point 
towards biological value. Biodiversity eliminativists appeal to biological value to argue 
that biodiversity is not a suitable goal for conservation because it is a poor indicator of 
biological value. Conservation ought to protect the valuable elements of the environment, 
so a conservation goal should approximate biological value well. The value compass 
argument of eliminativists is that biodiversity is an ineffective surrogate for biological 
value; protecting biodiversity does not protect the important pieces of an ecosystem 
(Santana 2017, 86). Eliminativists motivate their arguments with examples of biodiversity 
correlating poorly with biological value. 
 
Nor does preserving richness reliably preserve biological value. Because richness is nothing more 
than a count of the number of species in an area, value on the richness scale increases with 
speciation and decreases with extinction but this misrepresents common values. Not all species are 
equally valuable, so the extinction of a pollinator like a honeybee would be more lamentable than 
the extinction of a species of leech. (Santana 2014, 769)   
 
This incomplete view fails to recognize that elimination of extensive areas of old growth forest, 
dramatic declines in hundreds of genetically distinct salmonid stocks in the Pacific Northwest, and 
the loss of chemically distinct populations from different portions of a species represent significant 
losses of biodiversity, regardless of whether any species become extinct. (Angermeier and Karr 
1994, 692) 
 
However eliminativists do not identify the type of biological value which 
biodiversity is required to approximate. This is problematic because without a clearly 
defined target the argument for low correlation between biodiversity and biological value 
is difficult to motivate. It is also problematic because of the different ways that the 
environment may be valued. If biodiversity is intended to be a surrogate for economic 
value then protecting biodiversity may not protect rare biological phenomena or value 
nature in an undisturbed state. Eliminativists believe that preserving biodiversity often fails 
to preserve biological value so the type of value they are appealing to needs to be laid out. 
 The goal of this chapter is to identify the type of biological value which 
eliminativists use as the correlation goal for biodiversity. I will consider three candidates: 
instrumental value which values as a means to an end, three different uses of intrinsic 
value, and non-anthropocentric value which forms an overlapping continuum with intrinsic 
value. There are instances of intrinsic value such as Calicott’s which are anthropogenic 
because they do not obtain without an agent to value them (Svoboda 2011, 27). There are 
also instances of non-anthropocentric value such as Paterson which reject the instrumental-
intrinsic distinction entirely (Paterson 2006). For each candidate I will outline the nature of 
158 
the value system and present textual evidence that eliminativists are appealing to it. From 
this textual evidence I conclude that the type of biological value which eliminativists are 
appealing to is pluralistic biological value. I use this conclusion to argue that eliminativist 
arguments equivocate over ‘biological value’.  
7.2 The Importance of Biological Value in the Value Compass Case 
 In value compass eliminativism , biological value has an important role because it 
is treated as the goal of conservation. Eliminativists argue that protecting biodiversity does 
not protect the valuable parts of the environment. So the value compass argument for 
biodiversity eliminativism relies on a claim of low correlation between the properties of 
biodiversity and biological value. One danger with this strategy is that it overlooks 
important research on biological value by treating it as a single category. There are many 
distinct types of biological value such as economic instrumental value or intrinsic value in 
the sense of value independent of agents. So if value compass eliminativism argues that 
biodiversity ought to approximate instrumental value but appeals to examples of 
biodiversity failing to approximate intrinsic value then the argument is equivocating in its 
appeal to biological value.  
 
7.2.1 The Value Compass Case for Biodiversity’s Elimination  
The value compass case for biodiversity’s elimination argues that biodiversity should be 
eliminated because it correlates poorly with biological value. It treats the goal of 
conservation as a compass which ought to point towards biological value. Since 
conservation ought to preserve the valuable elements of the environment, a good 
conservation goal needs to approximate biological value well. Formalised, the argument 
looks like this.  
 
The Value Compass Case for Biodiversity Eliminativism 
1) Conservation ought to preserve pluralistic biological value. 
2) Biodiversity does not reliably track pluralistic biological value. 
3) Biodiversity is the goal of conservation. 
4) The goal of conservation ought to reliably track pluralistic biological value. 
5) If the goal of conservation does not reliably track biological value then it ought to be 
eliminated. 
6) Therefore: Biodiversity ought to be eliminated as the goal of conservation. 
 
The value compass case argues that biodiversity ought to be eliminated as the goal 
of conservation because it fails to reliably track pluralistic biological value. It treats the 
goal of conservation as a value compass. Biodiversity ought to point conservationists 
towards the valuable elements of the environment. Since biodiversity does not reliably 
perform this function, Santana, Angermeier, Karr argue that we ought to eliminate it in 
favour of a different conservation goal. Eliminativists appeal to different types of value to 
justify elimination but the consensus between them is that biodiversity prioritises the 
wrong biological elements for conservation. It overlooks more valuable biological 
elements such as native species or important functional phenomena. I will critically 
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analyse the value compass case for biodiversity eliminativism in chapter eight. The 
purpose of this chapter is to inform that critical analysis by determining what eliminativists 
mean when they appeal to biological value. 
Individual eliminativists appeal to different types of biological value to motivate 
premise two of the value compass case. Angermeier and Karr appeal to health and 
sustainability with their preference for biological integrity; “Two visionary phrases in the 
act dealt with a "fishable and swimmable goal" and the charge to "restore and maintain the 
physical, chemical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."” (Karr 1991, 68). By 
contrast Santana does not identify the type of biological value which he believes fails to 
effectively correlate with biodiversity in his original work. In his 2017 paper he identifies 
ecological value as the goal of conservation where ecological value is “the aggregate of 
values we place in the environment” (Santana 2017, 86). So Santana uses the aggregate of 
all values we place in the environment as the standard for both the goal of conservation 
and the target which biodiversity fails to approximate.  
 
7.2.2 How the Value Compass Case Risks Equivocating ‘Biological 
Value’ 
The value compass case for biodiversity’s eliminativism risks equivocating in its uses of 
‘biological value’ for two reasons. Eliminativists do not explicitly state what type of 
biological value biodiversity is meant to approximate. It is unclear from textual evidence if 
biodiversity is meant to approximate instrumental value or less anthropocentric types of 
value. This lack of clarity is exacerbated by the motivating examples which appeal to 
specific but distinct theories of biological value. Santana for example describes a fictional 
gene soup as a counterexample to genetic diversity. “Genetic diversity, however, is nearly 
a non-starter. A “gene soup” containing a random sample of genetic material from a given 
place would furnish little in the way of useful information for several reasons.” (Santana 
2014, 771).  
Santana’s example can be interpreted in a number of different ways which is a red 
flag for equivocation. By ‘gene soup’ Santana could mean some kind of genetic ark or just 
a literal soup of biological material. The former interpretation is more charitable because 
conservation has little interest in genes which are not realised by genomes and less interest 
in a contaminated bucket of DNA. Charity is required to engage with the gene soup 
thought experiment because it is problematic in its current form. Genes cannot be easily 
quantified because they are strings of base pairs amongst other strings of base pairs. There 
is also an element of structural novelty to genetic information. Blood samples are not 
equivalent to living biological organisms any more than a word scramble is equivalent to a 
novel. 
 For the sake of argument, this project will be charitable and presume a genetic ark 
interpretation of gene soup with additional science fiction technology which could de-
extinct a species based on information extracted from that genetic ark. Santana’s argument 
then, can be understood as point that if diversity of genetic information is what matters 
about biodiversity then we would have no good reason to claim that extant species 
represent higher biodiversity than a genetic ark. But this example equivocates in its appeal 
to value. The uninformativeness of gene soup looks like an appeal to the value of genetics 
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for human beings but the soup example suggests a preference for biological organisms in 
their natural state. An argument could be made for either interpretation  
Equivocation is likely when multiple distinct types are treated as one category.  
One reason for the multiple distinct theories of biological value is that ‘value’ is a verb 
(Svoboda 2011, 27). So there as many theories of biological value as there are ways for 
agents to value the environment and —as I will argue in the following sections— just as 
many theories of value which don’t require agents. Identifying the type of biological value 
which eliminativists appeal to is essential to discussing the value compass argument for 
biodiversity eliminativism. I will not consider every type of biological value as the 
eliminativist target but I will discuss three staples of value theory: instrumental value, 
intrinsic value, and non-anthropocentric value which is often understood as equivalent to 
intrinsic value but forms a complex relationship with it. For value compass eliminativism 
to avoid equivocation, eliminativists need to appeal to the same type of biological value in 
their examples as the type that conservation is meant to prioritise. I begin by considering 
instrumental value as the type of biological value that eliminativists appeal to in their 
arguments against biodiversity. 
 
7.3 The Instrumental Value Compass Interpretation 
In this section I will consider if the type of biological value which eliminativists are 
appealing to in the value compass argument is instrumental value. My analysis has two 
stages. First I explain why eliminativists would appeal to instrumental value in their 
arguments. To this end I will explain what instrumental value is and discuss different kinds 
of instrumental value drawing attention to economic and aesthetic instrumental value. 
Then I will discuss the relationship between using objects instrumentally and value to 
show that this concept yields a great diversity of values for many objects. This diversity is 
operationalisable for the goals of conservation in so far as we can quantify values but leads 
to disagreement when one agent values a biological element but the other agent does not. I 
consider the argument that instrumental value makes the environment a second class 
citizen and respond that instrumentalists have the tools to treat various sentient beings as 
moral agents worthy of consideration. After motivating instrumental value as a candidate 
for biological value I present textual evidence to argue that eliminativists are appealing to 
instrumental value in the examples they use to motivate the value compass argument. I 
conclude that the value compass argument should be understood as instrumentally laden. 
 
7.3.1 The Nature of Instrumental Value 
In this subsection I will explain the nature of instrumental value with an emphasis on its 
diverse applications. Instrumental value is the value of means to an end. An object which 
can be used to achieve some beneficial goal has instrumental value (Ronnow-rasmussen 
2002, 25). Movies and art have instrumental value because they may produce a variety of 
emotions in us. A hammer has instrumental value because we may use it to drive in nails 
more effectively or flatten dents in metal. But instrumental value is not limited to human 
interactions. An object has instrumental value just so long as it useful in achieving some 
beneficial goal. In one experiment scientists introduced  the concept of money to a society 
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of capuchin monkeys by introducing silver coin like discs and teaching them to trade them 
for food rewards (Chen, Lakshminarayanan, and Santos 2006, 519). These discs quickly 
gained instrumental value for the capuchins who re-budgeted their allowance to purchase 
more food when the price of apple slices was decreased (Chen, Lakshminarayanan, and 
Santos 2006, 528). 
 There are different types of instrumental value because there are many ways to 
value an object. One important type in conservation biology is economic instrumental 
value; the many ways in which the environment help human beings to prosper (Kaufmann 
1980, 35). New Zealand has a reputation for being a very green country which brings in 
millions of dollars of tourism to our GDP every year. The environment has also yielded 
many important medications and although the prospects of a biological gold rush were 
overestimated (Maclaurin and Lean 2016, 31), the products we derive from the 
environment are an important source of economic instrumental value. Aesthetic 
instrumental value is another important form of instrumental value (Kaufmann 1980, 35). 
We experience great beauty whilst travelling through the environment and we may find 
aesthetic beauty in everything from biodiversity hot spots to desert wilderness. Leopold’s 
well known Sand Country Almanac extolled the virtues of untouched wilderness and the 
importance of preserving it in its natural state (Callicott, Crowder, and Mumford 1999, 
30). Leopold’s descriptions of nature capture an irreplaceable source of beauty (Leopold 
1949, 89). Leopold was a champion of intrinsic value but reservations about intrinsic value 
are no obstacle to the instrumental value which the aesthetics of nature provide. 
There are problems with our romanticised conception of wilderness (Cronon 1996, 
51). Apparently barren dessert terrains teem with life (Durant et al. 2014, 116) and there 
are few true wilderness ecosystems in the sense that they are actually untouched by human 
beings (Odenbaugh 2014, 94; Takacs 1996, 42). But we can also be amazed by complex 
organisms flourishing under harsh conditions, or scarcity.  
 
Biodiversity hotspots understandably attract considerable conservation attention. However, deserts 
are rarely viewed as conservation priority areas, due to their relatively low productivity, yet these 
systems are home to unique species, adapted to harsh and highly variable environments. (Durant et 
al. 2014, 114) 
 
We find great aesthetic value in desert wilderness and our romanticised conception of 
wilderness is another source of instrumental value. 
 The total instrumental value of the environment is diverse because there is a 
multitude of different ways for organisms to use the environment. For a long time humans 
have taken great pride in reshaping the environment and its products (Kaufmann 1980, 
36). But the same tree which is valued as raw material for household furniture is also 
valued as part of ancient forest in its natural state. That tree is also the home to many 
organisms which rely on it for life, and it competes with smaller plant life for survival. 
Because instrumental value is the value of using an object to achieve a goal and there are 
many goals that the environment could fulfil, there are many kinds of instrumental value. 
That diversity leads to conflict between valuations. 
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 Economic instrumental value forms a complex relationship with the environment. 
The snail darter is such a remarkable case because it seemed to bear so little instrumental 
value. It was not phenotypically distinctive, it was phylogenetically uninteresting, it had no 
cultural history, apparent economic importance or potential, and its small population 
meant that its extinction was unlikely to disrupt the local ecosystem. But it was an 
endangered species so people campaigned against the construction of the Tellico damn to 
preserve it (Nash 1989, 178–79). While the environment is a source of economic value 
through tourism, intellectual property, and the off-setting of carbon emissions, conserving 
it requires commitment from entire societies (Angermeier 2000, 378). The prospect that 
the Tellico dam might not be built just to save an unremarkable minnow from extinction is 
the wrong decision if you are an agent counting on the job which dam construction will 
provide. Often the people we ask to sacrifice economic value for the sake of the 
environment are those who are the most dependent on it (Cronon 1995, 20). 
One objection to instrumental value is that it relegates the environment to the status 
of a second class citizen (Kaufmann 1980, 37). Human beings and the various ways in 
which we value the environment take priority. The environment is valuable in so far as it 
continually supports our survival and entertains us. The Pando aspen grove at Fishlake 
National Forest looks like a forest of aspen trees. It is in fact a single 43.6 hectare clonal 
biological organism with an interconnected root system (DeWoody et al. 2008, 495). The 
genetic material in one aspen tree at one edge of the colony is identical to the genetic 
material in a different aspen at the other edge of the colony. If we apply an instrumental 
analysis to this grove we would conclude that this particular grove has great instrumental 
value including aesthetic and economic but we would also conclude that our obligations to 
protect this grove stem from self-interest. The grove is valuable and we should protect it so 
long as it benefits human beings. But Hargrove might argue that a single organism of this 
size on our planet has its own value as well as the potential for human use (Hargrove 1992, 
199). 
 Utilitarian responses to this problem have revolved around the goal of expanding 
our circle of moral obligations to include the environment. Much of our development as a 
species has occurred alongside a slow expansion of our circle of moral obligation (Nash 
1989, 5). We know to take care of ourselves and then we extend care to our family and 
friends. As societies form we gain obligation to our groups, our countries, and then people 
in other countries. An important question for Utilitarians has been how to ground our 
expansion of that moral circle out to other biological organisms. Peter Singer has proposed 
the quality of sentience (Paterson 2006, 146). Comparisons of outcomes often weigh up 
happiness with unhappiness, pleasure with suffering, prosperity and fulfilment with 
impoverishment and dissatisfaction. Humans share these qualities with other sentient 
creatures so we can expand the moral circle to include any creature with the capacity to 
suffer. Conservation decisions which weigh instrumental value must also take into account 
their impact on the instrumental value for other sentient species.  
 This response by Utilitarians is an important improvement but it does not avoid the 
objection because much of the biological world such as plants, fungi, and single celled 
organisms are still excluded from the moral circle (Paterson 2006, 146). Bear in mind that 
this does not mean that we have no obligation to rest of the biological world. We retain 
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some obligations; the problem for Utilitarians who wish to explain the value of the natural 
world is just that the worth of the biological world is grounded entirely in its value to 
sentient creatures. The circle can be extended further by considering if the interests of 
biological organisms carry moral weight. Organisms which lack sentience can still 
demonstrate interests (Callicott 1984, 301). Plants grow towards sunlight, insects adapt 
protection from predators for survivability, every living thing attempts to pass on its genes, 
and prey prefers not to be eaten (Rolston 1992, 253). Though not strictly instrumentalists, 
Paul Taylor and Tom Regan both argue for an expansion of the moral circle. Taylor argues 
that moral rights are incompatible with animals and plants in some senses but that our 
general moral duties justify strong protections for much of the environment which are 
structurally very similar to moral rights. We must respect their preservation, protect their 
good, and make restitution if a group of organisms are wronged (Taylor 1986, 253, 245). 
Regan argues that many organisms including mammals, birds, and fish are ‘subjects-of-
life’ in the sense that they have rights to liberty, bodily integrity, and life. As such, those 
organisms bear moral rights. 
But, the justification for extending the circle is contentious. By contrast DeGrazia 
also argues for an expansion of the moral circle but limits its expansion far more severely, 
based on current evidence of the mental activity of biological organisms. He argues that 
the moral impermissibility of confining great apes (excluding . . . ) and organisms of the 
dolphin family is absolute. But he also argues that we have less moral obligation to birds, 
and most species of fish. Despite these difficulties, endorsing an expansion of the moral 
circle allows theories of instrumental value to more successfully ground moral obligations 
to protect the environment. This does leave the issue of discerning the interests of non-
sentient biological organisms. It is not clear that the moral circle can expand to include all 
of biological diversity. Much of an ecosystem depends on the very small organisms which 
keep an ecosystem functioning. Aside from the vested interest all species have in survival, 
the interests of mites or bacteria are unclear. The value of those organisms require further 
justification similar to Taylor’s who, for example, argues that all humans have a moral 
interest in ecosystem services. So substantially harming the environment also harms those 
interests and decreases instrumental value (Taylor 1986, 236). 
The strength of instrumental value is also problematic for the efforts of 
conservation. Instrumental value identifies value wherever there is means to an end but 
because all agents desire different ends those values conflict. The poaching of endangered 
species and destruction of the rain forest represents unreplaceable losses of aesthetic 
instrumental value to some but to others it represents survival: food on the table, 
employment, and financial security. I am concerned about the possible extinction of the 
panda bear. But when villagers from Africa who had never heard of pandas were shown a 
picture of them, they asked where it could be found and if it could be eaten (Einarsson 
1993, 74). This conflict of values is exacerbated if we take into account future generations. 
We can understand economic, aesthetic and other interpretations of instrumental value as 
a-temporal (Kaufmann 1980, 34). That is, the aesthetic or economic value of the 
environment for current generations counts equally with the aesthetic or economic value 
for future generations. The valuations conflict because it is difficult to predict how 
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instrumental valuations will change. Cronon observes that the preference for wilderness is 
a modern one. Once it was considered savage, barren, and desolate (Cronon 1995, 8). 
Theories of instrumental value meet the goals of conservation well because they 
identify a diversity of ways to value the environment. Considering value as a means to end 
identifies types of instrumental value such as economic value, aesthetic value, cultural 
value and others. One objection to instrumental value is that it treats the environment as a 
second class citizen. The instrumental tool kit responds by expanding our moral circle of 
consideration to take into account the interests of sentient organisms. However we are still 
left without a reason to care for the smallest pieces of biodiversity other than some further 
benefit which it may provide to sentient species. The advantage of identifying value 
wherever there is a means to an end is also a drawback because it leads to conflicting 
valuations. There is conflict between economic and aesthetic value, conflict between 
humans and other biological organisms, and conflict between current and future 
generations. In the next subsection I will argue that eliminativists are appealing to 
instrumental value in their examples of biodiversity failing to approximate biological 
value. 
 
7.3.2 Eliminativists’ Appeals to Instrumental Value 
To motivate premise two of the value compass case for biodiversity eliminativism, 
eliminativists present examples in which protecting biodiversity would fail to protect 
valuable parts of the environment. Some of these examples appeal to instrumental value.   
 
Healthy fish stocks feed us, extensive forests remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and 
flourishing vegetation feeds livestock, prevents erosion, and directs the flow of water. (Santana 
2017, 88) 
 
Only in the presence of a functioning biological system are other resources (for example, energy, 
minerals) useful to man.  (Karr and Dudley 1981, 56)  
 
The total worth of biodiversity to society comprises a broad array of values, including aesthetic, 
ecological, and utilitarian values. Some of that value is inherently dependent on the variety of biotic 
systems. (Angermeier 1994, 601)  
 
Santana points out that fish stocks feed us, Karr and Dudley acknowledges the importance 
of the resources to man, and Angermeier highlights the importance of aesthetic value. 
These are all conceptions of value which focus on a means to an end. Fish are a means to 
nourishment, natural resources are a means to flourishing, and the variety of biotic systems 
is a means to aesthetic enjoyment. These are examples of appeals to instrumental value 
because they understand the value of the environment in terms of their ability to satisfy a 
further goal. Based on these examples the value compass argument for eliminativism 
should be understood as focused on anthropocentric instrumental value. Conservation 
should preserve the instrumental value of the environment, so because biodiversity 
correlates poorly with instrumental value it is a not suitable goal for conservation. 
However I will argue in the following sections that eliminativists are not just appealing to 
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instrumental value. They also appeal to a combination of intrinsic and non-anthropocentric 
types of value. 
7.4 The Intrinsic Value Compass Interpretation 
In this section I will consider if eliminativists’ arguments are appealing to intrinsic value. 
In this two-stage analysis I first explain why eliminativists would appeal to intrinsic value 
by discussing the nature of intrinsic value. I will outline the distinction between three 
different uses of ‘intrinsic’ in academic literature: intrinsic in the sense of non-
instrumental, intrinsic in the sense of a non-extrinsic property, and intrinsic in the sense of 
value independent of agents’ beliefs. I argue that intrinsic value in the first sense creates 
moral obligations to organisms in the environment analogous to the moral obligations 
humans bear to one another. I discuss the tension between instrumental and intrinsic value 
and argue that value theorists often want the best of both worlds and attempt various ways 
of importing features of intrinsic value into instrumental systems or vice versa. I argue that 
intrinsic value provides strong protection for the environment and can defend itself against 
objections provided that attention is paid to the different types of intrinsic value. After 
arguing that eliminativists have good reason to appeal to intrinsic value in the value 
compass argument I move on to textual evidence of their appeals to intrinsic value. In the 
case of Santana these appeals are tacit rather than explicit so I argue that his examples do 
at least appeal to intrinsic intuitions to motivate value compass eliminativism . Angermeier 
and Karr demonstrate a clear preference for naturalness which is a clear appeal to intrinsic 
value. I conclude that as well as an argument for instrumental value compass eliminativism 
there is also an argument for intrinsic value compass eliminativism .  
 
7.4.1 The Multiple Meanings of ‘Intrinsic Value’ 
In this subsection I explain the nature of intrinsic value and draw attention to its differing 
uses in academic literature. I argue that the primary use of ‘intrinsic value’ for 
conservationists is in the non-instrumental sense but it also supplemented by the senses of 
‘intrinsic property’ and agent independent value. ‘Intrinsic value is a single term but in the 
literature it is used with different meanings. This is problematic because our conclusions 
are at risk of equivocating meaning (O’Neill 1992, 120). O’Neill has identified at least 
three senses of ‘intrinsic value’: non instrumental value, intrinsic properties, and the 
possession of objective value. These different meanings are important because of the 
conclusions we draw about moral obligations from claims of intrinsic value.  The inference 
from ‘x has intrinsic value’ to ‘x must be protected’ is only a valid one if ‘intrinsic’ is used 
in the sense of some kind of value. Other senses of ‘intrinsic’ may commit a fallacy of 
equivocation. We are morally obliged to respect an organism if it possesses intrinsic moral 
worth but not obliged to respect it if it possesses intrinsic properties. 
 The first sense that ‘intrinsic value’ is used within the literature is the sense of non-
instrumental value. As I discussed in the previous section ‘Instrumental Value’ is a term 
which is used to refer to objects which have value in terms of their further use. Movies 
have instrumental value in that they may create enjoyment when they are experienced or 
given as gifts. This is distinct from the intrinsic value of an autonomous agent. An 
organism with intrinsic value in this sense cannot be used as a means to an end without 
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informed consent. If an organism lacks the means to provide informed consent then there 
is still a moral duty that we never treat that organism merely as a means. We must always 
treat them as an end in themselves. Thus to have intrinsic value in this sense is to be 
valuable regardless of any potential benefit or use which you may bring to another agent 
(O’Neill 1992, 119).  
In the second sense, ‘intrinsic value’ refers simply to the intrinsic properties of an 
object in the sense that they are not extrinsic properties. These are properties which are 
inherent to the object rather than those properties which are relational between objects. 
‘Intrinsic’ in this sense is the claim that the value of an organism is a primary quality in the 
same way that shape is intrinsic to an object. This distinguishes it from an extrinsic 
property such as weight which relies on the relation between two or more objects which 
have mass. While mass is intrinsic to an object, weight is extrinsic because it is a 
gravitational relation between two or more objects. Applying this analogy to value, 
intrinsic value supervenes on the properties of an object. That is, when A supervenes on B, 
any alteration of A is also an alteration of B. This is in contrast to extrinsic value such as 
rarity or difference. Rarity and difference are relational properties in that they are a 
function of multiple objects. Being rare can make an object such as gold valuable but it is a 
function of supply of and demand for that object. In the second sense of ‘intrinsic value’ 
then, ‘intrinsic’ refers to the intrinsic properties of an object rather than an extrinsic kind of 
value such as rarity (O’Neill 1992, 120).  
In the third sense ‘intrinsic value’ refers to the value which biodiversity possesses 
independently of any autonomous valuers. An analogy with art is useful here. Most people 
would agree that the music of Beethoven is a rare fusion of beauty and genius which has 
created a timeless piece of art. But a problem remains about the value his symphonies 
would possess if there were no agents around to enjoy it. While it is contentious, some 
people argue that Beethoven’s symphonies would still be beautiful even if no agent had 
ever experienced them. This is the third sense of ‘intrinsic value’. Rather than being 
valuable because of its use to humans, biodiversity has an independent value (Elliot 1992, 
151). This is subtly different to the second sense. Value does not need to be intrinsic to an 
object for it to persist without a valuer around. We hold that the intrinsic value of a human 
being persists even if there were no other agents around to value her (and was in a coma so 
could not value herself) but it does not follow that value is a primary quality.  
The first sense of intrinsic value, the traditional Kantian interpretation of non-
instrumental value, is supplemented by the second and third senses in various ways. 
Callicott, for instance, argues that organisms have intrinsic value (in the first sense) but 
that this value does not persist without valuers (third sense) because ‘value’ is a verb and 
so must require a subject to act (Svoboda 2011, 27). Whatever the further combination, 
using the first sense of intrinsic value implies very strong moral obligations to the 
environment because the organisms have intrinsic moral worth. If biodiversity and the 
organisms which inhabit it cannot be ethically treated as a means to an end then we have 
an obligation to the environment not to use it as a means to an end. It is true that agents do 
use each other as a means to an ends on a regular basis. The normal interactions of 
everyday life require that I perform tasks for money but these interactions are permissible 
because agents obtain informed consent from one another and consent in arrangements are 
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how we ensure that our ends are considered. The first sense of intrinsic value creates 
strong protection for the environment because we may not use it merely as a means to an 
end whilst the second sense acknowledges the unique value of biodiversity but is more 
flexible with its uses. 
Santana worries that intrinsic value cannot aide in conservation triage because 
assigning intrinsic value to organisms makes it impossible to compare values for 
conservation decisions. If one endangered organism has intrinsic moral worth and another 
organism has intrinsic moral worth then deciding which to conserve is an impossible moral 
dilemma. So, intrinsic value makes no difference to the outcomes of triage decisions. Since 
all organisms have moral worth we must appeal to instrumental value to decide which one 
to preserve. 
 
If intrinsic value is ubiquitously distributed, or incommensurable with other values, or of infinite 
worth, —all features often attributed to intrinsic environmental value— it will not allow us to use 
quantitative decision-making tools to prioritise conservation efforts.  (Santana 2017, 89) 
 
Additionally, if a response to biodiversity eliminativism is going to be grounded in an appeal to 
intrinsic value, units will not differ in any meaningful way in the intrinsic value they possess. They 
will however, differ significantly in the non-intrinsic value attributed to them. Consequently, in 
situations of conservation triage, decisions between different units must be made on the basis of 
non-intrinsic value. (Santana 2017, 89) 
 
But it is only the first sense of non-instrumental value which provides strong protection for 
the environment but struggles with triage dilemmas. That is the sense which confers 
inherent moral value on organisms. The second sense of a value as an intrinsic property 
and the third sense of value without an observer provide weaker protection for the 
environment but allow for agents to use it as a means to an end without requiring informed 
consent.  
Intrinsic value in the sense of non-instrumental value provides strong protection for 
the environment because it mimics the trumping power of moral rights by implying a 
moral duty not to treat organisms merely as a means. To have non instrumental value is to 
be valued as an end in itself. Any organism which is valued as an end in itself bears moral 
rights which protect it from the interference of other agents (Regan 2013, 119). This is 
deeply problematic because moral rights bear a trumping value (Hargrove 1992, 200). 
Agents are not entitled to violate moral rights just because the outcomes would be 
beneficial. If I need to obtain permission to use my friend’s car then it does not matter how 
much I need the vehicle or even if I can burrow it in a way that does not inconvenience my 
friend. I still need to obtain permission before I can use it because otherwise I treat my 
friend merely as a means. There are extreme counterexamples in which the positive 
outcomes are so important that they appear to justify infringing on a right (Nili 2017, 322; 
Taylor 1986, 243). No friend of mine would consider me to have wronged them if I 
borrowed their car without permission because I needed to drive a dying person to the 
hospital. The trumping power of rights is so strong that some authors worry that it entails a 
right to do wrong (Waldron 2006, 107). After all it seems well within my rights to spend 
168 
money on what I wish rather than donating it to a needy cause or to set fire to my property 
if it should please me to do so.  
If organisms bear intrinsic value in the Kantian sense then it is problematic for 
conservation because this implies strong moral duties with an accompanying trumping 
feature (Regan 2013, 119).  So the benefit the environment provides to us does not justify 
us harvesting it for resources. This reasoning is explicit in David Degrazia’s work who 
argues in Taking Animals Seriously that we have inalienable moral duties to certain non-
human animals. He goes onto argue that because of our duty not to cause unnecessary 
suffering and our duty to only confine when it is required, both factory farming and much 
of rural farming is unethical (DeGrazia 1996, 288). Intrinsic value grants strong protection 
to organisms such that even free farming rural methods may not be sufficiently ethical to 
respect that organisms’ wellbeing. 
If multiple species are intrinsically valuable then even issues of survival become 
ethically complicated (Callicott 1984, 301). If a biological organism bears intrinsic value 
in the first sense then I am no more entitled to kill that organism for food than I would be 
to kill another human for food. In Animal Rights and Environmental Value Regan responds 
to the predatory and prey objection to intrinsic value (Regan 2013, 121). Roughly, this is 
the argument that if predator and prey both have intrinsic value then predators violate the 
rights of prey when they hunt. He argues that only moral agents have the capacity to 
violate rights and that we have a moral duty to organisms in the environment to let them be 
as much as possible. The latter he takes to explain why we would be obliged to save a 
human child from a lion but not a wildebeest. In effect he attempts to solve this problem 
by stripping out some of the protection of intrinsic value (Regan 2013, 122). Wildebeests 
have a right to protection from human beings but not from lions. 
We cannot strip out the protection of intrinsic value in the Kantian sense. Intrinsic 
value in the Kantian sense without an accompanying prefect moral duty simply isn’t 
intrinsic value in the Kantian sense. Non-instrumental value systems are such that they do 
not permit the use of others merely as a means. Whilst Kant did not have non-rational 
animals and other biological organisms in mind as bearers of non-instrumental value, if 
authors argue that biological organisms bear intrinsic value in the Kantian sense then that 
implies strong moral duties to those organisms. In his framework, Regan restricts those 
duties but needs to explain why the predator prey relation between biological organisms 
does not warrant interference when the relation between serial killer and human victim 
does warrant it. 
The problem for Santana is that his conclusion rests exactly upon on a non-
instrumental interpretation of ‘intrinsic’. The non-instrumental Kantian sense of intrinsic 
does bear moral rights but a non-intrinsic property or value independent of agents needn’t 
bear any moral rights. This is problematic for Santana’s example because he requires a 
non-instrumental sense of intrinsic value for his incommensurability objection to work. 
But that interpretation makes little sense because normal interactions between organisms 
for survival become so ethically contentious. Santana makes a mistake in treating all 
intrinsic value as the same and I will argue in the next sub section that despite his 
scepticism about intrinsic value, he is appealing to it in his examples of biodiversity failing 
to approximate biological value. 
169 
 
7.4.2 Eliminativists’ Appeals to Intrinsic Value 
To motivate premise three of the value compass argument for biodiversity eliminativism, 
eliminativists present examples in which protecting biodiversity would fail to protect 
valuable parts of the environment. Some of these examples appeal to intrinsic value. 
Angermeier’s and Karr’s appeals to intrinsic value are transparent because they prioritise 
ecosystems in an undisturbed state. For Santana’s work I will argue that his appeals to 
intrinsic value are tacit rather than explicit. I say tacit because Santana is sceptical of the 
idea of intrinsic value (Santana 2017, 89). However at the very least his examples appeal 
to intuitions about intrinsic value.  
 
Additionally it seems to be the case that many people value keeping ecosystems as close as possible 
to the state of nature. But a richness scale suggests that we can improve a system by deviating from 
the state of nature and importing species by, say, adding a fish to a lake. (Santana 2014, 769) 
 
The trend in conservation biology of prioritising biodiversity “hot spots” distracts from attending to 
biodiversity “cold spots”. (Santana 2014, 770–71) 
 
Even if Santana is not convinced by intrinsic value theory, he argues that maximising 
biodiversity will not help conservationists maintain the natural state of an ecosystem. But 
arguing that biodiversity misleads conservation because the concept does not prioritise 
nature in an unspoilt state is appealing to intrinsic intuitions. This tacit use of intrinsic is 
echoed in his concern for biodiversity cold spots. Biodiversity cold spots have less species 
and biological phenomena than biodiversity hotspots so it is unusual for a pure 
instrumentalist who is focused on conservation triage to express the kind of concern for 
them shown by Durant (et al. 2014, 115).  
 Angermeier and Karr both demonstrate a more transparent appreciation for 
intrinsic value as they include naturalism as an important aspect of biological integrity. 
 
The inadequacy of current conceptions of biodiversity recently was made clear to me in several 
independent discussions with natural resource managers and scientists, where I asserted that 
introductions of exotic species into the wild diminish rather than enhance biodiversity. (Angermeier 
1994, 660) 
 
Conservation biology exists because conservationists believe that biotic diversity, ecological 
complexity, and evolution are intrinsically good (Soulé 1985) and ought to be conserved. It is not 
diversity, complexity, and evolution, per se, that warrant conservation, but natural components and 
levels of diversity and complexity and natural rates of evolution. The cornerstone value judgment of 
conservation is that naturally evolved biotic elements—genomes, communities, landscapes— are 
fundamentally more valuable than artificial ones. (Angermeier 2000, 377) 
 
Biological Integrity — The capability of supporting and maintaining a balanced, integrated, 
adaptive community of organisms having a species composition and functional organisation 
comparable to that of natural habitat of the region. (Karr 1990, 285)   
 
Despite the difficulties of a distinction between artificial and natural ecosystems, the belief 
that ecosystems have greater integrity if they are in a natural state only seems justifiable if 
170 
it rests on the idea that natural ecosystems have greater intrinsic value. The type I meaning 
of intrinsic value was that of non-instrumental value. Where instrumental value identifies a 
means to an end, intrinsic value identifies an end in itself (Norton 1992, 214). If 
ecosystems are more valuable in an undisturbed state they will continue to possess value 
even if they remain completely untouched by human beings. Intrinsic value in the sense of 
an intrinsic property or agent independent value should also not be affected by the 
presence of humans. It could be affected by destruction at the hands of humans but the 
appeal to intrinsic value in these examples is very much non-relational value. The 
environment has value in its own state rather than as a use for human beings. 
 Based on this textual evidence I conclude that the value compass argument for 
eliminativism should also be understood as focused on intrinsic value. Conservation 
should preserve the intrinsic value of the environment, so because biodiversity correlates 
poorly with intrinsic value it is a not suitable goal for conservation. This conclusion 
increases the risk of equivocation in the value compass argument for biodiversity 
eliminativism. If the goal of conservation were instrumental value but biodiversity was 
eliminated for failing to approximate intrinsic value then there is a serious equivocation in 
the value compass argument. Eliminativists must therefore carefully distinguish between 
instrumental value compass eliminativism and intrinsic value compass eliminativism . 
This task becomes more complex because non-anthropocentric value forms a complicated 
relationship between instrumental and intrinsic value. I will argue in the next section that 
eliminativists’ examples can also be understood as appeals to non-anthropocentric value in 
a way that is not captured by either instrumental or intrinsic value. Non-instrumentalism 
correlates highly with non-anthropocentricity but value in the sense of an intrinsic property 
can still be conceived in an anthropocentric manner. The ascription of interests and moral 
rights to other sentient beings is an anthropocentric method of justifying conservation 
efforts because interests and moral rights are human-centric frameworks. 
 
7.5 The Non-Anthropocentric Value Compass Interpretation 
In this section I will consider if eliminativists’ arguments are appealing to non-
anthropocentric value in a way that is not accurately captured by either instrumental or 
intrinsic value. This analysis has three stages. First I discuss the nature of non-
anthropocentric value to explain why biodiversity eliminativists would appeal to it in their 
arguments. I discuss anthropocentric motivations and briefly chart the aim of deep ecology 
which attempts to identify value in the environment on its own terms. Secondly I argue 
that non-anthropocentric value differs from intrinsic value in important ways. I discuss 
examples of: instrumental value with a non-anthropocentric slant, intrinsic value with an 
anthropocentric slant, and a form of non-anthropocentricism which rejects the 
instrumental-intrinsic distinction entirely. I use these examples to motivate a continuum of 
anthropocentricity along which instrumental value and intrinsic value sit in their various 
formulations. Lastly I present textual evidence to argue that biodiversity eliminativists are 
appealing to non-anthropocentric value. I argue that if the textual evidence is not sufficient 
to justify an intrinsic value interpretation of the value compass case, then it is still 
sufficient to justify a non-anthropocentric interpretation of the value compass case. This 
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conclusion implies that if eliminativists object to my arguments for interpreting the value 
compass argument as intrinsically motivated they still risk equivocating instrumental value 
with non-anthropocentric value.  
 
7.5.1 The Nature of Non-Anthropocentric Value Theories   
The non-anthropocentric movement is motivated by the distinction between deep ecology 
and shallow ecology. Where shallow ecology values the environment in human terms, 
deep ecology attempts to value the environment on its own terms. This distinction emerged 
because many of our systems have attempted to find value in the environment in a human 
centred way. Does this resource benefit us more out of the ground than in it? Can the 
conservation of this species benefit us financially in the long run? Even our attempts to 
protect the environment are often more human centred than we would like to admit. 
Conservation campaigns to protect whales and native birds are far more prevalent than 
campaigns to save frogs or insects. This is due in some part to the greater ease of 
identifying with the rationality of a whale than with a frog (Paterson 2006, 146).  
 
We have caught the whale butchers red-handed in the act of taking an undersized whale. Riding out 
on a Zodiac, I leap from the inflatable craft onto the slain whale, its skin warm and oily, the blood 
flowing from the gaping wound in its side, hot on my hand. I stroke the flipper, reach down toward 
the vacantly staring open eye and close the eyelid. I am lost and lonely upon the ocean with that 
dead whale child. (Paul Watson quoted in Einarsson 1993, 78) 
 
It is also due to the charisma of certain fauna. The charismatic megafauna group is just that 
because it shifts the focus of conservation to relatable mammals from the many smaller 
species which maintain the ecosystems that those mammals inhabit (Karr 1993, 301). 
These are instances of shallow ecology because they tend to conceive of environmental 
value in very anthropocentric ways, either by directly linking the value of the environment 
to its benefit for humans or by failing to consider the interests of biological organisms on 
their own terms.  
 Deep ecology attempts to reconceive of environmental value in a non-
anthropocentric way. This is a complicated task because we are attempting to remove 
implicit bias from our inferential reasoning. However, we aren’t always aware of our bias. 
Work in psychology has shown that unconscious bias affects our decision making even 
when we are made aware of and struggle against our bias. One such study demonstrated 
that a Judge’s sentencing is most lenient immediately following a meal break, despite the 
Judge deciding when the meal break should occur (Danziger et al. 2011, 6890 and 6892). 
As human beings we are also limited to converse in human concepts. So the goal of deep 
ecology is a worthy but ambitious one. Unsurprisingly then it has yielded a great diversity 
of theories with differing levels of non-anthropocentric commitment. Intrinsic theories of 
environmental value are non-anthropocentric in that they consider the moral worth of 
organisms in the environment on their own terms. A further non-anthropocentric step is to 
reject the instrumental / intrinsic distinction all together and attempt to reinterpret the role 
of human beings as participants in the ecosystem rather than as external entities in 
competition with it (Paterson 2006, 148). An even further non-anthropocentric step is an 
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attempt to conceptualise biological value with a minimal reliance on human concepts and 
traditions. The next subsection will focus on these varying levels of deep ecology to 
explain how the distinction between deep and shallow ecology comes apart from the 
distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value. 
 
7.5.2 How Deep Ecology and Intrinsic Value Come Apart 
In this subsection I will argue that the continuum of anthropocentric theories comes apart 
from the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value. I will do this by outlining 
non-anthropocentric theories of biological value to highlight the difference between deep 
ecology and deeper ecology. ‘Deeper ecology’ is the name I give to the continuum of non-
anthropocentric theories which vary in their commitment to an anthropocentrism-free 
theory. Whilst I discussed intrinsic value in its own section, intrinsic value is a non-
anthropocentric commitment in so far as it extends the moral duties which agents hold to 
one another out to non-human organisms in the environment (Callicott 1984, 299). 
Anthropocentric theories such as instrumental value can also extend our moral duties out 
to non-human organisms but they ground those duties in very different ways. Instrumental 
value may ground an obligation to protect the environment but it is does so because the 
environment has a further use to us or because certain organisms in the environment suffer 
in the same way that we do. Theories of intrinsic value ground those moral duties in very 
different way. Organisms and the environment have their own value independent of us 
which we are morally obliged to respect (Svoboda 2011, 26). There is the notable 
exception of Callicot who believes that there is never value without someone to value it, 
even if that value is intrinsic (Svoboda 2011, 27). But most theories of intrinsic value 
assign non-anthropocentric value to differing aspects of the ecosystem, some to sentient 
creatures and some to more. 
 A further non-anthropocentric commitment is to reject the distinction between 
instrumental value and intrinsic value entirely. Whilst intrinsic value does ground moral 
obligations to other organisms it still brings some anthropocentric ideas to the table. The 
framework of intrinsic value is built on a foundation of moral rights which is a thoroughly 
human-appropriate framework. With various extensions it captures some of the organisms 
in the environment but still excludes most of them (Callicott 1984, 301). Interestingly, 
some further deontological analysis seeks to distance itself from these anthropocentric 
elements. Rights based ethical analyses dictate when an agent is permitted to act, and when 
they can waive their rights (Wenar 2005, 230). Neither is a good fit for non-sentient 
instinctual organisms such as flora, insects, or bacteria. Taylor is acutely aware of this 
issue when he argues that biological organisms require a modified system of rights. He 
advocates for a modified system because the traditional moral rights framework relies on 
notably human features such as the will to decide if one should exercise a right and second 
order powers over rights (the right to alter our rights) (Taylor 1986, 241, 251). He 
concludes that plants and animals are not right-holders but argues that it is less confusing 
if we simply put the language of rights to one side and, instead, focus on their inherent 




For Kant moral evil occurred when an agent made an exception for themselves from a 
moral law; but insects and flora don’t make exceptions for themselves any more than they 
can respect one another’s interests or waive their rights. 
 Barbara Patterson has argued that we should reject the instrumental-intrinsic 
approach because it perpetuates a western and deeply anthropocentric approach to life: 
development and competition (Paterson 2006, 149). One of the enduring trends of human 
civilisation is our passion for taking the environment and reshaping it for our needs or 
according to our vision (Kaufmann 1980, 36). In the western world we also have a cultural 
glorification of competition (Paterson 2006, 147). We compete and the strong emerge, 
those who have yet to emerge need to fight harder. Patterson argues that we should 
abandon systems of intrinsic value because they echo these anthropocentric assumptions. 
They place us in conflict with the environment. Rights theory still places us in competition 
because the right of human beings to flourish conflict with the right of the environment to 
survive. Patterson argues that we would be better off to understand environmental value as 
a Buddhan land ethic, one which sees human beings as part of the ecosystem which they 
inhabit. Under this interpretation for human beings to irreparably consume the 
environment is as much an act of self-destruction as it is the harvesting of resources 
(Paterson 2006, 148). The details of Patterson’s proposal for this thesis are not as relevant 
as what it represents; a non-anthropocentric system of environmental value which rejects 
intrinsic value as an anthropocentric concept. 
 A final extra step towards non-anthropocentrism is to divorce ethical analysis from 
human preferences as much as possible (Grey 1998, 98–100). This is a punishing standard 
for non-anthropocentrism. It is difficult to conceive of analysis or conversation about 
environmental value between humans without employing at least some human concepts. 
This extreme form of non-anthropocentrism appears as a conceptual challenge to the goals 
of non-anthropocentricism.  
 
This approach is said to produce non-anthropocentric value, rather than anthropocentric value, 
because the human self is only a small part of nature as a whole, which is the Self with a capital S. 
Nevertheless, an alternative interpretation is available, according to which Self-realization is 
anthropocentric and nothing more than Cartesianism commandeered for environmental purposes. 
Note that nature acquires (or borrows) its intrinsic value from the human self, which is established 
on supposedly noncontroversial traditional grounds (the uncritical belief that humans have intrinsic 
value). (Hargrove 1992, 194) 
 
It is an obscure version of non-anthropocentrism because it represents the very far end of 
the continuum of non-anthropocentric theories of value. It is the point on the continuum at 
which we recognise that we cannot completely separate ethical analysis from 
anthropocentric ideas. 
 Non-anthropocentric theories of biological value range in diversity from intrinsic 
theories which extend human considerations to other sentient species to theories which 
attempt to analyse environmental value with as few anthropocentric assumptions as 
possible. Deep ecology is a broad continuum which interacts with instrumental and 
intrinsic value in different ways. Singer extends moral consideration out to non-human 
animals (Paterson 2006, 146). So the application of his theory to biological value is 
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instrumental with a non-anthropocentric slant because it applies instrumental value to non-
humans. Callicot recognises intrinsic value but denies it can occur without an agent to 
value it (Svoboda 2011, 27). Callicot’s intrinsic value has an anthropocentric slant because 
it requires agents. Patterson argues against the instrumental-intrinsic distinction entirely so 
her view of biological value is non-anthropocentric without appealing to intrinsic value. So 
the relationship between anthropocentricism and the instrumental-intrinsic distinction is 
understood as a perfect overlap between the instrumental/intrinsic distinction and the 
anthropocentric/non-anthropocentric distinction (Paterson 2006). 
 
 
Figure 7.1 The received relationship between instrumental, intrinsic, and anthropocentric 
value 
 
Instead of the above figure, instrumental and intrinsic value should be viewed as 







Figure 7.2 The proposed relationship between instrumental, intrinsic, and anthropocentric 
value 
 
In this figure zones A and B represent the standard view of instrumental value as 
anthropocentric and intrinsic value as non-anthropocentric. Zone C is Singer’s extension of 
interests to non-human organisms. Zone D is the overlap of instrumental and intrinsic 
theory since intrinsically valuable organisms are also an instrumentally valuable means to 
an end. Zone E is Callicott’s theory of intrinsic value which has an anthropocentric slant 
and zone F is Patterson's Buddhan Land ethic that rejects the instrumental, intrinsic divide. 
There are many non-anthropocentric theories of value but they have a diverse interaction 
with other theories of value. What unites them is a core belief that the environment bears 
its own value, independent of anthropocentric concerns. 
In this subsection I explained the distinction between deep ecology and deeper 
ecology. The goal of deep ecology is to rethink our approach to biological value by 
removing anthropocentric assumptions. Instead of thinking of the value of the environment 
in human terms, we should focus on the value of the environment in its own terms. I began 
with a discussion of intrinsic value which is non-anthropocentric in so far as it confers 
value on the environment independent of whether humans are around to value it. I 
discussed a Buddhan land ethic which attempted to reinterpret the role of human beings as 
caretaking participants rather than in a state of competition with the environment. Finally I 
discussed the extreme deepest ecology in which as little recourse is made to human 
concepts as possible. I then used these examples to justify interpreting types of value along 
an anthropocentric continuum between shallow ecology, deep ecology, and deeper 
ecology. This picture differs from the traditional categorisation of instrumental value as 
anthropocentric and intrinsic value as non-anthropocentric. The relationships are more 
complex and require careful attention when appealing to biological value in examples. In 









anthropocentric value in their examples to motivate premise three of the value compass 
argument. This serves as a back up to my claims made about intrinsic value. If 
eliminativists wish to argue that they are not appealing to intrinsic value they will also 
have to argue that they are not appealing to non-anthropocentric value to avoid the risk of 
equivocation. 
 
7.5.3 Eliminativists’ Appeals to Non Anthropocentric Value  
To motivate premise three of the value compass argument for biodiversity eliminativism, 
eliminativists present examples in which protecting biodiversity would fail to protect 
valuable parts of the environment. Some of these examples appeal to non-anthropocentric 
value. I argued in the previous section that the value compass argument is intrinsically 
focused but eliminativists do diverge in how they appeal to intrinsic value. Angermeier’s 
and Karr’s preference for naturalness is a less contentious appeal to intrinsic value than 
Santana’s appeal which openly rejects intrinsic value. “Therefore, appeals to the intrinsic 
value of biodiversity, or to how well the broad nature of biodiversity captures the broad 
distribution of intrinsic value, don’t ground an objection to biodiversity eliminativism” 
(Santana 2017, 90). 
Using textual evidence I will argue in this sub section that eliminativists are 
appealing to non-anthropocentric biological value in their examples. So if eliminativists 
disagree with their appeals being labelled as intrinsic then I will still have a strong case for 
equivocation in the value compass argument. Eliminativists will have to demonstrate that 
the value compass argument appeals to biological value without equivocating 
instrumental, intrinsic, or non-anthropocentric value. The distinction between intrinsic and 
non-anthropocentric value is important because they are distinct conceptions of value. As I 
have argued in the previous subsection, it is possible for: an instrumental theory to lean 
towards non-anthropocentricism, for an intrinsic value theory to lean towards 
anthropocentricism, and for a non-anthropocentric theory to reject the instrumental-
intrinsic value theory completely.  
As with intrinsic value Angermeir and Karr appeal to non-anthropocentric value 
more explicitly than Santana. Both argue that keeping ecosystems in a natural state should 
be the goal of conservation. 
 
When a river is dammed, integrity is reduced, resulting in declines of populations adapted to the 
natural hydrological regime. 
 
Such a change may be interpreted as either a gain or loss in diversity, but integrity is clearly reduced 
because of the shift away from native conditions. 
 
Artificial elements reduce integrity through widely documented effects on native elements and 
processes and should be excluded from evaluations of biodiversity. (Angermeier and Karr 1994, 
693–94) 
 
This preference for a natural state works into their concept of ecological integrity. 
Angermeier defines ecological integrity as the completeness of evolved elements and in 
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one joint author study, measures the introduction of nonindigenous species as a reduction 
of biological integrity. 
 
Thus, ecological integrity reflects the completeness of evolved elements and processes over a broad 
range of organizational levels and spatiotemporal scales. (Angermeier 1994, 601)  
 
Percent nonindigenous individuals measures the degree to which nonindigenous species and hybrids 
have reduced biological integrity in the Ohio River. (Angermeier, Emery et al. 2003, 800) 
 
Angermeir and Karr are appealing to non-anthropocentric value theories in their arguments 
for the elimination of biodiversity. They have a preference for the natural state of an 
ecosystem and they view nonindigenous species as greater threat to biological integrity 
than indigenous species. The most prevalent nonindigenous species is Homo Sapiens so 
tying biological integrity to a lack of nonindigenous species is a deeply non-
anthropocentric commitment.  
Santana’s appeal to non-anthropocentric value is contestable because he words 
most ascriptions of value in terms of what they mean to an agent. “Some ecological values 
are none of these, but are merely existence value, which is the satisfaction derived merely 
from knowing that an object persists in a desired form.” (Santana 2017, 88). The ascription 
of value to an object merely for persisting is intrinsic value in the sense of agent 
independent value but Santana’s description as the “satisfaction . . . from knowing” 
presents it in an instrumental way. Putting aside questions of whether intrinsic value 
understood through an instrumental lens is no longer intrinsic; Santana is appealing to the 
non-anthropocentric intuitions of his readers. “Genetic diversity, however, is nearly a non-
starter. A “gene soup” containing a random sample of genetic material from a given place 
would furnish little in the way of useful information for several reasons.” (Santana 2014, 
771). One of the reasons that gene soup is a compelling example is that it describes a state 
of affairs with comprehensive genetic diversity but without species interacting with one 
another in any sort of ecosystem. It argues that genetic diversity is better when the 
organisms which carry them are active and interacting. Valuing organisms in their own 
ecosystems over reducing them to genetic information places this example squarely on the 
non-anthropocentric continuum.  
The problem with the gene soup example is that it professes to appeal to 
instrumental value but it does it on classically non-anthropocentric territory. It is not clear 
that a genetic ark contains little useful information. It is still a genetic record of every 
single extant species which necessarily includes all undiscovered species and its 
preservation requires less space than typical wildlife preserves. However it is appealing to 
think that genes are more informative when they are instantiated in flourishing, interacting 
biological organisms. This is a non-anthropocentric intuition and it isn’t overwritten by the 
presence of instrumental value. It is possible for a biological element to be intrinsically 
valuable and instrumentally informative. Santana’s argument that gene soup is less 
informative than a comparable functioning ecosystem is an appeal to non-anthropocentric 
value. It is just an appeal to non-anthropocentric value which is obscured behind an 
instrumental façade.  
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Based on the textual evidence I have presented in this subsection I conclude that 
eliminativists are appealing to non-anthropocentric value and that their argument for 
eliminating biodiversity should also be understood as non-anthropocentric value compass 
eliminativism . This conclusion further complicates the value compass argument as I have 
also argued that it should be understood as appealing to instrumental and intrinsic value. 
So to avoid equivocation, eliminativists need to distinguish between three types of 
biological value with numerous sub types when they appeal to biological value in their 
examples. The addition of non-anthropocentric value to the possible interpretations 
strengthens the case for equivocation. If Santana were to argue that intrinsic value compass 
eliminativism incorrectly represents his view then my case that his examples appeal to 
non-anthropocentric value still implies equivocation in the value compass argument for 
biodiversity eliminativism. I have now presented evidence that eliminativists’ value 
examples are appealing to instrumental, intrinsic, and elements of deep ecology. In the 
next section I will argue that since eliminativists need their examples to motivate the value 
compass argument and since those examples appeal to multiple types of biological value, 
that the ‘value’ in value compass eliminativism needs to be understood as pluralistic 
biological value. 
 
7.6 Why the ‘Value’ in the Value Compass Case is Pluralistic 
In this section I will argue that the eliminativists’ appeals to biological value require a 
pluralistic conception of biological value. Pluralist theories take multiple contenders for a 
concept and treat them all as correct. Instrumental, intrinsic, and non-anthropocentric value 
are all important dimensions of biological value so pluralistic biological value recognises 
all of these dimensions as correctly describing some element of biological value. I present 
textual evidence of the author’s appeals to these differing dimensions to argue that the 
value compass case uses pluralistic biological value as the standard for biodiversity. I 
appeal to my conclusions from early sections to argue that eliminativists are appealing to 
pluralistic biological value. Since Santana understands intrinsic features with an 
instrumental lens I present a detailed argument that his standard for biodiversity must be 
pluralistic rather than just instrumental value. I discuss his tacit appeals to intrinsic value 
and argue that because he defines ecological value as an aggregate of values ecological 
value must include multiple dimensions.  
Pluralist systems take multiple distinct concepts and treat them all as correct (Hull 
1997, 358). Biodiversity is treated as such a concept by certain realists. It has a strong 
species core with multiple dimensions of: phylogeny, trait diversity, genetic diversity, 
functionality, and others. To be a pluralist about biological value is to treat different 
theories of value such as instrumental and intrinsic as multiple dimensions of biological 
value. Each captures important elements of biological value but no individual theory 
correctly describes biological value by itself. Pluralism leads to conflict in 
operationalisability. The intrinsic value of the snail darter may require it to be saved even 
if it does not possess enough instrumental value to be worth conserving. But pluralism 
allows conservationists to consider multiple distinct value systems before making a 
decision. 
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The eliminativist conception of value is pluralist because the examples which 
eliminativists use appeal to different types of biological value. So if the examples are to be 
persuasive then eliminativists must presume that the type of value correctly describes an 
important dimension of the environment. In this chapter I have presented textual evidence 
to argue that the examples which Santana, Angermeier, and Karr present are relying on 
intuitions about instrumental value, intrinsic value, and varying degrees of non-
anthropocentric value. The case for Angermeir and Karr’s conception of value is straight-
forward. They acknowledge instrumental value but also appeal to intrinsic non 
anthropocentric value with their preference for naturalness. Naturalness is a key factor in 
biological and ecological integrity which they argue should replace biodiversity as a goal 
of conservation. 
 
To be effective, conservationists will need to openly profess their values and persuade others that 
natural biotic diversity contributes significantly to the quality of human lives. (Angermeier 2000, 
379) 
  
The capability of supporting and maintaining a balanced, integrated, adaptive community of 
organisms having a species composition, diversity, and functional organization comparable to that 
of natural habitat of the region. (Karr and Dudley 1981, 56)  
 
Whereas diversity is a collective property of system elements, integrity is a synthetic property of the 
system. Unlike diversity, which can be expressed simply as the number of kinds of items, integrity 
refers to conditions under little or no influence from human actions; a biota with high integrity 
reflects natural evolutionary and biogeographical processes (Angermeier and Karr 1994, 692). 
 
Therefore the type of value which Angermeier and Karr use to motivate premise three of 
the value compass argument is pluralistic. They point out the importance of non-
anthropocentric and intrinsic elements whilst also appealing to the instrumental value of 
the environment. They argue that ecosystems which are closer to their natural state will 
contribute significantly to human lives. 
 The case for Santana’s pluralism is more complex than that of Angermeier and 
Karr’s because Santana prefers non-intrinsic analyses of value. In his 2017 article he is 
sceptical of intrinsic value and presumes its existence for the sake of argument (Santana 
2017, 89). However he does clearly state that “Ecological value comprises at least these: 
economic, aesthetic, cultural, and existence values” (Santana 2017, 89). Economic, 
aesthetic, and cultural value are all examples of instrumental anthropocentric values. They 
are valuable to agents from a human centric approach to the world. Existence value is 
typically an intrinsic form of value but Santana explicitly defines it as the satisfaction we 
derive from knowing that an object is persisting (Santana 2017, 88). So this particular 
account of existence value is also both anthropocentric and instrumental. Despite this, I 
contend that Santana’s concept of ecological value is actually pluralistic. Santana’s appeals 
to value are presented as instrumental but whether they are compelling is dependent on a 
variety of intrinsic and non-anthropocentric intuitions. 
 I offer two reasons to think that Santana’s concept of ecological value is pluralistic. 
The first is the textual evidence I presented in the intrinsic and non-anthropocentric 
sections. Santana may be suspicious of intrinsic value but he is appealing to our intrinsic 
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intuitions with his examples. A preference for nature in its natural state or presuming that a 
genetic ark has less value than a functioning ecosystem containing the same information is 
a tacit appeal to non-anthropocentric systems of intrinsic value. The second reason is that 
Santana also states that the ecological value which he believes biodiversity fails to track is 
“the aggregate of values we place in the environment” (Santana 2017, 86). The use of ‘we’ 
suggests anthropocentricism but the use of ‘place’ is ambiguous. It could refer to a human 
construction or an act of inference such as ‘based on the thermal imaging I place the nest 
over there’. A true aggregate of values includes intrinsic and anthropocentric values and it 
is only anthropocentric in the sense that the values are identified by humans. So ecological 
value includes the weak intrinsic value of (Hargrove 1992), the instrumental value of 
(Kaufmann 1980), and the non-anthropocentric rejection of the instrumental-intrinsic 
distinction by (Paterson 2006). Therefore Santana’s concept of ecological value is also 
pluralistic. Instrumental, intrinsic, and non-anthropocentric are all values that authors place 
in the environment so if ecological value is the aggregate of values we place in the 
environment then it includes those three and many of their sub types.  
Biodiversity eliminativists use a variety of examples to advance their thesis that 
biodiversity is not suitable for the goals of conservation. These examples are presented 
with the implicit claim that they are examples of biological value. They represent 
organisms or biological phenomena that we ought to preserve. I have argued throughout 
this chapter that they are valuable in different ways. Since eliminativists believe that these 
are compelling examples of biological value which biodiversity fails to protect and they 
are appealing to different systems of value then the kind of value which eliminativists are 
concerned about is pluralistic. They believe that biological value refers to multiple distinct 
elements captured by different theories. Ecosystems are valuable for human use but they 
also possess a value intrinsic to themselves and it might be best to approach it in a non-
anthropocentric way where possible. Thus the value compass argument for biodiversity 
eliminativism relies on pluralistic biological value. Eliminativists are arguing that 
biodiversity fails to preserve the instrumental, intrinsic, and non-anthropocentric value of 
the environment so we ought to use a different target for conservation; one which better 
approximates pluralistic biological value. In the next two sections I will discuss problems 
with using pluralistic biological value as the standard for conservation surrogates. I begin 
with eliminativist equivocations of ‘value’.  
 
7.7 Eliminativist Equivocations of 'value' 
In this section I will argue that biodiversity eliminativists are not being careful enough 
with their appeals to biological value and so are equivocating in the value compass case 
for biodiversity’s elimination. Angermeier and Karr use a concept of integrity which 
equivocates the health of an ecosystem with its natural state. They identify dimensions of 
ecosystem health as the priority of conservation but then appeal to examples of ecosystems 
in a natural state. Santana explicitly argues for instrumental value but tacitly appeals to 
intrinsic and non-anthropocentric instances of biological value. So his concept of 
ecological value equivocates instrumental value with pluralist biological value. 
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7.7.1 Biological Integrity as Pluralist biological value 
Angermeier and Karr‘s integrity concept equivocates in their value compass case because 
they present biological integrity as a concept of health but appeal to a lack of naturalness 
to criticise biodiversity.  
 
 This incomplete view fails to recognize that elimination of extensive areas of old growth forest, 
dramatic declines in hundreds of genetically distinct salmonid stocks in the Pacific Northwest, and 
the loss of chemically distinct populations from different portions of a species range represent 
significant losses of biodiversity, regardless of whether any species become extinct. (Angermeier 
and Karr 1994, 692) 
 
 The inadequacy of current conceptions of biodiversity recently was made clear to me in several 
independent discussions with natural resource managers and scientists, where I asserted that 
introductions of exotic species into the wild diminish rather than enhance biodiversity. (Angermeier 
1994, 660) 
 
So Angermeier and Karr’s value compass argument for biodiversity eliminativism takes 
the following form. 
 
The Value Compass Case for Biodiversity Eliminativism 
1) Conservation ought to preserve the valuable elements of the environment. 
2) Biological integrity reliably tracks biological value. 
3) Biodiversity does not correlate well with biological value or biological integrity. 
4) Therefore: The goal of conservation ought to be biological integrity rather than 
biodiversity. 
 
Biological integrity is presented as a health concept. In Biological Integrity versus 
Biological Diversity as Policy Directives Angermeier and Karr (1994, 692) offer the 
following table to break biological integrity down into its components. 
 
Hierarchy Elements Processes Indicators 
Taxonomic Species Range expansion or contraction Range size 
  Extinction Number of populations 
  Evolution Isolating mechanisms 
Genetic Gene Mutation Number of alleles 
  Recombination Degree of linkage 
  Selection Inbreeding or outbreeding 
depression 
Ecological Population Abundance fluctuation Age or size structure 
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  Colonization or extinction Dispersal behaviour 
  Evolution Gene flow 
 Assemblage Competitive exclusion Number of Species 
  Predation or parasitism Species evenness 
  Energy flow Number of trophic links 
  Nutrient Cycling Element redundancy 
 Landscape Disturbance Fragmentation 
  Succession Number of communities 
  Soil formation Persistence 
 
Table 7.1: Components of Biological Integrity 
 
So biological integrity should be understood as a measure of how well the biological 
processes of an ecosystem are functioning. This is an analysis of health. If species richness 
is steady but nutrient cycling is failing then integrity is reduced.  
 But in their examples which criticise biodiversity, Angermeier and Karr both 
appeal to the naturalness of an ecosystem multiple times.  
 
Biological Integrity — The capability of supporting and maintaining a balanced, integrated, 
adaptive community of organisms having a species composition and functional organisation 
comparable to that of natural habitat of the region. (Karr 1990, 285)  
 
When a river is damned, integrity is reduced, resulting in declines of populations adapted to the 
natural hydrological regime. 
 
Such a change may be interpreted as either a gain or loss in diversity, but integrity is clearly reduced 
because of the shift away from native conditions. 
 
Artificial elements reduce integrity through widely documented effects on native elements and 
processes and should be excluded from evaluations of biodiversity. (Angermeier and Karr 1994, 
693–94) 
 
Thus, ecological integrity reflects the completeness of evolved elements and processes over a broad 
range of organizational levels and spatiotemporal scales  (Angermeier 1994, 601). 
  
The capability of supporting and maintaining a balanced, integrated, adaptive community of 
organisms having a species composition, diversity, and functional organization comparable to that 
of natural habitat of the region. (Karr and Dudley 1981, 56)  
 




The Value Compass Case for Biodiversity Eliminativism 
1)  Conservation ought to preserve the valuable elements of the environment. 
2)  Biological integrity (understood as ecosystem health) reliably tracks biological value. 
3) Biodiversity does not correlate well with biological value or biological integrity 
(understood as ecosystem naturalness). 
4) Therefore: The goal of conservation ought to be biological integrity rather than 
biodiversity. 
 
The argument equivocates the different meanings of ‘biological integrity’. Health and 
naturalness are distinct properties. Health is just as difficult to measure as biodiversity but 
naturalness is a deeply contentious concept. Human beings are a part of the ecosystem 
which conservation aims to protect (Takacs 1996, 42). Our preference for unspoilt 
naturalness is a recent development which often overlooks the indigenous people who 
were shifted off that land. The equivocation here is problematic because it argues that 
conservation should protect the health of an ecosystem by keeping things human free in a 
natural state. Arguing that health is a better goal for conservation than biodiversity is 
difficult enough without substituting ‘health’ for ‘naturalness’. Naturalness is a more 
contentious concept than health which is itself less contentious than biodiversity.  
 To complicate matters further Angermeier and Karr both appeal to instrumental 
value in their arguments as well.  
 
Only in the presence of a functioning biological system are other resources (for example, energy, 
minerals) useful to man.  (Karr and Dudley 1981, 56)  
 
The total worth of biodiversity to society comprises a broad array of values, including aesthetic, 
ecological, and utilitarian values. Some of that value is inherently dependent on the variety of biotic 
systems. (Angermeier 1994, 601) 
 
To be effective, conservationists will need to openly profess their values and persuade others that 
natural biotic diversity contributes significantly to the quality of human lives. (Angermeier 2000, 
379) 
 
These are appeals to anthropocentric instrumental value because they appeal to ways in 
which the environment provides a means to human ends. So the examples they use to 
motivate premise three of the value compass argument appeal to health and naturalness 
which are intrinsic and non-anthropocentric but they also appeal to instrumental value and 
anthropocentric values. There is an equivocation of biological value because Angermeier 
and Karr are treating distinct conceptions of biological value as the same concept. 
 
7.7.2 Santana's instrumentalism as pluralist biological value 
Santana equivocates in his value compass case for biodiversity’s elimination because he 
presents instrumental value as the goal of conservation but appeals to intrinsic and non-
anthropocentric value in his motivating examples. Santana initially uses instrumental value 
as the goal for conservation. He is explicitly sceptical of intrinsic value  and defines 
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ecological value instrumentally (Santana 2017, 89). “Ecological value comprises at least 
these economic, aesthetic, cultural, and existence values.” (Santana 2017, 89). Whilst 
value for existing is typically an intrinsic type of value, Santana defines it instrumentally 
as “the satisfaction derived merely from knowing that an object persists in its desired 
form” (Santana 2017, 88). So rather than value for existing, existence value is how much 
we enjoy knowing that something exists which is a clear example of means to an end. 
Santana argues that we should reject biodiversity because it does not track ecological value 
well. 
 
The principle role played by biodiversity in conservation biology is as a comparative measure of 
value. Biodiversity does not fulfil that role well, in part because it is not straightforwardly 
measureable quantity. Moreover, it does not fulfil that role well because it does not closely track 
ecological value, the aggregate of values we place in the environment. (Santana 2017, 86) 
 
So Santana’s value compass argument takes the following form. 
 
The Value Compass Case for Biodiversity Eliminativism 
1) Conservation ought to preserve ecological value. 
2) Therefore: The goal of conservation ought to reliably track ecological value. 
3) Biodiversity does not reliably track ecological value. 
4) Therefore: Biodiversity ought not to be a conservation goal. 
 
Santana has defined ecological value instrumentally. Even his appeals to 
naturalness are worded as the value people derive from a natural ecosystem. 
 
Additionally it seems to be the case that many people value keeping ecosystems as close as possible 
to the state of nature. But a richness scale suggests that we can improve a system by deviating from 
the state of nature and importing species by, say, adding a fish to a lake. (Santana 2014, 769) 
 
Whilst Santana sets the goal for conservation as instrumental value, his motivating 
examples appeal to multiple types of value. Consider his appeal to gene soup to reject 
genetic diversity as a candidate for the meaning ‘biodiversity’. 
 
Genetic diversity, however, is nearly a non-starter. A “gene soup” containing a random sample of 
genetic material from a given place would furnish little in the way of useful information for several 
reasons. (Santana 2014, 771) 
 
In this example Santana prefers functioning ecosystems over genetic soup because it is 
more informative. So his motivation is instrumental. But, provided that it is a genetic ark 
rather than a bowl of D.N.A., gene soup is as instrumentally valuable as a functioning 
ecosystem containing the same genetic information. It contains a genetic record of every 
extant species and we can study that record in a single place. It is also possible that 
Santana is appealing to existence value. Some agents prefer wild ecosystems to botanic 
gardens but for every agent who values genes in the wild there is an agent who values 
genetic soup. Santana defines existence value in terms of how much we enjoy a biological 
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element’s existence and there are many reasons to enjoy the existence of gene soup. A 
container of every biological gene makes for a fascinating station at a museum.  
 Gene soup cannot rely solely on instrumental value for its persuasiveness because 
there is as much instrumental value in gene soup as there is in a functioning ecosystem. 
This is because instrumental value is the value of a means to an end so there are as many 
instrumental values as there are preferences in sentient agents. This is also because a 
complete genetic ark provides immediate access to the genetic information of all species. 
For gene soup to be a persuasive example it must appeal to intrinsic value in the sense of a 
non-extrinsic property or some other non-anthropocentric value. Santana sets instrumental 
value as the target for conservation but appeals to non-anthropocentric value. So, his value 
compass argument for biodiversity eliminativism equivocates in the following way. 
 
The Value Compass Case for Biodiversity Eliminativism 
1) Conservation ought to preserve ecological value (instrumental value). 
2) Therefore: The goal of conservation ought to reliably track ecological value 
(instrumental value). 
3) Biodiversity does not reliably track ecological value (non-anthropocentric value). 
4) Therefore: Biodiversity ought not to be a conservation goal. 
 
This equivocation is echoed in his concern for biodiversity cold spots. “The trend in 
conservation biology of prioritising biodiversity “hot spots” distracts from attending to 
biodiversity “cold spots”.” (Santana 2014, 770–71). Instrumental value ought to decrease 
as species richness and functionality do. A concern for biodiversity cold spots is a non-
anthropocentric one which attempts to treat various biological organisms as equal rather 
than give undue weight to species rich ecosystems. Biodiversity cold spots such as deserts 
are still as valuable as biodiversity hotspots and deserve conservation’s attention (Durant 
et al. 2014, 114). 
 Santana’s value compass case for elimination equivocates because it presents itself 
as concern about how well biodiversity tracks instrumental value but the motivating 
examples appeal to instrumental value, intrinsic value, and non-anthropocentric value. 
Santana sets instrumental value as the goal of a conservation surrogate but criticises 
biodiversity for failing to approximate multiple distinct types of biological value. Treating 
distinct types of biological value under a single category is a mistake. However restricting 
value compass eliminativism to a specific dimension of biological value such as economic 
instrumentalism is not a palatable option for eliminativists either because they would have 
to give up many of their motivating examples. The best option for biodiversity 
eliminativism is to understand the value compass case as focusing on pluralistic biological 
value. Then eliminativists can retain their examples as instances of biological value which 
biodiversity does not track well. Pluralistic value compass eliminativism is the best 
interpretation of eliminativist arguments but as I will argue in the next section it comes 




In this chapter I have introduced the value compass case for biodiversity’s elimination and 
sought to identify the type of value which eliminativists are appealing to. Identifying the 
type of value is important because while eliminativists argue that biodiversity is a poor 
surrogate for biological value but there are multiple distinct types of biological value and 
eliminativists do not identify which type of value biodiversity is a poor surrogate for. 
Treating all types of biological value as the same risks equivocation in the value compass 
argument so in this chapter I used textual evidence to identify the types of biological value 
that eliminativists appeal to in their examples and argue that the value compass argument 
for biodiversity eliminativism is far more problematic when care is taken to distinguish 
types of biological value.  
 I began by discussing different types of biological value and arguing that Santana, 
Angermeier, and Karr appeal to them in their examples of biodiversity correlating poorly 
with biological value. I explained instrumental value as a means to an end and highlighted 
different types of instrumental value such as: economic, aesthetic, and cultural. I explained 
intrinsic value as its own end but also drew attention to three different uses of intrinsic: 
non-instrumental, non-extrinsic property, and value independent of an agent’s beliefs. I 
introduced non-anthropocentric value as an alternative to intrinsic value. I argued that 
whilst intrinsic value and non-anthropocentric value are often treated interchangeably they 
are distinct. There is a continuum of anthropocentricity along which instrumental and 
intrinsic sit in overlapping positions. I used textual evidence to argue that Santana, 
Angermeier, and Karr appeal to all three types of value in their examples which are used to 
motivate premise two of the value compass case. Angermeier and Karr’s appeals focus on 
non-anthropocentricity and intrinsic value but they also appeal to instrumental value. 
Santana identifies ecological value as instrumental but his examples do appeal to intrinsic 
and non-anthropocentric types of value. I noted that identifying these examples as 
appealing to both intrinsic and non-anthropocentric value is important. If eliminativists are 
opposed to their work being analysed in terms of intrinsic value then they still have to 
argue that their motivating examples are not appealing to non-anthropocentric value. 
 Using this textual evidence I concluded that the value compass case was focused 
on pluralistic biological value. Eliminativists are in fact arguing that a good conservation 
surrogate should approximate multiple types of biological value. I then argued that 
eliminativists are equivocating in their arguments. Angermeier and Karr criticise 
biodiversity for failing to prioritise integrity and the naturalness of an ecosystem but they 
use examples which highlight a loss of instrumental value. Santana criticises biodiversity 
for correlating poorly with instrumental value but uses examples which highlight losses of 
intrinsic and non-anthropocentric value. In the next chapter I will argue that the pluralistic 
value compass case for biodiversity’s elimination is unsuccessful. 
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8 The Value Compass Case for Eliminating Biodiversity 
is Unsuccessful  
 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will argue that the value compass case for eliminating biodiversity fails. 
This chapter’s conclusion relies on the material from chapter seven. In chapter seven I 
sought to identify the kind of biological value which eliminativists were appealing to in 
their arguments. I identified several equivocations in the eliminativists' use of ‘value’ and 
argued that the best way to understand their arguments was as an appeal to pluralistic 
ecological value. Eliminativists argue that the priority for conservation ought to reliably 
track our common intuitions about biological value. The assumption in the eliminativists’ 
argument that biodiversity ought to be a value compass is an important one. Not just 
because it is the standard which is used to justify eliminating biodiversity but also because 
it motivates the conceptual and empirical cases for elimination. A common thread in the 
conceptual and empirical case for eliminating biodiversity was the eliminativists’ appeals 
to biological value. Demonstrating that the value compass case is unsuccessful also 
highlights further flaws in the conceptual and empirical cases. 
I begin in section 8.2 by re-introducing the value compass case for eliminating 
biodiversity. Biodiversity ought to track pluralistic ecological value but it often does not. 
In section 8.3 I discuss problems with using a value compass as the standard which a 
conservation goal must meet. I argue that pluralistic ecological value is a punishing 
standard, that eliminativists have not told us why biodiversity ought to be a reliable value 
compass, and that the value compass case for elimination is self-eliminating. In section 8.4 
I argue that even if biodiversity is not a reliable value compass then there are still good 
reasons to retain biodiversity as a conservation goal. Biodiversity is a better conservation 
priority than the alternatives and it tracks reductions of biological value even if it does not 
reliably maximise value. In section 8.5 I identify an equivocation in the value compass 
case and argue that the same equivocation occurs in both the conceptual case and the 
empirical case for biodiversity’s elimination. I conclude that the value compass case fails 
and that because the conceptual and empirical cases for elimination also fail, we have good 
reasons to use biodiversity as a goal for conservation. 
 
8.2 The Value Compass Case for Eliminating Biodiversity 
In this section I will outline and motivate the value compass case for eliminating 
biodiversity. The value compass case for elimination argues that conservation should not 
use biodiversity as a goal because it does not track pluralistic biological value well. 
Actions such as the extermination of smallpox, lower biodiversity but promote biological 
value (Santana 2014, 769). This is due in part to the complex relationship between what is 
valuable for the environment and what is valuable in the environment for human beings 
now. Conservation does not prioritise the survival of smallpox because it poses a 
significant threat to the well-being of human beings.  Similarly, the relationship between 
biodiversity and biological value is also a complex one. Whilst the preservation of 
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biodiversity is a goal for conservation, in practice conservationists also dedicate many 
resources to eradicating elements of biodiversity. The control or eradication of pest species 
is a high priority for conservation because it protects biological value. 
The value compass argument is an amalgamation of the arguments for 
biodiversity’s elimination presented by Santana, Angermeier, and Karr. All three authors 
present motivating examples for biodiversity’s elimination, in which preserving 
biodiversity would not protect biological value. In chapter seven I discussed these 
examples at length. I argued that whilst they all appeal to biological value, they all appeal 
to different types of biological value. I concluded that biodiversity eliminativists use 
pluralistic biological value as the standard for a conservation goal. They expect the goal of 
conservation to track the many different types of biological value which are borne by the 
environment. Adjusted for the conclusion of chapter seven, the value compass case for 
biodiversity eliminativism can be formalised in the following way: 
 
The Value Compass Case for Biodiversity Eliminativism  
1) Conservation ought to preserve pluralistic biological value. 
2) The goal of conservation ought to reliably track pluralistic biological value. 
3) Biodiversity is the goal of conservation. 
4) Biodiversity does not reliably track pluralistic biological value. 
5) If the goal of conservation does not reliably track biological value then it ought to be 
eliminated. 
6) Therefore: Biodiversity ought to be eliminated as the goal of conservation. 
 
 The value compass case is my construction of the author’s arguments so its 
premises require justification. Premise three is not contentious although it has rightly been 
pointed out that biodiversity can be understood as one important goal for conservation 
rather than the only important goal for conservation (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 988). 
However given that ‘biodiversity’ appears as a priority in a number of international treaties 
of conservation, it is fair to treat it as a high priority even if conservation has other goals as 
well (Maclaurin 2017, 57). The examples in chapter seven justify premise four. All three 
authors have presented multiple examples of biodiversity failing to track pluralistic 
biological value. Certainly, biodiversity sometimes conflicts with our conservation 
intuitions. Faith, for example, contemplates preserving only one species of tuatara because 
further species do not maximise phylogenetic diversity.  
Premise one that “conservation ought to preserve pluralistic biological value” is an 
assumption which Santana, Angermeier, and Karr rely on in their arguments. If one argues 
that the failure to track biological value is a good reason to eliminate biodiversity as a 
conservation goal then one is assuming that conservation ought to preserve biological 
value. To that end premise two is required; if conservation ought to preserve pluralistic 
biological value then whatever we set as the goal of conservation ought to reliably track 
pluralistic biological value. This is an assumption but it is a sensible one. Conservationists 
have limited resources and when we cannot preserve all elements, we ought to preserve the 
most valuable elements. Likewise, premise five that “if the goal of conservation does not 
reliably track biological value then it ought to be eliminated” is also a sensible assumption. 
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Goals are only effective when they track the objective which they are required to. For 
example, profit is an ineffective goal for medical research because treating disease can be 
expensive. 
Lastly, the value compass case for biodiversity eliminativism does not consider the 
role of risk in conservation decision making. Risk is an important factor in decision 
making because what we ought to do is not only a function of what is valuable but also of 
risk based factors such as the probability of success and the danger of producing harm. 
Small pox was eradicated because it was dangerous to humans and conservationists often 
face difficult decisions with fund allocation. Restoring a critically endangered species is 
costly and difficult, whereas the same money could effectively protect an several 
endangered species. The value compass case does not consider these factors because it is a 
response to the eliminativist challenges against biodiversity and those eliminativists do not 
discuss risk at detail in their appeals to biological value. These chapters are a direct 
response to the eliminativist position and as such are a focused response to their 
arguments. 
 My strategy for the value compass case will be to accept the truth of premise four 
and three but challenge the truth of premises: one, two, and five. Biodiversity is the goal of 
conservation and I accept that it does not reliably track pluralistic biological value but I 
deny that it ought to. In section 8.3 I will identify several problems with using a pluralistic 
biological value compass as the minimum standard for a conservation goal. I will use these 
problems to argue that contra to premises one and two, pluralistic biological value is an 
inappropriate standard to measure the success of conservation goals. In section 8.4 I will 
argue that even if biodiversity is a poor value compass then, contra to premise five there 
are still good reasons to retain it as conservation goal. In section 8.5 I will argue that the 
value compass case for biodiversity’s elimination is faulty because it relies on conflating 
biological value with conservational normativity. I will argue that this mistake also 
motivates the conceptual and empirical cases. For these reasons I will conclude that the 
value compass case for biodiversity’s elimination is unsuccessful. 
8.3 Problems with Setting Pluralistic Biological Value as the Goal 
In this section I will outline several problems with using pluralistic biological value as the 
target for a conservation surrogate. The type of biological value which eliminativists are 
appealing to in the value compass case is pluralistic. Their motivating examples, however, 
appeal to specific dimensions of biological value such as aesthetic instrumental value or 
non-anthropocentric value. Aside from the equivocation risk there are further problems 
with setting pluralistic biological value as the standard that a conservation surrogate must 
achieve. In this section I will discuss three such problems. In section 8.3.1 I will argue that 
pluralistic biological value is too punishing a standard for a conservation goal. In section 
8.3.2 I will argue that biodiversity eliminativists have not explained why conservation 
goals must achieve such a high standard. ‘All biological value’ is a difficult standard 
which few conservation surrogates could effectively track. It is not surprising that 
biodiversity struggles to track: instrumental, intrinsic, and non-anthropocentric elements of 
biological value. In section 8.3.3 I will argue that the concept of pluralistic biological 
value is vulnerable to the eliminativists’ own strategy. If general conceptions of 
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biodiversity ought to be eliminated because they are not operationalisable, then pluralistic 
biological value ought to be eliminated because it is less operationalisable than 
biodiversity.  
 
8.3.1 Pluralistic Value is too punishing a minimum standard 
In this subsection I will argue that using pluralistic biological value as a standard to judge 
the performance of a conservation goal is too punishing. This is because of two reasons: 
there is no consensus among value theorists as to which theory correctly describes 
biological value, and systems of pluralistic value make conflicting recommendations.  
It is unfair to test a conservation goal as a value compass because there is no 
consensus among value theorists about what biological value is. The material I presented 
in chapter seven demonstrated that the current debate over the nature of biological value is 
still unsettled. Like the species problem and the biodiversity problem, there are many 
conflicting theories about which theory of biological value is correct. No individual theory 
provides a complete account of value so multiple theories are necessary to give an accurate 
account of the nature of value. When there is no consensus on the nature of biological 
value, conservation goals cannot be value compasses. We cannot test a conservation goal 
by how well it selects the most valuable biological elements because we cannot agree on 
which elements are the most valuable. Even if there were a value theorist consensus on the 
nature of biological value, a concept like biodiversity could never reflect everyone’s 
intuitions about which biological organisms are valuable. Santana’s example of the 
eradication of smallpox is a persuasive example because it aligns with our personal 
intuitions about biological value. It is not so much a clear example of an increase in 
biological value as an example of an organism which conservationists ought not to 
preserve for the benefit of human beings.  
A pluralistic biological value compass test is also a punishing standard because 
pluralistic systems often make conflicting recommendations. The biological species 
concept and the morphological species concept disagree over whether hybrids are unique 
species. Utilitarians and deontologists disagree over whether it is right to kill one person to 
save five (Kagan 2011, 107). So, a pluralist moral system consisting of utilitarian and 
deontological dimensions would conflict over whether such an act is morally permissible. 
Pluralistic systems generate inconsistent recommendations because their multiple 
dimensions disagree over classification. Because biological value is a pluralistic system 
there will be problem spots for any conservation goal which is trying to function as a value 
compass. The eradication of smallpox to protect human beings appeals to instrumentalists 
but intrinsic value theorists will disagree that we are permitted to exterminate a species for 
human benefit. The preservation of ecosystems in their native conditions appeals to the 
deep ecology movement but not to authors such as Cronon who see problems with the 
wilderness concept (Cronon 1995).  
These examples are the problem spots of a pluralistic system of biological value. 
They tell us little about the accuracy of a conservation goal and much more about how 
difficult it is to make sense of biological value. Because of the conflicting 
recommendations of pluralistic systems all conservation goals will struggle to reliably 
track biological value, so biodiversity should not be held accountable for struggling as a 
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value compass. In the next subsection I will argue that eliminativists have not explained 
why biodiversity ought to be a compass for pluralistic biological value. 
8.3.2 Eliminativists have not explained why biodiversity ought to track 
pluralistic biological value 
Biodiversity eliminativists have appealed to multiple types of biological value in their 
motivating examples but they have not explained why the standard for a conservation 
surrogate should be ‘all of biological value’. This is problematic for the eliminativist 
position because their motivating examples, whilst compelling, rely on that assumption. 
Angermeier and Karr are correct that we should be concerned about deforestation long 
before the individual species are about to go extinct (Angermeier and Karr 1994, 692). 
Santana is correct that adding more species to an ecosystem is not the same as returning it 
to its naturally evolved state (Santana 2014, 769). But neither have they explained why the 
acceptable threshold for a conservation surrogate is that it accurately approximates 
multiple systems of biological value. When a conservation surrogate is expected to 
correlate with multiple systems of biological value it will miss valuable organisms. A push 
to mitigate species loss may do nothing to protect the migration of the monarch butterfly. 
However it would protect countless other instances of valuable biology such as organisms 
which are instrumentally or intrinsically valuable.  
If eliminativists want a conservation surrogate which successfully protects multiple 
systems of value then few surrogates will be up to the task and the eliminativist 
observation that ‘biodiversity fails to protect this’ will be less persuasive. If biodiversity 
were expected to protect a single dimension of biological value such as instrumental value 
then observations that it was failing at its task would be quite powerful. But in so far as 
eliminativists expect conservation surrogates to get all of biological value correct, their 
observations highlight the tensions of a pluralist system rather than a shortcoming of 
biodiversity. In fact, it is not clear that any conservation surrogate could accurately 
approximate pluralistic biological value. Pluralistic biological value has more internal 
conflict than biodiversity because multiple dimensions are determined by an agent’s 
personal interests. As I will argue in the next subsection, by Santana’s own standard for a 
conservation surrogate, pluralistic biological value is self-eliminating. 
8.3.3 As a standard for elimination, pluralist biological value is self-
eliminating 
A serious problem for the value compass case is that, by Santana’s own standards, it is 
self-eliminating. Understanding biological value as a single clustered property with 
multiple loosely correlated dimensions is structurally no different to understanding 
biodiversity as a single clustered property with multiple loosely correlated dimensions. The 
central argument in Santana’s work is that the multiple dimensions of biodiversity do not 
correlate highly enough to warrant being treated as a single property (Santana 2014, 761). 
But as diverse as the multiple dimensions of biodiversity are, the multiple dimensions of 
biological value are more so. This leads pluralistic biological value to the same dilemma 
which Santana used against biodiversity. Biological value is the target for conservation 
and can either be pluralistic or specific. If biological value is pluralistic then is not 
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operationisable. If it is specific then it has counterexamples. In the case of biodiversity 
Santana offered examples to convince us that species, morphology, functionality, 
evolution, and genetic diversity cannot represent biodiversity. If you believed that 
biodiversity was genetic diversity then you would be satisfied with preserving a gene soup 
containing as many genes as possible. But you are not satisfied with gene soup so there is 
more to biodiversity than genetic diversity (Santana 2014, 771).  
It is a convincing argument but mutatis mutandis arguments can be produced 
against biological value. If you believe that biological value was a matter of instrumental 
value then you would have no problem with whaling practices which did not threaten 
extinction. But you are not satisfied with whaling practices even if whaling brings 
instrumental value to some people so there must be more to biological value than 
instrumental value. Examples are easily replicable so if Santana contends that the first 
observation is sufficient to question the use of ‘biodiversity’, then the second observation 
is sufficient to question the use of biological value. Where Santana argues that we should 
eliminate biodiversity because it cannot be understood as species, genetics, or 
functionality, then we should eliminate biological value because it cannot be understood as 
instrumental, intrinsic, or non-anthropocentric value. Understanding biological value as 
pluralistic implies that value motivated eliminativism is relying on a vague cluster property 
(biological value) to exploit apparent conflicts with another vague cluster property 
(biodiversity). This is a self-undermining strategy because all vague cluster properties are 
susceptible to the pattern of arguments which Santana uses against biodiversity. Santana’s 
dilemma between specific dimensions with counterexamples and general but non-
operationalisable conceptions applies as well to biological value as it does to biodiversity. 
So, pluralistic value compass eliminativism is self-eliminating. 
8.4 There are still good reasons to retain Biodiversity even if it is 
not an effective value compass  
In this section I will argue that even if biodiversity is not an effective compass for 
pluralistic biological value, there are still good reasons to retain it as a goal for 
conservation. This conclusion will falsify premise five of the value compass case for 
biodiversity eliminativism which states “If the goal of conservation does not reliably track 
biological value then it ought to be eliminated”. Since the premise is a conditional 
statement, a counterexample is produced by assuming the truth of the antecedent and 
demonstrating the falsity of the consequent. Biodiversity is the goal of conservation so a 
counterexample requires an instance in which biodiversity does not reliably track 
biological value but ought to be retained as a goal for conservation. In this section I argue 
for two such instances. Firstly, I argue that biodiversity is a better conservation target than 
the alternatives. A conservation goal ought to be retained if it meets the needs of 
conservation better than its competing theories. Secondly, I argue that even if maximising 
biodiversity does not maximise biological value, it still tracks losses of biological value. A 
conservation goal ought to be retained if it monitors a loss of value. So biodiversity can be 
an important goal during decreases of biological value without being an important goal 
during increases of biological value.  
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8.4.1 Biodiversity is a Better Conservation Target than the alternatives 
In this subsection I will argue that one reason to retain biodiversity as a target of 
conservation if it is not a reliable value compass is that is still a better conservation target 
than its competitors. First I explain the philosophy of science behind this idea. Historically, 
science has been better served by favouring the best performing theory than rejecting 
imperfect theories. Then I outline several goals which the focus of conservation must 
meet. Next, I presume that biodiversity is not a reliable value compass but argue that it is 
better suited for the goals of conservation than the following competitors: biological 
integrity, biological value, and the specific dimensions of biodiversity. I conclude that 
even if it were an unreliable value compass, biodiversity should be retained as a goal of 
conservation because it is a better target than the alternatives. 
 There are good reasons to retain biodiversity as a conservation target even if it is 
not a reliable value compass because theories which perform better than their competitors 
are worth retaining. An important historical example of this is the continued use of naïve 
set theory despite its inconsistency. There is no clearer proof of the incorrectness of a 
theory than a demonstration that it generates an internal contradiction. Naïve set theory 
was demonstrably incorrect but it remained in used for approximately thirty years until it 
was replaced with Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (Colyvan 2008, 
24–25). Similar issues faced the infinitesimal calculus of Leibniz and Newton until a more 
suitable method was discovered (Brown and Priest 2004, 379). Scientific work continues 
with problematic theories because restricting the tool set to problem free theories leaves 
few tools to work with. Theory selection in scientific progress is less about which theory is 
not problematic and more about which theory is the least problematic. 
All conservation goals will be somewhat problematic because effective 
conservation has several difficult requirements. Santana, Angermeier, and Karr correctly 
identify one such requirement that our conservation goal prioritise the most valuable 
biological elements for conservation. But, conservation has other requirements. The goal 
of conservation must also be: pragmatic, operationalisable, amenable to legislation, and 
balance benefits for the environment such as low habitat fragmentation with humans’ 
desires such as urban development. The goal must be pragmatic because we must be able 
to conserve it. It must be operationalisable because we need to measure and calculate for 
triage and reporting. It must be amenable to legislation so that we can set down clear 
policy and perhaps most difficult, it must balance the environment’s needs with human’s 
desires. Conservation ought to preserve organisms but for political purposes it also ought 
to keep human beings happy. Smallpox is not eligible for conservation because it poses a 
significant threat to human beings.  
Biodiversity is a suitable conservation goal because even if it is not a reliable value 
compass it still meets the other conservation requirements very well. As a goal for 
conservation, biodiversity is pragmatic, operationalisable, amenable to legislation, and 
balances the environment’s needs with humans’ desires. It is pragmatic because it sets 
conservation the task of preserving the greatest biological diversity with limited resources. 
It is also operationalisable. In chapters four to six of this thesis I showed how it can be 
measured and calculated. It is amenable to legislation because its specific dimensions can 
be used to set targets and monitor progress in policy and there is general agreement on 
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what those dimensions are. It also strikes a balance between the needs of the environment 
and the desires of human beings. It can explain why humans care about certain unique 
species such as the tuatara but also explain why we need to preserve all the pieces of the 
environment which make the survival of the tuatara possible. Biodiversity is the top 
performer when it is compared with its modern competitors. In the following comparisons 
I presume that biodiversity is not a reliable value compass. However, I argue that 
biodiversity ought to be retained as a conservation goal because it is better at conservations 
requirements than the following competitors: biological integrity, biological value, and the 
specific dimensions of biodiversity. 
 Biodiversity is a more suitable goal for conservation than biological integrity 
because whilst biological integrity is an operationalisable goal, it is not pragmatic, 
amenable to legislation, and does not balance the environment’s needs with humans’ 
desires. In section 7.7.1 I argued that as a concept, biological integrity encapsulates both 
ecosystem health and native conditions, which according to Angermeier and Karr, 
represents an ecosystem that has evolved with minimal interference. It is operationalisable 
because Angermeier and Karr provide us with a large number of specific dimensions to 
measure and argue that we should evaluate an ecosystem’s health by comparing it to other 
similar ecosystems (Angermeier and Karr 1994, 692). It is not a pragmatic goal because 
achieving ecosystem health and native conditions, as Angermeier and Karr conceive of 
them, requires removing human beings. This is also not a pragmatic condition for 
conservation because of climate change (Takacs 1996, 56). We cannot return any 
ecosystem to how it was 100 years ago. It is not amenable to legislation because of the 
problems with native and wilderness concepts (Cronon 1995). It also does not balance 
humans’ desires with the environment’s needs. Instead, it ejects human beings for the sake 
of the environment. 
 Biodiversity is a more suitable goal for conservation than biological value because 
whilst biological value would balance the environment’s needs with human’s desires, it is 
not pragmatic, operationalisable, or amenable to legislation. As a goal for conservation, 
biological value would balance human desires with the environment’s needs because 
pluralistic biological value balances instrumental value with non-anthropocentric value. It 
is not a pragmatic goal because we cannot only preserve the valuable organisms. 
Biological organisms with instrumental value for human beings tend to be either key stone 
species, phylogenetically unique, members of the charismatic megafauna, or directly 
related to ecosystem services. Conservation requires that we preserve more than the 
valuable organisms. 
Organisms are a part of an interactive ecosystem and they require that ecosystem to 
flourish. It is not practical to only preserve the valuable organisms and ecosystems because 
there are numerous species which are not key stone species, phylogenetically unique, 
members of the charismatic megafauna, or directly related to ecosystem services. Those 
species make up ecosystems which are essential to the flourishing of the valuable 
organisms. It is not pragmatic to only preserve the tuatara and not the myriad of species 
which make up the ecosystem that the tuatara needs. Nor will the valuable organisms 
provide umbrella protection to other species. Selecting places for conservation based on 
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the presence of the charismatic megafauna has been shown to be less effective than 
selecting places at random (Sarkar 2005, 173).  
One response to this problem is to argue that the less valuable species are 
instrumentally valuable to the tuatara. This response leads to a lengthy regress of 
instrumental values for the sake of supporting other instrumental values. Tuataras are 
instrumental valuable because humans enjoy them.  Spiders are instrumentally valuable 
because Tuatara’s eat them. Flies are instrumentally valuable for spiders and excrement is 
instrumentally valuable for flies. This response still implies that biological value is not a 
pragmatic goal because extending out instrumental value along a regress makes almost all 
organisms instrumentally valuable and we cannot preserve every organism any more than 
we can only preserve the valuable organisms. As a goal of conservation biological value is 
also not operationalisable or amenable to legislation. It is an intangible property without a 
consensus on how to measure or calculate it. To make the issue more complex, some 
intrinsic theories of value seem to assign infinite value to certain organisms (Santana 2017, 
89). 
Biodiversity is a more suitable goal for conservation than its specific dimensions 
because whilst the specific dimensions of biodiversity are pragmatic goals for 
conservation, they are partially operationalisable, partially amenable to legislation, and do 
not balance the environment’s needs with human’s desires well. The specific dimensions 
of biodiversity are pragmatic goals because we can set a clear target of maximising species 
richness or protecting local phylogenetic diversity. However, they are only partially 
operationalisable and amenable to legislation. In chapter six I argued that there was not a 
suitable replacement for biodiversity because only a small number of dimensions are 
operationalisable and Santana has already argued that those do not track biological value 
well. Without operationalisability we cannot put targets or monitoring into policy so the 
specific dimensions of biodiversity are not amenable to legislation. They also do not 
balance the environment’s needs with human’s desires well. In chapter two I argued that as 
a concept biodiversity reduces misdirection because it forces people to engage with the 
multidimensional nature of the environment. Engaging with specific dimensions imperils 
the environment for the sake of human beings. Buckets of beetles are a wonderful source 
of species richness but we should conserve more than just beetles. 
In this subsection I argued that one good reason to retain biodiversity as the goal of 
conservation is that even if it is not a reliable value compass, it still outperforms its 
competitors at the other demands of conservation. I motivated this argument with some 
brief history of science and outlined four additional requirements for a conservation goal. 
Conservation goals must be: pragmatic, operationalisable, amenable to legislation, and 
balance the environment’s needs with humans’ desires. I argued that biodiversity meets 
these goals well compared with its competitors: biological integrity, biological value, and 
the specific dimensions of biodiversity. In all three cases I argued that biodiversity is a 
better goal for conservation because even if it did not track biological value well, it still 
satisfies more of conservations’ requirements than its competitors. In the next subsection I 
will argue that there is another reason to retain biodiversity as a conservation goal if it is 
not an effective value compass. Biodiversity still tracks losses of biological value. 
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8.4.2 Biodiversity Tracks Reductions of Biological Value  
In this subsection I will assume that biodiversity is not a reliable value compass but argue 
that we ought to retain it as a goal for conservation because it is still a useful surrogate for 
reductions in biological value. That is, maximising biodiversity will not always maximise 
biological value but mitigating biodiversity loss will mitigate loss of biological value. I 
argue that biodiversity is therefore a useful goal because global biodiversity is rapidly 
diminishing (Sepowski 2017, 26).  
Santana, Angermeier, Karr all argue that biodiversity does not predict biological 
value well but they are focusing on ways in which maximising aspects of biodiversity does 
not maximise biological value. Simply increasing the species richness, phylogenetic 
diversity, or phenotypic diversity of an ecosystem does not always increase its biological 
value because theories of value are diverse. Introducing new species can endanger current 
species and some people value ecosystems in a native state (Santana 2014, 769; 
Angermeier 1994, 600). The eliminativist point is correct, maximising biodiversity does 
not maximise biological value. For example, the value of homeowners’ gardens is 
decreased when weeds become rampant. However, conservationists can have biodiversity 
as a goal without wishing to maximise it (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 988). Even if 
maximising biodiversity does not maximise biological value, mitigating biodiversity loss 
will mitigate the loss of biological value. We cannot significantly reduce the species 
richness, phylogenetic diversity, or phenetic diversity of an ecosystem without also 
decreasing its biological value. 
 The suitability of biodiversity as a goal for conservation depends on whether 
conservation is focused on preserving or increasing biodiversity. Bearing in mind that I am 
only assuming that biodiversity does not reliably track biological value for this section, 
biodiversity is a more suitable goal for preservation then restoration. Conserving 
biodiversity requires cataloguing what still exists and protecting as much of it as possible. 
Increasing biodiversity in instances such as the predator free islands of New Zealand 
requires protecting certain species and eradicating the local population of others. 
Biodiversity is therefore a very important goal for conservation because practically all 
conservation performs critical triage (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 178). The planet is in a 
sixth major extinction event (Sepowski 2017, 35). Around 90% of species are still 
undocumented so many of these will go extinct without being discovered (Mora et al. 
2011, 2). The once worst case scenario for climate change of two degree increase is now 
our best case scenario (IPCC 2014, 10). By 2025 we expect two thirds of the world to face 
freshwater scarcity because of the depletion of ancient aquifers of water and by 2050 we 
expect there to be more plastic than fish in the oceans (Sarkar 2012, 158; Ellen MacArthur 
Foundation 2016, 7). We are also haemorrhaging biological value because biodiversity 
loss is creating an ecosystem services debt (Isbell et al. 2015, 119). Biodiversity is an 
important goal for conservation because it monitors biodiversity loss and by proxy, the 
reduction in biological value.  
 Biodiversity is an effective tool for tracking a loss of value even if maximising 
biodiversity will not maximise biological value. In ‘Mammal diversity will take millions 
of years to recover from the current biodiversity crisis’ Davis, Faurby, and Svenning 
(2018) apply a phylogenetic analysis to modern rates of extinction. They find that 
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extinction rates in mammals are disproportionately high compared to the number of 
species which have gone extinct (Davis, Faurby, and Svenning 2018, 11262). The 
dominance of human populations makes us a competitive force with the survival of other 
mammals with the net effect that we have heavily pruned the mammalian branch of the 
tree of life. They conclude that if our current rate of mammalian extinctions continues for 
50 years then it would take five to seven million years to recover the mammalian 
phylogenetic diversity which has been lost (Davis, Faurby, and Svenning 2018, 11265). 
The work here does not presume that biodiversity is the only indicator of biological value, 
but it does use one important dimension of biodiversity to track a loss of biological value 
caused by the sixth extinction event. There is more to biological value than phylogenetic 
diversity so maximising feature diversity will not maximise biological value. However, 
this phylogenetic analysis tracks the loss of biological value by emphasizing how many of 
the extinctions are borne by a major branch of the tree of life. 
 In this section I assumed that biodiversity does not reliably track biological value 
to argue that premise five of the value compass case for elimination is false. Premise five 
claims that “if the goal of conservation does not reliably track biological value then it 
ought to be eliminated” so I assumed the antecedent and argued that even if biodiversity 
was a poor value compass, there are two good reasons to retain it as a goal for 
conservation. In section 8.4.1 I argued that problematic theories are retained if they 
outperform their competitors. I then argued that as a goal for conservation, biodiversity 
meets the diverse requirements better than biological integrity, biological value, and the 
specific dimensions of biodiversity. In section 8.4.2 I argued that biodiversity is a useful 
tool for tracking the loss of biological value even if it is not a useful tool for maximising 
biological value. If biodiversity does not track biological value well then it is better suited 
for preservation rather than restoration. These arguments imply that premise five of the 
value compass case for elimination is false. It is not the case that conservation goals ought 
to be eliminated if they fail to reliably track biological value. In the next section I will 
argue that the value compass case is faulty because it conflates biological value with 
conservation normativity. 
8.5 The value compass case is unsuccessful because it conflates 
biological value with normativity 
In this section I will argue that the value compass case for elimination is unsuccessful 
because it conflates biological value with normativity. That is, eliminativists treat 
biological value as predictive tracker for ‘what conservationists ought to do’ which I will 
call ‘conservation normativity’. I will argue that these two features come apart in 
important ways. Whilst limited resources imply that we ought to preserve the most 
valuable biological elements, conservation oughts’ are generated for many reasons other 
than value. This conclusion will strengthen the position of biodiversity as a goal for 
conservation because it is a guide to conservation normativity beyond its ability to act as a 
compass for pluralistic biological value. In section 8.5.1 I argue that biological value is a 
poor guide to conservation normativity before arguing in section 8.5.2 that the value 
compass case overlooks this distinction. In section 8.5.3 I argue that this conflation is also 
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present in both the conceptual case and the empirical case for biodiversity eliminativism. I 
conclude that the value compass case for biodiversity’s elimination is unsuccessful.  
 
8.5.1 The value compass case overlooks the distinction between value 
and normativity. 
In this subsection I will argue that the value compass case for biodiversity’s elimination 
conflates biological value with conservation normativity. One reason for this argument’s 
persuasiveness is that it analyses biodiversity in terms of its relationship with biological 
value but criticises it in terms of its relationship with conservation normativity. To 
motivate the conflation, I begin by discussing the intuition that value tracks normativity; 
the value of an act or an object has a close relationship with what we ought to do. I then 
argue that biological value does not track conservation normativity well. I outline 
examples of valuable biological organisms which ought not to be preserved and 
conservation oughts which are not the product of biological value. I use these examples to 
argue that the value compass case is conflating biological value with conservation 
normativity.  
 In the literature conservation normativity and biological value are often discussed 
interchangeably. In chapter seven I discussed several appeals to biological value by 
biodiversity eliminativists. They presume that the role of a conservation goal is to 
recommend the most valuable biological elements for conservation. Part III of The 
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Biodiversity (2017) is titled ‘Why protect 
biodiversity?’. It contains five chapters by McShane, Callicott, Heinzerling, Odenbaugh, 
and Minteer, all of which are on the relationship between biodiversity and biological 
value.  
Other authors also approach the analysis of biological value with a similar goal. 
Biological value is a guide to what we ought to conserve.  
 
Here I argue that wild nature has intrinsic value, which gives rise to obligations both to preserve it 
and to restore it. (Elliot 1992, 138) 
 
Resource economists have long been aware of the significance of the opportunity to delay an 
irreversible investment decision. In the 1970s Arrow and Fisher (1974) introduced the term 'quasi-
option value' to represent the additional value obtained when the option to delay was fully 
integrated into the decision process. (Forsyth 2000, 413) 
 
It is only the evolution of a universal environmental system that could save the environmental 
movement from gradual extinction. (Balasubramaniam 1994, 1329) 
 
Unity, communality, ethicality, and equality are the values that are constructed as the basis for 
acceptable environmental actions, and are partly written and expressed openly, and partly present as 
hidden meanings in the texts. (Onkila 2009, 295) 
 




Many reasons for conservation have little to do with biodiversity as we have defined it. Forests may 
be valued as homes to particularly charismatic or culturally important plants and animals, or as a 
source of key natural resources. (Burch-Brown and Archer 2017, 988)  
 
Elliot justifies conservation by appealing to intrinsic value and Forsyth considers the 
impacts of delaying environmental action on options value. Balasubramaniam argues that a 
universal value system is needed for conservation to survive whilst Onkila identifies four 
values as the justification for conservation. Maguire and Justus criticise intrinsic value for 
failing to guide conservation normativity, and Burch-Brown and Archer note that 
conservation is a product of what human beings value in the environment. We presume 
that biological value is a reliable guide to conservation normativity because the 
justification is intuitive. Conservation has limited resources so the decisions require triage 
(Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 178). It cannot preserve everything so it should prioritise 
the most valuable organisms. The argument is persuasive but I will argue that biological 
value and conservation normativity come apart in important ways. 
 Biological value does not reliably track conservation normativity because they are 
functions on significantly different sets. Biological value is the function of a pluralistic set 
of conflicting valuations: the instrumental value which the environment provides humans, 
the non-anthropocentric value of unique species, and the intrinsic value of sentient species. 
The value of an organism or an ecosystem is a function of the different dimensions of 
value. Conservation normativity is the function of multiple diverse goals: environmental 
needs, option value, biological value, biodiversity, triage constraints, and human interests. 
What conservationists ought to do is a function of conflicting goals and biological value 
only represents one of those goals. So the oughts’ of conservation and biological value 
come apart in important ways. 
 There are examples of biological value which conservation ought not to preserve 
because there are many different types of biological value. Many species which pose a 
threat to the health of human beings such as smallpox or house mould are not priorities for 
conservation. Both bear some form of non-anthropocentric value or instrumental value for 
people who wish to study them. Imported species which become pests are like-wise a low 
priority for conservation. Rabbits, weasels, stoats, and gorse add phylogenetic diversity, 
species richness, and bear non-anthropocentric value. They also increase instrumental 
value for non-human organisms because they thrive so well in their new ecosystems. The 
New Zealand ecosystem evolved as a reasonably safe environment for avian species so it 
contains a wealth of instrumental value for carnivorous land predators. Those land 
predators have a great deal of their interests met by New Zealand’s ecosystem. In extreme 
cases conservation cannot remove pest species because humans value them so highly. Cats 
and dogs are excellent at catching avian species but they are so instrumentally valuable to 
New Zealanders that conservation ought not to get rid of them. Lastly, the triage 
constraints of conservation mean that sometimes valuable species are passed over for 
conservation priority (Durant et al. 2014, 116). These are some of the possible reasons for 
conservationists not to preserve a valuable species. Biological value comes apart from 
conservation normativity. 
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 There are also examples of conservation normativity without biological value. 
These are actions which conservationists ought to undertake that preserve no (or marginal 
amounts) of biological value. This occurs when we need to protect functioning 
ecosystems. Individual species of flora and insects are essential to maintaining nutrient 
cycling in the soil which in turn supports the life of the ecosystem. They aren’t highly 
valuable because they are often interchangeable. Ecosystems require a certain number of 
species of flora and insects performing crucial biological functions to support life, they 
rarely require specific species. This can be seen in recent work on the role of non-native 
organisms in local biodiversity. Philosophers of biology have begun to argue that the 
introduction of non-native species often enhances biodiversity (Schlaepfer, Pascal, and 
Davis 2011; Schlaepfer 2018). The exception is keystone species which are essential to the 
current state of an ecosystem but these are rare (Takacs 1996, 56). To use the well-worn 
analogy, conservation is about preventing the popping of rivets along an air plane wing 
(Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981).  A few rivets are not a problem but many rivets are a problem 
as we go further and further down a slippery slope. That is precisely the point; one rivet is 
not valuable but we still ought to protect rivets because we need to protect a functioning 
wing. Grazers require grass to eat but that doesn’t make a blade of grass valuable because 
grass is plentiful and interchangeable. However, if you plan to keep grazers then you ought 
to have grass. 
 Another important source of conservation normativity without biological value is 
collective action problems. A collective action problem occurs when the actions of a single 
agent have no negative outcomes, unless multiple other people are all performing the same 
action (Nefsky 2011, 364). The standard example from the literature is overgrazing on 
common fields (Hardin 1968, 1244). The utility increase of a herdsman adding one more 
sheep to the flock will not exhaust the common grazing area, unless all the other herdsman 
are reasoning the same way. Collective action problems also apply to: pollution, climate 
change, collapse of fisheries, and the depletion of ancient aquifers. Conservation requires 
that we emit less carbon and consume less water but not because small amounts of those 
resources are valuable. By definition, collective harm problems apply to harmless actions 
which are only harmful if multiple people are engaged in them (Kagan 2011, 108). One 
agent cannot consume enough water or fish in their entire lifetime to have a negative 
environmental impact. The negative environmental impact is a produce of multiple agents 
performing harmless tasks.  
 One more example of this will be useful. Imagine that Alice is faced with the 
decision to clear some trees to build a new house. The trees are young, not endangered and 
do not house unique species. Alice’s decision to clear some trees to build a house does not 
lower biological value but we still ought to be careful of clearing trees to build new houses 
because so many other people reason the same way. In fact work on island biogeography 
indicates that species richness drops as the islands which contain that richness get smaller 
and further away from the mainland (Macarthur and Wilson 1967, 22). Alice’s new house 
is part of multiple new developments which convert green areas to a series of isolated 
islands. Collectively, urban development’s decrease species richness by fragmenting 
habitats (Swenson and Franklin 2000, 723). Crucially, the conservational ought is 
generated by a collective action problem rather than a reduction of biological value. 
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Individually, no house reduces biological value. Collective action problems are an 
important example of the way that biological value and conservation normativity come 
apart because so much of conservation is a collective action problem. 
 One possible objection to my examples is that I have not taken full advantage of 
the available framework for biological value. If grazers need grass then it has instrumental 
value for them. If we ought to conserve water and fish then surely they must be valuable. 
This objection does not hold. Grass has negligible instrumental value to grazers because it 
is plentiful and interchangeable; grazers can access it easily and any grass will do. Using 
an object to some end does construe instrumental value but the amount of value is 
proportionate the accessibility and interchangeability of the resource. Tissues have little 
instrumental value to a healthy person, more value to a person with a running nose, and 
high value to a person with a running nose who is about to run out of tissues. Grass to 
grazers also bears little instrumental value because it is interchangeable. Goats, for 
example, will eat just about anything.  
Secondly, conservation normativity cannot confer value on pain of circularity. If 
we preserve things because they are valuable and things are valuable because we preserve 
them then biological value cannot advise conservation decisions. Likewise we must be 
careful of ad hoc applications of value to justify conservation normativity. Declaring that 
Alice should not build her house because other people find existence value in the trees, 
addresses the thought experiment, but weakens the usefulness of biological value as a goal 
for conservation. These are examples of biological value coming apart from conservation 
normativity in important ways. In the next subsection I will outline how this distinction 
affects the value compass case for biodiversity’s elimination. 
 
8.5.2 The value compass case conflates biological value with 
conservation normativity 
In this subsection I will argue that the value compass case fails to distinguish biological 
value from conservation normativity. These two are conflated by the value compass case 
because it presumes that conservation goals ought to track biological value when they 
ought to track conservation normativity. Consider a version of the argument in which 
‘biological value’ is replaced with ‘conservation normativity’.  
 
The Value Compass Case for Biodiversity Eliminativism 
1) Conservation ought to preserve [conservation normativity]. 
2) The goal of conservation ought to reliably track [conservation normativity]. 
3) Biodiversity is the goal of conservation. 
4) Biodiversity does not reliably track [conservation normativity]. 
5) If the goal of conservation does not reliably track [conservation normativity] then it 
ought to be eliminated. 
6) Therefore: Biodiversity ought to be eliminated as the goal of conservation.  
 
With the exception of premise three, this substitution drastically changes the truth value of 
the premises. Premise one is now redundant because conservation ought to preserve what 
it ought to preserve. Premises two and five are now true because conservation goals should 
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be a prescriptive guide to action. Importantly, premise four is now false. In section 8.3 I 
argued that there are very good reasons why biodiversity cannot be a reliable value 
compass, however, biodiversity is an excellent guide to conservation normativity. 
The value compass case is significantly weaker when it is focused on conservation 
normativity because premise four is now false. Biodiversity is an excellent guide to 
conservation normativity. What conservationists ought to do is a function on a complex 
and often conflicting set of goals. Environmental needs conflict with human interests. One 
of the causes of harmful algal blooms is overfishing (Jackson et al. 2001, 631). The ocean 
needs to be fished less but the billions of human beings also need a food. Option value 
theory argues that we should preserve as much diversity as possible as hedge bet against 
future interests but that conflicts with the interests of current human populations. 
Biological value identifies the most valuable organisms or ecosystems but it also comes 
apart from the goals of conservation in important ways. Conservation normativity is 
therefore a complicated function which needs a reliable guide. 
Biodiversity is an excellent guide to conservation normativity because it strikes a 
middle ground between acts which benefit the environment and those which satisfy the 
desires of human beings. This makes biodiversity an excellent tool for conservation 
because whilst human beings benefit enormously from sustainable flourishing ecosystems, 
it can be difficult to explain why a human interest such as urban development is not as 
important as preventing steady habitat fragmentation. Biodiversity explains why we need 
to preserve the small biological elements of an ecosystem; it maintains high species 
richness and maximises diversity. It explains why human beings take such an interest in 
unique species such as the red kangaroo (Macropus rufus) or the velvet worm genus 
Peripatus; they are phylogenetically unique. It explains why organisms are better off in 
full ecosystems than in controlled enclosures; it increases functional diversity. It permits 
human beings to manipulate the environment; all species affect their environment but 
because we are such a successful species, we need to be careful about permanently 
damaging the environment. Biodiversity helps to preserve biological value and option 
value because it tracks losses of both. Biodiversity can advise triage decisions by 
prioritising species richness or phylogenetic uniqueness depending on whether the 
ecosystem is a biodiversity hot spot or has a phylogenetic diversity score 
disproportionately large to its species richness. It can also explain why we ought to care 
about more than the charismatic megafauna; preserving the megafauna requires preserving 
the biodiversity around it. Biodiversity is a successful conservation goal because it can 
balance so many other goals of conservation. For this reason, biodiversity is a reliable 
tracker of conservation normativity and the reinterpreted value compass case for its 
elimination is very weak.  
In this subsection I argued that the value compass case for biodiversity’s 
elimination conflates biological value with conservation normativity. I outlined intuitions 
about correlations between the value of organisms and what conservation ought to 
conserve. Then I argued that biological value does not correlate highly with conservation 
normativity. I demonstrated that substituting ‘conservation normativity’ for ‘biological 
value’ in the value compass case for elimination significantly weakened the argument. 
Biodiversity is not a reliable compass for pluralistic value because no conservation goal is, 
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but it is an excellent guide to conservation normativity. In the next subsection I will argue 
that the conflation of value and normativity in the value compass case is also present in the 
conceptual and empirical cases for biodiversity’s elimination. 
 
8.5.3 The conflation of value and normativity also drives the conceptual 
case and the empirical case for eliminativism 
In this subsection I will argue that the conflation between biological value and 
conservation normativity which is present in the value compass case for elimination is also 
present in the conceptual and empirical cases. In the conceptual case, I argue that concerns 
about value which are used against specific dimensions of biodiversity and precision in the 
surrogacy chain are actually concerns about conservation normativity. In the empirical 
case, I argue that premise five of the empirical poor fit argument which attacks within-
surrogate operationalisability is actually a concern about conservation normativity. 
Understanding these arguments as concerns about conservation normativity further 
weakens the conceptual and empirical case for biodiversity’s elimination. 
 In the conceptual case for biodiversity eliminativism Santana disqualifies several 
candidates for a meaning of ‘biodiversity’ based on value focused counterexamples. 
 
“Nor does preserving richness reliably preserve biological value. Because richness is nothing more 
than a count of the number of species in an area, value on the richness scale increases with 
speciation and decreases with extinction but this misrepresents common values.” (Santana 2014, 
769) 
 
“But the relative abundance of species also fails to represent biological value well.” (Santana 2014, 
770) 
 
“Diversity, on this account, is important because it enables evolution, making genetic diversity a 
key component of biodiversity. This approach is present in many writings on biodiversity (e.g. 
Frankel and Soule´ 1981), but it requires the questionable assumption that evolution is in itself 
valuable.” (Santana 2014, 771) 
 
“Nor does ecological diversity function as a reliable means to assess the biological value of an 
area.” (Santana 2014, 772) 
 
“One final option considers the diversity of biological processes and services such as 
biogeochemical cycles. Biological processes are indubitably often valuable, but I fail to see how 
they can be directly incorporated into a concept of biological diversity.” (Santana 2014, 772) 
 
Santana presents these as counterexamples. He argues that species richness can be high 
whilst biological value is low, that abundance tells us little about value, and that diversity 
can only track value if evolution is inherently valuable. He also argues that ecological 
diversity does not correlate with biological value, and that functional diversity is not 
operationalisable. But these counterexamples conflate biological value with conservation 
normativity. They look like criticisms of the relationship between biodiversity and 
biological value because Santana is arguing that even if it increases biodiversity, smallpox 
is not a valuable organism. However, these examples are actually criticisms of the 
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relationship between biodiversity and conservation normativity because they falsely 
suggest that preserving biodiversity would prescribe conserving smallpox.  
 Biodiversity cannot guide conservationists to preserve smallpox because the 
marginal increase in species richness, feature diversity, and functionality could never 
outweigh the impact on the other goals of conservation. Preserving smallpox restricts our 
option value because an important option for future generations is to live in a world 
without smallpox. In the same vein it decreases instrumental value because human beings 
hold the world in higher value when there are as few human threatening diseases as 
possible. One more species with some unique adaptations is not a justifiable reason for 
preservation when it poses such a risk to the flourishing of human beings. Understood as a 
critique of conservation normativity rather the biological value the extinction of smallpox 
is an unconvincing example because high biodiversity cannot justify its preservation.  
 Also in the conceptual case, Santana argued that including biodiversity in the 
surrogacy chain makes the conservation process more prone to error. A key assumption in 
this argument was that the role of a conservation goal was to track biological value. 
However, I have argued in this section that conservation normativity does not always 
correlate highly with biological value. Replacing biological value with conservation 
normativity gives the following surrogacy chain. 
 
Estimator Surrogate  True Surrogate  Biodiversity  Conservation Normativity 
 
This replacement weakens Santana’s argument because, as I argued in section 8.3, no 
conservation goal is a reliable guide to biological value and I argued in section 8.5 that 
biodiversity is an excellent guide to conservation normativity. Biodiversity is not a reliable 
guide to pluralistic biological value but it is very good at striking a balance between the 
needs of the environment and the desires of human beings. On this interpretation, 
including it in the surrogacy chain increases precision along the chain. 
 In the empirical case for biodiversity’s elimination, Santana criticised the 
operationalisability of the specific dimensions of biodiversity because they failed to 
accurately predict biological value. Premise five of the empirical poor fit argument states 
that “individual dimensions of biodiversity are either: not operationalisable, do not 
accurately track biodiversity, or do not accurately track biological value”. Understanding 
these as critiques of conservation normativity instead of biological value weakens the 
empirical poor fit argument further. Some specific dimensions of biodiversity do struggle 
as reliable value compasses because biodiversity is not always commensurable with 
pluralistic biological value. However, specific dimensions of biodiversity are useful guides 
to conservation normativity. It is just a matter of prioritising the right set of dimensions to 
the right context. New Zealand requires more attention to phylogenetic diversity than 
species richness because many of our species evolved without land predators. Biodiversity 
hot spots require a focus on species richness because 34 biodiversity hotspots in the world 
shelter at least 50% of vascular plant species and 42% of terrestrial vertebrates (Burch-
Brown and Archer 2017, 992). The reason why a multidimensional tool like biodiversity is 
so useful for complicated situations is that the performance of its dimensions is context 
dependant. 
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In this subsection I argued that the conceptual and empirical case for elimination 
make the same conflation as the value compass case. At several stages, biodiversity 
eliminativists criticise biodiversity or its specific dimensions because it is not a reliable 
value compass. These arguments are discussed in terms of the relationship between 
biodiversity and biological value but they are actually critiques of the relationship between 
biodiversity and conservational normativity. The precision of the surrogacy chain and the 
within-surrogate operationalisability of biodiversity’s dimensions are concerns about the 
ability of biodiversity to prescribe the actions of conservationists and not its ability to track 
biological value. This error further weakens both the conceptual and the empirical case 




In this chapter I argued that the value compass case for biodiversity eliminativism is 
unsuccessful. In section 8.2 I reintroduced the value compass case for eliminating 
biodiversity with an edit based on the material from chapter seven. In that chapter I argued 
that the kind of biological value which they appeal to in their examples is a pluralistic 
system. The value compass case rests upon two major claims: that biodiversity is not a 
reliable value compass and that the conservation goals should be evaluated by how well 
they track pluralistic biological value. I challenged both of these claims. I accepted the 
truth of premises four and three. Biodiversity is the current goal of conservation and it is 
not reliable compass for pluralistic biological value. In section 8.3 I argued that premises 
one and two were false. Premise one assumed that conservation ought to preserve 
pluralistic biological value and to serve this purpose premise two stated that the goal of 
conservation ought to reliably track that value. I argued that these premises were false 
because there are a number of issues with setting the tracking of pluralistic biological 
value as the minimum standard for a conservation goal. I argued that it was too punishing 
a standard, that eliminativists have not explained why it should be the standard, and that 
the standard was so punishing that it was self-eliminating. Against premise five, I argued 
that a conservation goal which is not a reliable value compass could still be retained for 
other reasons. Assuming that it does not reliably track biological value, biodiversity is still 
the best available conservation goal and it is important because it tracks losses of 
biological value. 
 In section 8.6 I sought to identify an error in the value compass case to explain its 
persuasiveness. I argued that eliminativists treat biological value as a compass for 
conservation normativity; the valuable elements of biology are the ones which 
conservation ought to preserve. I argued that this was a mistake because conservation’s 
oughts’ are generated for diverse reasons. It is the case that given the resource constraints 
of conservation we ought to preserve the valuable biological elements but some should be 
preserved for different reasons even if they are not valuable. I then argued that this mistake 
occurs throughout the arguments for biodiversity’s elimination. The motivating examples 
and the reasoning in the conceptual, empirical, and value compass case for biodiversity’s 
elimination misunderstand the relationship between biodiversity and biological value. The 
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value compass case for biodiversity’s elimination is unsuccessful for this reason and 
because premises one, two, and five are false. Likewise, in chapter three I argued that the 
conceptual case for biodiversity’s elimination is unsuccessful and in chapter six I argued 
that the empirical case for biodiversity’s elimination is unsuccessful. Biodiversity is a good 






9.1 Project Conclusions  
Biodiversity is a good fit for its role in conservation biology. As a goal for conservation, 
the biodiversity concept has adapted over time to incorporate multiple distinct dimensions 
of biology. Eliminativists argue that the concept is now too bloated to be a useful goal for 
conservation. In this project I have collected the arguments of Santana, Angermeier, and 
Karr and categorised them as either a conceptual, empirical, or value compass case for 
biodiversity’s elimination. I have argued that biodiversity survives the arguments for its 
elimination. It is a complicated multi-dimensional concept but like health and poverty, it is 
an important one which requires monitoring. It is difficult to operationalise, but using the 
surrogacy strategy and transforming data sets for cross comparison informs the decisions 
of conservation. It has a complicated relationship with biological value but it is an 
excellent guide to conservation normativity. 
 In the conceptual case for elimination Angermeier and Karr argued that 
biodiversity misleads conservation. Santana argued that ‘biodiversity’ has no clear 
meaning and unnecessarily complicates the surrogacy strategy. In response, I developed an 
homeostatic property cluster which avoided eliminativists’ criticisms. It allows for a 
general meaning of ‘biodiversity’ which is also informative and its multi-dimensional 
nature reduces misdirection in conservation. In the empirical case for elimination Santana 
argued that biodiversity is not operationalisable. In response, I defended the surrogacy 
strategy against the problems of incommensurability and multiple surrogates. I argued that 
the empirical case misrepresents the state of biodiversity measurement. I then outlined the 
methodological detail of five true surrogates for biodiversity. I used that detail to argue 
that the expanding multiplicity of biodiversity measures is overblown and that the 
empirical case for elimination is unsuccessful. By Santana’s own standards, the specific 
dimensions of biodiversity are not a suitable empirical replacement for biodiversity. 
 In the value compass case for elimination Santana, Angermeier, and Karr argued 
that biodiversity is a poor guide to conservation because it is a poor guide to biological 
value. In response I first discussed what type of biological value eliminativists are 
appealing to. In chapter seven I argued that eliminativists are appealing to a pluralistic 
system of biological value. This system includes disparate theories of biological value 
such as instrumental, intrinsic, and a range of non-anthropocentric views. I formally 
applied this standard to the value compass case for biodiversity’s elimination and in 
chapter eight I argued that it was unsuccessful for three reasons.  
Firstly, there are problems with using pluralistic value as a minimum standard for a 
conservation goal. It is too punishing, eliminativists have not explained why biodiversity 
ought to track it, and it is a self-eliminating goal. Secondly, there are good reasons to 
retain biodiversity as a conservation goal even if it is not a reliable value compass. It is a 
better conservation goal than its competitors and biodiversity is still necessary for 
biological value. Thirdly, the value compass case for elimination conflates biological value 
with conservation normativity. These two concepts are distinct from one another but 
because eliminativists use biological value as a proxy for conservation normativity, they 
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overlook how successful biodiversity is as a direct guide to what we ought to preserve. 
This error is also present in the conceptual and empirical arguments of eliminativists. 
Since biodiversity survives all three cases for its elimination, we have excellent reasons to 
retain it as the goal of conservation. 
 
9.2 Open Questions 
In this section I will briefly discuss open directions for research suggested by this project.  
I will focus on three outstanding issues: the role of abundance in species diversity, 
operationalising functional diversity, and the relationship between biological value and 
conservation normativity.  
 
9.2.1 Abundance and Diversity 
Abundance has a complicated relationship with biodiversity. In chapters two and three I 
discussed the motivations for incorporating it as a dimension of biodiversity. Systems are 
more diverse when the groups within them have even representation. A board of directors 
is more diverse when it has equal representation of gender and race. An ecosystem is more 
biodiverse when the organisms within it are evenly represented (Maurer and McGill 2011, 
56). In chapter five I discussed the problems with operationalising species diversity. 
Diversity is the combination of richness and evenness. Even representation of groups is 
captured by diversity measures but it is not the kind of abundance which is good for an 
ecosystem (Santana 2014, 770). Ecosystems require more food sources than organisms 
which consume them and dominant species are only a problem once their abundance has 
significant impact on the ecosystem. 
 One direction for research would be to make abundance a dimension of ecosystem 
health instead of a dimension of biodiversity. Biodiversity can focus on metrics of richness 
for species and phylogenetic diversity. Ecosystem health can focus on abundance counts 
for endangered species and to monitor sudden population drops. This shift would not 
impact the motivating reason for the preference of calculations of species diversity over 
species richness. At times, species richness can seem like a misleading measure because 
species may be close to extinction without affecting counts of species richness (Santana 
2014, 769). This is a good objection but it is best understood as a concern about accuracy 
over time. Species richness is still informative because a species with a population of one 
is typically due for extinction. Species richness will drop but it will only do it once the 
species is extinct rather than doomed to extinction. In this sense, measures of richness are 
not misleading so much as lagging behind the state of an ecosystem. Moving abundance to 
health addresses this because abundance helps to detect how well an ecosystem is 
performing and whether it is in a steady decline. It also separates abundance from richness 
in an important way because it focuses on individual species and tasks us with considering 
what kind of evenness is beneficial for an ecosystem. The answer isn’t equal 
representation for all species but it is an interesting question. 
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9.2.2 A Future for Functional Diversity 
Calculations of functional diversity are currently problematic for two reasons: they aren’t 
functional enough and they fall foul of the trait dilemma. The values don’t capture the 
high-level functional phenomena which are used to motivate the importance of functional 
diversity.  The tiger moth can jam bat sonar (Corcoran, Barber, and Connor 2009, 327). 
However, including it an ecosystem will not raise the functional diversity value any more 
than a similar moth without sonar jamming functionality. This is because ‘functional trait’ 
is defined so generally that it is almost synonymous with phenotypic trait. Calculations of 
functional diversity cannot weight high-level functional phenomena because their 
conception of functional trait is too general. They also struggle to approximate the 
functional diversity of an ecosystem because of the trait dilemma. Shared functional traits 
are uninformative but informative functional traits are not widely shared. 
 A direction for research on functional diversity would be to re-evaluate how we 
approach the issue of measuring functional diversity. Interaction is an extrinsic property 
between multiple organisms but we have been calculating it in terms of the intrinsic 
properties of individual organisms. Intrinsic properties have been used as a proxy for 
functional diversity because all properties are also causes of effects. Height can be 
understood as a functional trait because it impacts the fitness of an organism. Because the 
fitness of an organism impacts the flourishing of other organism’s height is functional in 
the sense that, besides being an intrinsic property, it is a part of causal relation with other 
organisms. But, we could shift the focus towards conversions between intrinsic properties. 
Conversions are a common property of functions. In logic a function converts one value to 
another value. In philosophy of mind, functionalists argue that our mental states are the 
causal relationships between input, output, and other mental states (Mandik 2014, 109). 
Functional diversity could be analysed in terms of biological conversions. Research could 
focus on the level of nutrient cycling, the conversion rates of gases, daily consumption of 
prey, annual leaf fall, measures of species density. Matrices could be developed for 
common interactions such as the above. Organisms with high-level functional interactions 
such as the tiger moth could be prioritised as key stone functional organisms. Functional 
diversity is a fascinating dimension of biodiversity and it deserves our attention. 
 
9.2.3 The Relationship between Biological Value and Biodiversity 
The relationship between biodiversity and biological value is still unclear. Eliminativists 
use a number of examples in which biodiversity functions as a poor guide to biological 
value. I have argued in chapter eight that biodiversity should be understood as a guide to 
conservation normativity rather than to biological value. As a guide to pluralistic 
biological value, biodiversity is ineffective. This is however, a feature of the complexity of 
pluralistic biological value rather than a serious shortcoming of biodiversity. My 
arguments from chapter eight are not intended to suggest that biodiversity has no 
relationship with biological value. Rather, the relationship is unclear because there is little 
consensus about the nature of biological value and evidence is difficult to come across 
which does not rely heavily on personal intuition. This leaves open the question of what 
the relationship is between biodiversity and biological value and more importantly, how 
preserving biodiversity might preserve biological value. 
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 One approach to this problem would be to focus on the relationship between 
biodiversity and specific theories of biological value. One issue with the value compass 
case for biodiversity’s elimination is that the eliminativists cast a very wide net over value 
theories. Because they appealed to multiple types of theory, it was implausible to expect a 
conservation goal to track them all. This does not imply that biodiversity cannot reliably 
track certain kinds of value such as instrumental value. Instrumental value is the value of 
means to an end so we can infer that organisms derive instrumental value from the 
biological elements which they rely on (Rolston 1992, 253). Then biodiversity would 
reliably track instrumental value because it requires interactions and a more diverse 
ecosystem has more interactions. There is already important work on the link between 
biodiversity and specific theories of biological value. Maclaurin and Sterelny argue that 
biodiversity protects our option value theory which is the value of having as many options 
with the environment as possible in the future (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 154). More 
recently, Faith has continued to argue that there is a strong link between biodiversity and 
the availability of ecosystem services (Faith et al. 2017, 717). These are important results 
because more work is required on the subject of how well we can preserve biological value 
by preserving biodiversity. 
 
9.3 Final Remarks 
Criticism is essential to the empirical reputation of science. It makes theories stronger and 
explains when a theory should be eliminated. Biodiversity eliminativists have presented 
serious conceptual, empirical, and value tracking criticisms but biodiversity has weathered 
them. It is true that biodiversity has adapted multiple times to new empirical observations. 
It is also true that biodiversity has become a complex multi-dimensional concept with a 
variety of measurement strategies and a complicated relationship with biological value. 
But it is that inherent conceptual complexity and empirical flexibility which makes it such 
a successful guide to conservation normativity. Biodiversity is an excellent fit for its role 
because of the subject matter of the biological sciences. Biology is a science of continuous 
properties and vague boundaries. It is successful because it embraces complexity. We 
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